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This dissertation explores Asian discourses produced by Japanese social scientists 
during the wartime period. The intellectual history of the Japanese empire has long 
been conceived of as a fantasy to be forgotten rather than as an object to be studied. 
However, this study presents a new thesis: that Japanese intellectuals, social scientists 
in particular, committed themselves to the Japanese empire in a highly rational and 
scientific manner, rather than turning to the traditional and particularistic notion of 
Asia. Contending that beginning in the early 1930s, Japanese social scientists began 
searching for a new regional order to replace the League of Nations system, this study 
shows that the concept of Asia emerged as the main subject of social scientific studies 
in Japan. This dissertation investigates how the notion of a regional system developed 
by Japanese social scientists was transformed into a highly rationalized vision of 
imperial knowledge that eventually shaped the intellectual basis for the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the early 1940s. While taking into consideration various 
aspects of Asian discourses, this study primarily focuses on how imperial intellectuals 
in wartime Japan theorized and redefined the concepts of nation, space and community 
in order to justify Japan’s colonial violence, while challenging the notion of Western 
social sciences as modern, objective and therefore universal. In this process, my 
dissertation examines the intellectual space of Japanese imperialism where the project 
of overcoming the West and transcending the dichotomy between empire and colony 
took place. 
    In the conclusion, this dissertation argues that the project of rationalization and 
 modernization in wartime Asian discourses was not simply a break from the dominant 
nation-state and modernization discourses in postwar and postcolonial Asia. The 
purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, to provide a new intellectual perspective for 
writing a comprehensive intellectual history of Japanese imperialism.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Rewriting the Intellectual History of Japanese Social Sciences 
 
This dissertation is a study of wartime Japanese social sciences. No group of 
intellectuals was as preoccupied with the search for modernity as were Japanese social 
scientists in the early 20th century. Their ultimate aim was to explicate the path of 
historical development in Japanese society through a social scientific language. Not 
surprisingly, they were trained in prestigious imperial and private universities and many 
of them were among the blessed few Japanese people who were able to visit Western 
countries, Germany in particular. They dexterously absorbed the modern knowledge 
and technologies that soon became the intellectual backbone of the modern Japanese 
nation-state. However, this study does not aim to narrate the stories of those Japanese 
social scientists, who are still revered as the fathers of modernization in Japan. Rather, it 
deals with the period of time between 1931 and 1945, often categorized as the wartime 
or interwar period, a time which many renowned social scientists in postwar Japan 
asserted had left few traces for them to examine. In that respect, this dissertation might 
be a study of the “dark era” of Japanese social sciences.  
In 1947, two years after Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, the 33-year-old 
political scientist Maruyama Masao argued pointedly that prewar Japanese political 
science “had no tradition worth reviving.”1 This barbed remark might be interpreted as 
a critique of wartime Japanese social scientists who committed themselves to 
                                                 
1 Maruyama states, “[T]here has undoubtedly been a brilliant revival in other social sciences, but political 
science in this country, to put it bluntly, really has no tradition worth reviving. For Japanese political 
science everything depends on what it happens in the future.” (Emphasis added) Maruyama Masao, trans., 
Arthur Tiedemann, “Politics as a Science in Japan: Retrospect and Prospects,” in Maruyama Masao, trans., 
Ivan Morris, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969), p.226. 
                                                       
 2 
colonialism and the imperial war. It is understandable that social scientists’ involvement 
in wartime discourses was conceived of as an “original sin” by many postwar Japanese 
social scientists such as Maruyama, an intellectual icon of postwar Japanese democracy 
and the “civil society” school in the 1950s and 1960s. In that respect, it might not be out 
of line to understand Maruyama’s pronouncement as a reflection of a general attitude 
toward not just political science but wartime Japanese social sciences as a whole.2 
However, one may wonder why Maruyama and his students particularly problematized 
wartime Japanese social sciences, given that the issue of colonialism and imperialism 
existed throughout modern Japanese history, ever since Japan began to colonize its 
neighbors in the 1870s. 
      An important clue to this question can be found in the ample historiography of 
Japanese social sciences written by Ishida Takeshi, a renowned political scientist as 
well as Maruyama’s own student. Echoing Maruyama’s critiques of wartime political 
science, Ishida positioned wartime Japanese social sciences in a distinctive way. 
According to him, the first and foremost guilt of wartime Japanese social sciences was 
that social scientists voluntarily subordinated themselves to the national entity (, 
kokutai), going against the critical and objective tradition that their ancestors such as 
Minobe Tasukichi and Yoshino Sakuzō had established.3 This guilt was described by 
Ishida as “atavismus”; that is, these wartime social scientists committed a “self-
negation” by dismissing scientific objectivity and the rationality, which are imperative 
                                                 
2 “Extensive self-examination does seem to have taken place in other branches of social sciences too, 
once the hollow sounding tunes heard briefly in the intermediate post-war period subsided. A year and a 
half after the war ended social scientists were asking themselves whether their sciences could really serve 
as guiding influences in contemporary reality… They realized that the problem was not to be solved by 
merely returning to ‘the good old days’ and treating the decade of reaction as a historical vacuum,” 
Maruyama wrote. Ibid., pp. 226-227.  
3 Ishida Takeshi, Nihon no shakai kagaku (Tokyo: Tokyodaigaku shuppankai, 1984), p.144. Notably, both 
Maruyama’s and Ishida’s criticism directly and indirectly focused on the work of political scientist 
Rōyama Masamichi, Professor of Law at Tokyo Imperial University and a leading intellectual in the 
formation of East Asian Community discourses in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In Chapter 2, I will 
discuss in detail Rōyama’s theorization of a new political space and his encounter with Asian regionalism.   
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for social scientific thinking.4  
     In this way, the intellectual history of Japanese social sciences has been written 
with a clear division between the prewar and postwar periods. While wartime social 
sciences have remained a vacuum space or a “dark era” soon to be forgotten, those 
writing the history of the social sciences in Japan have been predominantly concerned 
with redeeming the glorious social scientific tradition of the prewar period. Through 
this process, the “continuity” in the intellectual history of Japanese social sciences has 
been revitalized as postwar Japanese social sciences have become once again an 
intellectual guide for reconstructing a modern nation-state, as did prewar social sciences. 
 This approach, however, has produced ruptures, making it difficult to draw a 
comprehensive picture of Japanese social sciences. In an effort to critically evaluate 
wartime social sciences, both Maruyama and Ishida conducted what they called a 
methodology-centered analysis. According to them, social scientists must embody 
objectivity and scientific rationality as a basic condition for analytical thinking. They 
were convinced that Japanese social scientists’ apolitical and highly objective 
perspective became distorted as they committed themselves to the state’s empire 
building project during the wartime period. In this way, scientific rationality and “bad 
ideologies” are postulated as essentially contradictory to each other. Highlighting the 
massive government intervention in social scientists’ knowledge production process 
during the wartime period, Maruyama and Ishida aimed to reduce the problem of 
wartime social sciences to the power relation between the authoritarian state and the 
intellectuals who responded to it. 
     It is important to note that this seemingly critical approach to wartime social 
sciences was also premised on a certain political intention. By divorcing objectivity and 
rationality in the social sciences from “bad ideologies” in real politics, both Maruyama 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
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and Ishida intended to prevent Japanese social sciences from extending its 
consideration of imperialism and colonialism to other periods. The wartime period is 
thus portrayed as the most coercive time and thus a particular moment in Japanese 
history, when intellectuals were forced to collaborate with the state. Maruyama and 
Ishida not only showed no sympathy with them, but also made every effort to eliminate 
their “stained” knowledge from the realm of orthodox Japanese social sciences. In 
doing so, they effectively precluded the complicit relationship between social sciences 
and colonialism throughout modern Japanese history from being critically interrogated. 
Therefore, I argue that behind the ostensibly purely methodology-centered analysis of 
Maruyama and Ishida, there is an explicit political intention to rescue Japanese social 
sciences from the specter of imperialism and colonialism.  
Leading social scientists’ writings in the late 1920s and early 1930s clearly show 
us that they were already developing a series of imperial discourses on an East Asian 
new order that was later concretized in the notion of the East Asian Community or the 
East Asian Cooperative Community. This explains why this study deals with a span of 
the two decades between the late 1920s and the 1940s, rather than simply focusing on 
the wartime period between 1937 and 1945. I argue that the commitment of leading 
social scientists such as Takata Yasuma, Rōyama Masamichi, and Shinmei Masamichi 
to Asian discourses before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 first tells us 
that their involvement was not simply a choice forced by the government. In this 
respect, it is seriously misleading to label these social scientists’ commitment to the 
Japanese empire, both in theory and in practice, a one-time “deviation” from authentic 
social sciences.  
More importantly, my study explores the paradoxical nature of objectivity and 
scientific rationality in the social sciences. These wartime social scientists developed 
imperial discourses based on a critical observation of the limits of rationality and 
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objectivity inherent in the social sciences in the early 20th century. Their discourses are 
not unrelated to critical approaches to modern thought systems that first emanated from 
Europe. European intellectuals’ critical speculations on modernity were in many cases 
associated with disclosing the limits of democracy and the capitalistic modes of life. On 
the other hand, anti-Western and anti-modern theories rapidly gained currency as 
Japan’s conflict with the West became aggravated in the wake of Japan’s invasion of 
China in 1931. Anti-Western and conservative intellectuals intended to create a 
totalitarian system in which the Emperor dominates social values and unsurprisingly, 
their main targets were democracy and the capitalistic system. All these circumstances 
created certain conditions that symbolized “social sciences in crisis.” Japanese social 
scientists in the early 1930s were placed in the position of having to respond to 
challenges emanating both from real politics and from critiques of scientific objectivity 
and rationality in the social sciences. 
However, the Japanese social scientists I will deal with in this study did not 
denounce objectivity and rationality as such. Instead, they attempted to expand the 
exteriority of social scientific thinking to the seemingly “unscientific” and subjective 
elements of human life. They were conscious that creating and rationalizing a multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural empire would not be possible by simply relying upon the 
existing principles of causality and objective rationality in the social sciences. Therefore, 
they strove to present a new concept of rationality by engaging both objective and 
subjective aspects in human society and incorporating them in a new social system 
called the East Asia Cooperative Community.  
 
Rationalizing Empire : Subjective Social Science () 
At this point, let me move on to the central thesis of my dissertation, rationalizing 
empire. It might be useful to revisit the sociologist Max Weber’s classic definition of 
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rationality. Weber defined rationalization as a driving force for modern society. 
According to him, it diminishes the religious, supernatural, and metaphysical part of 
human activities, which he viewed as irrational. Therefore, rationality is comprised of 
social and institutional forces controlled by reason, calculation, and goal-oriented 
activities.5 Weber distinguished modern society from other forms of society by the 
formers’ calculability, efficiency and predictability. Based on this premise, He 
established a universally shared speculative mode in the social sciences; that is, private, 
social and institutional phenomena in modern society must be explained, calculated and 
predicted, while relegating the rest of human activities to the realm of irrationality.  
      It is important to revisit the notion of rationality before discussing wartime 
Japanese social scientists’ engagement with the empire. To begin with, rational choice 
or rational action is not necessarily accompanied by social justice or politico-economic 
development. Rationality as a purely social scientific concept is often intertwined with a 
highly teleological sense of human life. In the social sciences, the term “rationalization” 
has denoted the optimization of effectiveness and productivity and precisely for this 
reason, it has been considered one of the core values of modern society. On the other 
hand, it is often accompanied by the after-the-fact justification of one’s own subjective 
action by linking it to the objective norms of society. In discussing Japanese social 
sciences in the interwar period, however, I do not use the term rationality in the narrow 
context of social scientists’ discussions of maximizing effectiveness, nor in the context 
of the after-the-fact justification of colonial violence executed by the Japanese empire.  
      Instead, I pay close attention to the way Japanese social scientists in the wartime 
period redefined the very concept of rationalization, which they first encountered 
through Western social sciences. The first challenge they confronted was how to 
                                                 
5 Max Weber, trans and eds., H.H Gerth and C. Wright, From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.267-359; Max Weber, Taclcott Parsons ed., The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 8-29.  
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explicate non-scientific and intrinsic elements such as Asian space, race, and 
community through a social scientific language. In responding to this challenge, they 
began dismantling the highly compartmentalized disciplinary order in the social 
sciences. Each discipline in the social sciences – political science, sociology and 
economics – has its own explanatory boundary – economy, society and politics – and 
sets forth objective theories to explain human activities using methodologies of its own. 
The synthesis of these compartmentalized academic units creates an objective and 
comprehensive picture of each society. The wartime Japanese social scientists whom I 
will discuss became conscious that human activities are constituted under a hybrid and 
heterogeneous mixture of social elements, and they soon came to realize that an East 
Asian empire could not be created simply by instilling in imperial subjects ideas based 
on monolithic and compartmentalized social theories.  
    More importantly, redefining the notion of rationality by engaging non-social 
scientific concepts was closely associated with the logic of creating new social 
scientific thinking, that is, a subjective () social science. Here, the term 
“subjective” does not simply denote something that is not “objective.” To be sure, these 
social scientists were aware that the East Asian regional community was full of 
subjective () elements. Therefore, they searched for a social scientific logic that 
could convert these subjectivities () and uncertainties in space, ethnicity and 
community into rational forces necessary for building an empire. However, they were 
also convinced that building an East Asian empire could be accomplished simply by 
revisiting the notion of Asian commonness, which entailed non-social scientific 
elements.  
    It was for this reason that these social scientists faced a second challenge; that is, 
how a new social science should overcome the binary structure of empire and colony 
and theorize “subjects” as a new form of identity in a Japan-centered empire. This is 
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why the social scientific theories that I will analyze in this dissertation commonly 
touched upon the question of transforming the colonized into the active participants of 
the empire-building project. Therefore, I pay special attention to how these wartime 
Japanese social scientists theorized non-social scientific Asian elements – religion, 
culture, race, and community– in a new social scientific language of subject formation. 
In this process, the logic of “rationalizing empire” was closely associated with the 
project of a subjective social science (	
) that focused on creating newly 
motivated social scientific subjects who would serve the collective good of the East 
Asian Community.     
One important question still remains to be answered. Building an Asian empire 
based on a newly defined rationalist mindset, rather than intrinsic and supernatural 
forces necessarily called for the reconfiguration of the power relationship between 
metropole and colony. These social scientists were convinced that in order to transform 
the heterogeneous and subjective elements of Asian society into rational potentials for 
the “community of destiny,” forward-looking and at times subversive social, economic 
and political measures must be carried out in the colony: expansion of educational 
opportunities and political rights, eradication of racial discrimination, and facilitation of 
economic development. This notion was logically connected to reformative discourses 
in Japan proper. To be sure, many of these social scientists were once ardent supporters 
of liberal democracy, and some of them were preoccupied with the dream of socialist 
revolution. These formerly liberal or left-wing thinkers often created political tensions 
as they were opposed to the wartime policy of conservative bureaucrats and military 
leaders during the wartime period. Many of them tried to “reform” the domestic 
structure by proposing “radical” policies. Precisely for this reason, there has been 
another tendency to evaluate these wartime social scientists from a different perspective. 
In contrast to Maruyama and Ishida, who simply eliminated them from the orthodox 
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history of Japanese social sciences, a new perspective focuses on the historical impacts 
that their reformist social sciences had on both Japan and the colony. Although their 
imperial commitment has been harshly criticized, this new perspective aims to pave a 
new way toward understanding wartime intellectual history by overcoming the binary 
paradigm of the colonizer and the colonized, or resistance and collaboration.6 
I fully agree that imperial/colonial history must be rewritten by including voices 
of minorities and the colonized. But I strongly disagree that rewriting the intellectual 
history of the Japanese empire in the highly ambiguous languages of reform or passive 
resistance can bring new life to it. To be sure, the rationalist stream, represented by the 
notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community, was substantially different from the 
total mobilization policy of hard-line military and political leaders who are 
unquestionably responsible for forcing a countless number of colonial subjects onto the 
battlefield. This does not mean, however, that what might be called rationalist and 
moderate intellectuals took a forward-looking perspective and formed a buffer-zone 
against brutal military violence. Rather than cast a somewhat romantic eye toward their 
frustrated dream of constructing a utopian empire, I argue that what is important is to 
thoroughly investigate why and how leading intellectuals subjectively immersed 
themselves in the empire building project. Through the notion of the East Asian 
Cooperative Community, they aimed to create logics through which both the colonized 
and colonizer could voluntarily rationalize their commitment, in many cases even 
sacrificing their lives, to the community of collective violence. I also interrogate the 
perception that scientific rationality is free from any kind of atrocities toward humanity. 
Paradoxically, this study aims to show that the maximization of rational thinking itself 
                                                 
6 Many works deserve attention and some of them include Yonetani Masafumi, “Senjiki nihon no 
shakaishisō – gendaika to senjikenkaku,” Shisō 882 (Dec 1997), pp.69-120; Yonetami Masafumi, 
Ajia/nihon (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006); Janis Mimura, “Technocratic Visions of Empire : The Reform 
Bureaucrats in Wartime Japan,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2002. 
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produced colonial violence in its extreme form during the Asia-Pacific War.  
 
Japanese Social Sciences as Area Studies  
To further investigate the paradoxical nature of rationality and objectivity in wartime 
Japanese social sciences, one might need to call into question the logic of universality 
and particularity inherent in the social sciences. The ontological value of the social 
sciences was to establish universal languages through which every phenomenon in 
human society could be explicated. At stake is the notion that the term universality is 
often considered identical with the West. Social scientists have observed societies 
outside the universal world through the binary of universality and particularity. 
Extending one’s gaze to the other has been conceptualized in the name of area studies, 
and this was the case for Japanese social scientists in the early 20th century as well. As 
many have pointed out, Japanese social scientists were actively involved in producing 
knowledge about Asia. The East Asian Cooperative Community, which later became 
the theoretical ground for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was the zenith of 
their intellectual endeavors to produce and accumulate knowledge about Asia during 
the wartime period. 
     It is not uncommon for social scientists to get closely involved in producing 
knowledge about the other. Immanuel Wallerstein’s insightful study shows that postwar 
social scientific research in the United States was conducted with a political view 
toward accumulating practical knowledge and information about other areas in the 
name of area studies. In most cases, area studies in the United States were focused on 
assessing people and cultures in non-Western areas based on the universal logic of the 
social sciences.7 Accordingly, their modes of life are often categorized as “particular,”8 
                                                 
7 The following statement clearly shows the nature of postwar area studies in the United States. “The 
immediate need for social scientists who know the different regions of the world stands second only to the 
demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential combat zones….The primary 
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and in most cases, extending one’s gaze to the other for the purpose of knowing about 
“them” as opposite to “me” results in reinforcing one’s own identity. This process is 
often called the politics of identity or subject formation, that is, by determining the 
other as particular, one’s own position as universal is guaranteed. Precisely for this 
reason, the formulated notion of universality and particularity in the social sciences has 
perfectly explained the existential meaning of area studies. This is also why a number 
of critical intellectuals have recently engaged in efforts to deconstruct area studies.9   
      Returning to the history of Japanese social sciences, one may find important 
aspects of area studies in the early 20th century. Japanese social scientists of the time, as 
I have mentioned, aspired to guide and explain Japan’s passage into a modern society. 
To put it another way, this was a painstaking effort to identify Japan with the West, by 
demonstrating that Japan had the same path of modernization that the West had 
undergone. In spite of methodological differences, this epistemology dominated the 
mindset of Japanese social scientists until the early 1930s. As a result, they acquired the 
symbolic “trophy” presented by the West that Japan was the only Asian country that 
had successfully completed a modernization project.  
The seemingly successful identity formation in prewar Japanese social sciences 
                                                                                                                                            
task of the social scientists is to master and contribute to his discipline… But the laws and generalizations 
of the social sciences are relevant to time, place and culture; and much can be gained by the concreteness 
derived from the regional approach.” Internal Report, 1943, “World Regions in the Social Sciences” The 
Committee on World Regions of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), cited from Immanuel 
Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies,” in Noam Chomsky (et al.) eds., 
The Cold War and the University: Toward an intellectual history of postwar years (New York: New Press, 
Distributed by W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp.195-196. 
8 Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science : The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms 
(Cambridge: Polity Press in association with B. Blackwell, 1991). It was reprinted by Temple University 
Press in 2001. Many works on the origins of area studies in the United States deserve mention and some 
of them include Bruce Cumings, “Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during 
and after the Cold War,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 29, no. 1 (1997), pp. 6-26. 
9 Tessa Morris Suzuki, “Anti-Area Studies,” Communal/Plural, 8:1 (April 2000), pp. 9-23; Harry 
Harootunian, “Tracking the Dinosaur: Area Studies in a Time of “Globalism”,” History’s Disquiet: 
Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday life (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), pp. 25-58; Harry Harootunian, “Introduction: the “Afterlife” of Area Studies,” in Harry 
Harootunian and Masao Miyoshi eds., Learning Places; The Afterlives of Area Studies (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002), pp. 1-18.  
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created a paradoxical space between Japan and its Asian neighbors. The birth of 
modern social sciences in Japan was inseparable from Japan’s position as a colonizer 
since the 1870s. The process of producing knowledge about the colonized took the 
typical form of universality and particularity. Japanese intellectuals’ colonial gaze was 
in no way different from that of European intellectuals, who determined their colonies, 
Southeast Asia in particular, as particular societies and developed “area studies.” In a 
similar way, Japanese intellectuals portrayed minority groups including Koreans as not 
belonging to the universal world and they therefore rationalized Japan’s colonization of 
these groups in the name of civilization and enlightenment. In this sense, early 20th 
century Japanese social sciences such as area studies were essentially double-layered.  
On the one hand, these Japanese intellectuals made every effort to position Japan in the 
universal world, and this very process of becoming universal citizens was possible by 
particularizing the rest of Asia.  
However, the problem of universality and particularity was not as simple as 
Japanese social scientists might have anticipated. The “basic instinct” of returning to 
Asia never completely disappeared. The concept of Asia as a geographic, cultural, and 
racial given constantly resurged in the thinking of Japanese intellectuals.10 Needless to 
say, returning to Asia was in most cases a political move designed to spread the rhetoric 
of Japan’s mission of protecting Asia from Western imperialism. However, Japanese 
social scientists in political science, economics and sociology still strove to create a 
theory of having to universalize Asia in the grand current of civilization, while avoiding 
the question of Japan as a colonizer.11  
                                                 
10 Okakura Tenshin, The ideals of the East, with special reference to the art of Japan (New York: E.P. 
Dutton and company, 1905).  
11 Kang Sang Jung has made the interesting point that liberal Japanese intellectuals such as Nitobe Inaz 
and Yanaihara Tadaō, both trained in the Department of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University and 
heavily influenced by Adam Smith’s evolutionary economic philosophy, attempted to rationalize the 
highly inconsistent relationship between liberal social science and colonialism in their advocating the 
logic of civilizing mission and the dissemination of advanced culture. Kang Sang Jung, “The Discovery of 
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      In the meantime, the social scientific distance between Japan and Japan’s Orient 
became increasingly wide. To be sure, modernity or modernization was not necessarily 
conceptualized by Japanese social scientists in a positive way. The project of building a 
modern society was in many cases associated with constructing a powerful nation-state, 
which often results in the dominance of the state over individuals or society. Beginning 
in the late 1910s, Japanese social scientists started to speak out against the state which 
once enabled them to be a privileged social group. Radical Marxist intellectuals and 
liberal thinkers in social scientific disciplines called into question the superabundance 
of state authority, (Staatslehre). To put it another way, Marxists advocated the 
emancipation of the proletariat and liberal intellectuals called for the true establishment 
of democracy. In this process, they made an important theoretical breakthrough in 
discovering the concept of society (, shakai) and discovering social problems (
, shakai mondai) that occurred as a result of modernization.12 Thus, they 
effectively demonstrated the possibility of critical and independent social sciences from 
the bottom up, overcoming the excessive influence of the state as a top-down agency.13  
I argue that the qualitative diversity of Japanese social sciences can be fully 
evaluated only when one takes into account the historical reality that Japan had become 
an imperial power. The expansion of an independent social space within Japan does not 
necessarily tell us that Japanese social scientists armed themselves with theories critical 
of imperialism. Nor does it show us that as a result, commoners at the bottom organized 
resistant movements against both the emperor system and imperialism. As Andrew 
Gordon’s study well demonstrates, the development of democracy and capitalism at 
                                                                                                                                            
the “Orient” and Orientalism,” in Richard F. Calichman ed., Comtemporary Japanese Thought (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp.84-100.  
12 Ishida, Nihon no shakai kagaku, pp.101-124. 
13 Andrew Barshay categorizes this period as the moment of “pluralization” in Japanese social sciences, 
see Andrew Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004), pp. 36-71. 
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home became paradoxically associated with endorsing national interests abroad, and 
consequently, imperialism and democracy could cohabit the political space for a 
considerable time.14 For this reason, many have delved into the question of why the 
democratic regime suddenly collapsed and the reactionary militarists came to power in 
1930s Japan.15 A renowned postwar Japanese intellectual, Kato Shūichi, has presented 
the interesting thesis that this heyday of liberalist thinking in the Taisho Democracy 
period foreshadowed the coming of wartime totalitarianism in the 1930s.16 
 
Wartime Japanese Social Sciences: The Reversed Logic of Universality   
The search for the origins of wartime mobilization in the tradition of Taisho democracy 
is very important as a meaning of critically understanding Japanese intellectual history, 
in that it provides an effective antithesis to the theory that Japanese fascism was a 
particular moment. The thesis of continuity between the prewar and wartime periods 
has recently gained currency among a wide range of students of Japanese studies, 
especially in the United States. It has played an important role in refuting the myopic 
and highly politically-oriented notion of universalism and particularism that has long 
constituted the core value of postwar Japan studies in the name of modernization theory. 
As Harry Harootunian and others have emphasized, the so-called advent of Japan 
studies in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was closely related to the task of 
digging into the question of why only Japan accomplished modernization to the level at 
                                                 
14 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
Also see Part I in Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds : The State in Everyday Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 1- 145. 
15 Sakai Tetsuya, Taishō demokurashī taisei no hōkai : naisei to gaikō (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 
1992); Miles Fletcher, The Search for a New Order : Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982). 
16 Kato Shūichi, “Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese Militarism,” in Bernard S. Silberman 
and Harry Harootunian eds., Japan in Crisis : Essays on Taisho Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), pp.217-236. 
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which it could boldly stand up against the United States in the Asia Pacific War.17 For 
this reason, modernization theory in postwar Japan studies has shown an explicit Japan-
centeredness, completely omitting the colonial origins of wartime and postwar Japanese 
society. 
The continuity thesis between prewar and wartime periods has been recently 
expanded to the postwar period.18 A group of scholars have ambitiously attempted to 
position prewar Japan in the dynamics of the world system and postwar Japan in the 
current of globalization. But one may wonder whether this new perspective could 
embrace the voices of colonial and minority subjects that had gone unrepresented for so 
long. 
In this dissertation, I present the term internationality as a gateway to 
understanding the initial question I would like to pose. What ontological challenge did 
the epistemology of particularizing the rest of Asia face as Japan became an empire in 
the early 1930s? What kind of intellectual tasks pervaded the mindset of Japanese 
social scientists so that they questioned the very nature of social sciences as rational and 
objective? In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the Japanese government 
accelerated its military invasion of Northern China, which forged the Manchurian crisis, 
and that crisis was later expanded to the “China Problem” in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. At the early stage of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese social scientists’ 
attitudes toward this overt imperialism were in no way different from their previous 
approach to the colony. The notion of civilizing mission was once again appropriated as 
                                                 
17 Harry Harootunian, History’s Disquiet : Modernity, Cultural Practice and the Question of Everyday 
Life (New York : Columbia University Press, 2000), pp.25-58. 
18 Yasushi Yamanouchi, J Victor Koschmann and Ryūichi Narita eds., Total War and ‘Modernization’ 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Yasushi Yamanouchi and Naoki Sakai eds., Soryokusen taisei 
kara gurōbarizēhon e (Tokyo : Heibonsha, 2003); Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary and Iyotani Toshio eds., 
Deconstructing Nationality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Also see Louise Young, Japan’s Total 
Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998). 
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a panacea. Although among intellectuals they the were most “internationally-minded,” 
given that a majority of them had spent a substantial amount of time abroad and were 
always open to cutting-edge theories produced outside of Japan, their perception of 
internationality was so narrow that only a simplistic intellectual map of the world – the 
West as modern and universal and the rest of it as uncivilized and particular – had 
penetrated their mindset.19   
     Repeating the so-called messianic civilizing mission did not even convince many 
other intellectuals within Japan. As discourses on crisis in democracy and capitalism 
rapidly gained currency in Europe, Japanese intellectuals began critically revisiting the 
nature of modernization as well. In addition, Japan’s relations with the West became so 
seriously aggravated that Japan eventually withdrew from the League of Nations in 
1933. All in all, it became self-evident that Japanese intellectuals could no longer rely 
on the universality of democracy and capitalism in order to sustain Japan’s position as a 
world power. Therefore, the cohabitation of the democratic system at home and 
imperialism abroad gradually lost its validity. Right-wing conservatives dexterously 
utilized this opportunity to strengthen their power and as a result, the “democratic” 
tradition established by liberal and progressive social scientists was challenged by a 
number of anti-social scientific discourses: Emperor-centered Japanism, chauvinistic 
state socialism, and, eventually, spiritually-oriented Pan-Asianism.  
      Perhaps the most formalist interpretation of wartime Japanese social sciences 
would be to narrate the process of how social scientists gradually subordinated 
themselves to the state and served as intellectual resources for producing imperial 
knowledge for the Japanese empire. For example, prewar Japanese Marxists’ 
                                                 
19 For a study of internationalism in modern Japanese intellectual history, see Naoki Sakai, 
“ ‘Kokusaisei’ni yote naniwo mondaika shōtoshiteirunoka,” in Yoshimi Shunya and Hanada Tatsurō eds., 
Karuchuraru sutadizu to no taiwa = A dialogue with cultural studies (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1999), pp.286-
315.    
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commitment to the empire, often theorized in the term tenkō (, conversion), was 
the most frequently chosen research topic for students of modern Japanese history.20 To 
be sure, this kind of approach has some validity to it. However, in many cases, the 
scope of related research has been narrowly confined to the dynamic between the 
coercive state and individuals who were forced to choose either collaboration or 
resistance, thereby marginalizing the presence of multiple actors inside and outside of 
the Japanese empire. In order to avoid reproducing the monolithic picture of the 
totalitarian state and intellectuals within Japan, I argue that in writing wartime Japanese 
intellectual history it is imperative to highlight the moment when imperial intellectuals 
encountered the space of Asia and how their engagement with Asian discourses forged 
changes in the hierarchy of imperial knowledge.  
      The reason Japanese social scientists’ encounter with Asia fundamentally 
reshaped the framework of knowledge production was that their engagement with state 
institutions did not take the form of traditional area studies. On an institutional level, 
their area studies show a great similarity to postwar area studies in the West, the United 
States in particular. Presumably, no other group of intellectuals would surpass wartime 
Japanese intellectuals in producing knowledge about the other in collaboration with the 
state. A great number of government-funded research organizations under the umbrella 
of area studies emerged during the fifteen-year period between 1931 and 1945. These 
institutions mainly targeted China and Southeast Asia, two potential territories of the 
Japanese empire, and were filled with leading social scientists from top-notch imperial 
and private universities.21  
     The guiding principle of wartime area studies conducted by Japanese social 
                                                 
20 Recently Janis Mimura presented a study of reform bureaucrats in wartime Japan, focusing on their 
subjective vision for constructing the Japanese empire. Janis Mimura, “Technocratic Visions of Empire : 
The Reform Bureaucrats in Wartime Japan,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2002.  
21 For a detailed research on Japanese intellectuals who collaborated with the Japanese empire, see Sakai 
Saburō, Shōwa kenkyūkai : aru chishikijin shūdan no kiseki (Tokyo: Teibiesu Buritanika, 1979).  
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scientists differed strikingly from that of West. Although many social scientists did not 
completely dismiss the epistemological view of Japan as universal and the rest of Asia 
as particular, they were at least aware that China and the colonies could not be 
incorporated into imperial Japan by simply repeating this logic. Natural as it may sound, 
the task of convincing Asian people of the notion of an East Asian community was 
inseparable from searching for common values between Japan and its Asian neighbors. 
Without providing these, these imperial social scientists had no choice but to resort to 
fascistic violence. This raises an initial question: How could social scientists find 
common values for a new East Asian order without resorting to the conventional thesis 
of universality and particularity? Not surprisingly, many imperial intellectuals 
attempted to answer this question by employing the racial, blood-oriented, cultural, and 
spiritual elements that they believed would constitute Asian commonness. The most 
evident example was the notion of naisenittai  (Japan and Korea as one 
body) that emphasized the same racial and cultural origins between Japan and Korea. 
     Apart from the fact that these common elements in Asia were essentially an 
abstraction that could not be explicated in a social scientific language, the more 
fundamental problem was that the task of envisioning an East Asian empire should not 
be focused on a short-term government policy to mobilize colonial subjects for Japan’s 
war efforts. To engage colonial subjects and at the same time overcome the limits of 
democracy and capitalism, the empire-building project must focus on restructuring the 
existing socio-economic order at home, thereby creating a new system that could 
embrace the rest of Asia.  
This study, therefore, pays special attention to social scientists who took a 
markedly different path from that of the conservative intellectuals, who simply 
addressed Asian similarities and attempted to link them to the so-called Imperial Way 
(). First and foremost, these social scientists were convinced that simply 
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uncovering the similarities between the colonizer and the colonized would not make the 
colonized resonate with the Japanese empire, unless the power structure of empire and 
colony were restructured. In order to resolve this problem, they had to challenge the 
nation-state paradigm since it would constantly circulate the perception that Japan as an 
entity belongs to the universal world and the rest of Asia to the particular. These 
imperial social scientists argued that a new regional order as an alternative form of 
internationality must be something that does not repeat the schematic configuration of 
the West as universal and the East as particular.22 This signifies that their scientific 
Asian discourses would not simply repeat the modern configuration of knowledge that 
had been espoused in Western modernity. It necessarily raises another question: How 
did these social scientists confront the challenge of modernization?  
       
Creating a Universal Empire: the Question of Modernity  
Japanese social scientists’ intellectual endeavors to establish a self-sufficient regional 
order were naturally accompanied by interrogating the very framework of knowledge 
production dominated by the West. Wartime social scientists like Shinmei Masamichi, 
Takata Yasuma and Kada Tetsuji, for example, invariably problematized the 
unscientific elements of Western racism. However, their critiques of white supremacy 
were never presented to endorse the unity of yellow people as an anti-thesis. Instead of 
reversing the location of civilization so that the East was now conceived of as universal, 
they were more concerned with creating logics in which particularities of each 
individual, group and society in the East Asian Community would share the universal, 
best exemplified in the slogan, “the community of destiny.”   
      In writing the intellectual history of empire in wartime Japan, I do not base the 
                                                 
22 Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press: 1997), pp. 153-176. 
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discursive position of my study on the problematic thesis, “overcoming modernity (
).” Undoubtedly, the rhetoric of anti-modernity, anti-individualism and anti-
capitalism flooded intellectuals’ writings, novels, government propagandas, and other 
cultural and visual materials. The “war of thought ()” formulated a clear-cut 
battleground between Japan and the decadent West, and involved itself in the 
psychological and epistemological process of affirming an independent historicity in 
the East.23 As the term “overcoming” suggests, this logic in many cases employed the 
retrospective observation that Japan and the Japanese had striven relentlessly to catch 
up with Western modernity in its history, and that for this reason, what needed to be 
overcome was not just the West as an actual enemy but, more importantly, Western 
remnants within Japan. What was at stake in this intellectual domain is the fact that the 
more influential the slogan “overcoming the modern” became, the more the “war of 
thought” itself was reduced to the war between Japan and the West, marginalizing 
subjects in the colony as passive actors. The most extreme of this tendency might be the 
affirmation of the war as significant historical progress which liberated, or at least 
attempted to rescue, Asians from the oppression of white supremacy.24 
      Apart from the fact that leading Japanese social scientists were still attentive to 
theories originating from the West, broadly defined, in their empire-building project, 
their attempts to construct a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empire were primarily 
concerned with managing the unevenness between metropole and the colony. Most 
                                                 
23 Koyama Iwao, Sekashi no tetsugaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1941); Hiromatsu Wataru, Kindai no 
chōkoku ron: shōwa shisoshi no ichi dansō (Tokyo: Asahi shuppansa, 1980). The “Overcoming 
Modernity” symposiums in 1942 have recently been translated into English. Richard F. Calichman ed., 
Overcoming Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). About the “overcoming the 
modern” discourses by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, see Chapter 2 in Harry Harootunian, Overcome 
by Modernity: History. Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000), pp. 34-94; Karatani Kojin, “Overcoming Modernity,” in Richard F. Calichman ed., Contemporary 
Japanese Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp.101-118. 
24 David Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War : The Kyoto School philosophers and post-White 
power (London: Routlegde Curzon, 2004).  
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importantly, issues in the underdeveloped, agriculture-centered, and even primordial 
modes of life in the colonies generated a complex set of problems that cannot be simply 
captured in the problematic of “overcoming the modern.” Here, I do not intend to make 
the point that the notion of overcoming modernity is intellectually insignificant. In fact, 
many recent works have revealed the intertwined nature of this discourse and have 
shown the irony that these advocates of “overcoming modernity” themselves embraced 
the paradoxical conviction that Japan as the only “modernized” country in Asia should 
lead the rest of Asia.  
    From the perspective of Japanese intellectual history, however, the notion of 
overcoming modernity still contains some provocative issues one must pay close 
attention to. Most importantly, I argue that it was colonial intellectuals who most 
fervently responded to this intellectual stream. For them, overcoming modernity first 
came as a prescription for dismantling the empire-colony power structure. It was due to 
their observation that colonialism is simply the twin of modernization, that is, it always 
takes place where surplus value and economic gaps constantly exist. However, putting 
excessive emphasis on the discursive part of overcoming modernity might result in 
overlooking the practical problem of underdevelopment and stagnation in the colony. 
Even imperial intellectuals were aware that the economic gap between Japan and the 
colony, and between metropole and rural areas, would not be solved simply by 
advocating anti-capitalism in theory. In this respect, my study also pays close attention 
to how the logic of modernization did not disappear but was appropriated in different 
contexts in these social scientists’ imperial discourses.  
     The new East Asian empire envisioned by these social scientists took the form of 
a universal empire in which subjects in Asia were to be treated as equal citizens. To this 
end, any sort of ideologies endorsing individualistic and profit-oriented activities were 
first denounced. But these social scientists were also aware that simply rejecting 
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individualism and capitalism, and addressing the notion of community as an alternative, 
would not bring about the society they aimed to create. To put it another way, building a 
new empire was not a matter of returning to the community of premodern times, often 
called gemeinschaft in German. Therefore, the socio-economic configuration of a 
universal empire was not aimed at simply eradicating cultural and economic differences, 
thereby creating homogeneous subjects. These imperial social scientists boldly argued 
that indigenous cultures, languages and lifestyles must be recognized in this universal 
empire. However, they also contended that a new form of subjectivity must be created 
beyond these particularities among different Asian people. Ironically, it is at this point 
that the notion of subjectivity was powerfully revisited by these social scientists.  
As Naoki Sakai and others have pointed out, modernity itself is not a static 
concept, nor does it involve a certain point in time.25 Interestingly, the Japanese social 
scientists I will discuss were clearly aware that building an empire was not a monistic 
project that would render everyone into sameness. For example, Ezawa Jōji, the 
rationalist economist, addressed the principle of constructing space as a gateway to 
realizing the community of destiny. According to him, Asian space is neither a given 
nor a natural object, but where countless different memories and experiences occur 
simultaneously and ubiquitously. But, he believed that through the project of 
constructing a new space - for example through national land planning, - these different 
experiences can converge into a common goal, therefore, space, in his geopolitical 
thinking, was not a physical substance, but an active force for the destiny of 
community.26 In this way, heterogeneity in the empire was, for him and like-minded 
social scientists, not an obstacle but became an active dynamic to infuse into Asian 
people the sense of subjectivity through which even the colonized could voluntarily 
                                                 
25 Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, (London, New York: Verso, 1995); 
Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism, pp. 164-176. 
26 Ezawa Jōji, Kokudo keikaku no kisoriron (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1942). 
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participate in empire building. For social scientists like Ezawa, the concept of modern 
development thus occupied a central position in the East Asian Community. 
Tracing the unexplored writings of these intellectuals in the Japanese empire, I 
argue, will provide important insights into the complex questions intertwined with 
coloniality, modernity and postcoloniality in East Asia. These questions might include: 
why were Korean intellectuals in postcolonial Korea preoccupied with the logic of 
mobilization and development? How can we historicize the legacy of total mobilization 
in the Japanese empire to explain the origins of a total mobilization state in 1960s and 
1970s Korea?27 
 
Things Told and Untold: Colonial (Un)consciousness  
Last but not least, my study pays special attention to the voices of the colonized in the 
intellectual history of the Japanese empire. Although I will primarily focus on 
“Japanese” social scientists, this does not mean that the colonial voices are missing in 
this work. As many have pointed out, the wartime discourses of Japanese social 
scientists mainly targeted Chinese nationalism. They were convinced that the first and 
foremost task of building an Asian empire was to gain the support of the Chinese 
people, who were fiercely resisting Japan. Therefore, it was natural that the “China 
Problem” occupied a central position in their Asian discourses. In an effort to convince 
China, both conservative and liberal intellectuals in Japan emphasized the logic of war 
against the West; that is, the Sino-Japanese War was waged to create a self-sufficient 
politico-economic sphere in Asia, thereby protecting it from Western imperialism. 
                                                 
27 A number of important works written in English, Japanese and Korean deserve mention and some of 
them include Pang Ki-Jung, “Ilbon pasizum insik ui hondon kwa jaeinsikui banghyang,” in Pang Ki-Jung 
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Needless to say, completely missing in this rhetoric was the fact that Japan itself had 
been colonizing its neighbors and was conducting an imperialist war.  
    Although the social scientists that I will deal with in this work aimed to create a 
rational and utopian empire, they were not free from colonial consciousness either. 
Many of them took it for granted that Taiwan and Korea had already been part of the 
Japanese empire. Except for a small number of social scientists such as Moritani 
Katsumi, who was teaching social policy at Kyungsung Imperial University in colonial 
Korea, the colonial reality of the Japanese empire did not capture the attention of 
Japanese social scientists. Precisely for this reason, the notion of the East Asia 
Cooperative Community has been considered by Korean scholars to be empty rhetoric 
that was used to justify the mobilization of the Korean people for Japan’s war efforts.  
     As ironic as it may sound, it was colonial Korean intellectuals who responded 
most fervently to the voices from the empire. To be sure, Japanese social scientists were 
clearly aware that the economic gap between Japan and colonial Korea, and the 
agricultural problem in colonial Korea in particular, would be a major obstacle to 
incorporating Koreans into the Japanese empire. They were also conscious that their 
writings enjoyed a wide range of readership in colonial Korea. For example, Korean 
intellectuals expressed their political opinions in Japanese journals such as Tōyō no 
hikari  , to which these leading social scientists often contributed articles. 
Nonetheless, most Japanese social scientists averted their eyes from the reality of 
colonization, and to this end, they persisted in promoting the rhetoric of a universal 
empire in which the empire-colony hierarchy no longer exists.  
Importantly, this blindness toward Japan’s colonialism on the part of Japanese 
intellectuals ironically produced important spaces for identity politics. As I have 
discussed, the rhetoric of a universal empire was appropriated by a group of colonial 
Korean intellectuals as a way to surpass both the empire-colony power structure and the 
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limits of the capitalistic modes of production at the same time. Therefore, they 
subjectively interpreted the notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community in the 
name of naisenittai. Importantly, not all Korean intellectuals simply accepted the logic 
of Japan and Korea as one body at face value. They were aware that becoming a 
cosmopolitan citizen in the Japanese empire did not guarantee that the majority of the 
Japanese recognized colonial subjects as equal citizens. As I shall discuss in Chapter 6, 
Korean intellectuals such as In Jeong Sik acutely pointed out the limits of the East Asia 
Cooperative Community and the notion of naisenittai. Instead of repeating the highly 
abstract and philosophical notion of the East Asian Community or “overcoming 
modernity,” In saw modern development as a prerequisite step for naisenittai. In this 
way, the notion of modernization was paradoxically revitalized by colonial intellectuals.  
Therefore, I do not subscribe to the idea that these imperial social scientists’ 
Asian discourses were empty rhetoric that did not address the issue of coloniality 
during the wartime period. I argue instead that by critically investigating why imperial 
intellectuals adhered to the logic of a universal empire, we can reveal more clearly the 
intertwined aspects of colonial reality addressed by colonial intellectuals.  
 
Organization  
As a study of intellectual history, this dissertation necessarily focuses on tracing the 
intellectual trajectories of a group of prominent figures in the history of Japanese 
imperialism. For this reason, I admit that elite-centeredness might inevitably appear in 
some places in this dissertation. However, rather than narrating the dominant position 
of these social scientists, my work aims to show the violent nature of knowledge 
production itself by investigating how their imperial discourses served the cause of  
total war and mobilization. 
      Importantly, this study does not follow a chronological or compartmentalized 
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order in the history of Japanese social sciences. The main purpose of my study is not to 
narrate the writings of leading Japanese social scientists in each discipline. These 
imperial social scientists soon realized that individual theories in sociology, economics 
and political science could not universalize the complex web of uncertain, 
unpredictable and at times irrational social and political relations in East Asia. This 
observation necessarily demolished the seemingly solid boundaries between social 
scientific disciplines and gave rise to new forms of thinking; that is, “interdisciplinary 
provinces” from today’s perspective, such as geopolitics and ethnology. Instead, this 
study concerns itself with why the concept and space of Asia came to be so important 
for Japanese social scientists that they immersed themselves in the project of 
rationalizing an Asian empire, voluntarily transcending the fortress of the most 
universalized and modernized mode of thinking, social science.  
     With these observations in mind, this dissertation deals with wartime Japanese 
social scientists and their encounter with an Asian empire, focusing on important 
conceptual and theoretical challenges they faced: space, ethnicity and community. 
Chapter 2 sets up a discursive framework for their actual encounter with these 
concepts. It focuses on how external and internal crises in 1930s Japan prompted 
Japanese social scientists to look beyond the narrow cage of Japanese society and to 
come to terms with Asian regionalism. Closely attentive to social and political changes 
in 1930s Japan and Asia, this chapter tries to answer the question of why Japanese 
social scientists’ exposure to regionalist thinking ironically led them to problematize 
their own social scientific thinking.  
    The project of building a multi-ethnic empire will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, the longest chapter of this dissertation. Not surprisingly, it was sociologists 
who most ardently involved themselves in creating the logic of a multi-ethnic empire. 
These social scientists were clearly aware that without overcoming the logic of race and 
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ethnicity, which could be a potential threat to the stability of empire in the name of 
ethnic nationalism, they could not rationalize a Japan-centered multi-ethnic community. 
This chapter examines how these social scientists redefined ethnicity not as 
supernatural, blood-oriented and thus a-historical but as a socially constructed and 
therefore “could-be-engineered” element in organizing a social community. Paying 
special attention to various debates on ethnicity, the chapter focuses on the writings and 
theories of Shinmei Masamichi and Takata Yasuma, two key figures in wartime and 
postwar Japanese sociology. 
     Chapter 4 probes the question of space in the making of an East Asian empire. A 
concept that is unexplored and seemingly unrelated to social scientific thinking, space 
generated an enormous amount of academic writing, and even played an important role 
in the emergence of a new social scientific discipline, geopolitics. Contrasting and 
comparing two distinct intellectual groups that developed geopolitics, this chapter 
investigates why and how Asian space was transformed from a given, natural, static and 
thus “uncivilized” space into a most dynamic and mobilizing force that attempted to 
bring the destiny of community to Asian people. This chapter also investigates the 
question of how the logic of modern development in the colony was appropriated and 
rationalized by imperial intellectuals. By closely reading the work of Ezawa Jji and 
Ryama Masamichi, two prominent social scientists, I argue that their discussion of 
maximizing productivity for Japan’s war efforts was paradoxically connected to 
emphasizing modern development in the colony.  
In the chapters that follow, I will call into question the Marxist notion of an East 
Asian community. Chapter 5 deals with the question of how Japanese and Korean 
Marxists portrayed Asia in the Asiatic mode of production debate in the mid 1930s. It 
first aims to draw a picture of Japanese Marxist social scientists in comparison to so-
called bourgeois social scientists. While bourgeois social scientists such as Ryama 
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Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi were envisioning a new theory of community in 
their critiques of universal social science, Marxist intellectuals were still preoccupied 
with the logic of universal historical development based on historical materialism. By 
revisiting the Asiatic mode of production debate, this chapter examines how the concept 
of community itself was distorted by Marxist intellectuals and how these distortions 
had an impact on their later commitment to various “community” discourses. 
     Chapter 6 focuses on two prominent former Marxists, Hirano Yoshitarō and 
Moritani Katsumi, and their Asian discourses. By comparing their distinctive theories, 
this chapter aims to show how they reinterpreted the logic of community and 
accordingly theorized an East Asian community. Special attention will be paid to the 
absence of the politics of subject formation in these converted Marxists’ discourses on 
Asian community. This chapter also focuses on the problem of colonial Korea by 
closely reading the writings of Moritani Katsumi, who spent 18 years, between 1927 
and 1945, as a professor at Kyungsung Imperial University. By engaging in multi-
dimensional analyses of metropole and colony, and of Japanese and colonial 
intellectuals, I try to reveal the gap between theory and practice inherent in their 
imperial discourses. In addition, it poses one important question that should be 
seriously considered when discussing the legacy of wartime Asian discourses: How did 
the overwhelming experience of wartime mobilization and modernization impact the 
construction of postcolonial Asia, North and South Korea in particular, and the modes 
of people’s everyday life? 
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Chapter 2 
Social Sciences in Crisis: 
Regionalism and Cooperativism in Interwar Japan 
 
Japan’s invasion of Northeast China in 1931 and the construction of Manchukuo the 
following year brought about profound changes in the topography of the Japanese 
empire. It first invoked severe diplomatic conflicts with Western powers that had 
condoned Japan’s annexation of Taiwan and Korea. The United States and European 
powers were unwilling to witness the emergence of another superpower in East Asia. 
The diplomatic tension reached its apex as Japan withdrew from the League of Nations 
in 1933. On the other hand, the racial configuration of the Japanese empire underwent 
dramatic changes beginning in 1931. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the 
Japanese economy was hit by severe unemployment and an imbalance between metro 
cities and rural areas. But this was not just the case for Japan proper. Under equally 
unfavorable conditions, colonial workers rushed to Japan in search of job opportunities. 
For example, the number of Korean residents in Japan increased from 311,247 to 
798,878 over the 7-year period between 1931 and 1938.1 This influx first demonstrates 
that metropole and colony in the Japanese empire were closely interconnected from an 
economic perspective. More importantly, the racial mixture caused by migration 
became a potential threat that would jeopardize the racial hierarchy in the Japanese 
empire.  
     Such changes had an impact on the mindset of Japanese intellectuals as well. 
Most of all, it was Japanese social scientists, liberal intellectuals in particular, who 
faced a serious intellectual challenge under these changing circumstances. As the 
                                                 
1 Pak Kyung Sik ed., Zainichi chōsenjin kankei shiryō shūsei 4 (Tokyo: San’ichi shōbo, 1976), pp.63-64. 
                                                       
 30 
conflict between Japan and the West became worse, various anti-Western discourses 
flooded academia and the media. Criticizing modern values such as individualism and 
the “rationalist” world order established by the West, Japanese intellectuals advocated 
Asianism or the emperor-centered Japanism as a counter theory. On the other hand, 
totalitarian theories originating in Europe rapidly gained currency among conservative 
intellectuals. In spite of their different directions, both chauvinistic spiritualism and 
fascist movements focused on restructuring domestic politics by overthrowing the 
existing parliamentary democracy and capitalist economy. 
     More serious than the international crisis was the absence of regionalist thinking 
in the mindset of both liberal and Marxist social scientists. Advocates of anti-Western 
and totalitarian theories emerged in response to the growing conflict between Japan and 
the West, and overtly supported Japan’s imperialist moves. At the heart of such reactive 
movements lay a strong objection to Western thinking based on rationality as well as 
the world order dominated by European powers. More importantly, the so-called 
modern thinking and modernization as its result were being questioned by European 
intellectuals as well. In the wake of World War I, discourses on the limits of democracy 
and the capitalistic system rapidly gained currency. On a philosophical level, these 
discourses focused on interrogating the origins and limits of the concept of the modern 
in European society.2  
     This chapter examines Japanese social scientists’ encounter with regionalist 
thinking in the early and mid 1930s. Except for a small group of radical intellectuals, 
most social scientists rationalized Japan’s position as a colonizer in the name of 
civilization and enlightenment until the early 1930s. This explicit appropriation of 
                                                 
2 For example, see Edmund Husserl’s discussion of the crisis of the European sciences in the 1930s. 
Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis Der Europaischen Wissenschaften Und Die Transzendentale 
Phanomenologie; Eine Einleitung in Die Phanomenologische Philosophie, trans., David Carr, The crisis 
of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology; an introduction to phenomenological 
philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 
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Western universalism came to an impasse as Japan’s imperialist moves provoked severe 
criticisms from the West. Under this circumstance, many social scientists realized that 
they could not envision a new imperial order by simply resorting to the existing 
thinking in the social sciences. This observation generated various discourses on 
rationalizing Japan’s position and incorporating China and the colonies into a new order. 
Therefore, the first objective of this study is to critically investigate how the sense of 
crisis changed the mentality of Japanese social scientists and led them to create various 
alternative theories.  
    In this chapter I will critically analyze liberal social scientists’ responses to this 
international crisis and also investigate two theories of regionalism, the Asia Monroe 
Doctrine and the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc economy system. I argue that both 
liberal and conservative social scientists in the early 1930s failed to draw a picture of a 
regional community in which Japan and the rest of Asia could be united beyond the 
existing empire-colony power structure. Most of the regional discourses in the early 
1930s were preoccupied with justifying Japan’s invasion of China, leaving the domestic 
structure intact. However, social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi !"#
(1895-1980) and Shinmei Masamichi $%&'(1898-1984) realized that without 
fundamentally changing the paradoxical coexistence of so-called “democracy” at home 
and colonialism abroad, creating a regional community and convincing the rest of Asia 
of this new order would not be possible. Thus, the early part of this chapter will focus 
on showing the limits inherent in the so-called “democratic” and thus reformist stream 
in 1920s Japanese social science led by liberal intellectuals such as Yanaihara Tadao (
)*+ (1893-1961) and Nitobe Inazō'$,-./'(1862-1933). Through this, I 
highlight the “failure” of the liberalist project in Japanese social science during the 
Taisho period to overcome the dual-structure of democracy at home and colonialism 
abroad. I will then move on to the question of how the Japanese social scientists in the 
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mid 1930s who inherited the legacy of these liberal social scientists in the previous 
decades tried to link reforms of the domestic socio-political structure to a new 
regionalist thinking.  
    Constructing a new regional order was inseparable from the notion of subjectivity 
formation. Since a new East Asian order, both the conservative and liberal versions, 
aimed to embrace China and people in the colony, it also had to provide a logic through 
which people in Asia could belong to a Japan-centered regional community. To this end, 
what had to be overcome first was the single nation-state framework; that is, political 
subjectivity was only possible by one’s becoming a member of the Japanese nation-
state. The limits of democracy and the nation-state framework led the social scientists I 
will discuss in this chapter to envision a new theory of political subjectivity. Needless to 
say, the main question they posed was how the empire-colony power structure should 
be dismantled and under which political system the Chinese and people in the colony 
could be considered members of a regional community. By critically analyzing the 
limits of state socialists’ discourses on the totalitarian political system, I will show why 
both Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi came up with the unique notion of 
the East Asian Cooperative Community, which later became the theoretical backbone 
for total mobilization during the wartime period. 
  
Social Sciences in Crisis 
In the 1930s, a variety of crisis discourses awaited Japanese social scientists, who had 
enjoyed the “renaissance” of knowledge in the previous decades. To be sure, the sense 
of crisis was not so much limited to the social sciences as it pervaded the entire 
Japanese intellectual circle. The term “crisis” was inseparable from Japan’s conflicts 
with the West and thus crisis discourses were soon transformed into critiques of modern 
modes of life, individualism, consumerism and so on. Notably, anti-modern discourses 
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did not immediately replace the system of modern social scientific thinking that had 
dominated the mindset of Japanese social scientists. However, crisis discourses did not 
simply resonate within the framework of real politics. Recognizing the sense of crisis 
both in real politics and in the academic boundary of the social sciences, Japanese 
social scientists expressed anxiety over the limits of social scientific thinking in various 
forms.  
In March 1934, a 27-year-old sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō'01234'(1907-
1988), who later emerged as one of the most influential social scientists during the 
wartime period, contributed a dismally titled article to the famous journal Chūōkōron 
(The Central Review, 5678). In this article, entitled “The Tragedy of Sociology 
(
9:),” Shimizu, in a very skeptical tone, revisited fundamental questions in 
sociology – the relationship between totality and part, and between individual and 
society.3 As he himself acknowledged, the problem of sociology as tragic lay in the 
fact that the notion of civil society had been regarded as the most advanced answer to 
these essential questions. However, what Shimizu problematized was not simply the 
issue of civil society but the ontological meaning of sociology itself. In that respect, the 
German sociologist Georg Simmel captured Shimizu’s attention. Simmel observed that 
that sociology is an academic discipline that deals with questions that cannot be solved 
in essence.4 Apparently, it was the paradoxical statement that sociology cannot exist 
without unsolvable propositions, which dislocated sociology from the realm of social 
sciences.  
As many have pointed out, the term shakai (, society) had explained the 
ontological meaning of Japanese social sciences during the Taisho democracy period. 
As political scientist Ishida Takeshi has pointed out, the unique thinking process – 
                                                 
3 Shimizu Ikutarō, “Shakaigaku no higeki,” Chūōkōron 49, no 3 (Mar 1934), pp. 60-61.  
4 Ibid., p.61. 
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problem consciousness (;<) → discovering social problems (=>) 
→ solving social problems (?@) – had served as a driving force in 
envisioning an advanced society.5 Importantly, the logic of civil society, which Shimizu 
pointed out as the most advanced form encompassing state and individual, emerged in 
this thinking process. In an attempt to rescue social sciences from being an agency of 
state power, Japanese social scientists strove to theorize society as an independent space 
where autonomous individuals are guaranteed civil rights and freedom independent of 
the state. Although the term civil society was theorized by radical intellectuals such as 
Marxists as well, it was liberal intellectuals in early 20th century Japan who paid the 
most attention to concretizing it.6 
The logic of civil society in its pure sense always faces challenges as individuals’ 
profit-oriented behavior is not mediated by social norms. Social problems, therefore, 
constantly occur between individuals and society, and between individuals and the state. 
To minimize potential and actual conflicts in the web of social relations, Japanese social 
scientists strove to provide practical theories for solving social problems, and they were 
convinced that social progress could be realized through this process. However, the act 
of solving social problems never provides a solution for the essential problem inherent 
in state-society relations or society – individual relations: how could social scientists 
theorize a form of community in which these social conflicts are permanently 
extinguished? Shimizu’s lamentation about civil society was based on this observation.  
While Shimizu’s thesis at least derived from a pure academic concern, the sense of 
crisis was already foreshadowing a particular politico-economic direction for other 
social scientists. In an article entitled “Economic Theories in Crisis (ABC8D
                                                 
5 Ishida Takeshi, Nihon no shakai kagaku (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1984), pp.94-96. 
6 For a study of liberal intellectuals in prewar Japan, See Andrew E. Barshay, State and Intellectual in 
Imperial Japan : The Public Man in Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Sharon Nolte, 
Liberalism in Modern Japan : Ishibashi Tanzan and His Teachers (Berkeley : University of California 
Press, 1987). 
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E),” Hijikata Seibi FGHI (1890-1975), Professor of Economics at Tokyo 
Imperial University who later addressed the theory of controlled economy (JKAB) 
during the wartime period, asserted that contemporary economic theories based on 
individuals’ rational behavior and the theory of natural balance had failed to explain the 
existing international crisis.7 He was equally critical of Marxist economic theory, 
contending that symptoms of the current economic crisis clearly showed that 
communism would not be an alternative to the laissez faire system.8 As it became clear 
that neither liberalism nor communism could explicate the location of economic 
problems, Hijikata insisted that the state become the central actor. Accordingly, he 
targeted liberal democracy as well, insisting that the parliament must be restructured to 
support the state-controlled economic system.9  
How, then, did he redefine the concept of the individual in his new state-centered 
economic theory? Three months later, Hijikata contributed another article to the same 
journal. This time he searched for rational links between the state-controlled economy 
and what he called Japanese spirit (LMNO). He was convinced that the individual in 
capitalism had been distorted and would thus be destined to collapse. Therefore, the 
relationship between state and individual must be redefined. 
 
The control (JK) that corresponds to our ethnic spirit (PQNO), needless 
to say, is not a control that limits individuals to a certain category and thus 
must be one that rejects obstacles oppressing development within individuals. 
The reason control in contemporary capitalist economies is being condemned 
is that the pressure of capital suppresses the development of the individual’s 
personality.10 
 
Based on this observation, Hijikata continued to argue that insofar as the theory of 
marginal utility and free competition is enforced, control and balance in the capitalist 
                                                 
7 Hijikata Seibi, “Keizai riron no kiki,” Keizai ōrai 7, no.13 (Dec 1932), pp.1-11. 
8 Ibid., p. 2. 
9 Ibid., pp.10-11. 
10 Hijikata Seibi, “Tōsei keizai to nihon seishin,” Keizai ōrai 8, no.3 (Mar 1933), p.7. 
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economy would not be achieved. It was at this point that Hijikata intended to theorize 
what he called Japanese spirit. He was convinced that there had been a spirit in Japan 
that enabled the development of the individual as well as the balance and control of 
totality.11 His logic of Japanese spirit and its compatibility with a new state-planned 
economy, however, was not sufficiently articulated in the mid 1930s. Indeed, it 
reappeared 5 years later as a theory of bun (R, given role) in a book entitled The Way of 
Japanese Economics (LMAB
). Here, Hijikata sought the sustainability of a 
total society in individuals’ moral behavior. Morality, however, was depicted as if it 
could only be accomplished when individuals faithfully follow their roles given by the 
state.12 In this way, Hijikata intended to rationalize a control economy through terms 
that were inexplicable from a social scientific perspective, and this, as I shall discuss 
later in detail, gives us an example of how Japanese social scientists in the 1930s hid 
themselves under abstract spaces such as traditional Japan or Japanese spirit. 
Why, then, did the sense of crisis in the social sciences become widespread 
among Japanese social scientists, who had enjoyed the “renaissance” of knowledge 
over the past few decades? What kind of alternative thoughts did they develop 
afterwards? Apparently they were heavily influenced by crisis discourses on modernity 
that first emanated from Europe. On the other hand, the limits of the social sciences 
were appropriated to depict Japan as the victimized in the Europe-centered international 
order. 
In January 1933, Chūō University professor Kawahara Jikichirō S)TU4
(1896-1959) wrote an article entitled “The Poverty of Political Science (#V
W
X).” As one may easily anticipate through this title, Kawahara touched acutely upon 
the limits of modern political science. However, this article was dissimilar to the 
                                                 
11 Ibid, pp.9-13. 
12 Hijikata Seibi, Nihon keizaigaku no michi (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1938), pp.134-158. 
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previous two articles by Shimizu and Hijikata in that Kawahara projected his discontent 
with modern political science directly onto the particular political situation Japan was 
facing. He drew special attention to the diplomatic conflict between Japan and the West 
over the 1931 Manchurian Incident, and basically viewed the League of Nations as 
representing the voices of European countries. Instead of directly opening fire on the 
League of Nations, Kawahara tried to theorize this diplomatic conflict as an issue of 
objectivity in modern political science. Since Plato and Aristotle, Kawahara contended, 
the basic analytical unit in political science was the nation-state.13 He continued to 
argue that the necessity of establishing an objective international organization such as 
the League of Nations emerged since intellectuals and politicians naturally represent the 
interests of their own countries. However, he was adamant that the League of Nations 
had already lost the value of, in his words, kōheimushi (7YZ[, fairness and 
impartiality) in the process of dealing with the Manchurian Incident.14 Therefore, it 
was described as an international organization lacking objectivity. In this way, 
Kawahara appropriated the notion of objectivity in modern political science as a way to 
highlight Japan’s position as the victimized in international politics.  
Japan’s invasion of Northeast China in 1931 was a political prescription to break 
through the economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. However, Japan’s 
occupation of Manchuria, which culminated as Manchukuo which was founded in 1932, 
did not bring what it longed for. The expanded trade between Japan and Manchuria 
seemed to help recover the Japanese economy, but it did not fundamentally cure the 
basic problem of the imbalance between technology-centered heavy industry and the 
tattered agricultural sector. Takahashi Korekyo \]^0 (1854-1936), who became 
Ministry of Finance in December, 1931, attempted to rejuvenate the economy by 
                                                 
13 Kawahara Jikichirō, “Seijigaku no hinkon,” Keizai ōrai 8, no.1 (Jan 1933), p. 175.  
14 Ibid., pp. 173-182.  
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strengthening the Japanese Yen in the international currency market, but this policy 
incurred severe criticism from European powers.15 As Bruce Cumings has argued, the 
hierarchy among the economic powers was so solidly established in the early 1930s that 
Japan could not escape from the position of late-comer imperial state simply by 
annexing extra territories in Northeast China.16 
However, Japan’s one-dimensional military policy in Northeast China immediately 
caused hardships to both diplomacy and domestic politics, and more importantly, it 
dramatically changed the mindset of Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular. 
Between 1931 and late 1932, most Japanese intellectuals were convinced that Japan 
could end this diplomatic conflict favorably within the framework of the existing 
international order. They were rather anxious that this international crisis would be 
appropriated as an excuse by right-wing extremists to dismantle the democratic order at 
home. In fact, on May 15, 1932, a group of young right-wing officers in the Navy broke 
into the Prime Minister’s residence and assassinated Inukai Tsuyoshi, who had been 
taking a moderate position in dealing with diplomatic issues with the West. It was a 
symbolic incident that uncovered dormant conflicts between right-wingers and liberal 
intellectuals and bureaucrats regarding their understanding of the international order. 
Ultra-nationalists had maintained the firm belief that the existing international order 
established right after the end of World War I had represented the interests of European 
countries. Therefore, they persistently pressed liberal politicians and intellectuals to 
claim Japan’s special position in East Asia. However, liberal intellectuals were hesitant 
to position Japan as a particular country and rather adhered to the perception that it 
                                                 
15 Matsuura Masataka, Nitchū sensōki ni okeru keizai to seiji (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1995), 
pp. 42-43. 
16 Bruce Cumings, “Archaeology, Descent, Emergence: Japan in British/American Hegemony, 1900- 
1950,” in Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian eds., Japan in the World (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1993), pp. 79- 113; Bruce Cumings, “Japan’s Position in the World System,” in Andrew Gordon ed., 
Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 34- 63. 
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must be conceived of as belonging to the universal international order represented by 
the League of Nations. The Washington correspondent of the Tokyo Hōchi Newspaper, 
Karl Kiyoshi Kawakami displayed this mentality very well: 
 
All that needs to be said is that Japan has sought no special rights or 
privileges in Manchuria, or anywhere in China. Even since she began the 
intervention she has concluded no new agreement or obtained no new 
concessions in Manchuria. All that she has been trying to do there is to 
enforce or give effect to the agreements and treaties which China has violated 
or has refused to execute for no valid reason.17 (Emphasis added) 
 
Yet international circumstances became increasingly hostile to Japan as it continued to 
claim Manchukuo as its legitimate state. It eventually reached the critical point of 
considering withdrawing from the League of Nations. Although a number of liberal 
intellectuals were concerned about the aftermath of extreme self-isolation, it suddenly 
became a fait accompli that Japan would withdraw from the League of Nations, which 
indeed took place in 1933.    
The urgency of the international situation concerning the League of Nations 
sparked fierce debates over Japan’s future direction vis-à-vis the international order. 
Liberal social scientists were still anxious that leaving the League of the Nations would 
further marginalize Japan’s position in the existing Europe-centered international order. 
For example, Nitobe Inazō, a pioneer of colonial policy studies as well as a leading 
liberal economist, suggested that Japan should persuade the world to recognize its 
civilizing mission in China.18 He was thus opposed to withdrawing from the League of 
Nations. Notably, Nitobe’s internationalism was premised on his firm belief that 
colonization is the dissemination of advanced civilization to the underdeveloped. Such 
                                                 
17 K. K. Kawakami, Japan Speaks On the Sino-Japanese Crisis (New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1932), p. 95. Notably, this book was not just a publication by a newspaper reporter. Prime Minster Inukai 
Tsuyoshi wrote the introduction of this book and The New York Times also showed keen interest in this 
work. Under these circumstances, this book was printed three times in 1932 alone. 
18 Nitobe Inazō, “Kokusairenmei ni okeru manshūmondai,” Chūōkōron 47, no.2 (Feb 1932), pp. 41-46. 
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an epistemology had already been appropriated to justify Japan’s annexation of the 
existing colonies: the Ainu, Okinawa, Taiwan and Korea. Hence, it was not so much an 
internationalist or regionalist theory as an affirmation of the liberal imperialism first 
developed by Adam Smith.19 
     Nitobe’s adherence to Adam Smith’s theory reveals the essential dilemma that 
Japanese social scientists, liberal intellectuals in particular, were facing in the early 
1930s. Regionalist thinking never received attention in the social sciences during the 
Taisho Period. Except for China, which was regarded as a country Japan must 
eventually enlighten, the rest of Asia was simply conceived of as part of Japanese 
territory. Hence, the notion of internationality or regionalism was applied only to 
Japan’s relationship with the West. In this process, colonies were never given the status 
of a regional unit in the social sciences and this annexation was always justified in the 
name of civilization and enlightenment, as best illuminated in Nitobe’s work. To 
borrow Andrew Gordon’s concept, it generated a unique dual-thinking process called 
imperial democracy in the social sciences.20 The development of parliamentary 
democracy at home in the 1920s, Gordon has argued, functioned as a means to 
rationalize imperialist consciousness in the rest of Asia. For example, liberal social 
scientists like Nitobe strove to devise liberalist solutions for colonial reality and 
rationalize colonization as a gateway to modernization. Marxist social scientists were 
less concerned with criticizing Japan’s imperialism abroad than with focusing on class 
struggle at home.21 As a consequence, regionalist thinking remained a vacuum space in 
                                                 
19 For a study of Nitobe’s internationalism, see Thomas W. Burkman, “Nationalist Actors in the 
Internationalist Theatre: Nitobe Inazō and Ishii Kikujirō and the League of Nations,” in Dick Stegewerns 
ed., Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian brotherhood, or world 
citizenship? (London: Routhledge, 2003), pp. 89- 113. 
20 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991). 
21 Gordon writes, “[T]he evidence for labor attitudes toward empire and imperialism is ultimately 
ambiguous. The proletarian camp went on to make considerable political gains in the mid-to-late 1930s, 
persisting in its domestic critique of capitalism and its call for social reform, but returning to the themes of 
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1920s Japanese social sciences. 
     Therefore, at the heart of crisis discourses on the social sciences was the 
intellectual challenge of how a new paradigm would overcome the theoretical limits of 
the dual-thinking structure. As a matter of fact, social scientists’ responses to these 
challenges were yet to be concretized, as many liberal social scientists intended to stick 
to the old theory. However, Japan was already dexterously carrying out its new order 
project in real politics. With the foundation of Manchukuo in 1932, slogans like Pan-
Asianism or Japanism appeared conspicuously in major journals.22 To be sure, these 
ideologies did not have a concrete theoretical structure either, let alone a social 
scientific paradigm within them. However, they easily obtained readership and captured 
attention from intellectuals as well as ordinary people under the situation of intellectual 
vacuum on the part of social sciences. This gap provided intellectual grounds for non-
scientific and irrational political slogans to widen their currency more rapidly than ever. 
 
The Asian Monroe Doctrine and the Bloc Economy System 
Under these circumstances, some social scientists attempted to concretize a regionalist 
perspective so as to rationally explain Japan’s current situation. Yanaihara Tadao, 
Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, addressed the concept of the 
“line of sovereignty” in an article he contributed to the journal Kaizō shortly after 
Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations.23 This theory, reminiscent of former 
Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo’s theory of “line of interest,” was based on 
Yanaihara’s observation that not all territories in the world can be defined by the 
modern theory of sovereignty. Yanaihara contended that no political sovereignty was 
                                                                                                                                            
empire and emperor with extraordinary alacrity and verve. This makes the twelve-year interlude (1919-
1931) of working-class anti-imperialism seem to us now a fainter and more fragile vision than it may have 
been.” Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan, p.230. 
22 For example, see “Nihonshugika shakaishugika” Nihonhyōron 11, no. 6 (June 1936), pp.5-39. 
23 Yahaihara Tadao, “Manmoshinkokkaron,” Kaizō 14, no. 4 (Apr 1934), pp. 18-29. 
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established in Manchuria and Mongolia in a modern sense. This observation led him to 
argue that special relationships between these entities and a certain nation-state may 
occur based on particular interests.24 According to him, Japan had developed historical 
and cultural interactions with them and this granted Japan a legitimate right to establish 
what he called a “Manchu-Mongolian state.” In fact, what Yanaihara really intended to 
address in this highly ambiguous political theory was a very simple notion, that is, 
Japan’s “advance” to Northeast China had nothing to do with imperialism.25 
Yanaihara intended to inject rationality into Japan’s invasion of China by 
addressing the “exceptionalism” or “vacuum” in modern political science, not in 
Japanese social sciences. To be sure, Yanaihara’s thinking was a much more evolved 
form of rationalization, compared to the theory of Nitobe, who outspokenly affirmed 
colonization as a form of civilization, and by whom Yanaihara himself was taught 
colonial policy studies. However, such an attempt to rationalize Japan’s new order by 
attributing it to the limits of modern social science did not receive much attention from 
most Japanese social scientists. Most liberal social scientists were still preoccupied with 
the necessity of maintaining democracy and capitalism at home, and accordingly 
warned that parliamentary democracy would be jeopardized by right-wing extremists.26 
I argue that this explains why two regional theories – the Asia Monroe Doctrine and the 
Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc theory – gained currency among Japanese 
social scientists beginning in 1932. The former represented a diplomatic solution for 
Japan’s crisis caused by the Manchurian Incident and the latter focused on economic 
aspects.27 In many cases, these two theories were discussed simultaneously to explain 
                                                 
24 Ibid., p.20. 
25 Ibid., pp.24-26. 
26 For example, See Minobe Tatsukichi, “Gikaiseido no kiki,” Chūōkōron 46, no.3 (Mar 1931), pp. 3-12.  
27 A number of articles regarding the Asia Monroe Doctrine appeared in major journals. Some of them 
include Imura Shigeo, “Tōyō monrōshugi no keizaiteki kiso – nichiman keizai brokku yori kyokuto keizai 
brokku e,” Gaikōjihō 672 (Dec 1932), pp.45-58; Tagawa Ōkichirō, “Ryōbe to tōa no rukye to hirukye – 
kyokutō monroshugi wo minishite,” Kokusai chishiki 14, no.6 (June 1934), pp.41-50; Rōyama Masamichi, 
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the political economy of Japan’s new order. For example, Imura Shigeo, an expert on 
Chinese economics, argued that the laissez faire liberalism had de facto ended at the 
turn of the 20th century and monopoly capitalism had already transformed the world 
economy in a new era. He then discussed the necessity of establishing a Japan-
Manchuria-China economic bloc to protect Asia from the West’s economic 
exploitation.28 Therefore, the concept of the Asian Monroe Doctrine was, for Imura, 
not so much a concrete political paradigm as it functioned as a spiritual buffer zone 
dissecting the East from the West.  
     It is important to note that the Monroe Doctrine itself was not a political theory 
but a diplomatic policy first promulgated by the 5th president of the United State, James 
Monroe in 1823. Its core logic was to initiate an America-centered regional sphere 
throughout the Americas that could not be violated by European powers. It had been 
amended many times since then and Franklin Roosevelt revisited it to redefine 
American exceptionalism in the 1920s. However, being “exceptional” in the 20th 
century version of the Monroe Doctrine did not mean that the United States would 
adopt a substantially different system from Europe. In short, it was never intended to 
particularize the United States from the international trend of liberal democracy and 
colonial capitalism, nor did it aim to transform the socio-political system in Latin 
America by the United States. It was contrived by the United States to rationalize its 
hegemony over the Americas but was a very limited diplomatic policy from the 
beginning. 
     Ironically, the very limitedness of the Monroe Doctrine attracted liberal 
intellectuals in 1930s Japan. Bureaucrats and social scientists believed that just as the 
Monroe Doctrine had been recognized as a legitimate form of regionalism, Japan’s 
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version of an Asian Monroe Doctrine could take the same path. Tachi Sakutarō _`3
4 (1874-1943), for example, was outspoken in arguing that it was absurd for Western 
countries, the United States in particular, to condemn Japan for advocating the 
principles of “Asia for Asiatics,” while they had established hegemony in their 
territories.29 In short, by “equally” dividing the world into several spheres of influence 
where leading nations in each region preserved exceptional privileges, advocates of the 
Asia Monroe Doctrine attempted to defend Japan’s influence over East Asia. For this 
reason, this diplomatic theory has strong affinities with the bloc-economy system in 
two ways. First, both theories were intended to create a so-called self-sufficient space in 
East Asia free from the influence of Western imperialism. Second and more importantly, 
they sought to intensify Japan’s hegemony in East Asia without changing the domestic 
social structure.   
Neither the Asian Monroe Doctrine nor the bloc-economy system was concretized 
regional theories although they ostensibly aimed to establish a regional community. As 
Hijikata’s return to spiritualism exemplifies well, moving from rational individuals to 
an omnipotent state was not accompanied by a sophisticated analysis of the state-
individual relationship. Pan-Asian ideologies based on traditional, cultural, and thus 
non-scientific Asian similarities rapidly acquired readership among intellectuals. The 
fact that Manchukuo was adopting the bloc-economy system but at the same time 
emphasizing religious affinities among Asians shows how spiritual Pan-Asian 
ideologies were rapidly penetrating the vacuum space where universal social science 
was no longer dominant.  
Under these circumstances, social scientists were placed in the position of having 
to create a theory that would rationally reorganize both the domestic social structure 
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and Japan’s position in the regional order, not merely justify military invasion through 
diplomatic rhetoric as best illuminated in the Asian Monroe Doctrine. Second, the 
newly envisioned regional system had to be applied to people in the rest of Asia, 
thereby extinguishing the hierarchy between empire and colony. In short, Japanese 
social scientists in the early 1930s were prompted to create the logic that would later 
provide the theoretical basis for the East Asian Cooperative Community.30  
 
Return to the State: State Socialism and the Absence of Subjectivity 
As I have discussed, social scientists’ encounter with crisis discourses developed in 
various directions. While a group of intellectuals aimed to concretize diplomatic and 
economic theories such as the Asia Monroe Doctrine and the bloc economy system, 
these notions were characterized by their division between domestic structure and the 
international order. In spite of differences, advocates of the Asia Monroe Doctrine and 
the bloc economy system intended to prevent discourses on Japan’s crisis in the existing 
world order from being appropriated as an excuse to fundamentally restructure the 
domestic system. It is noteworthy that liberal intellectuals’ discussions of rationalizing 
Japan’s territorial expansion, as best described in the internationalism of Nitobe Inazō 
and Tachi Sakutarō, did not contain any speculations on how their new international 
order should be associated with domestic reforms. Maintaining a steadfast belief in the 
liberal democracy and capitalism that they believed Japan had accomplished in the past 
few decades, they rather insisted that reactionary movements would jeopardize the 
domestic system.  
    However, it is important to note that crisis discourses emanating from Europe were 
inseparable from restructuring the domestic structure. For European intellectuals, 
                                                 
30 For a conceptual analysis of total war, see Yasushi Yamanouchi, “Total War and Social Integration: A 
Methodological Introduction,” in Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann and Ryuichi Narita eds., 
Total War and “Modernization” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp.1-39. 
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German and Italian intellectuals in particular, the crisis in the international order was 
much more closely related to envisioning a paradigm shift in the domestic structure, 
thereby intensifying hegemony in the international order. In an effort to overcome the 
limits of democracy and the laissez faire system, these European intellectuals revisited 
the concept of the state and as a result, various notions of state-centered social theories 
appeared in the early 1930s. While most liberal intellectuals in Japan were preoccupied 
with maintaining democracy and the capitalist system, another group of intellectuals 
showed keen interest in these newly emerging state-centered theories. In contrast to 
German and Italian intellectuals, who attempted to associate state theories with the 
international order, these Japanese social scientists were primarily concerned with 
questioning the logic of civil society in domestic politics and rehabilitating the state. 
Before moving to these state-oriented theories in early 1930s Japan, let me first discuss 
their newness as well as uniqueness   
    To begin with, although both national socialism and fascism were gaining 
currency in Europe, their inception in Japan explicitly took the form of state socialism 
(a). The reason state socialism gained currency in Japan is closely related 
to the intensity of critiques against civil society or class struggle theory in early and mid 
1930s Japan. For example, pointing out the ambiguity between minzoku and nation (
P) in Japanese social sciences, political scientist Ishida Takeshi has highlighted this 
anti-democratic tendency as returning to an ethnic community (PQbc) from the 
notion of class struggle.31 However, Ishida’s seemingly convenient categorization is 
ambiguous as well, since most advocates of state socialism did not simply subordinate 
their socialistic orientation to the state. State socialists were on the blacklist of the 
government censorship, simply because they did not officially dismiss socialism. For 
this reason, it is not so much a matter of replacing class with state as a task of closely 
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examining the complex aspects of state-society relations in mid 1930s Japanese social 
sciences. 
Second, as Ishida himself acknowledged, the emergence of the term minzoku P
Q in his analysis mostly involves social scientific discussions that appeared in the late 
1930s by non-Marxist intellectuals such as Rōyama Masamichi and Takata Yasuma \
def'(1883-1972).32 Given that they were de facto non-Marxists, the term minzoku, 
for them, was not a substitute for class, either. Rather, as I shall discuss in detail in the 
following chapters, the connotations that both nation and minzoku signified in their 
theories were very fluid from the beginning. For this reason, it was misleading to 
presuppose that the emergence of either state or minzoku in late 1930s Japanese social 
sciences was conceptualized in the narrow context of the Japanese state or the 
Japanese people, as clearly shown in Ishida’s discussion.     
     Therefore, what is important is to closely trace the emergence of the state as a 
central force in various totalitarian theories in the mid 1930s as well as to examine its 
limits. In so doing, one may draw a comprehensive picture of how state-centered 
totalitarian thinking and its theoretical drawbacks foreshadowed the advent of co-
organic and cooperative theories in the late 1930s, as best exemplified in the East Asian 
Cooperative Community. This transformation is closely related to the observation that 
neither statism nor state socialism in the mid 1930s developed a sophisticated analysis 
of state-society or state-individual relations, although they aimed to overcome the limits 
of democracy and civil society. Precisely for this reason, state socialists’ efforts to 
envision a new type of subjectivity were focused on how the state as an omnipotent 
organ should absorb individuals and society under its control. However, the rhetoric of 
anti-capitalistic subjectivity formation did not explain how individuals would serve as 
                                                 
32 Ishida mainly criticizes Rōyama Masamichi and his theory of community. However, Ishida’s critiques 
invariably focus on Rōyama’s writings after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, based on his 
participation in the Showa Research Institute. Ibid., pp.142-148 
                                                       
 48 
an organ of the state. Nor did it contain any speculations about how the state-centered 
system would operate as a driving force to incorporate colonial subjects into the empire. 
Consequently, the lack of subjectivity formation in state socialism and its Japan-
centeredness was observed by another group of social scientists, who showed keen 
interest in the cooperative system. In the pages that follow, I examine the content of 
state socialism and its limits as a regional theory.  
Notably, state socialism itself was not a theory that first appeared in Japanese 
academic circles in the mid 1930s. The famous Marxist theoretician Takabatake 
Motoyuki \gh'(1886-1928), who translated Marx’s Das Kapital into Japanese 
several times, advocated state socialism in the late 1920s.33 Takabatake contended that 
social association, political and economic, is based on human beings’ social instinct (
Mi), which is nothing but egoism. Human beings’ egoism, however, is much 
more complex than that of other creatures, and for this reason it often generates social 
conflicts. He was thus convinced that this state of conflict would not be fundamentally 
resolved unless human beings returned to what might be called the status of primitive 
society.34 This observation by Takabatake bears a striking resemblance to the basic 
theory of mainstream laissez faire economics that preconditions human beings as profit-
oriented creatures. However, it did not lead him to endorse capitalism as the most 
appropriate system for human society. By transforming a nation into what he called a 
commodity, he argued, the capitalist system constantly reproduces class struggle caused 
by economic interests. Therefore, Takabatake argued adamantly that capitalism had 
failed to produce a nation (P) that possesses patriotism for the state. He was equally 
critical of Marxism, which refers to the state as simply a “committee” for the bourgeois, 
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34 Takabatake Motoyuki, Kokkashakaishugi taigi (Tokyo: Nihon shakaishugi kenkyūsho, 1932), pp.12-17. 
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and therefore called for the necessity of state-centered socialism.35   
     Given that Takabatake’s state socialism was shaped as he became critical of 
Marxism in the late 1920s, it can be said that his theoretical orientation focused on the 
limits of Marxism rather than transforming it into an actual social force. For this reason, 
his turn to patriotism sounds somewhat abstract and naïve from the perspective of the 
social sciences. Nonetheless, his “pioneering” articulation of state socialism apparently 
foreshadowed the spread of various state-oriented theories in the mid 1930s and it was 
Waseda University professor Hayashi Kimio jklm'(1883-1947) who came to the 
forefront in this stream. 
    Taking the position of secretary in the Academic Association for Japanese State 
Socialism (LMa
n), founded at his alma mater in April 1932, Hayashi 
published his first major book on state socialism, entitled “The Principles of State 
Socialism (a)C)” in the same year. He observed that state socialism 
first pertained to a state in which all kinds of socio-political, economic and cultural 
conflicts have been eliminated. Therefore, the concept of the social in his state 
socialism was indicative of a kind of equilibrium forced by state power.36 Here, what is 
more important is how Hayashi came up with his totalitarian theory in his harsh 
critiques of both Western totalitarian and liberal thoughts. 
While acknowledging that the term state socialism did not exist in the West, 
Hayashi emphasized the necessity of “Japanizing” this Western totalitarian thought. He 
was convinced that although totalitarian theories emerged as an anti-thesis to liberal 
democracy, they emanated from the notion of organism inherent in Western liberalism. 
He was convinced that social theories based on the contract between individuals and 
state were not compatible with the case of Japan, where statism had been the ultimate 
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principle.37 Therefore, Hayashi’s project of Japanizing Western political theories began 
with criticizing the concept of organism in the West. Here, what captured his attention 
were the writings of Jeremy Bentham.  
 
Jeremy Bentham, an English philosopher at the end of the eighteenth century, 
explained the aim of the state as “the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number,” but the idea of “the happiness of the greatest number” is not 
integralistic, but individualistic; for the number is calculated by regarding an 
individual as its unit, and he considers the State as a mechanical group of 
individuals. This idea is rejected from the integralistic standpoint, which 
regards the State to be an inseparable organic unity above individuals…. In 
an organic body, what is important is only life as a whole. The individualistic 
theorists of the State regard individuals – who are mere cells in the State – as 
the supreme beings.38 (Emphasis added) 
 
Although utilitarianism advocates the maximization of individuals’ happiness, it also 
recognizes the necessity of social norms and rules to mediate conflicts between 
individuals’ pursuit of happiness and social order. As Bentham’s notion of Panopticon 
well suggests, individuals’ act of pursuing happiness can occur only in a closed world 
where they are always under invisible surveillance. Importantly, the statement above 
does not reveal that Hayashi was an anti-organist, but it rather shows his unique 
understanding of organism. Given that Hayashi clearly portrayed the state as an organic 
unity, it seems evident that he also based his state socialism on a kind of an organist 
theory. But his repugnance for individuals as autonomous subjects in a state organ 
created an intentional misunderstanding of the Western organism. 
Therefore, at the heart of Hayashi’s critiques of Western organist theories lay his 
strong anti-individualism. He was convinced that the amalgam of individuals’ 
happiness would never be realized as the collective good of the totality. This line of 
thinking was clearly illuminated in his understanding of Italian fascism. The 
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cooperative system between labor and capital in the Italian fascist movement, Hayashi 
asserted, would further separate that movement from the ideal of state socialism.39 In 
other words, Hayashi’s state socialism showed a kind of compulsory epistemology 
against the notion of the political in which individuals’ subjective resolution would 
work for the totality of a society. For this reason, the political in his theory was only 
possible in state organ without autonomous individual subjects. 
Interestingly, Hayashi’s highly problematic approach to the state was heavily 
criticized even by right-wing intellectuals. Minoda Muneki odpq (1894-1946), a 
famous right-wing critic who was at the forefront of attacking liberal and socialist 
intellectuals, dismissed Hayashi’s state socialism as an empty rationalism and ethics 
that lacked humanity.40 By presupposing the state as an omnipotent organ that controls 
the politics, ethics, law and religion of kokumin P, Minoda argued, the state became 
a trans-moral institution beyond a scientific analysis. Therefore, he did not hesitate to 
criticize the theory of Hayashi and like-minded state socialists as being fundamentally 
derailed from social science. However, the real discontent of Minoda, whose writing 
was substantially distanced from social scientific thinking as well, focused on the 
temporal aspect of Hayashi’s theory. In other words, by subordinating humanity to the 
state, Minoda believed, Hayashi’s state socialism eradicated the historicity of the 
Japanese state, whose principle was the spiritual integration of the Japanese people 
under the Emperor system.41 This explains a facet of the tension among conservative 
intellectuals in the mid 1930s regarding the question of how the Emperor should be 
defined in a new political system.  
More serious than the problem of temporality was the question of how state 
                                                 
39 Ibid., pp.238-242. 
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socialists positioned the spatiality of their theory. In other words, once the state became 
an ultimate unit of analytical thinking, state socialism would only operate in the 
boundary of a single nation-state. Notably, this concern was not fully discussed in the 
early state socialism of Takabatake, who died in 1928. This problem also appeared in 
Hayashi’s discussion of state socialism, which invariably disclosed Japan-centeredness.  
In 1932, Akamatsu Katsumarō rst'(1894-1955), a Tokyo Imperial 
University graduate and a student of political scientist Yoshino Sakuzō Uu`/
(1878-1933), published a book entitled “The Basis for a New National Movement ($
Pvwxy)” Apart from the fact that he used the term “national movement,” 
which was apparently rejected by other state socialists, what is unique is that Akamatsu 
devoted much of this work to envisioning what he called an Asian version of state 
socialism. He first critically analyzed that internationalism in Marxism is based on the 
monolithic perception that the proletariat in every country is and should be imbued with 
class struggle consciousness.42 If individual differences within the proletariat are 
ignored, he asserted, this monistic observation of internationality in Marxism is nothing 
but utopian socialism, which, he believed, became the main reason for the failure of a 
series of international socialist movements.43 For him, the most serious problem was 
racial and ethnic conflicts among the proletariat.44  
The observation above explains how Akamatsu understood fascism in Europe. 
He basically viewed it as an economic movement manipulated by financial capital. The 
state monopolizes financial capital and this necessarily enables the state to control 
industrial capital. In this process, the fascist state completes the nationalization of the 
whole economy. Based on this observation, Akamatsu was convinced that fascist 
movement will be closely associated with chauvinism, thus weakening the 
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internationalization of the economy.45 However, Akamatsu was adamant that this 
nationalization of the economy would rather reinforce the state-centered capitalist 
economy and argued that the state manipulates peasants and the working class by 
propagandizing that they would be liberated from the status of the “slave of debt”.46 In 
short, the nature of fascist movements in Europe was, for Akamatsu, a highly economic 
and essentially capitalistic movement that is fundamentally different from state 
socialism.  
As a matter of fact, not only state socialists but also leading social scientists in 
Japan shared the observation that fascist governments in Europe were deceiving 
destitute peasants and the poor urban working class. Shinmei Masamichi, Professor of 
Sociology at Tohoku Imperial University, acutely pointed out the limits of German 
fascism: 
 
National socialism’s attack on capitalism based on its middle-class-oriented 
ideology is superficial. This is due to the fact that the limits of its middle class 
ideology have been already preconditioned…It is certain that the middle class 
decisively takes a non-negating attitude toward capitalism, compared to that 
of the proletariat. As long as the ideology of the middle class is spontaneous, 
it would return to the affirmation of capitalism in the end. Because the 
ideology of national socialism takes nothing but this natural sentiment of the 
middle class, national socialism would be hardly away from affirming 
capitalism, even if ideological artificiality is added to it.47 (Emphasis added) 
 
The above remark by Shinmei, who was in Germany by the time he contributed several 
articles on European fascism to the journal Keizai ōrai, is telling in two ways. First, he 
was precisely aware that the German fascist movement appealed to the spontaneity of 
middle-class workers; that is, they are against big business by nature. Therefore, the 
German fascist government tended to draw support from them by claiming that it 
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would accelerate the nationalization of bourgeois capitalists and big businesses. 
Shinmei observed, therefore, that fascist movements always resort to nationalist 
sentiment. This led him to make his second observation about fascist movements; that 
is, fascism is easily associated with racist politics. Shinmei pointed out the paradox that 
although the German middle class were fascinated by the government policy to 
nationalize big business and finance capital, they were completely silent about the 
government’s attack on the Jewish middle class.48 Although both Shinmei and 
Akamatsu were critical of German national socialism from different perspectives, they 
had in common the observation that the capitalist system and democracy were being 
replaced by a new socio-economic structure.  
How, then, did Akamatsu conceptualize the internationality of his state socialism? 
In a roundtable discussion on the European fascist movements, he first asserted that in 
order to protect Japan from the monopolizing tendency of European powers, it must 
initiate what might be called single-nation socialism (). As for his notion 
of single-nation socialism, he referred to the Soviet Union’s planned economy as a 
realistic example.49 Akamatsu’s proposal of the Soviet Union as a model for Japan’s 
rosy future, however, soon provoked harsh criticism from other participants, who 
argued that by focusing on its own people, the Soviet Union’s monopolistic economy 
did not recognize its neighbors as its competition partners, and could hardly serve for 
the general good of the proletariat in the world.50  
    As for these critiques, Akamatsu attempted to rationalize his state socialism by 
pointing to its cosmopolitan ideal. He maintained that the new definition of 
internationalism must be that inferior ethnic groups form a united front and resist 
against the monopolizing interests of superior ethnic groups. To this end, he concluded 
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that a realistic internationalism ought to be based on the guiding spirit that facilitates the 
equalization of the living conditions of various ethnic groups on a world level.51 
Akamatsu observed that the world was being divided into several politico-economic 
blocs – the America-Latino bloc, the British Empire bloc and the Russia bloc. However, 
he was opposed to the idea that Japan’s bloc economy system should be based on 
capitalism. He instead proposed what he called a Greater Asian socialist bloc. He wrote 
it: 
Greater Asianism in the past was for exploitation. However, it was not based 
on the principle of the Kingly Way ideology. (z) The principle of the 
Kingly Way Ideology must serve not for exploitation but for the realization of 
harmony among ethnic groups. To this end, we must construct a socialist 
Japan that possesses supreme culture. As long as Japan adheres to its 
capitalistic status, it has neither the qualification for the Asian international, 
nor the qualification for guiding Manchukuo.52 
 
Assuring Japan’s leading role in establishing a Greater Asian socialist bloc, Akamatsu 
believed, would necessitate a fundamental transformation of the domestic structure. 
Here, he advocated the importance of a national movement (Pvw). To be sure, his 
concept of a national movement was different from that of Germany, which he 
condemned as capitalistic. His notion of a national community instead envisioned the 
future of Japanese minzoku; that is, social and political conflicts would all be eradicated 
through what he called national spirit (PQNO).53 
     To be fair, Akamatsu was at least aware that his notion of single-nation socialism 
had to be regionalized to embrace the rest of Asia. Moreover, he also recognized the 
necessity of the politics of subject formation in his emphasis on a national movement. 
Therefore, he insisted that a national party be organized to realize what he called 
Greater Asian socialism. However, the way he intended to infuse subjectivity into the 
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people of East Asia was to return to such transcendental notions like ethnic spirit. In this 
way, the concept of the political in Akamatsu became increasingly esoteric and as a 
result, political subjectivity was conceptualized as producing spiritually homogenous 
subjects, an idea which could not be explicated from the perspective of the social 
sciences.  
 
The Concept of the Political: Regionalism and Cooperativism 
Not surprisingly, state socialism as politics without political subjects became the target 
of harsh criticism, even by other social scientists. For example, Kada Tetsuji {d|}'
(1895-1964), Professor of Sociology at Keio University who later became one of the 
leading advocates of the East Asia Cooperative Community and a multi-ethnic empire, 
pointed out the shallowness of state socialism’s concept of nation and minzoku. He 
observed that a nation in Hayashi’s state socialism is portrayed as a mechanical entity 
of minzoku.54 Since Hayashi defined minzoku PQ in a very intrinsic way, as a group 
of people sharing the same blood, Kata argued, no socio-political explanations can be 
found in Hayashi’s theory regarding why minzoku should be transformed into nation. 
Quite the contrary, Kada emphasized that minzoku itself is formed in the relations of 
production in capitalism. Therefore, the conflict between the East and the West, he 
asserted, was a racial conflict, but rather stemmed primarily from economic relations.55  
The prevalence of state socialism and fascism in early 1930s Japan, in spite of 
their theoretical limitations, provides a key to understanding the direction of wartime 
Japanese social sciences. First, Japanese social scientists were preoccupied with the task 
of contriving the logic of community, national or ethnic, that would serve as a platform 
for total mobilization for Japan’s war efforts. Second, that believed that by abolishing 
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the distinction between metropole and colony, the East Asia community must achieve 
regional rationality, thus justifying Japan’s role in Asia. Therefore, from a social 
scientific perspective, the blueprint for the East Asian Cooperative Community had to 
be at once subjective and objective, national and regional, and totalistic and individual.  
     Tokyo Imperial University political scientist Rōyama Masamichi was one of 
those who delved into the question of a new direction for the social sciences in the early 
1930s. To highlight Rōyama’s notion of the political, it might be useful to see how he 
understood internationality and accordingly criticized nationalism. He basically 
observed that political science represented by nationalism did not meet with the 
political demands of total society that emerges to overcome the limits of national 
boundaries. He went on to argue that since nationalism was based on the geographical 
demarcation of national governmental institutions, it was necessary to establish 
international politics to destroy the obstacles that national had created.56 
Therefore, Rōyama’s early concept of political science, as many have argued, was 
primarily concerned with maximizing the potential of what he called international 
politics beyond the limit of national borders.57 The notion of internationalism 
continued to occupy the central place in his political theory after the outbreak of critical 
international events – the Great Depression in 1929 and the Manchurian Incident in 
1931. However, its content changed markedly as he began viewing the world order 
from a completely new perspective. To begin with, Rōyama maintained that the old 
regional order sustained by the League of Nations had come to an end, since he 
believed that European powers could no longer appropriate internationalism as a means 
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to justify their international order. Hence, he observed that new forces such as the 
independence movement in India and the Soviet regime in Russia would not follow the 
Europe-centered world order.58 Based on these observations, he insisted that a new 
regionalism should be based on “recognizing particular situations that a certain region 
has in terms of the interrelations between nations or kokumin (P).”59 
     This logic first enabled him to revisit the Manchurian Incident from a new 
perspective. The particular situation in Manchuria, he asserted, could not be fully 
explained in terms of the current international order or existing political theories. 
Instead, he aimed to redefine this incident as a critical moment in the world order 
dominated by world capitalism.60 Notably, he did not simply remain in the ivory tower 
in making political statements. Rōyama involved himself in real politics by joining the 
Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.61 Insisting that Japan had 
developed “special relations” with Manchuria, he argued that the only way to solve this 
problem of Manchuria “would seem to lie in the reconsideration of Japan’s assertion of 
a special position” and efforts “to safeguard Japan’s substantial interests in 
Manchuria.”62 He also participated in a special government-led research group whose 
goal was to find a way to resolve Japan’s situation in Manchuria. A year after the 
outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis, Rōyama wrote a unpublished book entitled Policies 
for Resolving the Manchurian Problem (~?@).”63  
    One may wonder how Rōyama differed from other conservative social scientists, 
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in that he also intended to rationalize Japan’s invasion of China. First and foremost, his 
notion of internationalism was not simply focused on diplomatic relations with the West. 
Instead, he placed great emphasis on restructuring both the domestic and the regional 
political structure to convince both Japanese and colonial subjects to embrace a new 
order. However, he was critical of the existing regionalist theories such as the Japan-
Manchuria-China economic bloc system. His critical gaze also targeted the Asia 
Monroe Doctrine, which, he believed, would function as a mere diplomatic policy, 
leaving the domestic political system intact.64 As for the economic bloc system, he 
asserted, “[T]he term bloc-economy is by all means an artificial term, since no political 
system exists that connects Japan with China or other Asian countries.”65 He was 
convinced that such theories would serve national interests rather than the good of a 
regional community. This statement clearly demonstrates that for Rōyama, regionalism 
first pertained to the question of how the concept of the political beyond national 
interests should be theorized in a certain area.  
    Rōyama’s seemingly radical thinking, however, raises one fundamental question. 
He had emphasized what he called international politics in his adamant critiques of 
nationalism. However, he also justified Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, contending that 
“special” relations and interests must be recognized in a regional order. How, then, 
could Rōyama theorize “special” relations outside the boundary of a nation-state? This 
provides us with a clue to understanding the dialectical aspect of his regionalist thinking. 
On a microscopic level, his theory had to embrace particular modes of life that each 
community had sustained. To describe it macroscopically, it also needed to mediate 
conflicts between state and individuals, and among ethnic groups.  
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     In pursuit of a new theoretical breakthrough, Rōyama also showed keen interest 
in newly emerging political theories of the time such as German national socialism and 
Italian fascism. He paid special attention to the logic of how these totalitarian theories 
aimed to diminish socio-economic inequality and create spontaneous subjects for 
mobilization. In this way, the notion of community or cooperativism first captured 
Rōyama’s attention in the early 1930s. But it was not only Rōyama who was attentive 
to totalitarian and cooperative theories in Europe. After obtaining a professorship at 
Tohoku Imperial University, Shinmei Masamichi embarked on a trip to Germany. 
During his stay in Germany between 1929 and 1931, Shinmei experienced totalitarian 
movements in Germany and Italy more vividly than any other Japanese social scientist. 
He contributed articles to the famous journal Keizai ōrai on contemporary political 
situations in Europe during his stay, which played an important role in introducing 
fascism and cooperativism to Japanese academic circles.66     
    What captured Shinmei’s attention was the concept of cooperativism inherent in 
both German and Italian fascism. A cooperative community essentially arises out of an 
economic demand to overcome the social and class conflicts between labor and 
capital.67 According to Shinmei, the main difference between a cooperative community 
(c) and an association () lay in the fact that the former functions as a 
political organization in itself, while the latter is viewed as a highly economic 
organization, thus having little impact on political issues. Cooperativism in Italian 
fascism, Shinmei argued, emerged in an attempt to replace parliamentary politics.68 
Each cooperative community has different collective goals, at times coming in conflict 
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with other cooperative communities. Therefore, they must belong to a grand 
community that eventually represents what might be called a central cooperative bureau. 
In this way, Shinmei concluded that cooperativism aims to mediate socio-political 
conflicts by creating a goal-oriented political space based on organic processes.  
It is understandable that Shinmei, who stayed in Germany between 1929 and 
1931, and witnessed a strong racist tendency in German national socialism, was 
influenced by the Italian fascist movement, which, he believed, at least was not based 
on racism. However, he was also clearly aware that this rosy ideal political totality 
faced certain obstacles from the beginning. First, he pointed out that Italian cooperative 
thought, which is traceable to the 1910s, presupposes the disappearance of class once 
cooperative communities begin to function effectively. But he observed that powerful 
class hierarchies still exist even at this stage and this makes it harder for cooperative 
communities to function as mediators.69 Second, Italian cooperativism was also 
premised on the perception that cooperative communities shape horizontal relations 
both with other communities and with the state. Under this system, individuals become 
autonomous political subjects, not controlled predominantly by the state. Hence, the 
emergence (=) of individuals that was emphasized in socialism continues to 
develop in each cooperative community. Shinmei observed, however, that these 
hypotheses are barely realized when homogeneous national interests come to the 
forefront. In this respect, he concluded that Italian cooperativism actually existed as a 
mere functional system for the fascist state, and accordingly, he redefined it as a 
cooperative state (ca) rather than cooperativism.70 
     Shinmei’s analysis of cooperativism posited two important questions as Japanese 
social scientists were searching for alternative social scientific methodologies. The first 
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question entails the issue of how a new form of political totality can be represented 
without resorting to the existing parliamentary system. The Italian version of 
cooperativism demonstrated well that a cooperative community will not function 
effectively insofar as political leaders’ decision-making eventually tops all other 
cooperative processes. Second and more importantly, the political space of 
cooperativism never exceeds that of the state in reality but rather sustains the state’s 
dominance over all other socio-political sectors. At stake was the issue of whether in the 
case of imperial Japan, reforming the domestic structure based on state cooperativism 
was likely to absolutize the Japanese state, thus creating inconsistencies with the 
regional order beyond the limits of nationalism.  
     In the same year Shinmei articulated his ideas about cooperativism, Rōyama also 
showed keen interest in this new political theory. Clearly aware of the problem of the 
state as a dominant agency in European totalitarian theories, Rōyama insisted from the 
beginning that the concept of the political must be distinguished from the concept of the 
state.71 This observation was logically connected to Rōyama’s unique understanding of 
political functionalism. Unlike Shinmei, who criticized the functionalist tendency in 
cooperativism under the Italian fascist regime, Rōyama saw functionalism as a way to 
overcome the dominance of the state in real politics. In order to capture Rōyama’s 
position more clearly, it might be useful to discuss his understanding of the relationship 
between modern politics and political functionalism. He contended that political 
science itself had existed as “a function (`) of constructing an order in human life.” 
He went on to argue that modern political science, however, had already lost the 
principle of constructing an order, and therefore had been reduced to the narrow realm 
of maintaining an order.72  
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This observation by Rōyama reveals his basic approach to the concept of the 
political. He was much less concerned with politics or political theory per se than with 
how something called the political actually functions and operates in real life. At the 
heart of Rōyama’s interest in new political theories, cooperativism in particular, was the 
question of how he could rationally create political spaces where the notion of political 
subjectivity functions to overcome the limits of the nation-state. In this way, a regional 
community was presented by him as a new political dimension. This also explains why, 
as Victor Koschmann has argued, Rōyama also showed interest not just in European 
totalitarian theories but also in the Soviet planned economy as well as the American 
New Deal policy.73   
    Given that modern political science had simply served to maintain the status-quo, 
and totalitarian theories were aiming to create another monolithic society, what kind of 
new agendas did he set up and how did he gradually direct himself to the notion of 
cooperativism? Returning to his 1935 articles, I argue that Rōyama’s critiques of 
modern political science were heavily influenced by the German political thinker Carl 
Schmitt and the American political scientist William Yandell Elliot (1896-1979). 
Rōyama first categorized the conceptual basis of political entities into three patterns – 
confederative (), totalitarian () and cooperative co-organic (cE
) . According to him, the confederative notion represents the combination of 19th 
century individual liberalism and party politics in the 20th century, that is, liberal and 
parliamentary democracy in a conventional sense. The totalitarian concept that emerged 
in the recent German political movement and its theoretical elements, Rōyama 
emphasized, were concretized by Carl Schmitt. Lastly, the cooperative co-organic 
notion is based on the observation that the two aspects of political totality – rational and 
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conscious versus irrational and organic – must coexist in harmony. Rōyama calls the 
third notion “co-organism (cE8)”, and it was an American political 
scientist, William Elliot, who elaborated on this theory in his comparative research on 
the pluralistic theory of state and fascism.74  
    Given that Rōyama, like other Japanese social scientists, was already aware of the 
limits of what he called the confederative concept of political totality, how did he view 
Carl Schmitt and German fascism? To answer this question, it might be worth briefly 
discussing Schmitt’s concept of the political. In a 1931 book, Der Begriff des 
Politischen, later translated as The Concept of the Political, Schmitt delineated his 
notion of politics, as he put it: 
 
German political science has originally maintained (under the impact of 
Hegel’s philosophy of the state) that the state is qualitatively distinct from 
society and higher than it. A state standing above society could be called 
universal but not total, as that term is understood nowadays, namely, as the 
polemical negation of the neutral state, whose economy and law were in 
themselves nonpolitical.75 (emphasis added) 
 
Clearly distinguishing totality from universality, Schmitt attempted to denounce the 
notion of the state as the ultimate destination of modern political science. However, this 
remark came as no surprise to Japanese social scientists, since many of them were 
already imbued with the idea that the state merely constitutes part of a total society.76 
What is rather striking in Schmitt’s concept of the political was how he defined what he 
called a political entity:  
 
The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore 
coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will 
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thus always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which 
embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political 
world is a pluriverse, not a universe…. The political entity cannot by its very 
nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire 
world.77 (Emphasis added)  
 
In this way, Schmitt revealed his understanding of universality and one can easily find a 
trace of dialectical thinking in his theory. A political entity was defined by him as 
recreating itself in its oppositional but mutual relation with another political entity. 
Rōyama also agreed with this observation and it might be no exaggeration to say that 
Rōyama’s critiques of rational universality in modern political science stemmed from 
Schmitt’s theory. This also explains the fact that the new orders in Rōyama and Schmitt, 
the East Asian Community and the German Empire respectively, were not envisioned 
under the project of establishing an alternative universal nation state in a conventional 
sense.  
However, while showing similarities in outlining the external contour of political 
entity, Rōyama and Schmitt developed substantially different perspectives in discussing 
the internal dynamics of the political. As the Italian political philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben has recently argued, Schmitt’s denunciation of rationality in modern political 
science is represented by the observation that political arenas are not limited to 
institutional sectors. In other words, the exceptional exists outside the domain of 
rational political behavior within institutional sectors and the very presence of the 
exceptional defines the political.78 Therefore, sovereignty in Schmitt’s theory occurs 
only when one can declare an emergency. () According to this logic, a political 
subject does not recognize the location of his sovereignty until he is positioned in the 
border between legal domains and domains outside the legal.79 Therefore, central to 
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Schmitt’s concept of the political is the observation that it is political leaders who 
determine and declare the exceptional.   
Rōyama conceptualized Schmitt’s theory as a threefold structure. Instead of the 
conventional twofold structure, the state and the people, Rōyama argued, Schmitt 
suggested one in which political leadership mediates the relationship between the state 
and the people.80  
     Therefore, in order for political leaders to achieve monolithic support from 
ordinary people, Schmitt’s theory must be expanded to socio-psychological domains 
over legal systems. The political in Schmitt must create an internal and spiritual space 
that connects people to political leaders.81 Rōyama further argued that this logic had 
already generated numerous problems in economic sectors where leaders’ will and 
individuals’ profit orientation collided with each other. Precisely for this reason, 
Rōyama contended that Schmitt’s political theory would be highly likely to be 
appropriated to justify dictatorship while appropriating sovereignty. I argue that as early 
as in the mid 1930s, Rōyama seems to have understood why racism would inevitably 
play a central role in German national socialism. Moreover, although Schmitt 
repeatedly denounced the universality of the state, his political theory never 
transcended the border of the state as an analytical unit. This did not correspond to 
Rōyama’s regionalist perspective and he argued for the need to search for a cooperative 
and organic theory.  
                                                                                                                                            
normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation 
exists…All law is “situational law,” The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He 
had the monopoly over this decision. Theirin resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which must be 
juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The 
exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s authority. The decision parts here from the legal 
norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on 
law.” Carl Schmitt, George Schwab ed., Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.13.  
80 Rōyama, “Seijiteki tōitsu no sho riron (1),” p.12. 
81 Ibid., p.14. 
                                                       
 67 
For these reasons, Rōyama did not think that Schmitt’s notion of the political, in 
spite of its numerous insights, would be applicable to the project of changing the 
political structure in Japan. A month later, Rōyama contributed another article on 
cooperativism. This time, he turned to what he called co-organic theory, the third 
pattern in his categorization of the political entity. He first defined co-organic theory as 
a theory of an internal and organic entity that links social groups and partial societies. In 
fact, this theory derived from The Political Revolt in Politics, William Elliot’s magnum 
opus. Elliot wrote:  
 
Such a theory of the relation of the state to other groups flows from a 
conception of the nature and functions of group life for which I propose the 
term co-organic as opposed either to the contractual or to the organic 
conceptions…The common ends which groups serve must fall into a scheme 
of moral values. The associational scheme of any political society assumes a 
character at once organic, economic, and functional. But the ordering of this 
functional realm can only assume moral character through a coherent scheme 
of ideal values.82   
 
At the center of Elliot’s somewhat rosy picture of a co-organic community lay the 
question of how different interests in different groups could be “organized” and 
represented as a collective and moral values. Here, Rōyama differentiated co-organism 
from organism. For Rōyama, organism was concerned with the process of leading 
individuals and groups to realize what he called a goal-oriented and self-conscious 
unification through institutional means such as law and order. Rōyama called this 
concept the perception of organizing (), borrowing the term from the 
American political scientist Ernest Barker (1874-1960).83 However, this conception of 
organism, Rōyama argued, neglects traditional and cultural aspects in a society that take 
place outside the arena of goal-oriented and rational activities. In other words, the 
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organizing idea as a collective goal at times occurs outside non-organized sectors such 
as religion, customs and ethnicity. Therefore, co-organism as a synthesizing principle 
must be based on both rational and organizing ideas and non-rational and 
environmental factors. In this context, Rōyama viewed Elliot’s co-organism as a more 
advanced version of organism.84 
    Morality in Elliot’s theory thus was not an abstract value per se. It instead 
represented a functionally idealized destination in co-organism. Each organ in a society 
operates co-organically and self-consciously to achieve its goals. This did not 
necessarily mean that both Rōyama and Elliot denounced the state and the 
constitutional system. Constitutionalism as a political system, Rōyama contended, 
represents the “[M]oral responsibility that arises out of the common consciousness 
which is one element of co-organic theory.”85 In other words, constitutionalism is not 
so much a rational and formal process of reaching what might be called a national 
intentiona;and driving people toward it, but an ethical and moral means to 
safeguard the creation and recreation of a co-organic entity. Thus, a co-organic entity 
was described as intrinsically self-changing in itself. Therefore, as Victor Koschmann 
has argued, politics was, for Rōyama, radically redefined as the constant process of 
creating structures. It is in this context that Rōyama’s unique notion of the community 
of destinyvbcemerged.86    
     How, then, did Rōyama conceptualize regionalism in his notion of East Asian 
Community? Similar to the way he categorized the theories of political totality into 
three patterns, he divided regionalism in three ways as well – exclusive regionalism (
), inclusive regionalism () and cooperative regionalism 
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(c). According to him, exclusive regionalism pertained to the 
Tokugawa regime and its seclusionism, and Japan’s exposure to world capitalism since 
the Meiji Restoration. In contrast to the previous two notions of regionalism, which 
were based on exploitation and imbalance, the principle of cooperative regionalism, 
Rōyama argued, must be to ensure regional balance and development.87 To this end, he 
also postulated the necessity of defining East Asia in a spatial sense.  
 
A region called East Asia has perpetually existed in a natural and 
geographical sense since the beginning of the earth. But, if we think about 
East Asia in a cultural sense, it is possible to say that unlike the West, it has 
not been considered an entity. A regional cooperative community, by nature, 
must have something other than natural and perpetual elements or cultural 
unification… The driving force that makes East Asia a regional cooperative 
community first lies in its spirit and mentality. It is generated through the 
essence of the regional destiny (Raumschicksal) of its minzokuPQ. The 
destiny that determines the existence of minzoku must be produced by the 
significance of unifying the destiny to certain regions.88    
 
Importantly, the “spirit” that Rōyama emphasized does not represent something 
transcendental. It instead occurs through the very process of co-organism. For this 
reason, East Asia as a region in Rōyama’s thinking is not static, nor too is the destiny of 
the East Asian community. Both East Asia and its destiny must negate and recreate 
themselves in the subjective and objective logic of cooperativism. In that respect, 
Rōyama’s wartime social science stayed far from the myth of objectivity in 
conventional social sciences and it bore a striking resemblance to philosophical 
approaches to total war, the Kyoto School of Philosophy for example. In the end, 
Rōyama’s new concept of the political and social sciences attempted to rationalize the 
Asian Pacific War and provide a logic basis for total mobilization.   
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Conclusion  
The limits of liberalism during the Taisho period became self-evident as Japan 
confronted the international crisis in the early 1930s. In an attempt to cope with 
pressure from the West and at the same time justify Japan’s position in China, Japanese 
social scientists developed various regional discourses. Their responses to the 
international crisis first demonstrated that the “liberal” notion of developing democracy 
and capitalism at home and rationalizing colonialism in the name of civilizing mission 
during the Taisho period would no longer become the solution for the international and 
domestic crises Japan was facing. However, many regional discourses such as the 
Japan-Manchuria-China bloc economy and the Asia-Monroe Doctrine simply aimed to 
maintain the status quo without changing the paradoxical dual-structure of democracy 
at home and colonialism abroad. On the other hand, state socialists appropriated the 
international crisis to overthrow the democratic regime at home and establish a 
totalitarian government. However, their state socialism lacked regionalist thinking, or 
subjects outside Japan should be included in their new order and, most importantly, it 
also lacked the notion of political subjectivity. In their theory, individuals were 
portrayed as being subordinated to the state without having any political autonomy. 
    It was under these circumstances that Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi 
developed regionalist thinking in the mid 1930s. Although they were heavily influenced 
by the champions of 1920s Japanese social sciences such as Yoshino Sakuzō, they tried 
to overcome the spatial and theoretical limitations of the Taisho social sciences by 
radically redefining the concept of the political. Both Rōyama and Shinmei were clearly 
aware that producing a regional theory and thereby rationalizing Japan’s dominant 
position in East Asia must be associated with creating new political subjects. To this 
end, they envisioned a new space called the East Asian Cooperative Community in 
which the empire-colony power structure was dismantled and transformed into a new 
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form of cooperative identity. They sought to theorize an East Asian community in 
which the subjectivities (shukansei, ) and heterogeneousness of Asian people 
were organically converged into what Rōyama called the community of destiny. In this 
sense, their project of establishing new social scientific thinking was in fact one of 
creating a subjective social science. (	
). 
    The newness of their social scientific thinking rapidly gained currency and played 
an important role in forming a group of social scientists who advocated the theory of 
the East Asian Cooperative Community (Tōakyōdōtairon, c8) during the 
wartime period.89 In the chapters that follow, I will disuses how these wartime 
Japanese social scientists involved in the East Asian Cooperative Community 
confronted various theoretical challenges – nation, space and community. In Chapter 3, 
I will deal with the question of why these social scientists vehemently denounced 
racism as anti-social scientific and sought to find the dynamics of subject formation 
through the concept of minzoku (PQ, nation) by focusing on two prominent 
sociologists Shinmei Masamichi and Takata Yasuma.
                                                 
89 Shinmei Masamichi, Tōa kyōdōtai no rishō (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939); 
Kada Tetsuji, Tōa kyōdōtai ron (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939); Nihon seinen gaikō 
kyōkai ed., Tōa kyōdōtai shisō kenkyū (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939); Sugihara 
Masami, Tōa kyōdōtai no genri (Tokyo: Modan nihonsha, 1939). 
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Chapter 3 
The Social Scientific Creation of a Multi-Ethnic Empire: 
Discourses on Race, Nation and Colonization 
 
In a 1939 book entitled Nation and Culture (PQ), Komatsu Kentarō s
34 (1894-1959), one of the most influential sociologists in prewar and postwar Japan, 
made an interesting point about “becoming” Japanese, while at the same time Japan 
was conducting a full-scale war against China: 
 
For example, one elite young Japanese man who does not have a sense of 
ethnic identity happens to go to work for a trading company near the Yangtze 
River upon graduation. If this young man is condemned, lynched and robbed 
of his belongings by a man from a certain country for no reason other than 
because he is Japanese, he will naturally feel that his ethnicity has been 
insulted. If his wife is violated on the street for no reason, he will feel the 
same way. In these cases, irrespective of his Japanese consciousness, he 
becomes Japanese as a natural man.1  
 
To be sure, this statement by itself does not allow us to assess the intellectual depth of 
Komatsu’s discussion of ethnicity. However, one might observe from it that the 
problem of ethnic conflict in the Japanese empire became so complex that leading 
social scientists like Komatsu indirectly disclosed their fear of ethnically-motivated 
reprisals against the Japanese in Japan’s occupied territories. I stress here that I do not 
intend to make the preposterous argument that fear of ethnic and racial discrimination 
against the Japanese was equivalent to that suffered by Japan’s colonial subjects. 
Komatsu’s seemingly naïve statement nonetheless shows how anxiety over the prospect 
of ethnic revolts within the Japanese empire gradually permeated the mindset of 
Japanese social scientists. It also indicates that the term minzoku (PQ), often 
ambiguously translated as “race,” “ethnos,” or “nation,” and which had not been an 
                                                 
1 Komatsu Kentarō, Minzoku to bunka (Tokyo: Rishōsha, 1939), p.45. 
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object of social scientific study precisely because of this ambiguity, rapidly gained 
currency among Japanese social scientists in the late 1930s.2 
     Therefore, it is not surprising that leading Japanese social scientists, including 
Kada Tetsuji'{d|}'(1895-1964), Koyama Eizō " (1899-1983), 
Komatsu Kentarō s34 (1894-1959), Shinmei Masamichi $%& (1898-
1984) and Takata Yasuma \def'(1883-1972), were all simultaneously involved in 
ethnographic studies during the wartime period. These figures also came to the 
forefront in developing a unique theory called “The East Asian Cooperative 
Community (c).”3 Therefore, it would hardly be possible to understand 
their wartime Asian discourses without critically examining their ethnographic studies. 
     In this chapter, I will examine Japanese social scientists’ discourses on race and 
minzoku in the 1930s and early 1940s. Their encounter with the notion of minzoku was 
closely related to the observation that neither scientific racism nor racial science in the 
Western social scientific tradition would support the project of constructing a multi-
ethnic empire.4 Therefore, the concept of minzoku and its interpretation first explain 
one facet of the intellectual tension between Japan and the West, Germany in particular. 
However, I do not intend to simply highlight the superficial tension between Western 
social science and Japanese intellectuals. I instead will show that these imperial social 
scientists’ encounter with the concept of race and ethnicity played an important role in 
                                                 
2 As I shall discuss in detail, the term minzoku has connoted plural meanings in Japan. It was often 
conceived of as conceptually the same as race or ethnic community. On the other hand, it signifies nation 
in the context of one’s belonging to a modern nation- state. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, I will 
use the Japanese word minzoku for the term  rather than race, ethnos, or nation.  
3 As I shall discuss in detail, social scientists such as Shinmei Masamichi, Kada Tetsuji, Koyama Eizō, 
and Takata Yasuma simultaneously produced the notion of East Asian Cooperative Community in the late 
1930s. See for example, Shinmei Masamichi, Tōa kyōdōtai no rishō (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai 
shuppanbu, 1939); Kada Tetsuji, Tōa kyōdōtairon (Tokyo : Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939). 
4 For Japanese social scientists’ critiques of racism in the 1930s and early 1940s, see Tessa Morris Suzuki, 
“Debating Racial Science in Wartime Japan,” in Osiris, 2nd series 13 “Beyond Joseph Needham: Science, 
Technology and Medicine in East and Southeast Asia,” (1998), pp. 354-375; Kevin Doak, “Building 
National Identity Through Ethnicity : Ethnology in Wartime Japan and After,” Journal of Japanese 
Studies 27 (2001), pp. 1-39. 
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their revisiting the discussion of identity formations in the Western social sciences.  
     In critically reading wartime social scientists’ works on race and ethnicity, one 
may need to keep in mind the fact that Japan emerged as a modern nation-state as it 
colonized its Asian neighbors beginning in the 1870s. Japanese intellectuals had 
developed various discourses on race and ethnicity as they faced changes in the colonial 
constitution of imperial Japan. The terms race and minzoku had been very ambiguously 
appropriated in both the political arena and academia in prewar Japan. The ambiguity 
was closely connected to prewar Japanese intellectuals’ seemingly illogical attempt to 
rationalize the superiority of the Japanese race while the same time emphasizing racial 
similarities among Asian people to justify Japan’s colonial rule in Asia. This gives us a 
clue to understanding why the social scientists I will deal with in this chapter 
problematized the limits of racial and ethnic discourses in both prewar Japanese and 
Western social science. They were clearly aware of the inefficacy of the existing 
discussion of race and ethnicity in light of the fact that the racial and ethnic 
configuration of the Japanese empire was undergoing fundamental changes beginning 
in the early 1930s.  
    Based on these observations, I will dedicate the first part of this chapter to 
examining the question of how Japanese intellectuals developed discourses on race and 
ethnicity in relation to Japan’s ongoing relations with the colonies, colonial Korea in 
particular. To this end, I will pay special attention to the ethnographic studies of Torii 
Ryūzō, a prominent Japanese anthropologist who conducted extensive research in 
Taiwan, Manchuria and Korea. A close and critical reading of his works will show the 
ambiguous nature of discourses on race and ethnicity in prewar Japan. In the second 
part of this study, I will deal with social scientists’ encounter with the term minzoku 
beginning in the mid 1920s. In particular, I explore the question of how and why 
sociologists became involved in ethnographic studies in the 1930s. To this end, I will 
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focus on two prominent sociologists, Takata Yasuma and Shinmei Masamichi, and their 
early sociology. Third and most importantly, I will examine the theory of a multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural empire developed by Japanese social scientists during the wartime 
period. By critically analyzing Takata Yasuma’s theory of East Asian nationalism (tōa 
minzokuron, PQ8) and Shinmei Masamichi’s notion of national sociology 
(minzokushakaigaku, PQ
, I will show how these imperial social scientists 
intended to rationalize Japan’s colonization and imperial war through the notion of a 
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empire. 
 
The Ambiguity of Race and Racism in Early 20
th
 Century Japan 
Racial science was developed and served as a scientific tool for tracing the origins of 
racial groups in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, it is often considered 
indistinguishable from the political ideology, that is, racism. As many have pointed out, 
students of racial science have constantly tried to position it within the realm of 
“objective science” by claiming that its main concern is to objectively find physical and 
cultural differences among races. In contrast, scientific racism explicitly takes the form 
of a political belief that the superiority and inferiority of races can be scientifically 
proved and objectified.5 As Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein have correctly 
argued, scientific racism has played an important role in producing and circulating a 
“universal” belief throughout the 20th century to rationalize the homogeneity and 
superiority of a national community over other racial groups.6 Scientific racism, in 
spite of its ostensible differences from racial science, also pretends to take the form of 
scientific and objective knowledge. In this way, racial science and scientific racism 
                                                 
5 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class 
and the Anti-Racist Struggle (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-20. 
6 Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London, New 
York: Verso, 1991), pp.15-68. 
                                                       
 76 
have been appropriated in highly ambiguous ways by European intellectuals. Advocates 
of racism first attempted to appropriate “objective” knowledge accumulated from the 
field of racial science and constitute the logic of a racial hierarchy based on them. In 
order to rationalize the superiority of one race to the other, they must establish the 
concept of pure race; that is, there must be a group of people who share the exactly 
same physiological characteristics. This logic produced another ambiguity: is it possible 
to scientifically theorize a pure race and rationalize its racial superiority to other races? 
Together with European intellectuals, Japanese intellectuals also had to face this 
conundrum in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Since the American anthropologist Edward Morse’s pioneering work Japanese 
Homes and Their Surroundings, the first English language work that extensively 
discussed the origins of the Japanese race, was published in 1886,7 a number of 
methodologies and theories on race and ethnicity were introduced to Japan. Politically 
speaking, racial theories that originated from Europe were first appropriated 
paradoxically by Japanese intellectuals in their critiques of Western racism toward 
Asian races. However, what struck Japanese intellectuals most was the fact that that the 
more they turned to what might be called objective modern racial science, the more 
clearly they realized that it would be impossible to prove the pureness of the Japanese 
race. In an 1890 essay, “On the Japanese Race (nihonjinshuron, LM 8),” the 
renowned philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō ¡¢|T4 (1856-1944) discussed the 
heterogeneousness of the Japanese race: 
 
In the Japanese race (jinshu, ), there exists a minzoku (PQ'that came 
                                                 
7 Edward Morse, Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1886). 
Edward Morse was already famous as a scholar among Japanese intellectuals in the 1870s. In 1874, he 
discovered shell mounds in the Omori area during his self-funded research trip to Japan. These ruins were 
later called the Omori kaizuka (	
) and have been considered of monumental importance in 
explaining the origins of the Japanese people. Between 1877 and 1878, Morse taught anthropology and 
Darwin’s theory of evolution at Tokyo Imperial University. 
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from the Korean peninsula in ancient times, and there exists the southern 
minzoku that came from the Southern Seas. The Ainu have been mixed with 
the Japanese race and the Chinese have migrated to Japan.8 (Emphasis 
added) 
 
This statement by Inoue was based on two interesting observations. One was concerned 
with his conviction that tracing and historicizing the origins of the “pure” Japanese race 
is virtually impossible. Therefore, he accepted the natural science-oriented notion of 
race that had demonstrated the multiple and heterogeneous origins of the Japanese race. 
More importantly, he used the terms race   and minzoku PQ indistinguishably, 
as if they denoted the same concept. This ambiguity made him unable to further discuss 
conceptual differences between the two. For this reason, Inoue eventually took the 
double standard in distinguishing the Japanese race from others, arguing that in spite of 
its salient similarities with other Asian races, the Japanese race also has its own 
particular cultural elements – language, customs and so on- that could become the 
sources of pure Japaneseness.9 In this way, Inoue understood that the pureness of a 
certain race is not a given but is socially and scientifically constructed. 
    Not surprisingly, the perception of similar origins among Asian races was 
politically appropriated by many Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats. On the one 
hand, the physiological and genetic commonness among Asian races provided an 
excuse for Japan to colonize its neighbors under the guise of protecting Asian races 
from Western imperialism. On the other hand, it often led to conflict with those 
advocates of scientific racism who had claimed that discrimination between Japan and 
its colonies must be justified based on the superiority of the Japanese race. In this way, 
the explicit belief in racial superiority on the part of Japanese intellectuals was often 
concealed as they constantly spread the rhetoric of unifying Asia to fight against 
                                                 
8 Inoue Tetsujirō, Tetsugaku to shūkyō (Tokyo: Kōdōkan, 1915), p. 785.  
9 Ibid., pp. 794-795. 
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Western racism toward Asians.  
Beginning in the 1920s, Japanese intellectuals once again appropriated this early 
version of Pan-Asianism in criticizing the immigration policy of the United States 
toward the Japanese and the Chinese.10 Hostility to American racism represented by 
the “yellow peril” thus became a very useful basis for propagandizing a theory of Asian 
unification. The notion of racial science based on Asian similarities supplied empirical 
evidence for a kind of Asianism, effectively transforming the science of searching for 
physiological and cultural differences among races into an anti-Western political 
ideology. In short, at the heart of the ambiguity in discourses on race in early 20th 
century Japan was the conundrum of how the notion of race could fulfill Japan’s 
double-layered desire: to maintain its colonial hierarchy by creating a pure and superior 
Japaneseness inherent in its history and culture, and at the same time to scientifically 
rationalize its colonial governance through Asian sameness. 
     As Japan continued its territorial expansion, contesting discourses on the notion 
of race became even more complex. In contrast to the colonization of the Ryukyu and 
the Ainu, which was conceived of by Japanese intellectuals as simply restoring these 
territories to Japan, the colonization of Taiwan and Korea generated enormous tension 
with regard to the general principle of colonial governance. Necessarily, racial scientists 
and ethnographers became deeply involved in the process of producing new governing 
technologies. A number of ethnographers committed themselves to various 
government-funded research projects, and the discourse they produced focused most 
frequently on Korea. Most of these racial science projects were focused on collecting 
historical, biological and genetic evidence to prove the foregone conclusion that the 
                                                 
10 When the United States government enacted its new immigration law that restricted the influx of the 
Japanese and Chinese to the United States in 1924, it immediately shaped a strong anti-American racist 
tendency in Japanese academic circles. For example, see Mitsukawa Kametarō, Tōzai jinshu tōsō shikan 
(Tokyo: Tōyō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1924). 
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Japanese and Korean people have the same racial origins. Among the ethnographers, it 
was Torii Ryūzō £¤¥¦ (1870-1953), often called the father of Japanese 
anthropology, who played the most important role in spreading this logic in his theory 
of nichisendōsōron (Lc§8¨Japan and Korea as having the same ancestor). 
    Born in 1870, Torii first encountered the discipline of anthropological studies 
when he attended Tokyo Imperial University. He was naturally exposed to the 
intellectual streams of the time that emphasized the similarity among Asian races and 
the heterogeneousness of the Japanese race.11 Having enormous impacts on both 
anthropology and adjacent disciplines, he began conducting extensive fieldwork 
research in Korea beginning in 1910, the year of Korea’s annexation by Japan. Torii’s 
involvement in government-funded projects in colonial Korea first indicates that 
ethnography studies in Japan as part of racial science rapidly lost their “objectiveness” 
by becoming policy studies. On the other hand, as philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō, whose 
discussion of the origins of the Japanese race was heavily influenced by Torii’s theory, 
wrote in 1890,12 Torii’s involvement in colonial ethnographic studies was also 
conceived of as a good opportunity through which the seemingly weak theoretical 
ground of nichisendōsoron could be concretized as a leading theory.  
    Torii made major fieldwork trips to Taiwan and Korea in 1895 and 1910 
respectively, when the two countries were colonized.13 However, in contrast to his 
research in Taiwan between 1895 and 1910, Torii’s studies on Korean archeology and 
anthropology soon faced severe challenges as the international political climate rapidly 
                                                 
11 In 1884, Tsuboi Shōgorō  (1863-1913) founded the Association of Anthropology 
 at Tokyo Imperial University, which was renamed the Tokyo Association of Anthropology 
in 1886. Torii became a member of this association at the age of 16. In 1893, anthropology lectures 
were first established at Tokyo Imperial University and was also affiliated with this program in the same 
year.  
12 Inoue Tetujirō, ibid. 
13 For Torii’s research trips to Taiwan and Korea, see Torii Ryūzō, Kanpan ni kizamareta sekai:torii ryūzō 
no mita ajia (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku sōgō kenkyū shiryōkan, 1991), pp.8-10. 
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changed. In the aftermath of World War I, ethnic nationalism became one of the major 
forces that swept away the world order, and this was also the case for colonial Korea. 
Under these circumstances, Torii temporarily suspended his fieldwork in Korea in 
1916.14 Three years later, the March First Independence Movement took place and it 
fundamentally changed the whole socio-political climate in colonial Korea. Torii could 
no longer enjoy his privileged relations with the colonial government. 
Unquestionably, the rise of ethnic nationalism was first attributed to the larger 
discriminatory governing structure in the Japanese empire. Propagandizing the notion 
that Japan and Korea have the same ancestor in theory was inconsistent with the fact 
that the discriminatory racial hierarchy had already deeply penetrated the everyday life 
of the colonized Koreans in practice. All in all, the most serious pitfall for Torii and 
like-mined advocates of nichisendōsoron was the basic problem that racial similarities 
did not necessarily result in a feeling of ethnic commonality between Japan and Korea. 
In other words, minzoku as a social construct did not seem to be a primary concern in 
Torii’s concept of race. He was less interested in delving into the question of the socio-
political dynamics of ethnic nationalism than in tracing the origins of the Japanese race 
back to ancient times by directly linking the long history of Korea to that of Japan. 
     However, Torii was still vocal in defending his theory of nichisendōsōron even 
after the 1919 March First Movement. In 1920, a year after the outbreak of this national 
uprising, the Governor General’s Office in Korea started publishing an institutional 
journal, entitled Dōgen (c©¨Same Origin), in Kyungsung (present-day Seoul). As the 
title of journal clearly suggests, it explicitly targeted Korean nationalist intellectuals and 
spread the theory of nichisendōsōron in order to reduce room for ethnic nationalism to 
resurge in post-1919 Korea. However, many Japanese social scientists, who were aware 
                                                 
14 After 1916, Torii took only one more trip to Korea in 1932 as part of his research trip to Manchuria 
funded by the Ministry of Education, as Japan occupied Northeast China as a new imperial territory.  
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that the rise of ethnic nationalism in the colony was closely related to the discriminatory 
power structure, did not accept this point of view. They were convinced that colonial 
ethnic nationalism could not be fully explicated in the simple logic of natural-science-
oriented research. Beginning in the early 1920s, liberal social scientists such as 
Yanaihara Tadao ()*+'(1893-1961) and Yoshino Sakuzō Uu`/'(1878-
1933) called for a complete resetting of colonial policy. Not surprisingly, Torii 
vehemently criticized these liberal social scientists:  
 
One day, a friend of mine told me that Yoshino Sakuz had published an 
article in a journal, arguing that “[S]ince Koreans are racially different from 
the Japanese, a law treating them as a different race must be applied although 
they behave dangerously,” If Yoshino had argued this, I must be opposed to 
his idea of Koreans being a different race. This is not just for Yoshino, but for 
everyone that has the same opinion as him…. Koreans are not racially 
different from Japanese () and they are the same minzoku and thus 
must be included in the same category. This is an anthropological and 
linguistic truth that cannot be changed.15 (Emphasis added) 
 
The comment above clearly shows that for Torii, race and minzoku had the exactly 
same meaning. Therefore, this observation led him to conclude that Japan’s occupation 
of Korea represented the reunification of the same minzoku. On the other hand, this 
perception exemplifies the dramatic tension between social scientific discourse on 
ethnicity and Torii’s steadfast belief in “natural scientific truth.” Although Torii never 
mentioned the exact source for Yoshino’s argument, it might be useful to refer to one of 
Yoshino’s writings on colonial Korea from the 1920s to locate Torii’s ethnography in a 
more distinctive way. Yoshino vehemently argued: 
 
Koreans are subjects of the Japanese state in a legal sense. However, because 
of the fact that they cannot be treated equally as genuine Japanese, they are 
not given the same rights as Japanese. This has become the evidence that 
explains why Koreans are not Japanese, although they must be Japanese in a 
                                                 
15 Torii Ryūzō, “Nichisenjin wa dōgennari,” Dōgen 1 (1920), Torii ryūzō zenshū 12 (Tokyo: Asahi 
shibunsha, 1976), p.538. 
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legal sense… It is the moral responsibility of the Japanese that makes 
Koreans complete Japanese through constant efforts and this must be the 
basic principle of governing Korea. For this reason, as a point of departure for 
colonial policy, we must recognize that they (Koreans) have not become 
Japanese yet, and it must be the final destination of our endeavors to ask them 
to assume the duties of Japanese.16 (Emphasis added) 
 
Undoubtedly, Yoshino, the icon of Japanese social sciences in the 1920s, seemed to be 
attempting to make a reasonable-sounding point on colonial policy, although he never 
denounced colonialism per se. What is more important is that in Yoshino’s highly 
institutionalist understanding of “becoming Japanese,” there is little room for the 
monistic notion of race or ethnicity. Deploying mainly a legalist approach, Yoshino 
attempted to bring rationality to his social scientific argument of making Koreans 
become Japanese. In contrast, Torii’s impracticality reached its apex when he dismissed 
contemporary political theories such as the Wilsonian notion of ethnic self-
determination. This became a theoretical watershed for both the 1919 March movement 
and the May 4th Movement in China. In his harsh critique of this America-born theory, 
Torii reiterated his scientific “truth”; that is, the fact that Koreans and Japanese are the 
same minzoku could be a solution for ethnic problems.17  
     To be sure, discourses on race and ethnicity developed by social scientists in the 
early 1920s had a number of theoretical limitations. But, their relatively rational sense 
of recognizing social problems enabled them to provide a much more convincing 
analysis of ethnic issues in the colony. This recognition also foreshadowed the 
emergence of a new discursive space in dealing with the issues of race and ethnicity in 
the Japanese empire. The emergence of social scientific discourses on race and ethnicity 
also indicates that the search for homogeneous racial origins by returning to the past, as 
                                                 
16 Yoshino Sakuzō, “Chōsen mondai,” Chūōkōron 36, no. 1(Jan 1921), in Yoshino sakuzō zenshū 9 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), pp. 167-168. This article was originally published in Chūō kōron in 1921. 
17 Torii, “Nichisenjin wa dōgennari,” pp. 539-541.  
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best exemplified in Torii’s research in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, gradually 
lost its momentum. The tendency to view ethnicity as a social construct gained 
momentum among Japanese intellectuals and under these circumstances, social 
scientists came to the forefront in this new discursive space beginning in the 1920s. 
 
The Multi-Ethnic “National” System 
New questions arose as the limits of the discussion of the homogeneous path between 
the Japanese race and the Japanese minzoku became evident. They first pertained to the 
issue of how the Japanese minzoku should be rationally defined. Secondly, logical 
interpretations of the Japanese minzoku had to be reflected in the reshaping of 
governing discourses and technologies in the colony. First and foremost, the term 
minzoku was redefined not as intrinsic or transcendent but as a social construct. In a 
1921 book titled Ancient Japanese Culture (), the prominent philosopher 
Watsuji Tetsurō 	
(1889-1960) asserted that an ethnic group called “Japanese 
minzoku” had never existed and the Japanese race had been mixed with different races. 
Although he did not completely deny certain linkages between the Japanese race and 
Japanese minzoku, Watsuji ardently called for creating a new Japanese minzoku.18 
      Watsuji’s distinct definition of ethnicity, reminiscent of contemporary theories 
on nation and ethnicity such as Benedict Anderson’s well-known concept “imagined 
community,” was widely shared by Japanese ethnographers in the 1920s. However, the 
voices of those claiming the superiority and pureness of the Japanese race never 
completely disappeared. As a matter of fact, this new tendency to theorize ethnicity as a 
modern construct in 1920s Japan was closely connected to the question of how the 
relationship between modernization and the individual should be construed. As 
Tomiyama Ichirōhas succinctly pointed out, these social scientists were convinced that 
                                                 
18 Watsuji Tetsurō, Nihon kodai bunka (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1921), pp. 1-13.  
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it is extremely difficulty to judge whether one race is more compatible with modern 
society than another.19 Instead, they observed that racial science simply reveals 
physiological characteristics that each race has, but they were also convinced that these 
elements themselves do not denote hierarchical relations among races in terms of a 
certain race’s compatibility with modernization. Therefore, their concern was centered 
on the question of how such a historically mixed race as the Japanese race should be 
manipulated and ameliorated to cope with changes in modern society. Based on this 
observation, they believed that a new identity called Japanese minzoku must be created. 
      With the arrival of this new trend in ethnography studies, racial science in Japan 
experienced a methodological transformation. In the process of constructing a modern 
minzoku, racial scientists and ethnographers quickly abandoned efforts to differentiate 
racial characteristics between Asian races or to trace the origins of the Japanese race 
back to ancient times, as best represented in Torii’s research. Instead, they centered their 
concern on scientifically measuring and controlling within the Japanese race biological, 
genetic and social elements that were incompatible with the project of constructing 
modern Japanese society. Accordingly, new academic disciplines such as eugenics 
rapidly became popular among Japanese ethnographers. In 1924, a journal entitled 
Eugenics (	 was first published in Kobe by Koto Ryūkichi 
. In the following year, the Japanese Association of Eugenics (
) was established in Tokyo, and in the same year it began publishing a journal, 
Yūseigaku (, Eugenics).20 From the very beginning, the Japanese Association of 
Eugenics made it clear that its founding philosophy was to make progress in the 
hygienic, environmental and social conditions of the Japanese people for the sake of 
the Japanese state. To this end, it insisted that one of its academic missions should be to 
                                                 
19 Tomiyama Ichirō, “Kokumin no tanjō to “nihonjinshu”,” Shisō 845 (1994), pp. 46-47.  
20 Suzuki Zenji, Nihon no yūseigaku: sono shisō to undō no rekishi (Tokyo: Sankyō shuppan, 1983), pp. 
104-105. 
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record and manage the characteristics of the Japanese minzoku.21 
     It must not be overlooked that the Japanese state, like did other modern nation-
states, had made constant efforts to transform ordinary people into members of the 
national community. In that respect, it is an oversimplification to argue that scientific 
technologies for the construction of national subjects first began to be utilized by the 
state and intellectuals in the 1920s. However, as I have discussed, the project of 
constructing a modern national subject () through the notion of race (did 
not bear fruit during the first two decades of the 20th century. As a result, the concept of 
ethnicity emerged as a powerful theoretical tool to integrate the heterogeneous Japanese 
race into a homogenous Japanese national community. Hence, it seemed that 
ethnographers and scholars of eugenics devoted much of their academic effort to 
creating a logic that identifies minzoku with nation in terms of one’s belonging to a 
nation-state; that is, kokumin  in Japanese. If this is the case, did this notion of 
nation offer a new approach to resolving the problem of ethnic nationalism in the 
colony? How did Japanese social scientists attempt to theorize the concept of nation in 
the Japanese empire? 
     Returning to Yoshino’s legalist approach to the so-called Korea problem, I argue 
that his acknowledgement that Koreans had not become Japanese clearly showed the 
problem of colonial governance. There was no question that for Yoshino and like-
minded social scientists, Yanaihara Tadao in particular, racial similarities between 
Koreans and Japanese would no longer be a driving force to integrate Koreans into the 
Japanese empire. However, Yoshino’s seemingly forward-looking but highly naïve 
views on the Korea problem were also premised on two very problematic hypotheses. 
One was the conviction that becoming a member of a nation-state is not necessarily 
analogous to one’s becoming a member of an ethnic or a racial community. To put it 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
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another way, Koreans could and should become Japanese national subjects in the sense 
of formal nationality, irrespective of the unchanging fact that Koreans cannot belong to 
the Japanese minzoku. Second, in order to theoretically rationalize his concepts of 
nation and minzoku, Yoshino then turned to a highly institutionalized assumption, that is, 
the same application of laws, systems and cultural politics to Koreans would produce 
the same outcome as that experienced by the Japanese people.  
     As Asano Toyomi’sexcellent studies have succinctly shown, the common legal 
system between metropole and colony was established based on this universalist 
perspective in the social sciences, legal studies in particular, as clearly shown in 
Yoshino’s writings.22 Needless to say, Yoshino’s somewhat radical account of the 
Korea problem was not reflected in real politics. However, beginning in the 1920s, the 
Japanese colonial government introduced a new set of colonial policies often called 
bunka seiji (, cultural politics). By expanding legal, political and cultural 
spaces to the colony, the colonial power attempted to control spaces of dissent and 
absorb colonial intellectuals and bureaucrats into the realm of the colonial institution, 
thereby diminishing the potential for ethnic resistance. This notion, in contrast to the 
previous assimilation policy (), which aimed to eradicate the ethnic 
characteristics of the colonized, was centered on extending institutional, cultural, and 
educational opportunities to the colony in the name of naichi enchō shugi  !"#
$. It was grounded in the observation that colonial subjects have their own ethnicity 
that is saliently distinguishable from the ethnicity of those at the metropole.  
     What, then, did the colonial power envision as an ultimate solution to the 
problem of colonial ethnic nationalism? Historian Komagome Takeshi has discussed 
this issue as he theorized the concept of the multi-ethnic national system (%&'
                                                 
22 Asano Toyomi, “Kokusai jitsujō to teikokujitsujō wo meguru nihonteikoku saihenno kozō,” in Asano 
Toyomi and Matsuda Toshihiko eds., Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no hōteki tenkai (Tokyo: 
Shinzanshashuppan, 2004), pp.61-136. 
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()). According to him, this system was put into practice as intellectuals and 
bureaucrats in Japan grappled with the question of how to embrace plural ethnic groups 
in the empire while trying to diminish the potential for ethnic revolt. By granting the 
colonized legal and institutional rights, Komagome contends, the colonial power aimed 
to absorb colonial subjects into a single imperial nation-state, and the eventual purpose 
of this system was to recreate the colonized as a member of the Japanese nation-state.23 
He observed that colonial governance based on multi-ethnicity and a single imperial 
state continued in the Japanese empire from the 1920s to the early 1940s. 
     Apart from discussing Komagome’s problematic periodization, I argue that the 
multi-ethnic national system itself was not free from theoretical and practical 
limitations either. It first generated spaces of tension within Japan regarding the 
concepts of ethnicity and nationality. As Naoki Sakai has argued, although formal 
nationality is given to colonial subjects, this does not guarantee these minority people 
any sort of practical national belonging as granted by the dominant group at the 
metropole.24 As a matter of fact, even superficial policies to provide colonial subjects 
with the same legal and institutional rights in the sense of formal nationality were never 
put into practice. Rather, the project of establishing a universal imperial nation-state, 
irrespective of its practical possibility, constantly invited resistance inside and outside 
the empire. Conservative Japanese at the metropole incessantly strove to maintain the 
privileges guaranteed to them and this was also the case for Japanese residents in the 
colony. 25  
The spread of the term minzoku in 1920s Japan revealed theoretical challenges 
that Japanese intellectuals was facing. Transforming the Japanese race into a Japanese 
                                                 
23 See Chapter 4 in Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgo (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1996), pp. 191-234. 
24 Naoki Sakai, “Imperial Nationalisms and the Comparative Perspective,” positions : east asian cultures 
critique 17, no.1 (2009), p.50. 
25 Asano, “Kokusai jitsujō to teikokujitsujō wo meguru nihonteikoku saihenno kozō,” pp.61-136. 
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minzoku as a modern construct basically meant establishing a nation state with one 
ethnic group. To logically associate this with the making of a multi-ethnic empire in 
which there would be no ethnic conflict, any sense of ethnic superiority or inferiority 
had to be eradicated. Faced with this challenge, Yoshino steadfastly believed that 
institutional and political measures could realize this, but not all social scientists sided 
with Yoshino. Yanaihara Tadao, Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University 
and one of the most liberal social scientists of the time, perhaps represents another 
direction. He vehemently rejected the multi-ethnic national system: 
 
Although independent Chosun [Colonial Korea] attempted to acquire 
permanent separation from Japan, is this a matter that Japan must be 
sorrowful for? If the occupation peacefully ended through morality (the way), 
we could maintain friendly relationships with Chosun. Chosun’s being 
independent from Japan does not necessarily mean that it becomes Japan’s 
enemy. If the impoverished and destitute Yi Dynasty attains vitality and 
accumulates energy that enables it to arise as an independent country, isn’t 
this a success of Japan’s colonial policy and an honor for the Japanese 
people? Shouldn’t we be satisfied that we have completed the responsibility 
of governing Chosun?26 
 
Instability of Empire  
To be sure, such a radical prescription by Yanaihara for the Korea problem was 
premised upon his internationalist notion that the modern world is comprised of plural 
nation-states that are given equal political status. Not surprisingly, his so-called “ethical 
imperialism” was rejected by most Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats, which 
eventually deprived him of his professorship at Tokyo Imperial University in 1937. 
However, Yanaihara’s approach clearly tells us just how far the so-called liberal social 
scientists could stretch the notion of colonization in 1920s Japan. He avoided the 
complex problems of a multi-ethnic empire by even affirming Korea’s decolonization. 
                                                 
26 Yanaihara Tadao, “Shokumin seisaku no shinkichō,” Yanaihara tadao zenshū 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1963), pp. 742-743.  
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Presumably, Yanaihara’s “conscientious social science” and “ethical imperialism” 
temporarily liberated him from the conundrum of rationalizing colonization. Notably, 
Yanaihara, the most prominent scholar of colonial studies in the 1920s and 1930s, never 
denounced colonization as such. Heavily imbued with Adam Smith’s classic theory of 
colonization, he was convinced that colonization was an effective means to disseminate 
advanced civilization to the underdeveloped. Therefore, Yanaihara’s fundamental 
disagreement with Yoshino was not concerned with the social scientific irrationality of 
colonization, but with his practical judgment that an imperial nation-state with plural 
ethnic groups might be impossible to realize.    
     It is important to keep in mind that liberal approaches to colonial problems such 
as Yanaihara’s “ethical imperialism” were in fact premised on the conviction that 
colonization would not fundamentally change the demographic configuration at the 
metropole. To put it another way, imperial Japan adopted a minimalist strategy in 
governing the colonies by dispatching a small number of bureaucrats and military 
forces to them, while preventing colonial subjects from migrating to the metropole. 
However, this strategy in the colony changed considerably after Japan invaded 
Northeast China in 1931. The growing shortage of labor for the unskilled sectors in the 
urban economy and the ever-worsening overpopulation problem in agricultural areas 
prompted the Japanese government to fundamentally reshape its economic structure. 
Beginning in the early 1930s, a huge number of colonial workers moved to Japan and 
filled the gap in the low-wage sectors of the Japanese economy. On the other hand, the 
Japanese government initiated a massive migration project to relocate its peasants to 
Manchuria.27 As a result, the number of Korean residents in Japan proper increased by 
500,000 during the seven-year period from 1931-1938 and it soon reached one million 
                                                 
27 For a detailed study of the Japanese immigration to Manchuria, see Chapter 4 in Louise Young, Japan’s 
Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998), pp. 307-398. 
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even before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Although no official record 
has been discovered, over 2 million Koreans were reportedly residing in Japan proper 
by the time the Asia-Pacific War ended.28 
     Unquestionably, the fact that imperial Japan was increasingly becoming a multi-
ethnic empire came as a threat to ethnic integrity deep-rooted in the mindset of the 
Japanese people and the ethnic hierarchy between metropole and the colony. More 
importantly, as Ann Stoler has argued, the collapse of ethnic integrity in the empire 
triggered by the political, social and economic crisis at the metropole often produced 
unexpected and intertwined scenes of tension inside and outside the empire.29 
According to her research on European colonialism in Southeast Asia, the white 
population residing in the colony consisted of mostly of people who were politically 
and economically marginalized at the metropole. They migrated to the colony in search 
of a privileged status over the colonial population. The presence of these disintegrated 
people within the dominant group, therefore, increased the internal instability of the 
empire in the first place.30 Stoler’s analysis focuses on the migration of the colonizer to 
the colony, but this phenomenon took place simultaneously and ubiquitously 
throughout the Japanese empire. In the early 1930s, colonial subjects residing in Japan 
proper were in most cases incorporated into the lower class, and were gradually 
absorbed into the unskilled and low-wage sectors of the economy. To be sure, they were 
“unwanted” guests for those Japanese who were already economically impoverished, 
since they had to compete with colonial workers for low-wage jobs that were once their 
                                                 
28 The number of Korean residents increased from 311,247 to 798,878 over the 7-year period between 
1931 and 1938. Pak Kyung Sik ed., Zainichi chōsenjin kankei shiryō shūsei 4 (Tokyo: San’ichi shobo, 
1976), pp.63-64. 
29 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Pres, 2002). 
30 For Stoler’s analysis of white people and their racial and cultural interaction with the indigenous in 
Southeast Asia, see Chapter 2 “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the 
Boundaries of Rule,” Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, pp. 
22-40. 
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own. On the other hand, these colonial workers sometimes emerged as a radical 
political force, as they became increasingly associated with domestic anti-government 
organizations, the Japanese Communist Party in particular.31  
    Changes in the ethnic constitution of the Japanese empire in the early 1930s 
provided important theoretical backgrounds for racial and ethnic discourses produced in 
the mid and late 1930s. To begin with, the term minzoku became a highly practical 
concern to Japanese social scientists. Yoshino and Yanaihara took a “third-person 
perspective” in dealing with colonial problems, believing that ethnic problems were a 
spatially remote issue that would not threaten the ethnic hierarchy at the metropole in 
the Japanese empire. However, beginning in the early 1930s, the problem of race and 
ethnicity rapidly emerged as a major social problem both at the metropole and in the 
colony. For this reason, Japanese social scientists were now in the position of having to 
take a “transnational perspective” to cope with ethnic problems. 
     I argue that the serious challenges Japanese social scientists experienced in the 
early 1930s also gave rise to a number of theoretical questions. If the homogeneous 
paradigm of a single nation-state could no longer sustain the already multi-ethnicized 
Japanese empire, where and how should Japanese social scientists search for the logic 
to maintain their belief in universality? Why did the terms minzoku and nationalism, 
which essentially represent particularism and separatism, capture their attention? In the 
pages that follow, I will explore these questions by analyzing the theories of two 
prominent sociologists, Takata Yasuma and Shinmei Masamichi.   
 
The Concept of the Social in Takata Yasuma’s Sociology 
                                                 
31 Ken Kawashima’s recent study well describes how the colonial population, workers in particular, 
became severely marginalized and as a result increasingly associated with radical social movements at the 
metropole. See Ken Kawashima, The Proletarian Gamble : Korean Workers in Interwar Japan (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2009). 
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In 1935, three years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Takata Yasuma, a 
leading social scientist who was teaching sociology and economics at Kyoto Imperial 
University, published a book entitled The Problem of Nation (&*+,). Following 
this work, Takata and other social scientists such as Kada Tetsuji, Komatsu Kentarō and 
Shinmei Masamichi published a series of works on race and minzoku, which formed the 
mainstream ethnographic studies during the wartime period. It is important to take a 
close look at their social scientific research in each discipline – sociology, economics 
and political science – to critically approach their imperial discourse on race and 
ethnicity. These social scientists all theorized ethnicity as a social construct that occurs 
as human beings are exposed to the modern web of relations including the capitalistic 
mode of production. Therefore, their wartime writings on race and minzoku were 
closely connected to their social scientific research in the 1920s and 1930s.   
Having published Principles of Sociology (-./), a pioneering work in the 
history of Japanese sociology, in 1919, Takata devoted much of the early 1920s to 
establishing sociology as an independent academic discipline. For him, this enduring 
task started with problematizing the relationship between sociology and social sciences: 
 
While sociology in the past comprehensively examined every social 
phenomenon, the new sociology aims to synthesize the parts of social 
phenomena (-01). The relationship between sociology and social 
science was in the hierarchy of high and low, as the former becomes a 
synthesizer of social scientific research and provides social science with basic 
knowledge and essential principles. However, the new sociology stands 
equally with other social scientific disciplines as it investigates parts of 
historical and social reality.32  
 
If sociology must separate itself from the perception that it explains everything in an 
encyclopedic way, thereby reigning over other social scientific disciplines, how, then, 
did Takata redefine it light of his own thinking? To answer this question, it is important 
                                                 
32 Takata Yasuma, Shakaigaku genri (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1919), p.39. 
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to understand some characteristics of Takata’s sociological methodology. His early 
sociology was based on two distinct premises. One is what might be called 
perspectivism (2 #$): the notion that a subject projects his or her own perspective 
onto historical and cultural reality (34), which are to be understood and extracted as 
objects of social cognition. Notably, extracted objects based on social cognition do not 
form hierarchal relationships of any kind. In Takata’s concept of society, all social 
phenomena, therefore, were basically conceptualized as relational. Secondly, Takata 
was convinced that human beings desire gregariousness (56*78). These two 
notions shape the core concepts of Takata’s early sociology; that is, human society 
constantly searches for communitarian modes of life, but these cannot be extracted 
from intrinsic and primordial elements precisely because every phenomenon is socially 
constructed. This notion gives us a clue to understanding Takata’s later involvement in 
ethnographic studies. From the beginning, he was conscious that minzoku or nation is a 
social construct, and it is a highly fluid concept contingent upon human relations. 
Such a seemingly rational observation, however, raises one important problem. 
Since individuals as social subjects all have different perspectives, one might wonder 
how a sociologist could establish a universal law by analyzing these social phenomena. 
In the 1922 book Introduction to Sociology (-9:), Takata first acknowledged 
that any kind of social law is basically psychological. In other words, all social laws are 
contingent upon individuals’ psychologically-motivated behavior in each society. This, 
however, does not indicate that he concedes the impossibility of discovering universal 
laws in sociology. He instead suggested new concepts such as “objective possibility (;
<=>?@)” and “proportion of tendency (Tendenzielles Gesetz, ABC).”33 
According to him, sociologists analyze social phenomena and extract a tendency that 
most commonly occurs to social subjects, and this process, Takata believed, enables 
                                                 
33 Takata Yasuma, Shakaigaku gairon (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1922), pp.60-68. 
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sociologists to move closer to what might be called the objective cognition of society.  
    In this way, society was conceptualized by him not as a given and thus an 
omnipotent creation embracing everything in people’s lives, but a space where 
individuals cognize things and constitute relations. In the same vein, sociology was 
redefined not as a discipline elucidating society in an encyclopedic way, but as a 
“particular” social scienceDEF-G
that discovers common forms among 
social phenomena and tries to get closer to the possibility of objective perception. In 
short, Takata’s project of establishing an independent methodology in sociology was 
closely connected to his desire to position sociology as what he called a “commoner (H
)” within the social sciences.34 
For this reason, it is highly conceivable that Takata was influenced by the 
German sociologist Georg Simmel’s so-called formal sociology (IJ-). 
Distinguishing sociology from other social scientific disciplines – economics, political 
science and so on – which exclusively focus on the contents of social phenomena, 
Simmel contended that sociology is the only social science that examines social 
interaction exclusively. According to him, society is an amalgam of social interactions. 
Therefore, the duty of sociologists is to find similar forms (IJ) –  collaboration, 
conflict, and competition –  in a variety of social interactions and to examine the 
essential meanings of these forms in different social contexts.35 This observation by 
Simmel came as a powerful alternative for Takata, who was also viewing sociology as a 
collective space of social relations. Takata’s early sociology was deeply imbued with 
Simmel’s formal sociology. In his seminal book Introduction to Sociology (-9
:), Takata outlined the constitution of society through such forms as cooperation, 
conflict and competition, all of which are actually the core concepts of Simmel’s 
                                                 
34 Takata, Shakaigaku genri, pp.40-43. 
35 For Georg Simmel’s formal sociology, see Georg Simmel, trans., Howard Becker, Georg Simmel 1858-
1918; a Collection of Essays (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959). 
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sociology.36   
    Takata’s encounter with Simmel, however, created tensions in drawing a general 
picture of sociology. The subtle but substantial difference between Takata and Simmel, 
I argue, explain the uniqueness of Takata’s early sociology, which continued to appear 
in his writings on ethnicity during the wartime period. As I have discussed, Takata was 
opposed to the conventional definition of sociology as establishing a universal law that 
could be deductively applied to every social phenomenon. Nonetheless, his sociology 
also began with one fixed presupposition, which I pointed out as the second 
characteristic of his methodology: the desire of human beings for gregariousness (56
*78).37 In this respect, Takata redefined society as a “desired coexistence (Gewlltes 
Zusammenleben, 8KLMNOP).”38  
    The conventional definition of minzoku and ethnicity is closely related to 
individuals’ having strong affinities with others based on blood, religion and culture. 
However, it is important to note that Takata’s notion of gregariousness was not 
premised on these intrinsic elements. His theory raises another question: how society 
and social subjects could co-existence in what he called “social differentiation (-*
Q.” For Takata, such coexistence was first related to the different layers of human 
beings’ desire. According to him, social subjects all have the same desire for 
gregariousness in a collective sense, but at the same time, they have desire to pursue 
their own interests. He attempted to explain this inconsistency through the term “social 
complication (-=RS).”39 As rationality and functionality become prevalent 
within a society, he contended, such values as integration and cooperation, which were 
well preserved in what might be called primitive societies like townships and blood-
                                                 
36 Takata, Shakaigaku gairon, pp. 109-273. 
37 Ibid., pp. 109-114. 
38 Ibid., p. 102. 
39 Takata Yasuma, Gendai shakai no sho kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1920), pp. 8-21. 
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oriented or religious communities, would weaken.40 Here, it is important to trace how 
Takata broadened the dimension of social relations and accordingly differentiated his 
concept of society from the gathering of individuals in a primordial sense. Takata 
clearly argued that these blood-centered relations would collapse as human beings 
experienced a much more complicated web of social relations. This reconfirms and 
foreshadows the fact that his concept of minzoku did not stem from these primitive 
communities. 
    Takata’s observation of profit-oriented relations in modern capitalist society 
demonstrates well his acute sense of reality in diagnosing social problems. Interestingly, 
it is at this point that Takata began problematizing Simmel’s methodology. He argued 
that Simmel’s methodology by no means delineated the “vertical” direction of society, 
simply enumerating and explaining its “horizontal integration (T=UV)” through the 
notion of forms.41 However, as human relations become increasingly complicated, they 
necessarily create vertical relations such as class and racial hierarchies, and as a result 
social problems also occur.  
Takata’s rough answer to his own question of a new direction for sociology was 
what might be called the “world-level integration (WX=YU)” of society. Here, 
Takata seems to be proposing his own desire for society’s ideal future. His theory of 
world society was based on the hypothesis that the complication of pluralistic societies 
would rather sustain the integration of human beings as a whole.42 He observed that the 
nature of social differentiation, although it often creates social conflicts, is to preserve 
integration within it. Its expansion to human beings as a whole, he contended, would 
result in one grand form of an integrated society, describing this phenomenon as all 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p.9. 
41 Ibid., p.14. 
42 Ibid., p.16. 
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human beings’ being part of “world society.”43 He then concluded with confidence that 
individuals’ complete autonomy and self-interest serving the good of society would be 
guaranteed only in this worldly integration.44    
This very rosy, ideal vision of society in Takata’s early sociology is telling in 
many ways. First, he did not limit his concept of society to simply explaining the 
difference between basic society – family, town and church – and derivative, that is, 
goal-oriented society. The complication of society from basic to derivative is best 
described in the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies’ seminal work Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft (Community and Civil Society). By dividing society into two groups, 
community and civil society, Tonnies argued that the former is constituted by human 
beings’ essential will (wesenwille), and free will (kruwille) is the locus that shapes 
Gesellschaft.45 According to him, Gemeinschaft is subdivided into three different 
categories based on the degree of will – blood-centered, regional and spiritual 
communities.46 Therefore, a community is characterized by the tenacious unions of its 
participants and is often realized in the form of customs, religion and ethnicity. On the 
other hand, civil society is represented by the preponderance of social relations based 
on individuals’ profit-oriented will. 
    As I shall discuss in detail, Takata was not unaware that the binary perception of 
society in Tonnies’ sociology might result in emphasizing a community-oriented 
totalitarian society. In fact, European intellectuals spread the sense of crisis in the goal-
and-individualism-oriented modern capitalist society and many of their alternative 
theories showed a tendency to return to totalitarianism. Takata’s concern, therefore, was 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p.17. 
45 Ferdinand Tonnies, trans., Jose Harris, Community and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
46 Ibid. For Takata’s analysis of Tonnies’ theory, see Takata Yasuma, Shakai to kokka (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1922), pp.40-41. 
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focused on how a sociologist could contrive a theory of overcoming such binary 
perceptions of society. To be sure, this observation continued to influence Takata’s 
sociology and his wartime writings on minzoku most clearly demonstrate how he 
intended to envision a new regional community that would overcome the schematic 
perception of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. 
    Second, Takata’s logic of society showed both similarities with and 
dissimilarities to the intellectual stream of 1920s Japanese social science. The 
perception of creating a social space, often called the “discovery of society (-*Z
2)” in the tension between society and state, apparently existed in Takata’s early 
sociology. But, as Kitajima Shigeru has argued, Takata was never satisfied with the 
logic of civil society as the most advanced social form.47 In that sense, Takata’s 
“desire” as a sociologist went well beyond the narrow space between state and society. 
It also tells us that spatiality in Takata’s early sociology is very important in 
understanding in what context he envisioned a cosmopolitan East Asian ethnic 
community in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The spatial dimension of Takata’s early 
sociology can be found in his understanding of the state. He acknowledged the 
historical formation of the modern nation-state as society entered the highly advanced 
stage of capitalistic development. What distinguished Takata from others, however, was 
the fact that he did not portray the state as an ultimate, all-encompassing total society. 
With regard to this issue, he addressed two categories of society, partial and integral 
society, and defined state as a partial society: 
 
Generally Speaking, we must recognize the fact that there exist multiple 
societies within today’s society. Not only religious organizations, political 
parties, class, occupational organizations, and industrial associations, but also 
minzoku, family and other associations and eventually, the state; all these are 
a society, so to speak. Therefore, insofar as these are a single society, I also 
                                                 
47 Kitajima Shigeru, Takata yasuma – riron to seisaku no mubaigaiteki kōichi (Tokyo: Toshinto, 2002), p. 
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recognize that there exists an integral society ([(-) that synthesizes 
them and is considered identical to the sum of these societies. An integral 
society, by definition, means the accumulation of associations that possesses 
and maintains close interrelations with each other, and it also designates what 
relates individuals involved in these associations, that is, a synthesis that 
integrates relational elements. Although integral society is identified as the 
sum of each individual society, this does not mean that integral society, as a 
universal creature, possesses each individual society as particular. This is 
because the association of integral society, aside from the association of 
individual societies, includes countless associations that are not connected to 
the formation of society as a unity.48  
 
As the observation above shows, in Takata’s concept of society, the stats is not 
equivalent to an integral society. Takata, however, does not clearly delineate what an 
integral society is. Perhaps, the concept of an integral society seems to correspond to 
his unique notion of world society and world association, both of which were 
explicated on a very abstract level in his early writings.  
Returning to Takata’s critiques of Tonnies, I argue that what Takata found more 
problematic in Tonnies’ simplification of society was that dividing society based on the 
form of will might lead to a false conclusion that the will of a certain association is 
superior to those of other associations. According to Takata, each individual has his 
own degree of will that is different from that of others. He went on to argue that the 
communal will in a certain community mere represents relational associations of their 
social wills, but it does not symbolize a totalized association or a collective force. This 
observation led Takata to problematize the tendency that the state is legitimized as a 
transcendental power through this logic of community. He writes: 
 
I have keen interest in political scientist Laski’s observation that the degree of 
the state will’s superiority over other organizations is different from person to 
person. In the state or other organizations, there exists a will to maintain and 
empower it. However, it is difficult to say that this is the will of integral 
society. I do not recognize a unified will toward an integral society, but I do 
recognize that there is a basic will or basic social consciousness that exists as 
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 100 
a foundation…. Since will gives rise in the reciprocal association between 
individuals within a society and is formed as a result of these interactions, it 
shapes neither a unified association nor collective force.49  
 
By refuting Tonnies’ notion of two different wills in human relations, Takata attempted 
to reconfirm his concept of society as constituted by the association of social relations, 
not by essential will or by free will. I argue that Takata’s critiques of Tonnies give us 
important clues to understanding of his later discussion of ethnicity. In summary, Takata 
rejected the one-dimensional process of subject formation inherent in Tonnies’ 
sociology and developed his concern with the intertwined process of one’s becoming a 
social subject by delving into the logic of minzoku. 
 
Population and Minzoku as a Social Problem   
How, then, did Takata encounter and conceptualize minzoku in the late 1920s and early 
1930s? Takata paid relatively little attention to the issue of race and minzoku in his early 
writings. However, the sociological concepts he developed in the 1920s tell us the 
direction of his writings on race and ethnicity in the 1930s. In a 1920 article entitled, 
“An Individual Opinion on Racial Problems (+,\2),” he observed, as did 
many Japanese social scientists at the time, that racial problems were basically an issue 
between white and colored people.50Therefore, Takata too, intentionally or 
unintentionally, tended to conflate the issue of racism with the problem of 
discrimination between Europeans and Asians in the early 1920s, thus avoiding 
mention of Japan’s racial oppression in the colony. However, unique in Takata’s 
understanding of race was his tendency to approach it not as an issue of a single nation-
state, but as a broader issue involving a world society. 
    Instead of dealing directly with the issue of race and ethnicity, Takata showed keen 
                                                 
49 Ibid., p.86. 
50 Takata Yasuma, Gendai shakai no so kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1920), pp. 179-199.  
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interest in the issue of population. Beginning with the simple observation that the birth 
rate exceeds the death rate in almost every society,51 Takata gradually came to realize 
that population is a highly overdetermined issue that is closely related to capitalism, 
imperialism and, most importantly, nation (minzoku). Takata believed that population 
increase would bring cultural development to human beings on a general level.52 
Central to this understanding of population in modern capitalist society is that 
population itself became a theoretical barometer that differentiated Takata from other 
social scientists, Marxist intellectuals in particular. Many social scientists at the time 
attempted to address the issue of overpopulation by proposing social-policy-oriented 
prescriptions such as the expansion of the welfare system and government control of 
the birth rate. Takata was opposed to this direction, sustaining his “idealistic” vision of 
social equilibrium. He was also vehemently opposed to right-wing political approaches 
to colonial imperialism that aimed to mitigate overpopulation and agricultural problems 
in Japan proper.53    
     Instead, Takata returned to the sociological concepts in his early sociology. He 
once again stressed the logic of social complication; that is, the more goal-oriented 
social relations prevail, the weaker the social integration on a general level becomes. He 
suggested that in order to solve this highly circulative problem, the living standard of 
the Japanese should be downgraded. Reversing the logic of social complication in such 
a way that “[T]he poorer and lower the living standard is, the stronger the integration 
toward society becomes,”54 Takata argued as follows: 
 
The strength of our minzoku has existed in its lower standard of living. If this 
is the case, I believe that the so-called passive measures for resolving social 
problems might be applied to national self-defense. In other words, these 
                                                 
51 Takata Yasuma, Shakaigakuteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Hōbunkan, 1923), pp. 95-152. 
52 Takata, Shakaigaku gairon, pp. 450-455. 
53 Takata Yasuma, Hinja hisshō (Tokyo: Chikura shobo, 1935), pp. 89-95. 
54 Ibid., p.87. 
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measures may begin to solve minzoku problems. If we could lower the 
economic status of all the Japanese people, that might be killing two birds 
with one stone.55 
 
Unquestionably, this idealistic approach to capitalism and population immediately 
provoked fierce critiques from Marxist intellectuals, including Kawakami Hajime ]^
_ (1879-1946), from whom Takata himself succeeded the professorship in economics 
at Kyoto Imperial University. Kawakami first disagreed to Takata’s observation that 
lowering the living standard would help mitigate poverty and the imbalance between 
metropole and rural areas. More importantly, Kawakami’s criticism focused on Takata’s 
somewhat naïve perception that developing commerce and industry would worsen 
these problems. Kawakami thus criticized Takata, arguing that the underdevelopment of 
commerce and industry in Japanese society indicated that there was a weak basis for 
capitalist production.56 Needless to say, Kawakami’s observation was based on his firm 
Marxist conviction that the maturity of the capitalist economy must precede socialist 
revolution.  
    Takata’s interesting views on the issue of population first uncovered the theoretical 
and practical tension between Marxist materialism and his idealism. As I shall explain 
later, Takata’s objection to the Marxist stage theory based on historical materialism 
underlay important concepts in his discourses on East Asian minzoku. On the other 
hand, he constantly attempted to link the issue of population to the problem of 
agriculture, and projected into it his personal background as a son from a poor peasant 
family. To be sure, Takata’s analytic mentality as a social scientist became highly 
“complicated,” as he was vocal in making the controversial statement, “[T]he core of 
the solidarity of our minzoku is a solidarity out of poverty and the poor’s affection 
toward Japan. I would say that the essence of Japan lies in poor peasants in rural 
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areas.”57  
    Second, as ironic as it may sound, Takata’s encounter with the notion of population 
shows well the way he intervened in real politics. Marxist intellectuals simply 
denounced his so-called “everyone-becomes-poor-theory (`a:)” as isolated 
from social reality. But Takata adhered to his universal perspective, believing that 
solutions for particular social problems must be sought from a universal theory. Central 
to this perception lay the question of how he attempted to universalize his sociological 
theories as he expanded them to consider colonial problems. 
 
Society and Politics - Shinmei Masamichi’s Logic of the Social 
While Takata Yasuma, already a leading sociologist, devoted much of his time in the 
1920s to developing sociological methodologies, Shinmei Masamichi, born in 1898, 
some 15 years after Takata’s birth, began establishing his social scientific thinking in 
the late 1920s. Heavily influenced by and also benefiting from the liberal atmosphere of 
the Taisho period fostered by liberal intellectuals, Shinmei encountered sociology and 
social science even before he attended college. In 1916, Yoshino Sakuz, Professor of 
Political Science at Tokyo Imperial University, published a monumental article on the 
history of Japanese liberalism in the well-known journal, The Central Review (bcd
:).58 It soon sparked a fierce debate over democracy, later called the minponshugi 
debate.59 Interestingly, Yoshino’s article led one high school student to choose political 
science as his college major. Shinmei was fortunate enough to study directly with the 
author of the article when he entered Tokyo Imperial University in 1918 at the age of 
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20.60    
     At Tokyo Imperial University, Shinmei was soon exposed to the most liberal 
academic atmosphere of the time in Japan and actively engaged himself with this 
stream of thought. In 1919, a year after entering Tokyo University, he joined the student 
organization Shinjinkai e, where he became acquainted with a number of young 
students who later became leading scholars in Japanese social sciences, including 
Ryama Masamichi.61  
     In contrast to Takata, who focused on establishing sociology as an independent 
academic discipline, Shinmei’s close relationships with political scientists led him to 
develop a political-science-oriented sociological methodology. This tendency was 
clearly reflected in his first book, Introduction to Sociology (-fg), published in 
1922, a year after his graduation from Tokyo Imperial University.62 For the most part, 
this book was constituted in a peculiar way, since not a single chapter was dedicated to 
sociology per se. Instead, Shinmei devoted much of this work to delineating the origins 
of the state in modern society and criticizing the dominance of the state from what 
might be called a sociological perspective:  
 
The state is losing its nature as representing each member’s desire in total 
society ([(-). It is now an organization subsumed by class interests. 
Should we expect the control of the whole society from the state which is 
based on the interests of private parties? Insofar as the state seizes control of 
society, it cannot be separated from the social…. However, I believe that it is 
necessary to examine why social conditions under the control of the state 
have become so tragic and inconsistent, and how the state arose and took the 
position of (controlling society).63 (Emphasis added) 
                                                 
60 Shinmei Masamichi recalled that his encounter with Yoshino’s article heavily influenced his decision to 
study political science at college. See, Yamamoto Shizuō and Tonosaki Akiko eds., Shinmei shakaigaku 
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61 For a study of Shinjinkai, see Henry Dewitt Smith, Japan’s First Radical Students (Cambridge, 
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62 Shinmei Masamichi, Shakaigaku josetsu (Tokyo: Daitōgaku, 1922), in Shinmei Masamichi, Shinmei 
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The statement above shows that Shinmei had two different concepts of society. One 
was related to society defined in a conventional way; that is, as he himself 
conceptualized, human beings have different spaces of life compared to those of non-
humans. He designated these spaces as society. However, for Shinmei, society in this 
sense is not the product of human beings’ goal-oriented activities.64 Therefore, the 
second concept of Shinmei’s sociology became crucial when the state as an omnipotent 
actor of human society did not fulfill its role. For this reason, sociology, although 
Shinmei never provided any definition of it, can be a discipline that studies a derivative 
or a relational space in relation to the state. This concept of society appeared in 
Introductory Lectures on Sociology (-fh), published in 1932, ten years after 
the publication of Introduction to Sociology. Dismissing social psychology that society 
is based on human beings’ instinctive activities that vary according to historical and 
environmental contexts, Shinmei presented the concept of social forces (-i) that 
form the content of society.65  
His keen interest in the sociological analysis of political structure continued to 
develop, and his 1925 translation of the American historical sociologist Harry Elmer 
Barnes’ Sociology and Political Theory was perhaps the best example of this.66 As 
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Barnes clearly articulated, “[T]he sovereignty of the state and its alleged qualities of 
originality, universality and absoluteness and the lack of finite limitations have long 
been dissolved under criticism, and now even its quality of unity is challenged.”67 It is 
conceivable that Shinmei found Barnes’ work interesting in his journey toward 
challenging the dominance of the state in the social sciences. Importantly, Shinmei’s 
concept of sociology, unlike that of Takata, did not attempt to establish an independent 
theory within it. Instead, he was apparently more concerned with positioning sociology 
in reciprocal relations with other social scientific disciplines. Simply put, by affirming 
the potential that a single subject such as the state can and should be analyzed from 
different angles within the social sciences, Shinmei attempted to softly inject sociology 
into the realm of already established social scientific disciplines.  
In this way, Shinmei’s early sociology, imbued with a variety of liberal 
intellectual streams in the “renaissance” of 1920s Japanese social sciences, clearly 
exemplified the tension between sociology as an independent social science and his 
obsession with being involved in political issues. In 1928, two years after he joined the 
Sociology Department at Tohoku Imperial University, Shinmei published his major 
book, entitled On Formal Sociology (IJ-:). However, this nearly seven-
hundred-page work was not written to simply praise Simmel’s achievement. Although 
he acknowledged Simmel’s theory as a revolutionary transformation in sociology, 
Shinmei was equally attentive to its limitations. Most of all, his discontent was centered 
on the observation that formal sociology views the state as a mere social element, 
ignoring its realistic importance. He wrote: 
 
[In formal sociology] Society and state are considered in the framework of 
total and part. ([(jkQ) Their relation is by nature not based on 
difference, as is the relationship between state and economy; however, their 
relationship with total and part is different. Society is bigger than the state. 
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Formal sociology does not contrast them in the notion of liberal association 
and power association. The concept of society in formal sociology merely 
includes the meanings of human relations. If the state is examined in this kind 
of a formal category, it becomes a one small part of sociological research.68  
 
In the same vein, Shinmei was critical of formal sociology’s approach to economic 
relations. Categorizing a total society into forms and contents, he argued, formal 
sociology only examines economic relations that are ordained in formal categories.69  
As I have discussed, Takata intended to partly resolve the tension between 
Simmel’s sociology and his own concept of social science by developing a unique 
dialectic of his own between the two. In contrast, Shinmei engaged himself more 
deeply with this fundamental concern. In 1929, the year of the Great Depression, he 
embarked on a trip to Germany, where he studied German sociology until his return to 
Japan in 1931. Given that he already had taken a professorship at one of the leading 
imperial universities, his stay in Germany was not aimed at obtaining a professional 
degree. Moreover, he was not fortunate enough to enjoy the strength of the Yen which 
had enabled many Japanese students to rush to Germany in the late 1920s.70 The Great 
Depression did make him experience economic hardships, but his being at the center of 
the most radical social changes in Europe had an enormous impact on his later 
sociology and his encounter with the concept of minzoku.  
    While maintaining his ties to Japanese intellectual circles by writing brief monthly 
reports on German society and politics in the famous journal Keizai ōrai (lmnop
Shinmei witnessed the rise of the fascist movement in Germany.71 Upon his return to 
Japan, he became one of the most sophisticated writers in Japanese intellectual circles 
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on this new political current, and produced numerous articles on fascism in various 
journals. Not surprisingly, he was aware that Japanese social sciences, arguably the icon 
of progressive scholarship in the 1920s, faced an ontological crisis with the emergence 
of this reactionary and conservative political movement. However, what captured his 
attention from a social scientific perspective was that German social scientists, 
sociologists in particular, became gradually involved in real politics, redefining the 
principle of the social sciences. Sociologist Hans von Freyer was one of the German 
social scientists who captured Shinmei’s special attention.  
     Author of the seminal book Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft (Sociology 
as a science of reality) published in 1929, Freyer advocated a methodological 
transformation in sociology in his emphasis on structuralism and his debunking of 
formal sociology.72 Not surprisingly, Freyer’s engagement with real politics as a 
sociologist received attention from Shinmei, who spent a long time developing a 
politico-sociological perspective. As a result, Shinmei’s 1935 book Sociology of 
National Revolution (qr*-) was actually an interpretation of Freyer’s 
sociology.73 Freyer denounced Simmel’s formal sociology as Logoswissenschaft 
(science of logos), which had only concentrated on constructing a world of abstraction 
in which, Fryer believed, the historicity of sociological objects was completely ignored. 
He instead insisted that contemporary sociology must be a science of ethos. To put this 
another way, sociology like Simmel’s, Freyer argued, had merely enumerated social 
phenomena through various social forms, but it did not provide a way to totalize social 
activities in a concrete structure, and as a result, society was deprived of its historicity.  
Freyer’s critiques of social science, however, were not simply an attempt to 
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endorse and return to what might be called conventional structuralism. He observed that 
Hegel’s idealism conceptualized the state as a synthesis of people’s collective freedom 
and cognitive personality in a community. However, he maintained that the state itself 
had been dominated by powerful social classes. For this reason, in order to 
conceptualize a total society, he contended, social scientists must pay attention to real 
power dynamics and structural changes that occur to the state.74 As the German 
sociologist Franz Oppenheimer put it, “[S]ociology is a science that studies totality as 
totality. It consolidates various social principles and therefore it is 
universalwissenschaft (universal science).” 75 Freyer thus redefined sociology as a 
discipline of discovering universal totality in the web of social and political phenomena.  
It was Freyer’s logic of totality that Shinmei drew special attention to in 
Sociology of National Revolution. Arguing that industrial society had been 
overwhelmed by economic interests, Fryer emphasized the necessity of its 
revolutionary transformation. However, he rejected both Marxist class struggle and 
civil society theories because they all marginalized the state as a by-product of social 
conflict. Instead, he contended that by creating a trans-class subject in society, the state 
of perpetual class struggle and crisis in the capitalist system could be overcome. He 
defined this new subject as nation () and a conservative national revolution would 
have to be accomplished by these cooperative national subjects.76  
     Although Freyer did not use the term cooperative community in his discussion of 
national subject, the concepts of cooperativism and cooperative subject were already 
gaining currency among European intellectuals. Shinmei also showed keen interest in 
these new political theories, and in 1934, he contributed two articles to Hōgaku s, 
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the college journal of Tohoku Imperial University, that explicitly touched upon the issue 
of cooperativism. In these articles entitled “The Concept and Structure of the 
Cooperative State (t('*<uvwxy),” he defined the cooperative state as 
a new type of state in which social subjects are incorporated into national subjects and 
the state accordingly eradicates all kinds of social and class conflicts through 
establishing a cooperative order.77 He was aware, of course, that this unprecedented 
political phenomenon in Western Europe, Germany and Italy in particular, was 
basically a totalitarian movement. However, Shinmei was less concerned with 
fundamental violence and coercion in fascist movements than with the observation that 
advocates of national socialism were mainly targeting peasant and urban workers, 
promising that they would be emancipated from the status of “debt slave.” Acutely 
aware that the identity politics of incorporating marginalized groups into national 
subjects became a driving force for the fascist state, Shinmei was also convinced that 
this rosy picture of eradicating socio-political hierarchies would never be realized. As 
Shinmei himself emphasized, both Hitler and the Italian fascists were heavily 
dependent upon the industrial bourgeoisies, and more importantly, the formation of 
national subjects in Hitler’s Germany was in fact excluding those who they considered 
to be racial minorities, the Jews in particular.78  
    Therefore, it is misleading to assume that Shinmei accepted the logic of European 
fascist movements at face value after his return from Germany. As a matter of fact, he 
was a most ardent critic of the German and Italian fascist movements. More important 
than evaluating how he viewed fascism is the question of how Shinmei attempted to 
theorize a new concept of subjectivity in his critical analysis of totalitarian movements 
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in Europe. To be sure, German totalitarianism and Italian fascism, in spite of their 
theoretical limits, came as a new form of subject formation to Shinmei. The popularity 
of totalitarian theories in Japan was also closely related to the dismal status-quo 
Japanese sociology was facing in the early 1930s. As the young sociologist Shimizu 
Ikutarō lamented in a 1934 article in The Central Review (bcd:), sociologists’ 
tendency to view civil society as the most advanced framework precludes sociological 
theories from developing further.79  
In summary, Shinmei’s sociology experienced a few detours before he engaged 
himself in ethnographic studies in the late 1930s. His search for a total society beyond 
Simmel’s formal sociology led him to directly confront European social theories. Yet it 
was through Shinmei’s stay in Germany and his exposure to fascist movements that he 
developed critical perspectives toward European social sciences and faced the 
challenge of creating a new paradigm for subject formation and a multi-ethnic empire 
in Japan. Thus, Shinmei developed his ethnographic studies in the late 1930s and early 
1940s as he confronted the tension between state as a total society and minzoku as part 
of it. In contrast to Shinmei, Takata took an idealistic approach to the term minzoku and 
constantly distanced itself from the boundary of the nation-state. How, then, did these 
seemingly different paths of theorizing racial and ethnic issues shape mainstream 
ethnographic studies during the wartime Japan? How did Japanese social scientists face 
the eventual challenge of rationalizing a multi-ethnic empire through their social 
scientific research?  
 
Racism as Anti-Social Scientific  
In October 1938, a year after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Kada Tetsuji, who 
was teaching sociology and economics at Keio University, a prestigious Japanese 
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private university, published Race, Nation and War (z&z{|), which soon 
became a best-seller.80 Not surprisingly, Kada reiterated the thesis that the Japanese 
race had mixed heritages, as already demonstrated in anthropologists’ ethnographic 
studies from the 1910s and the 1920s. Carrying this previous concept of race a step 
further, he asserted that the existing situation of white supremacy was mere a reflection 
of the capitalistic development that dominated Western Europe. Kada maintained that 
Western capitalism, historically speaking, had little to do with “superior” physiological 
characteristics of any kind within the white races.81 He was equally critical of the 
conventional concept of minzoku (&), which he viewed as a mere extension of 
blood-centered essentialism. Under this extremely narrow conceptual understanding of 
the term minzoku, it is natural that Kada, who had been writing extensively on the issue 
of nationalism, internationalism and cosmopolitanism since the early 1930s, could not 
find any potential for what he called “minzoku’s development beyond minzoku (&*
&}~ZN).”82 
Given that not only Kada but also many other wartime Japanese social scientists 
rejected racism and racial science, Kada’s somewhat heated critiques of racist thinking 
were not surprising. However, important in Kada’s discussion of racism is the fact that 
not only was he aware of the irrationality of western racism but he was also attentive to 
the way both racist and anti-racist discourses in Japan were appropriated in real politics 
in a very complex way, thereby producing another form of racism. With these 
observations in mind, Kada discussed the genealogy of racial thinking in modern Japan. 
For him, racial science in the West was deeply flawed in the fact that it served as a 
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theoretical tool for demonstrating the superiority of white Europeans in modern 
civilization.83 Interestingly, he was outspoken when he argued that modernization is 
not a one-dimensional, linear process, and that even industrialized societies continue to 
need agriculture and other not-yet-industrialized sectors.84 He then argued that 
Japanese social scientists had focused on scientifically proving that the Japanese race 
also had genetically dominant characteristics as Europeans tried to prove about 
themselves. For example, he discussed Taguchi Yukichi’s notion of the Japanese race 
which emphasized its similarity to European races in Taguchi’s refutation of the 
“yellow peril” theory.85 Kada problematized this “orientalist” version of racial theory 
put forth by Japanese social scientists, asserting even anti-Western racism in Japan was 
in fact a replica of Western racism, in that it had paradoxically repeated the logic of 
Western racism. He pointed out the irony in the fact that advocates of anti-Western 
racism in Japan firmly believed in Japan’s glorious modernization as proof that the 
Japanese race was as inherently superior as white races. 
     Kada maintained that irrespective of the theoretical validity of anti-racism, both 
racism and a Janus-faced Japanese version of anti-racism were being politically 
appropriated by conservative Japanists, namely advocates of the Imperial Way (). 
For instance, he paid special attention to the way anti-Semitism had been spread in the 
Japanese media and academia. Here, he made an interesting point: 
 
[R]eportedly, the number of Jews residing in Japan is about one thousand. 
Due to the small number of Jews in Japan, most Japanese in fact do not 
recognize the Jewish problem as such. Nonetheless, discourses on the Jews 
are rapidly increasing in Japan. In Japan, there are more than one hundred 
pamphlets and works on the anti-Jew movement and I possess dozens of 
them.86 
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As David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa have argued, Japanese intellectuals 
during the wartime period often described the Jews as a group of people who most 
powerfully embodied the “philosophy of liberalism and capitalism.” Many believed, 
therefore, that the Jews were even trying to “conquer the world through the power of 
money.”87 Fed by a conspiracy theory that the Jews would conquer the world, as best 
illuminated in the text of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,88 these anti-Semitic 
sentiments became increasingly widespread in the Japanese media. This evident racism 
on the part of Japanese intellectuals, however, was appropriated in reverse by another 
group of conservatives. As Nazi Germany began its genocide of Jews in Europe, a 
number of the Jews fled to East Asia, especially to Shanghai and Northern China. The 
presence of these Jewish refugees became an important and timely source for Japanese 
ultranationalists’ propaganda, as conservatives touted the morality and divine spirit of 
Imperial Japan. By integrating Jewish refugees into the racially harmonious East Asian 
Federation, these Japanists were convinced that they could send a strong message to the 
West, the United States in particular, that the morality and divine spirit of Imperial 
Japan was superior to the depraved values of the West.89 
     To be sure, the issue of anti-Semitism was not an especially provocative topic in 
Japan during the wartime period. Nonetheless, the fact that it was discussed at all 
certainly exemplifies how both racism and anti-racism operated in such a political way 
that they would eventually be absorbed into a newly-formulated racism in wartime 
Japan. This new form of racism seemingly emphasized unity among Asian races but 
never denied the superiority of the Japanese race. Needless to say, this distorted racist 
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thinking by Japanists actually played a role in their concealing of Japan’s colonization 
of its neighboring countries. Therefore, the discontent of social scientists was centered 
on the observation that any kind of politicized racial discourses, even if seemingly 
“anti-racist,” would give way to a far more essentialized racism. Kada was thus 
adamant in his denunciation of racial studies as fundamentally unscientific: 
 
The reality of racial theories in our time becomes evident when we think of 
the problem of racial conflict between white races and colored races. 
However, the differences between them lie in the question of whether we 
should think about it from the standpoint of Western imperialism or from 
Japan’s standpoint. Racial theories, as I have discussed, do not contain 
elements as a hard science. Therefore their validity as social science is 
different (from other disciplines).90 
 
Kada, a hard social scientist, clearly explains in this comment why racial theories 
continued to resurge both in Japan and in the West, although they do not have social 
scientific rationality. To him, therefore, racial studies became the dark side of modern 
social science. Distinguishing social science from racial theories, however, did not 
preclude racism from being politically appropriated for propagandistic purposes. Nor 
did it provide a practical solution for the problem of ethnic conflicts within the Japanese 
empire. Theoretically speaking, Kada’s critical approach to the concept of race clearly 
exemplifies Japanese social scientists’ tendency to avoid racial and ethnic discourses 
that originated in Germany. However, it also left much room for further discussion on 
what ought to be a driving force for creating a theory of a multi-ethnic empire. 
 
The Question of the Nation-State 
After writing several works on fascism and German sociology, Shinmei published his 
first major ethnographic study, Race and Society (j-), in 1940. The 
publication of this book is traceable to 1936, when he became an instructor in the 
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summer college organized by the Manchurian Railway Company Employee 
Association in Manchukuo. In Manchukou, he delivered several talks in major cities 
including Dairen and Harbin, and the monograph of his talk in Dairen, Shujoku to 
shakai &j- (Tribes and society), was published by the Manchurian Railway 
Company in 1936.91 
      Shinmei, a Taiwan-born sociologist who took his elementary education in both 
Korea and Japan, did not write on ethnic problems in the colony from within the ivory 
tower.92 Like Kada in his approach to the concept of race, Shinmei emphasized the fact 
that society had developed itself through changeable culture and organizations, not 
based on static racial elements.93 The fact that the biological unity among races is not 
self-evident, Shinmei argued, demonstrates that the idea of a pure race is simply a 
fantasy. In other words, race can only be considered part of a society when its 
absoluteness is dismantled and its reversibility is recognized.94  
     Central to this observation was the notion that no matter how race is 
conceptualized, it does not preclude the possibility of racial superiority and inferiority 
dividing a society. Clearly aware of this, Shinmei drew special attention to the 
relationship between race and the state:  
 
When a certain race is distributed widely through a state and comprises a 
substantial portion of the whole population, one can say that the relationship 
between race and nation (pkokimin, people in the sense of formal 
nationality) is very close. However, that case is an exception. A national 
society (-, kokumin shakai) is invariably based on race; however, 
race does not constitute a national society as an integral social association. 
The fact that the integration of national society is possible without racial 
integration is best demonstrated in the constitution of the populations of 
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Switzerland and the United States. Racists aim to constitute a national society 
from a racial perspective or commit racial discrimination within a society. In 
the present, German Nazism is showing this most thoroughly.95 
 
This argument above no doubt represents Shinmei’s theoretical positioning, as he 
delivered this lecture to Japanese workers in the Manchurian Railway Company. The 
state of Manchukuo was established in 1932 as a laboratory to realize multi-ethnicity 
and multi-culture in the Japanese empire. Therefore, it is conceivable that irrespective 
of his theoretical views, Shinmei was placed in the position of having to characterize 
the Manchurian state as an ultimate community of racial harmony. Arguably, he 
discussed a capitalist society like the United States as an example of a multi-ethnic 
nation-state. This tells us that Shinmei was also interested in theorizing a United States 
of East Asia, as he saw the multi-ethnic constitution of Manchukuo.  
Shinmei maintained that racism temporarily faded away when the capitalistic 
mode of production dominated society, since profit-oriented social forces would rest 
atop racial hierarchies. However, it is a mistake to conclude that Shinmei endorsed an 
advanced capitalist society as the ideal destination of anti-racism and multi-ethnicity. 
He argued that modern capitalism based on individuals’ indefinite pursuit of interests 
created a number of economic problems within a society. He contended that this 
explains why capitalist nation-states are often transformed into imperial nation-states, 
so that they may solve economic problems by annexing colonies. He stressed that it is 
this unique stage of capitalism that would lead to racism and ethnic nationalism 
between nation-states.96 In this respect, he was clearly aware that building a single 
multiracial state would not fundamentally solve the issues of racism and ethnic 
nationalism intertwined with international capitalism.  
    This observation on modern capitalism by Shinmei can also be found in his critical 
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reading of Ferdinand Tonnies’ theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. He did not 
deny that Tonnies’ highly binary analysis of society provides insights for diagnosing the 
crisis in modern capitalism.97 To be sure, the causal connection between monopoly 
capitalism and the resurgence of racism therein called for a new logic of community. 
However, he was strongly opposed to the circular logic that crisis in profit-oriented 
societies reconfirms the eternal validity of the communal life of premodern societies. 
Therefore, the search for a new cooperative community, he maintained, must go beyond 
the limits of such binary thinking and in this respect, he went even so far as to say that 
“[T]onnies’ sociology must be negated as a historical organization. (=)”98 
    Such a bold statement made by Shinmei shows that his anti-racism developed in 
parallel with his steadfast belief that society can be neither formed nor explained by 
transcendental and primordial values such as Gemeinschaft in Tonnie’s theory. What, 
then, did he theorize as the ideal relations among different racial groups within a nation-
state as well as with other states? It appears that Shinmei’s response to that question in 
Race and Society is still far from sophisticated. He argued that “[N]ational principles 
(=./) are to recognize the social power (soziale Kräfte, -i) of each 
national society as well as its integration.”99 In doing so, he believed that each national 
society could lead to a “rational world order,” where the problem of racism can be 
resolved in an ideal way.100 However, he never expounded in this book how on “social 
power” would bring a state of equilibrium to highly complex racial relations in modern 
capitalism. 
    Given that Race and Society was written based on his public lectures in 
Manchukuo in 1936, two years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the 
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spread of East Asian discourses, it is conceivable that Shinmei’s theory of a multi-
ethnic nation state did not encompass East Asia in general. Moreover, Race and Society 
was focused less on delineating the concept of minzoku than on denouncing racism. 
However, Shinmei’s work exemplifies well the theoretical concerns that Japanese social 
scientists at the time were sharing. These concerns first pertained to the question of how 
the framework of the nation-state is reformulated in envisioning a multi-ethnic empire. 
If racial issues in modern society are not separable from crisis in the conventional 
paradigm of the nation-state, the conventional logic of incorporating subjects into the 
state by bestowing nationality on them must be also fundamentally reconsidered. 
Second and more importantly, the relationship between capitalism and ethnicity needed 
to be elucidated further. Unless constructing a multi-ethnic empire does not simply 
mean a primitive community, as described in Tonnies’ Gemeinschaft, the next question 
might be how the logic of cooperativism could be gleaned from a highly goal-oriented 
and thus fragmented capitalist social formation. It was Takata Yasuma who took these 
questions more seriously than any other social scientists in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. 
 
Takata Yasuma’s Concept of minzoku   
In January 1939, Miki Kiyoshi  (1897-1945), a renowned Kyoto School 
philosopher and a leading theorist in Showa Research Institute () founded 
in 1933, published an article entitled “Principles of Thought for a New Japan (e
*./).” Stressing that the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident in China was a 
“world-historical moment,” Miki insisted in this 27-page pamphlet that “abstract 
modern ideologies” should be overcome in order to establish “East Asian thought” and 
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complete an “East Asian Cooperative Community (t().”101 Interestingly, 
among some eight ideologies to be sublated, Miki’s first target was nationalism.102 
Needless to say, his somewhat extravagant charge against nationalism reflects the 
concern of Japanese intellectuals’ with growing Chinese nationalism. Miki wrote: 
 
With respect to Chinese nationalism, just as all of the world’s countries 
moved from feudal societies to modern states through nationalism, China is 
experiencing nationalism in the same way; thus it is important to recognize 
the historical necessity of Chinese nationalism. Japan should not interrupt 
China’s national unification; rather, it is important for the true establishment 
of the East Asian Community that China acquires individuality through 
national unity. But at the same time, China, in order to enter the new world, 
must go beyond nationalism.103 (Emphasis added) 
 
Although Miki’s pamphlet was part of the government’s propaganda, his understanding 
of Chinese nationalism includes some profound philosophical points. To understand 
them, one may also need to pay attention to Miki’s logic of the East Asian Community. 
First, his zeal for the East Asian Cooperative Community was not grounded in any 
binary formation of the East and the West. Therefore, it is misleading to suggest that 
East Asian thought and community must be achieved only in relation to the West. 
Although he never denied the historicity of Western imperialism in East Asia, Miki’s 
logic of a cooperative community was far more sophisticated than a simple 
endorsement of a collective community in Asia as a counter force.  
     Therefore, the concern was based on the principle of subjectivity formation in a 
broader community-based society, and this notion would eventually replace the 
conventional constitution of the nation-state. In this respect, Chinese nationalism 
corresponded exactly to the historical process of obtaining individuality and forming a 
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modern nation-state. However, the way Chinese nationalism emerged also reconfirmed 
for Miki that it would be destined to become imperialism unless the questions of 
liberalism and individualism were resolved. As sociologists such as Takata had 
vehemently argued, the prevalence of individualism based on capitalistic modes of 
production would continue to give rise to social disorder, including ethnic conflicts. 
Precisely for this reason, Miki called for “overcoming” nationalism in a conventional 
sense, but he also showed keen interest in the possibility that the notion of ethnicity 
(minzoku) might replace the logic of nationalism and nation in terms of formal 
nationality.104 Miki believed that by radically approaching the notion of ethnicity and 
using it to replace nationalism and nation as the basis for formal nationality, he could 
discover a new theory of subjectivity that would overcome the current crisis in 
capitalism and individualism. 
As a number of social scientists grappled with the logic of ethnicity in the late 
1930s and the early 1940s, Takata published his major ethnographic study, On Nation 
(&:), in 1942. Before examining this book, which was far more sophisticated than 
his 1935 work, The Problem of Nation (&*+,),105 I call attention to several 
important points that should not be overlooked. First, although Takata was involved in 
various government-funded projects in the mid 1940s, his concern with the concept of 
minzoku was traceable to the mid 1930s and it was theoretically rooted in his social 
scientific thinking in the 1920s. 
 Takata was appointed as the director of Ethnic Research Institute (&) 
in January 1943. Unquestionably, his participation in this institute demonstrates that 
Takata, like other social scientists of the time, was actively involved in imperial 
research institutions during the wartime period. Hence, I agree that it is important to 
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highlight Takata’s political involvement in the Japanese empire, as scholars such as 
Kevin Doak have pointed out. However, I strongly argue that placing excessive 
emphasis on Takata’s commitment to these institutions would preclude discussion of far 
more important points. First, such an emphasis, whether intended or not, tends to 
restrict Takata’s ethnographic studies to a short time between the mid 1940s and the end 
of the Asia Pacific War. As Takata himself reiterated in his writings on minzoku, his 
notion of ethnic nationalism was by no means a one-time deviation forced by the 
imperial government. Therefore, it is very problematic to simply focus on his wartime 
writings, much of which Takata wrote while he was affiliated with Ethnic Research 
Institute in particular, and hastily judge him as a “converted” wartime fascist.106 
    Second and more importantly, such an approach is by no means separable from the 
issue of universality and particularity. Focusing on Takata’s wartime writings but 
ignoring their close connections to his early sociology from the 1920s, when Takata 
unquestionably identified himself as a universal social scientist, often results in 
positioning his wartime social science as particularism in opposition to his universal 
social science in the 1920s and 1930s. Needless to say, such an interpretation of Takata 
and other wartime Japanese social scientists reflects certain political intentions in the 
present. One facet of these political agendas is an attempt to rescue the historicity of 
Japanese social science from its “original sin” during the wartime period by declaring 
that wartime Japanese social science was far from universal social science.107 Another 
direction is to reconfirm the values of universalism by stressing the failures of the 
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“particularist visions” of an East Asian Empire.  
     Paradoxical as it may sound, Takata took this issue very seriously and 
vehemently argued that his ethnographic studies would not be applied only to East Asia 
as a form of East Asian nationalism. As Takata put it:     
     
Most of all, what I intend to do in this book is to analyze minzoku from the 
perspective of formal science (sG). It is nothing more or less than this. 
Insofar as I acknowledge the objectivity of formal science, it also demands an 
application to the world. The demand of science is neither that of class nor 
that of nation ()… As long as it [minzoku] is based on an analytical 
theory, it must be accepted by everyone. Therefore, I do not think that its 
content is particularly related to Japan.108 (Emphasis added) 
 
Given that the notion of particularity often comes into play in discussing ethnicity and 
ethnic nationalism, for example in the cases of Chinese nationalism and German volk, 
how did Takata lead readers to comprehend that his minzoku theory was universal? In 
delving into this question and tracing the sophistication of his scientific thinking, it 
would be worthwhile to examine Takata’s definition of minzoku in his 1935 book, The 
Problem of Nation. In translating the following text, I will adhere to the term minzoku 
rather than ethnicity or nation to minimize any conceptual confusion: 
 
What is minzoku? Minzoku is a group of people who recognize themselves as 
a minzoku. This, by all means, sounds like a circular definition. Nonetheless, 
it articulates that the locus of minzoku does not reside in external 
characteristics such as blood and physical similarities, but in the 
consciousness of its members. The fact that minzoku consciousness is not 
induced by minzoku, but minzoku is induced by minzoku consciousness is, 
irrespective of its somewhat insufficient manifestation, a truth that hardly be 
refuted.109 
 
As early as the mid 1930s, a few of years before the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, 
Takata was already making a subtle but very compelling argument about the concept of 
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ethnicity. Not only did he completely denounce race as irrelevant to minzoku, but he 
also argued that ethnic consciousness precedes the existence of an ethnic group. 
Therefore, for Takata minzoku as a collective consciousness was not a given community 
but a social construct by its nature, and this reconfirms the location of the term minzoku 
as an object of social scientific study. He then moved to the issue of the relationship 
between minzoku and nation (, kokumin). Here, Takata raises some conceptual 
questions:  
 
First, some discomfort occurs when the term kokumin is translated into the 
word nation. The word kokumin includes in its meaning all members of a 
nation-state and it is often considered to be identical to the nation-state in 
dimension. However, nation corresponds only in exceptional cases to the 
nation state in its dimensions. Second, nation has often been translated as 
minzoku. Since the term nation has been commonly used in expressions such 
as minzoku problems, minzoku autonomy and minzokushugi (nationalism), I 
believe that calling nation kokumin would create a great many difficulties and 
this tendency would not change… For this reason, I have decided to call 
nation minzoku.110  
 
Although he chooses minzoku as the translation for nation, Takata does not 
acknowledge that it has the same definition as nation in terms of a nation-state or in 
terms of formal nationality. This clearly indicates that instead of a Japanese word, 
Takata adhered to the English word “nation” in the original text. For Takata, the term 
minzoku, therefore, is highly equivocal, and he thus affirmed its limited similarity to the 
concept of nation-state. Theoretically, Takata’s hesitation to equate minzoku with 
nation-state is directly concerned with his whole concept of partial (kQ) and integral 
([( society. Takata stressed that the dimensions of an integral society are 
determined based on its degree of self-sufficiency.111 For him, the tendency for a 
nation-state to be considered as ultimate integral society and its members the subjects of 
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an integral society did not indicate that a nation-state is in itself a self-sufficient society. 
More importantly, this logic, Takata argued, neither explains the hybridity of one’s 
becoming a subject in complicated social interactions, nor does it provide practical 
solutions for the crisis in the modern nation-state. 
Takata maintained that the combination of Koreans and Taiwanese with Japanese 
minzoku itself does not constitute a nation-state as a self-sufficient integral society. 
Therefore, he contended that the boundary of a nation (kokumin, ) does not 
become the boundary of an integral society.112 In other words, he was strongly opposed 
to the idea that minzoku as a form of nation is itself either an integral society or a 
constituent of an element of an integral society, the nation-state in particular. Such a 
radical interpretation of the term minzoku tells us that Takata was painstakingly 
searching for a new logic of subjectivity formation in his observation of the limitations 
of the nation-state framework. Just as giving formal nationality to colonial subjects does 
not guarantee that they subjectively belong to the empire, Takata was opposed to the 
notion of constructing an East Asian empire by mechanically consolidating different 
ethnic groups. Here, he reconfirmed that minzoku itself does not constitute an integral 
society, nor a nation-state:  
 
Minzoku is not an integral society. Needless to say, various partial groups are 
included in an integral society, but these partial groups are not included in 
minzoku. Minzoku is also nothing but a partial society and the reason it has a 
particular meaning among partial societies is only because it is extended to 
the broad dimension of people’s lives. On the one hand, the combination of 
an integral society includes the combination of minzoku as its most important 
part, but an integral society is constituted by various combinations and 
mixtures. Therefore, the combination of minzoku at times positions itself 
against (the general combination of) an integral society; that is, an integral 
society even includes the combination of a group [minzoku] against it.113 
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Although minzoku, among other social groups, constitutes part of an integral society, it 
is extended to people’s lives to a greater degree. This first explains why Takata placed 
an enormous emphasis on it in his vision of an East Asian empire. Second, it is a 
dynamic element in society itself; that is, minzoku is not a given and static creature. It 
always negates and recreates itself and it is in this very process that a new form of 
subjectivity necessary for a grand community emerges.  
To this end, Takata had to debunk any possible links between transcendental, 
primordial, and thus non-scientific elements of society such as race, blood, and land. 
Takata even criticized his colleagues who shared the notion of anti-racism. Although 
they all agreed on the impossibility of racism as a communitarian theory, they also 
presented drastically different views on the concept of minzoku. For example, Komatsu 
Kentarō, a professor at Kansai Gakuin University, opened fire against Takata in a 1941 
book, Theories on Nation (&*/:). Critiquing Takata’s notion that minzoku 
consciousness precedes minzoku, Komatsu contended that minzoku consciousness itself 
is pre-determined by objective elements such as blood, language and culture.114 He 
thus charged that “a person’s subjective consciousness of Japanese minzoku” occurs 
only within the boundary where “he or she shares Japanese blood.”115 In doing so, 
Komatsu attempted to expand on his argument as a dialectical logic; that is, he did not 
count on a one-dimensional orientation between subjectivism and objectivism in 
explicating the origins of minzoku. However, Komatsu’s logic was far from an ideal 
interpretation of this highly heterogeneous concept. Insofar as he affirmed that 
“Japanese blood” has an “objective” existence, he could not escape from the circular 
logic that minzoku is constituted by inexplicable and therefore unscientific “objective” 
elements.  
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    For this reason, Komatsu and like-minded social scientists intended to resolve this 
antinomy by resorting to the nation-state (') as an all-encompassing integral society. 
By so doing, they at once avoided the complexities of subjectivism and objectivism 
regarding minzoku and confined the dynamics of minzoku to the nation-state. Takata’s 
discontent with these liberal social scientists was thus centered on their problematic 
understanding of partial and integral society. In fact, he devoted many parts of On 
Nation to defending his theory against Komatsu’s critiques,116 and this subtle but 
important dissonance even among anti-racist social scientists lasted until the end of the 
war.  
     Takata also acknowledged that minzoku fostered by minzoku consciousness is 
often represented by a nation-state. He described this category of minzoku as a modern 
nation (&) and this partly explains why he accepted, albeit unwillingly, nation 
as a translation of the term minzoku. A modern nation in this stage seeks to establish an 
ethnic nation-state based on the commonality of consciousness and life. However, the 
temporary parallel between minzoku and nation, Takata stressed, would not last long 
since modern nation states are destined to expand their territory.117 The politics of 
exclusion and inclusion arises within the modern nation at this second stage, so that 
either an ethnic nation attempts to integrate minority ethnic groups within itself, or it 
intends to separate itself from them by constructing another nation-state. Importantly, 
even if a majority ethnic group within a nation-state seeks to become a new nation-state, 
its minzoku consciousness has already changed from what it was in the past.118 
Therefore, Takata asserted that what might be called a pure ethnic nation-state is 
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exceptional.119  
  
Beyond Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft : A Community Capitalism? 
This understanding of the dynamics of minzoku clearly demonstrates that Takata’s 
social theory is significantly different from the binary logic of community 
(gemeinschaft) and civil society (gesellschaft).120 Nation or minzoku itself does not 
necessarily indicate a collective community. However, the general crisis of capitalism 
constantly creates an urgency to retrieve communitarianism, and to eradicate the 
inequality and unevenness caused by individuals’ profit-oriented desires. Here, race, 
nation, and ethnicity as primordial forms of community reemerge as a platform for 
reconstructing a new society, that is, community. As I have discussed, Takata rejected 
this logic of community, emphasizing that minzoku itself is a social construct in modern 
society. However, it is important to note that Takata’s social theory is not free from 
desire for a community either, as he and like-minded social scientists were all seeking 
to conceptualize the East Asian Community. 
    At stake here is the question of whether Takata’s theory of ethnicity could be a 
vehicle for overcoming the general crisis of capitalism and individualism, without 
resorting to a fantasy of community. To resolve this question, many Japanese social 
scientists had attempted to find a radical direction through class struggle theory. 
Undoubtedly, Takata was also exposed to the ardent intellectual atmosphere of 
Marxism in the late 1910s and 1920s at Kyoto Imperial University, where both 
Kawakami Hajime ^_ (1879-1946) and Yoneda Shōtarō 
 (1873-
1945), Takata’s mentor in sociology, were lecturing on historical materialism. However, 
he gradually became critical of socialism and found class struggle theory insufficient to 
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explain highly dynamic and heterogeneous social relations. From the beginning, Takata 
tried to understand the term class in a broader sense, not limited to an economic 
perspective. He saw class as having three distinct phases. The primordial sense of class 
is created when individuals find affinities and sympathies with others. But this notion of 
class is not transformed into an actual class due to geographical and occupational 
obstacles, which necessitate the second phase. This basic sense of commonality is then 
expanded to a social level, when what individuals feel what might be called class 
sentiment. Finally, this sentiment develops into class consciousness, through which 
individuals form organizations and engage in conflicts with other groups.121  
    Central to Takata’s concept of class was his observation that neither economic 
power nor class is constituted solely by economic relations. He writes: 
 
It can be said that views on placing similarities of economic power (i) or 
economic interest in the center of class are considered economic views on 
class. Although these views are widespread among a number of economists 
and socialists, I would say that they are short-sighted. As natural as this may 
sound, I would like to emphasize it once again. No society exists without 
hierarchical organizations. However, hierarchical relations in society are 
determined not merely by economic environments. Economic interests 
themselves do not mean a social hierarchy, and economic power is one single 
element that determines such a hierarchy.122 (Emphasis added) 
 
Takata believed that materiality or property by itself does not constitute class as a social 
power. Instead, he pointed out the paradox that class relations are in many cases 
sustained through blood relations, as best demonstrated in the heredity of the 
aristocratic class in medieval Europe. Takata paid special attention to the fact that social 
powers are often determined and inherited by what he called customs (), in many 
cases taking religious and racial forms.123 Takata first developed this understanding of 
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class in the 1920s, and persistently maintained it through the 1940s based on his 
observation that class struggle theory is an insufficient analytical unit in sociology. 
     Takata’s critical approach to class struggle theory shed new light on the complex 
relationship between nationalism and capitalism. Class consciousness in the capitalistic 
mode of production, he maintained, is often associated with ethnic consciousness, and 
they two factors reinforce each other. This relationship becomes all the more complex 
in a society with multi-ethnic groups. At the early stage of capitalism, Takata contended, 
national interests appropriate capital in order to reinforce their influence, and the 
development of capitalism thus becomes a passive means of realizing the demands of 
nationalism.124 Takata argued that the nation-state, appropriating the power of capital in 
the form of “nationalistic demands,” attempted to increase its profit at its highest stage 
of development.125 
     According to German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies’ theory of Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft (Community and Civil Society), the spread of goal-oriented activities by 
human beings comes about because of complex social relations. Further, the 
development of productivity and technologies necessarily gives rises to the prevalence 
of capitalism. Takata was exquisitely aware of Tonnies’ logic and acknowledged that 
nationalism as a form of community and capitalism are diametrically opposed to each 
other in theory. This explains why he described nationalism as “centripetal;” that is, an 
individual is represented as part of a total self ([(=), whereas capitalism is 
“centrifugal,” in that an individual always pursues a sense of superiority and a 
relationship of dominance.126 
     The problem here is that unlike Tonnies’ somewhat simplistic analysis of 
gesellschaft, the proliferation of profit-oriented relationships in modern society does not 
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necessarily mean that a community-centered society would come to an end. As Slavoj 
Zizek has correctly argued, the elementary feature of capitalism is its circularity, so that 
capital’s constant production of surplus value would not allow it to find equilibrium. 
According to Zizek, capitalism could not exist without its “inherent structural 
imbalance.”127 Takata observed that under this mechanism, capital must constantly 
increase its surplus value to limit social and economic inequality. He concluded that this 
is precisely the means by which a modern nation-state achieved development in the 
name of material civilization. He also pointed out that precisely for this reason, modern 
nation-states are not immune from all sorts of conflicts that are engendered by 
hierarchy and unevenness from a sociological perspective.128 
     Takata’s analysis of modern warfare was in fact based on his understanding of 
gesellschaft. To peacefully increase capital and surplus value, he stressed, a modern 
nation state strives to develop modern technologies and expand the capitalist market. To 
this end, it must subordinate the selfish desires of individuals to the collective good of 
the community by establishing an authoritative but highly rational state institution. This 
modern nation-state system, Takata acknowledged, does not necessarily generate 
conflicts between nation-states, as he noted in the examples of Sweden, Belgium and 
the Netherlands, all of which had achieved a certain level of capitalist development.129 
However, the ostensible status created by the peaceful accumulation of capital would 
not last forever, unless a modern-nation state permanently maintains what might be 
called an autarchy system. In an attempt to realize self-sufficiency and minimize the 
potential risks of conflict, Takata observed, a modern nation-state with many ethnic 
groups is often divided into several independent ethnic nation-states.130 He maintains 
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that this differentiation, however, would never fundamentally resolve ethnic conflicts 
that are intertwined with the capitalistic mode of production in such an overdetermined 
society as modern society.131    
     Takata’s zeal for a new society beyond the limits of gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft, therefore, is closely connected to his phenomenological discovery that 
nationalism and capitalism are essentially reciprocal. In this respect, he, like other 
wartime Japanese social scientists, paid attention to the necessity of creating a broad 
nation-state through which a higher level of communitarian integration might be 
realized. Importantly, Takata’s project of constructing a grand communal body was not 
intended to eliminate socio-political elements that cause conflict and inequality. As 
Zizek has argued, the corporatist temptation, often called a fascist fantasy, aims to 
create a community by way of eradicating those social and economic elements that give 
rise to structural imbalance and social antagonism. A totalitarian state, therefore, often 
strives to create a homogeneous means of forming subjectivity, in which profit-oriented, 
selfish individualism must be subordinated to the communitarian good. Precisely for 
this reason, these anti-social and anti-harmonious elements are explicitly imputed to 
groups and matters outside society, i.e. racism.132 Zizek therefore conceptualizes the 
desire of eliminating unevenness in modern society as “capitalism without 
capitalism.”133 
     Takata was keenly aware of the structural risks inherent in the capitalist system. 
He too unmasked his “corporatist” vision of envisioning a grand communal body. 
However, it should be emphasized that Takata’s notion of cooperative community was 
not centered on creating an omnipotent creature such as the Master that would realize 
social balance, as was described in Zizek’s analysis of German fascism. Nor was it 
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based on institutional and thus highly rationalized faith: specifically that the bigger and 
stronger a nation-state was, the more effectively it could control social and economic 
inequality. Inherent in Takata’s logic of community was regionality beyond the limits of 
a single nation-state. This explains why Takata, citing the writings of Alfred Rosenberg, 
a symbolic figure in the racist theory of Nazi Germany, somehow expressed sympathy 
with his general idea of creating a regional community.134 Takata’s interest in 
Rosenberg, however, was nothing more than academic and superficial. To be sure, he 
was keenly aware of Rosenberg’s extremely racist orientation, as his main argument 
was to spread the trans-historical superiority of the Aryan race, which he himself 
“discovered” in the myths of Northern Europe.135    
    Importantly, the problem Takata found in Rosenberg’s theory was the issue of the 
distorted relationship between German nationalism and the German nation-state. He 
observed that Nazi Germany’s ultimate destiny was to establish a regional political 
community in Europe by expanding a German nation-state. What Takata found 
problematic in this process was that German nationalism was presented as the principle 
of the integration of subjects in Germany’s political community.136 He stressed, 
however, that German nationalism was based on two unchangeable myths: (1) one was 
a faith in the superiority of the German minzoku, and the other, based on this faith, was 
that the German minzoku had been always creative and thus contributed to the 
development of world culture.137 Most problematic in this theory was that the German 
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minzoku itself is always portrayed as a given and thus trans-historical, lacking the 
dynamics of subject formation.  
Takata was adamant that a number of Japanese social scientists were recklessly 
replicating this one-dimensional and scientifically inconsistent thinking in their vision 
of the East Asian Community, particularly regarding the East Asian economic bloc 
theory. To put it another way, there is no absolute minzoku, as Nazi Germany attempted 
to postulate about German nationalism. Takata strove to establish his theory of an East 
Asian nation as a grand minzoku and at the same time to rationalize it by reconfirming 
that his theory of nation was actually a product of his long-standing sociological 
speculation that he had been developing since the 1920s.138  
     Takata intended to rescue minzoku from the tendency to view it as a static 
element that only prevails in the stage of gemeinschaft. By expanding the concept of 
minzoku to the basic sociological conviction that a subject in a society constantly 
changes himself in relation with the other, he attempted to rationally overcome the 
observation that minzoku as a form of gemeinschaft is opposed to the capitalistic mode 
of production as a representative form of gesellschaft. Takata’s acute critiques of Nazi 
Germany’s race-and-state-oriented regionalism and its supporters in Japan may sound 
convincing, given that Japan, too, failed to assimilate the Koreans and Taiwanese into a 
Japanese nation-state in the 1920s and 1930s. The question, then, is how Takata 
responded through his logic of a grand nationalism to the ethnic nationalism that was 
jeopardizing the Japanese state  
 
Minzoku in Transition: East Asian Minzoku as a Grand Nation ( &) 
                                                 
138 Takata Yasuma, Minzokuron, p. 145. Takata stressed, “[T]he logic of a grand minzoku (+ ,, 
grand-nationalism) is by no means a theory I developed out of the current situation in East Asia or 
Germany’s domination (in Europe). It [grand-nationalism] is simply a theory that is derived from the 
article “The Law of Expansion and Reduction in Basic Society (-./01234567),” which 
I wrote twenty-five years ago.” 
                                                       
 135 
As social groups and organizations constantly change themselves according to social 
interactions, minzoku also experiences integration, development and disappearance in 
Takata’s theory. He continued to elaborate this observation in his series of writings on 
minzoku in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In his 1939 book On The East Asian Nation 
(&:), Takata attempted to conceptualize minzoku in the context of East Asia. 
Notably, his discussion started with harsh critiques of the so-called East Asian 
Cooperative Community, which was a social scientists’ blueprint for Japan’s new order 
that was widely known among Japanese intellectuals. Its “impotence,” Takata stressed, 
resided in the reality that the mission of a new East Asia, the integration of China in 
particular, was not clearly presented in this theory.139   
     Among various doctrines presented in a series of discourses on the East Asia 
Cooperative Community, Takata primarily criticized the notion of the community of 
destiny. (¡rO() Importantly, he also recognized the reality that Western 
imperialism necessitated the self-defense of East Asia to some extent. However, he was 
reluctant to accept the logic that the presence of the West would bind East Asia from a 
regional perspective, and that it would guarantee the historicity of the notion of the 
community of destiny, as best described in political scientist Ryama Masamichi’s 
theory of the East Asian Cooperative Community. Takata’s critiques were two-fold. He 
argued that insofar as East Asian regionalism was associated with the theory of the 
“destiny” of East Asia, it would create a geography-centered and thus highly 
oversimplified epistemology of the East and the West.140 Therefore, his second 
observation was that the problem of people of yellow color was not whether they 
belonged to East Asia in a regional sense, but rather whether they have an awareness of 
ethnically belonging to Asian minzoku: 
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The cooperation of regional destiny has actually become the destiny of 
common regions that have been oppressed by Western powers. However, I 
must raise this question…. Is this destiny regional in nature? Was it yellow 
people who experienced the oppression of Western powers, in particular 
imperialistic oppression by white people in the West? White people in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai live and breathe in East Asia, but they never experience 
oppression, but all the people of color residing in East Asia experience it. 
Minzoku in East Asia is exposed to a common destiny, since we yellow 
people live in the region of East Asia. This is not so much a spatial destiny 
but rather minzoku. The so-called cooperation of regional destiny is in fact 
nothing but the cooperation of the destiny of minzoku. (For this reason), is 
regionalism no more than a form of nationalism?141 (Emphasis added) 
 
The subtle but significant difference between Takata and other advocates of East Asian 
regionalism is telling in many ways. Specifically, Takata emphasized the importance of 
nationalism in envisioning a new Asia. In doing so, he also reconfirmed that one’s sense 
of belonging to a certain ethnic group is not concerned as much with geographical and 
blood-related realities as it is with the dynamics of subjectivity formation. More 
importantly, by casting a critical eye on any sort of regionalism, Takata prevented his 
theory from being reduced to a regional logic of universality and particularity, He 
rejected the notion that the world is geographically constituted by the West as universal 
and the East as particular and oppressed. For this reason, Takata adhered to the concept 
of East Asian minzoku or East Asian nationalism, based on his universalist approach to 
minzoku and nationalism, which he refused to particularize in relation to the West. 
     With regard to ethnic nationalism, Takata was primarily faced with two 
contradictory realties. The first was that each ethnic group constitutes a community 
based on ethnic nationalism, and tends to be exclusive in nature. Second, plural 
nationalisms in each ethnic groups nonetheless have to accept the nationalism of East 
Asian minzoku in a broader sense.142 In order to scientifically rationalize this seemingly 
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impossible logic, Takata proposed that the nature of East Asian nationalism is as 
follows: 
 
Above all, nationalism as a demand for an essential minzoku is neither 
subordinated to East Asian nationalism, nor does the former serve as a means 
to the latter. To take this further, I do not argue that essential minzoku 
integrated with one another and constituted an East Asian minzoku. Each 
individual belongs to an essential minzoku and at the same time he belongs to 
a minzoku with a wider range. The two (nationalisms) have separate 
meanings in a sense. The question of how these two nationalisms have their 
own content and to what degree they integrate their members is primarily 
concerned with how they manage to effectively function in two different 
stages. Insofar as the maintenance and development of its members is only 
possible through the power of an essential minzoku, essential nationalism 
would be dominant. According to the degree to which essential nationalism 
recognizes and frees itself for nationalism in a broader sense, it [East Asian 
nationalism] might occur.143 
 
Clearly, the question Takata found to be most urgent was how he could theorize 
Chinese nationalism in his scientific approach to minzoku. To be sure, he never naively 
denounced Chinese nationalism as such. As he emphasized in On The East Asian 
Nation, he was convinced that the capitalist system of gesellschaft and ethnic 
consciousness as a form of gemeinschaft could co-exist. For him, this coexistence was 
necessary to create a modern subject as well. Therefore, capitalist development and the 
rise of ethnic nationalism in China were viewed by Takata as “necessary” steps toward 
an East Asian minzoku. However, this does not mean that he accepted discourses on 
Chinese nationalism produced by Chinese intellectuals at face value. In particular, 
Takata was critical of Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of Democracy (#$). Citing 
the renowned philosopher Funayama Shinichi’s ¢£¤¥ (1907-1994) work on Sun-
Yat Sen, Takata dismissed Sun’s theory of democracy and nationalism as “atomistic.”144 
     Of course, the notion of “atomism” that Takata appropriated to devalue Chinese 
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nationalism was not Takata’s original work. In the mid 19th century, Hegel 
conceptualized atomism by explaining civil society as a state of atomon where 
particularized individuals with multiple personalities form a society without an absolute 
unity.145 Individuals in civil society, Hegel argued, constantly attempt to compel the 
realization of their own interests over those of others, and the very impossibility of 
realizing the goals of individuals without interacting with others generates social 
relations. Therefore, everyone in civil society forms a network of inter-dependency and 
this network itself becomes the goal and means of human life.146 Hegel conceptualized 
this as a state of “anti-ethics,” and proposed the state as an absolute and universal unity 
for synthesizing the particularity of individuals.  
      Although Takata seemed to accept the Hegelian logic of atomism, his extension 
of this logic to nationalism was quite distinctive. Takata observed that the relation 
between individual and minzoku, especially in modern (Chinese) nationalism, isolates 
individuals within the narrow confines of a single minzoku, thus prohibiting individuals 
from forming subjectivity beyond ethnic nationalism.  
 
How is atomistic social thought led by nationalism, and how does 
nationalism become one result of atomistic social thought? This question is 
premised on the condition that individuals as atoms are not separated from 
the integration of minzoku, and that individuals could develop themselves 
only through the medium of minzoku. Thus, if we presuppose that the 
integration of East Asia is necessary for the sake of its liberation, and that 
members of each ethnic group in East Asia could develop themselves only by 
an East Asian integration, (Chinese) nationalism must be led by East Asian 
nationalism.147   
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According to this argument, Takata contended, the “establishment of a new order in 
East Asia” would be extremely difficult without asking for the “destruction of China’s 
atomistic nationalism” and the “complete negation of the basic principles of Sun-Yat 
Sen’s theory.”148 However, this logic created two problems. First, as Takata himself 
acknowledged, one could not completely eradicate atomistic thought in the structure of 
gesellschaft such as Chinese society. More importantly, if atomism pertains to the 
subordination of individuals to a totality, as described in Takata’s critiques of Chinese 
nationalism, how could East Asian nationalism overcome atomism as the legacy of 
modern nationalism? 
     Takata was clearly aware that the Germans conceived of national socialism as an 
alternative to atomism in modern society. However, he was adamant that subordinating 
individuals to a totality or an absolute leader, as best exemplified in Hitler’s emergence 
in Nazi Germany, would be possible only by emphasizing the totality of minzoku, 
which would completely ignore the dynamism of subject formation within minzoku.149 
For Takata, therefore, German nationalism, was not cooperativism (t#$) but 
totalitarianism ([(#$). How, then, did Takata understand cooperativism in his 
discussion of minzoku? Here, Takata borrowed the notion of the East Asian Cooperative 
Community from philosophical perspectives. Funayama Shinichi garnered special 
attention from Takata:  
 
When I think how dialectical thinking could synthesize inconsistencies, the 
notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community is a policy. As long as it is a 
policy, it must be realized in causal social relations. Then, how can 
inconsistencies from the perspective of an analytical theory be synthesized in 
reality? If cooperativism is the synthesis of totalistic and atomistic views, 
how can one say that “cooperativism is closer to a totalistic view”? … The 
total that is realized by the self-negation of the part becomes a part 
immediately, and this part once again becomes the total by way of self-
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negation.150 (Emphasis added)   
 
Takata’s so-called ko-minzokushugi ( &#$) was grounded in the philosophical 
theories of subjectivity formation developed by Japanese intellectuals, many of whom 
were not social scientists. However, Takata did not accept Funayama’s highly 
circulative philosophical dialectics at face value, since his criticism was that such 
dialectics could be only the precondition of the East Asian Cooperative Community, not 
its content.151 As a social scientist, Takata was faced with the question of how this 
theory of subjectivity formation could explain real problems, in particular the relations 
between different ethnic groups. To be sure, Takata also reiterated throughout On The 
East Asian Nation that the relationship between ethnic groups must be based on 
reciprocity, and that becoming part of an East Asian minzoku did not mean that one had 
to sacrifice his essential ethnicity.152  
 This idealistic approach to East Asian minzoku, however, clashed with both 
Takata’s basic concept of sociology and the actual hierarchical relation between ethnic 
groups. The boundaries of society were always fluid in Takata’s view because 
interactions between social actors and between integral and partial societies constantly 
create new forms of society. In this respect, the dialectics of self-negation between total 
and part, and between objectivity and subjectivity, seem to correspond with Takata’s 
theory of society. Yet it is important to note that Takata’s understanding of dialectics did 
not necessarily presuppose the equal status of social actors and groups. In other words, 
he acknowledged social divisions in class, culture, religion and ethnicity, and in this 
respect his sociology was not intended to eliminate these social hierarchies. However, 
most advocates of a new East Asian order emphasized anti-hierarchical and anti-
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discriminatory relations among ethnic groups as an ideal goal for the East Asian 
Community. Conceivably, this gesture was intended to hide the real imbalance in power 
relations, and at the same time to project a utopian and messianic perception of the East 
Asian Community in the future.  
 Caught between idealism and a fragmented reality, Takata once again returned to 
what he called scientific thinking. He first acknowledged the reality of an uneven 
configuration between minzoku groups. Minzoku groups that are superior in population, 
culture and politics, Takata stressed, have become leading ethnic groups in human 
civilization, whereas inferior minzoku groups, or the middle ground (b¦) as he called 
it, have naturally disappeared in world history.153 He conceptualized this as a theory of 
circulative minzoku. (&§¨:)  This thinking seems not to be a simple replica of 
the Comtean or Spencerian social organism, reminiscent of the logic of the “survival of 
the fittest.” Takata argued that the relationship between majority and minority ethnic 
groups is not one of “winner takes all.” Relatively inferior ethnic groups such as Indians 
in North America, he contended, would also survive, being surrounded by stronger 
ethnic groups. At stake is the fact that these non-mainstream ethnic groups could not 
develop enough to become a mainstream ethnic group in world history.154 Therefore, a 
“world-historical moment” for Takata occurs when a certain ethnic group emerges as a 
world-leading minzoku. 
     Takata’s observation clearly shows that he not only affirmed capitalistic 
development and the rise of nationalism in China as its result, but he recognized these 
phenomena as what the Kyoto School philosophers referred to as a “world-historical 
moment.”155 Since he did not take the one-dimensional worldview of the “survival of 
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the fittest,” the rise of Chinese nationalism did not mean that minority ethnic groups 
such as the Ainu, the Ryukyu and the Koreans would disappear. He was open to the 
possibility that these minor groups would take the position of a leading ethnic group 
through social interaction. Through interaction with Japan, Takata was convinced that 
Korean agriculture had developed significantly, and he called this process 
“rationalization.”156 He went on to argue that rationalization in East Asian minzoku 
must take the form of organizations in each ethnic group functioning to serve their own 
interests without exploitation and oppression. In so doing, he also tried to rationalize the 
role of a leading minzoku like the Japanese who, he believed, could bring about a 
world-historical moment.157  
 
Making the Irrational Rational 
The ostensibly “rational” and even “rosy” future for Asian people predicted by Takata, 
however, reached an impasse as he faced the difficulty of having to endorse Japan’s 
leading role in the current situation. To begin with, Takata had to explain first why 
ethnic groups in East Asia had to be united in order to logically apply his theory of 
circulative minzoku (&§¨:) to a new East Asian empire. As I have discussed, he 
did not attempt to solve this problem by framing it in terms of Western imperialism 
versus Asianism; that is, Asian people were destined to be united, otherwise they would 
be colonized by the West. 
 Social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi and Ezawa Jōji attempted to find a 
rationale for this unification by emphasizing futurity in their so-called “subjective” 
social science. In other words, Asian people who had experienced different paths to 
subject formations could find a sense of common destiny by projecting their present 
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into a new future, as yet to be constructed. Therefore, Rōyama and Ezawa argued for 
the necessity of the unity of Asian people less from a historical past characterized by 
sharing the same ancestry, than from the standpoint of an unknown but dynamic future 
that could be realized through the “community of destiny.”158   
    Takata’s critiques of these “future-oriented” social scientists centered primarily on 
their excessive emphasis on the notion of spatiality. If either construction or 
development of the future were to play a central role in realizing the East Asian Co-
operative Community, he argued, it would be geographically limited to East Asia, 
where the Japanese nation-state could exert direct political and economic control, 
thereby marginalizing Southeast Asia and other areas where people who are conscious 
of being “East Asian” resided.159 Takata, however, became increasingly engaged with 
arguments that were apparently neither scientific nor rational in order to rationally 
refute these social scientists. Presenting ancestry, region and culture as three key 
elements in unifying East Asia, he endorsed historical similarities inherent in Asian 
people because they share Asian blood and culture.160 To be sure, he was reluctant to 
accept the theory that Japan was messianically destined to unify East Asia in response 
to the West’s invasion of Asia. The necessity of an East Asian union was, for Takata, 
theorized by the national fate (&=©r) of Asian people, rather than by its spatial 
configuration that included Japan, China and Korea in relation to the West.161  
    Arguably, Takata’s endorsement of blood and culture should not simply be equated 
with that of so-called nativists who argued for the pureness and eternity of the Japanese 
race. To be sure, he was heavily influenced by the Kyoto School philosophers whose 
thinking about subject formation was characterized by the co-figuration of self-negation 
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and creation. In this respect, Takata’s preoccupation with envisioning an East Asian 
Community that would extend beyond the regional boundary of China, Japan and 
Korea was inseparable from his zeal for a world society whose outlines he had been 
developing since the 1920s. However, his vision of a world society never included the 
notion of a cosmopolitan subject, as best described in Miki Kiyoshi’s wartime 
philosophy.162 According to Miki, Asian minzoku is defined as a dialectic object to be 
negated, recreated, and eventually become part of a cosmopolitan society. However, 
Takata observed that there are no objective and irrefutable truths in Miki’s philosophy 
through which Japan might rationalize its leading role in East Asia. To resolve this 
dilemma, Takata’s notion of East Asian minzoku was destined to return to History, 
where he could find what he believed were objective realities such as blood and culture, 
while at the same time he had to present his vision of minorities’ becoming a majority 
within the Asian community.  
     Takata’s logic of East Asian minzoku, therefore, employed several theoretical 
orientations that are seemingly irreconcilable in one theory. To highlight the potential 
that minority ethnic groups might become a majority, he appropriated the philosophy of 
Miki Kiyoshi and Funayama Shinichi. Through the process of negating the self and 
creating a totality, Takata maintained that a minority ethnic group in the present could 
become a leading ethnic group of a new East Asian minzoku in the future. In this 
respect, his theory of East Asian nationalism apparently spoke to the future and this 
logic was intended to mobilize colonial subjects to the project of building an East Asian 
empire. Takata constantly tried to distance himself from the specter of the nation-state, 
and from the faith that a new nation-state would become a “buffer-zone” for existing 
                                                 
162 For Miki’s cosmopolitanism, see John Namjun Kim, “The Temporality of Empire: The Imperial 
Cosmopolitanism of Miki Kiyoshi and Tanabe Hajime,” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann eds., 
Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 151-167. 
                                                       
 145 
ethnic conflicts as it incorporated colonial subjects.  
However, he returned to history to conceal the irrational reality he was facing in 
the present. Takata was acutely aware that Japan’s past and present as an imperial 
colonizer must be rationalized in order to accomplish a Japan-centered empire-building 
project for the future. To this end, he immersed himself in the fantasy of culture and 
blood. It was precisely for this reason that he asserted that Japan’s annexation of Korea 
was not an imperial colonization but the dissemination of culture and advanced 
technologies between two nations [minzoku] that had shared cultural similarities in 
history.163 Such a naive view of colonization might not be expected from a social 
scientist like Takata, who was meticulous in his contemplation and writing.  
Notably, Takata never touched upon issues relating to individual colonies other 
than Chinese nationalism in his writings. By not taking on the colonial problem as a 
particular issue, Takata could become a universalist. But I argue that it was Takata’s 
“performative” choice of refusing to directly address colonial problems in reality that 
created a paradoxical and very powerful discursive space between colonial and imperial 
intellectuals. Colonial subjects could internalize imperial discourses like Takata’s in 
their hidden desire to directly project themselves into a universal and cosmopolitan 
world beyond the inconsistencies between empire and colony. For this reason, colonial 
intellectuals’ failure to find any recounting of the colony in the writings of imperial 
intellectuals did not in fact disappoint them, nor did it detach them from the project of 
establishing a universal empire. Rather, it reinforced the desire of colonial intellectuals 
to be universalists. Takata’s writings demonstrate this paradox clearly.164 
                                                 
163 Takata never dealt with the Korea problem in detail in his wartime writings. But he discovered in a 
number of places that Korea had already become part of Japan and it was by no means imperial 
colonization. Takata, Minzokuron, pp.96-120. 
164 I will examine the issue of colonial intellectuals’ subjective responses to imperial discourses in detail 
in Chapter 5, focusing on the writings of In Jeong-Sik, who was one of the most influential Marxist 
intellectuals in colonial Korea.  
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Shinmei’s Logic of a Multi-ethnic Nation-State 
In contrast to Takata, who did not position the nation-state as a central organization for 
the East Asian Community, Shinmei attempted to find through the nation-state the 
middle ground for resolving problems caused by an ethnic hierarchy. One focal 
question he posited was how the notion of a multi-ethnic nation state would be different 
from the previous one, which had already failed to incorporate colonial intellectuals. To 
begin with, Shinmei divided ethnic groups into two sub-categories, grand minzoku and 
small and medium-sized minzoku. He observed that so-called ethnic spirit is inversely 
proportional to the size of each ethnic group; that is, small and medium-size ethnic 
groups often show much stronger nationalist sentiment than large-size ethnic groups 
do.165 Therefore, he maintained that a serious problem would occur when these small- 
size ethnic groups with strong passions create a nation-state and protested against 
nation-states made up of grand ethnic groups. 
 
As we witness the establishment of strong nation states based on grand ethnic 
groups, it is very problematic that small and medium size ethnic groups form 
nation-states based on nationalism and continue to resist against strong nation 
states. The success of nationalism by these ethnic groups is eventually 
possible only when they receive support from grand nation states. In getting 
through this difficulty, small and medium size ethnic groups can only think of 
one direction….That is not a nationalism that has the notion of one minzoku 
and one nation as its content. That is a form of kokuminshugi #$, in 
that it affirms the formation of multi-ethnicity and a single nation. However, 
although the content of kokuminis multi-ethnic, it has the possibility 
of forming a single grand minzoku, insofar as there exist affinities in blood, 
region and culture.166 
 
Shinmei attempted to separate his concept of kokumin from what he called the 
“modern” concept of nation in terms of formal nationality. According to him, modern 
                                                 
165 Shinmei Masamichi, Minzoku shakaigaku no kōso (Tokyo: Mikasa shobo, 1942), p.41. For your 
information, most of Shinmei’s writings on the East Asian Cooperative Community and East Asian 
nationalism during the wartime period are not included in Selected Works of Shinmei Masamichi.  
166 Ibid., pp.42-43.  
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national society is characterized by the integration of national subjects based on 
administrative, financial and military measures.167 However, modern national society, 
he contended, had collapsed with the general crisis in democracy and liberal capitalism, 
and for this reason, he emphasized the importance of “restructuring national subjects 
(ª)” based on a new way of thinking. In delving into this highly 
philosophical question of subjectivity, Shinmei too, like Takata, showed keen interest in 
the theories of Miki Kiyoshi and Funayama Shinichi. To be sure, Shinmei’s encounter 
with their philosophical perspectives deeply influenced his vision for a new East Asia, 
but on the other hand he did not hesitate to express harsh criticism of their ideas.  
     Shinmei’s main criticism against Miki and Funayama focused on their 
philosophical perspective to see all variables as non-static. In other words, for Shinmei, 
the principle of cooperativism as espoused by these philosophers lay in the perception 
that the relationship between total and part is spiral, always creating a new form of total 
and part which will be self-negated again. For this reason, the cooperativism of Miki 
and Funayama, he observed, regarded minzoku as part of these social variables to be 
self-negated and recreated.168 Shinmei’s discontent with these philosophers focused on 
the excessiveness and impracticality of their metaphysical understanding of society. For 
Shinmei, the dynamism between total and part, which Miki and Funayama theorized as 
the dialectics of self-negation and creation, was conceivable insofar as a visible totality 
is recognized in a society. 
    Not surprisingly, Shinmei reiterated that minzoku is a basic organization, but at the 
same time it constitutes in itself a general society («V-) as reality.169 Therefore, 
Shinmei stressed that leaning too much on the logic of metaphysics to link minzoku to 
                                                 
167 Shinmei Masamichi, Tōa kyōdōtai no rishō (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppansha, 1939), 
pp.143-144. 
168 Ibid., pp.177-179. 
169 Ibid., p. 180 
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philosophical cooperativism would result in cosmopolitanism, which can be a 
characteristic of any human society, but (precisely for this reason) cannot be a leading 
social theory in reality.”170 The theoretical distance between Shinmei and these 
philosophers also explains some fundamental differences between Takata and Shinmei. 
As I have discussed, Tataka’s concept of minzoku, which to some extent contains 
essentialism such as blood and culture, was not theorized in a binary relation to the state 
from the beginning. Therefore, Takata attempted to draw the spatiality of his East Asian 
nationalism vis-à-vis a world society as the universal. However, the spatiality of 
Shinmei’s notion of minzoku was confined, as sociologist Seino Masayoshi has argued, 
to the realm of the nation-state.171 In A Study of Social Nature (-¬:), published 
in 1942, along with A Concept of National Sociology (&-*y), Shinmei 
expounded on the relationship between minzoku and state; 
 
[M]inzoku is a basic organization (­®Y(as an element that constitutes a 
general organization («VY(, and the state is a derivative organization(¯
Y(. However, needless to say, the historical and realistic form of the 
derivative organization (the state) is nation (), Sociologists have 
speculated that human society (°) is either a general organization or a 
derivative society….Human beings stand as part of human society in terms of 
relational negotiations (±²=³´@), but their belonging to human society 
does not constitute a general organization in terms of general relations of 
social activities… In the present, a national general organization (=«
VY() or a national general society(=«V-) becomes the 
ultimate unit of human society in reality. (Emphasis added)172 
 
Just as Takata emphasized that his East Asian nationalism is a continuation of his 
sociological thinking from the early 1920s onward, Shinmei’s notion of minzoku and 
the East Asian Cooperative Community is traceable to his obsession with the state as a 
                                                 
170 Ibid., p. 187.  
171 Seino Masayoshi, “Senjika no minzoku kenkyū (2) - takata yasuma to shinmei masamichi no baai,” 
Ritsumeikan sangyōshakai ronshū 30, no.2 (Sep 1994), pp.30-31. 
172 Shinmei Masamichi, Shakai honshituron (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1942), pp, 400-401; SMC 2, pp.518-519. 
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universal totality. The question was, then, how a new East Asian nation-state as a 
universal totality would overcome the limits of ethnic conflicts and the decadence of 
democracy and capitalism shown in the modern nation-state. To this end, Shinmei 
stressed that a new cooperative state should not simply be identified with Gesellschaft 
based on goal-oriented activities. Of course, he was clearly aware that Tonnies’ logic of 
Gemeinschaft as a form of community would hardly be compatible with the multi-
ethnic formation of the Japanese empire.  
     For this reason, what was stressed in Shinmei’s logic of the East Asian Co-
operative Community is the concept of artificial rationality (µV/@). According to 
him, gemeinschaft is a conventional form of community based on what he called 
natural and emotional associations. Shinmei maintained that either cooperation or 
association in the cooperative community must take the form of an organic thought (¶
x=).173 In this sense, the term artificial rationality was presented as a vehicle for 
accomplishing “profit-oriented integrality (·¸=«V@),” which Shinmei envisioned 
as a form through which the inconsistencies between community and civil society could 
be transcended.  
     However, it is at this point that Shinmei’s faith in rationalization came to an 
impasse. At the center of his logic of artificial rationality and organic thought was the 
nation-state. The state, he argued, transforms certain types of cultural similarities into 
the political and social will of a subject.174 Without a nation-state, a certain ethnic 
group, he emphasized, would never form a community in a real sense, simply because 
their cultural similarities could be neither politicized nor socialized, and therefore they 
could never create subjectivity. For this reason, he went so far as to argue, “In the case 
of multi-ethnic formations, there must be a nation-state that lacks cultural 
                                                 
173 Shinmei, Tōa kyōdōtai no rishō, pp. 205-208. 
174 Shinmei, Minzoku shakaigaku no kōso, p.13. 
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commonness.”175 However, Shinmei’s rosy picture of an Asian nation-state never 
offered a sophisticated discussion of how these different ethnic identities could be 
incorporated into a nation-state. 
Moreover, this seemingly extreme rationalist approach to the notion of 
community, which eliminated primordial and natural elements inherent in ethnicity, 
does not explain why ethnic groups in Asia had to be united under the banner of the 
East Asian Cooperative Community. If blood-oriented similarities in ethnic 
communities were to be transcended in a cooperative community in the end, why 
should it be geographically limited to East Asia? As I have discussed, Takata attempted 
to avoid this question by directly projecting his theory of minzoku into a world society. 
Shinmei’s notion of ethnicity, however, could not avoid this trap, since the spatial 
dimension of his theory was confined to a nation-state. For this reason, he also returned 
to commonness in blood-centered relations and culture as a precondition to rationalize 
the necessity of constructing an East Asian empire led by Japan. In other words, like 
Takata, he was also trapped in the irony that the more he stressed the state as the 
ultimate rationalized future of East Asia, the more he had to resort to blood, nature and 
culture, all of which he could not explicate through social scientific thinking.  
 
Conclusion  
Wartime Japanese social scientists exposed their messianic and universalist zeal for an 
East Asian empire through their involvement in ethnographic studies. Of course, their 
thinking started with the realistic observation that ethnic conflicts and discriminatory 
hierarchies both in the colony and at the metropole would create instability in the 
empire. To provide a practical solution for a complex web of socio-political imbalances 
and unevenness in the highly capitalist empire, they paid attention to the newness of the 
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term minzoku and tried to extract from it a new logic of community.  
     The multi-ethnic vision of an Asian empire emphasized an organic dynamism in 
which subjects belong to the East Asian Co-operative Community while retaining their 
ethnicity. This vision also retained subjects’ goal-oriented desires in society. 
Theoretically speaking, this logic was nothing more than the reflection of social 
scientists’ desire to overcome the limits of capitalism and civil society. Unsurprisingly, 
Takata Yasuma and Shinmei Masamichi envisioned a community in which a certain 
kind of socio-political equilibrium is realized. Ostensibly, this balance and harmony 
also guaranteed a higher degree of social mobility. Other social scientists such as Kada 
Tetsuji, in spite of their theoretical differences, all emphasized that this new form of 
community would overcome the imbalance and inequality in the present system. Their 
futuristic logic clearly explains why their voices shaped such powerful discursive 
spaces among colonial intellectuals, although they never grappled with colonial 
problems in detail.  
     In this way, Takata’s “radical” approach to the term minzoku and Shinmei’s logic 
of a multi-ethnic nation-state temporarily concealed colonial problem, and presented a 
theoretical platform to further mobilize colonial subjects for the sake of the Japanese 
empire. However, their attempts to rationalize the empire by way of the term minzoku 
vividly show their distorted desires for a universal social science. Their theories did not 
offer a fundamental critique of colonialism. In order to avoid colonial reality, they 
constantly subordinated it to the specter of universal community. However, their vision 
of community was by no means free from colonial violence and this clearly 
demonstrates that social scientists served the empire in the name of universal social 
science. 
    In Chapter 4, I analyze spatial theories produced by the social scientists who 
advocated the East Asian Community. Together with the concept of minzoku, the 
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seemingly abstract terms kūkan (¹º, space) and chiri ( /, geography) captured 
special attention from these social scientists in their theorizing of imperial subjects (»
=#(). I will pay special attention to how space and geography became a 
theoretical vehicle for constructing a new imperial community as well as how the 
problem of modernization was dealt with in these spatial theories. 
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Chapter 4 
Mapping Greater East Asian Space: 
Geopolitics in Interwar Japan 
 
The “Greater East Asian Space” 
In 1938, a year after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimarō made a series of announcements about a new order in East Asia, which 
eventually became officialized in the early 1940s as the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Although various Asian discourses had already appeared, it was 
around this moment in time that Japanese intellectuals became increasingly involved in 
producing East Asian discourses. Not surprisingly, their spatial concept of East Asia 
was in most cases formulated in the strategic schema of the East vis-à-vis the West, but 
the question of how to rationally and scientifically conceptualize East Asian space 
quickly emerged as a main concern in East Asian discourses. This issue became more 
complex as the project of constructing a new Asia was juxtaposed with Japan’s 
destructive war against its fellow Asian country, China.  
In Principles of Constructing a Greater East Asia (¼½¾:), published in 
1943, Murayama Michi¿£À (1902-1981), secretary of the Planning Bureau, 
provided three main principles for constructing a new Asia: Imperial Spirit, Co-
prosperity based on the Way ($), and Japan’s leading role in a new order. 1 In 
Murayama’s vision of a new East Asia, the concept of East Asian space was not simply 
represented as a given geographical unity vis-à-vis the West. Referring to the 
geopolitics of Karl Haushofer, a German specialist in geopolitics, Murayama outlined 
his concept of a new East Asian space as part of overcoming the artificial geographical 
and political constitution of the world which was improperly divided by Western 
                                                 
1 Murayama Michio, Daitōa kenseturon (Tokyo: Shōkō gyōseisha, 1943), p.6. 
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powers.2 Highlighting Haushofer’s argument emphasizing the differences between 
Japan and European powers in terms of colonial policy, Murayama attempted to link 
the construction of a greater East Asia to Japan’s glorious spiritual culture, which he 
believed was ethically superior to Western imperialist thinking.3 
Therefore, mapping East Asian space went beyond geographical borders, which 
for Murayama, were a highly politicized issue. However, his turn to Haushofer’s 
geopolitics did not seem to provide him with an ultimate answer to the question of how 
East Asian space could be defined in a scientific and rational manner. But, given that 
Murayama’s book was a kind of official governmental guide for the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere, one could understand the extent to which geopolitical thinking 
was influential in shaping the spatial concept of East Asian discourses by both Japanese 
intellectuals and bureaucrats. 
In this chapter I will examine the essential question of how East Asian space was 
theorized in a series of East Asian discourses produced by Japanese intellectuals, social 
scientists in particular. Although there are a great many studies of Japanese imperialism, 
both quantitative and qualitative, little attention has been paid to this basic but most 
essential question of space in wartime East Asian discourses.4 To approach this 
                                                 
2 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
3 Ibid., p.4. Murayama paid special attention to Haushofer’s comparison between Britain’s annexation of 
Ireland and Japan’s colonization of Korea. In Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans (Geopolitics of the 
Pacific Ocean), Haushofer argued that the population of Ireland decreased from 8 million to 4.5 million, 
while Korea’s population increased from 11 million to 20 million under Japan’s rule. Karl Haushofer, 
trans., Taiheiyō kyōkai, Taiheiyō chisegaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,1942), p.244. 
4 A brief list of recent studies on East Asian space in wartime East Asian discourses is as follows: Shibata 
Yōichi, “Ajia taiheiyō sensōkino senryakukenkyū ni okeru chirigakushano yakuwari- sogochirikenkyukai 
to rikukunsanbohonbu,” Rekishichirigaku 49, no.5 (Dec 2007), pp.1-31; Shibata Yōichi, “Komaki 
Saneshige no “nihon chiseigaku” to sono sishōtekikakuritu,” Jinbunchiri 58, no.1 (2006), pp.1-19; 
Yamamurō Shinichi, “Kokuminteikoku,nihon no keisei to kūkanchi,” in Yamamurō Shinichi and Sakai 
Tetuya (et al.) eds., Teikoku nihon no gakuchi 8 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), pp.21-66; Fukuma 
Yoshiki, ““Daitōa” kūkan no seisan- Chiseigakune okeru kūkan ninshiki no doutaiseto nashonarizumu no 
zaikochiku (1),” Seijikeizaishigaku 441 (May 2005), pp. 1-23; Fukuma Yoshiki, ““Daitōa” kūkan no 
seisan- Chiseigakune okeru kūkan ninshiki no doutaiseto nashonarizumu no zaikochiku (2),” 
Seijikeizaishigaku 442 (June 2005), pp.15-31; Christian Spang, trans., Ishi Shokai, “Karu haushofar to 
nihonno chiseigaku-daiichiji seikaitaisengono nichidokukankei no nakade,” Kūkan, shakai, chirishisō 6 
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question, this chapter examines the emergence and spread of geopolitical thinking in 
Europe as an alternative spatial discourse and traces the intellectual trajectories of 
Japanese social scientists’ encounter with geopolitics in their rational and scientific 
theories of East Asian space. However, I do not limit my concern to the realm of 
geography or the history of geopolitics. I argue that a close look at the way geopolitics 
was introduced and interpreted will not only provide us with clues to understand how 
East Asia as a space became an object of social scientific research, but will also give us 
a picture of how Japanese social scientists grappled with the question of overcoming 
Western social scientific scholarship and went about establishing the “subjective” 
Japanese social sciences.  
As part of this project, I will first discuss the rise of geopolitical thinking in post 
World-War I Europe, Germany in particular, and investigate in what context it was 
introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the 1920s. Secondly, I will examine the spread of 
geopolitical thinking in Japan beginning in the late 1930s as it started a full-scale war 
against China and later the United States. In particular, I will focus on the translation 
and introduction of the German geographer and political scientist Karl Haushofer. A 
close look at Haushofer’s emergence in 1930s and 1940s Japan will give important 
clues for understanding Japanese social scientists’ responses to a leading social theory 
originating in Germany. Third and most importantly, I will discuss two streams of 
geopolitics during the wartime period: the Kyoto School of Geography and the so-
called rationalist geopolitics in the Tokyo area.  By looking at these two distinctive 
geopolitical approaches to East Asian space, I seek an answer to the unexplored 
                                                                                                                                            
(2001), pp.2-21; Hisatake Tetsuya, “Hawaiha chisana manshukoku- nihonchiseigakuno kaihō,” 
Gendaishisō 27, no.13 (Dec 1999), pp. 196-203; Takeuchi Keiichi, “The Japanese Imperial Tradition, 
Western Imperialism and Modern Japanese Geography,” in Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith eds., 
Geography and Empire (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp.188-206; Takeuchi Keiichi, 
“Geopolitikuno hukatuto seijichirigakuno atarashii tenkai- geopolitikuhutatabi kangae,” 
Hitotsubashironsō 96 (1987), pp.523-546. 
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question of how Japanese social scientists encountered and theorized East Asian space 
as an object of social scientific studies and eventually produced geographical and 
spatial knowledge for the Japanese empire. Special attention will be given to Ezawa 
Jōji’s concept of economic development and how he theorized the logic of subjectivity 
formation through the notion of developing spaces in the colony.  
 
Space and Politics in Post-World War I Europe 
World War I has often been described as Germany’s collapse and the rise of the 
America-centered international order, but its impacts on European society were much 
more profound than its political aftermath. In a geographical sense, Europe experienced 
a full-scale war not in the colonies but on its own soil for the first time in modern 
history. The impact of the “war in Europe” played a major role in establishing the 
League of Nations, the first international political organization in modern times, but on 
the other hand, the sense that such an international organization was inevitable clearly 
reflected European intellectuals’ skepticism toward their longstanding belief in what 
might be called the ‘balance of power’ theory, namely that the major powers in Europe 
had successfully maintained physical stability at home as well as European hegemony 
abroad without such an international organization. Interestingly, this observation of the 
limits of existing political theory was logically connected to European intellectuals’ 
fundamental reexaminations of democracy itself. In the 1919 book Democratic Ideals 
and Reality, published one year after the end of World War I, Halford Mackinder, a 
British geographer and political scientist, vehemently argued as follows: 
 
Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until compelled to do so 
for purposes of defense. That, of course, does not prevent democracy from 
declaring war for an ideal, as was seen during the French Revolution. One of 
the inconsistencies of our pacifists today is that they so often urge 
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intervention in the affairs of other nations.5 
 
Given that Britain as a member of the Entente Powers reconfirmed its hegemony in its 
victory over the Central Powers represented by Germany in World War I, Mackinder’s 
statement above leaves much room for further discussion. Why did a renowned British 
intellectual come up with the idea that democracy, unquestionably the fruit of British 
political thought, was no longer compatible with maintaining peace in the international 
order?  
     Mackinder’s insights on the limits of democracy were in large part grounded in 
his observation that the existing political ideology could no longer correspond to the 
rapidly changing geo-political constitution of nation-states. To put it another way, he 
viewed nation-states as what he called a “Going Concern,” by which he theorized that 
the state as an organic unity was destined to expand its territory.6 Therefore, he argued 
that in order for democracy as a political theory to correspond to this new geopolitical 
configuration of the nation-state, a whole new spatial perspective was needed to replace 
the old-fashioned notion of democracy as a static political theory. What he offered as an 
alternative to the geopolitical constitution was “heartland theory.” Contending that the 
world consists of a few “heartlands,” Mackinder predicted that nation-states which 
could occupy these heartlands would take political hegemony in the international order, 
and he also pointed out that “Eurasia” would become the most important heartland in 
the world.7 
                                                 
5 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction 
(London: Constable and Company, 1919), p. 31. 
6 Ibid., pp. 147-190. For a detailed analysis of Mackinder’s notion of ‘Going Concern’ and “heartland 
theory,” R. Mayhew, “Halford Mackinder’s “new” political geography and the geographical tradition,” 
Political Geography 19 (2000), pp.771-791; see also chapter 3 in Mark Polelle, Raising Cartographic 
Consciousness: The Social and Foreign Policy Vision of Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century (Lanham, 
Md. : Lexington Books, c1999).  
7 Ibid., pp.191-235. Mackinder wrote a famous phrase on his Heartland theory,  
“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World -Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the World,” ibid., p.194. 
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     If new geopolitical thinking could be conceived of as a kind of political 
suggestion from the side of British intellectuals, geopolitics had a much stronger 
potential to be directly connected to national policies in Germany, where the sense of 
loss was endemic throughout the country in the aftermath of World War I. Friedrich 
Ratzel’s seminal book of 1897, Politische Geographie (Political Geography), and his 
theory of Lebensraum (Living Space) attracted attention in 1920s Germany,8 and the 
geopolitical theory of the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, who has often been 
regarded as the first to conceptualize geopolitics, also became popular among German 
intellectuals. Ratzel’s theory of Lebensraum, based on the state-organ theory, 
emphasized that a nation-state must ensure that it has enough living space for its people, 
and in this respect his geopolitical conceptualization of a nation-state in his famous 
phrase, “expand or perish” was a vivid example of how an organist perspective became 
increasingly popular among post-World-War I European intellectuals. German 
intellectuals’ engagement with geopolitical thinking culminated in the emergence of 
political scientist and politician Karl Haushofer as a leading figure both in German 
academic circles and in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Defining geopolitics as a “science to 
understand political living forms in natural living space in terms of geographical 
restrictions and historical movement,” Haushofer contended that geography as a 
discipline providing knowledge about the surface of the earth should now serve as a 
branch of policy studies for the territorial expansion of the nation-state.9  
     Despite its potential to overcome the spatial limits of democracy and its 
theoretical justification of a fascist nation-state based on the organist notion, geopolitics 
never became a dominant social theory in Europe except in the case of Germany. 
                                                 
8 Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie (München und Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg, 1897). 
9 Karl Haushofer, Bausteine zur Geopolitik, von Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach, Otto 
Maull; hrsg. der Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik. Mit 20 Skizzen (Berlin-Grunewald : Kurt Vowinckel, 1928), 
trans., Tamaki Hajime, Chiseijigaku kiso riron (Tokyo: Kagakushugikōgyōsha, 1941), p.27. 
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Interestingly, it was in wartime Japan that this Western-originated spatial discourse 
rapidly gained currency among intellectuals and eventually played an important role in 
the making of Greater East Asian space in imperial Japan. How and in what context did 
this new geopolitical thinking affect both Japanese social scientists and the making of a 
Greater East Asian space in wartime Pan-Asian discourses? 
 
Japanese Intellectuals’ Encounter with Geopolitics  
The first encounter of Japanese geography with geopolitical thinking took place in 1925 
and 1926, when Tokyo University geographer Iimoto Nobuyuki Á¤Â (1895-
1989) contributed three articles to The Geographical Review ( /Ã:) entitled 
“The Reality of Racial Conflict and its Geopolitical Analysis.”10 Basically accepting 
Friedrich Ratzel’s concept of Lebensraum, Iimoto argued that conflicts surrounding 
living space mainly take a form of racial conflict.11 In the 1928 essay “The Concept of 
So-called Geopolitics,”12 Iimoto introduced the general stream of Western geopolitics. 
Central to his thinking was the fact that through the lens of geopolitics Western 
geographers were engaging with state theories that had previously been the realm of the 
social sciences. Given that geography in Japan at the time was being led by natural 
scientific approaches, geology in particular, Iimoto’s observation is revealing. In short, 
his introduction of geopolitics or political geography as part of the social sciences was 
partly an attempt to expand the scope of geography in Japan to the realm of the social 
sciences so that geographers could intervene in social and national issues. 
More importantly, Iimoto’s conceptualization of geopolitics was grounded in the 
                                                 
10 Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatu (1)” Chirigaku hyōron 1, no.9 (Sep 
1925), pp. 16-37; Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatu (2),” Chirigaku hyōron 
1, no.10 (Oct 1925), pp. 955-967; Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatu (3),” 
Chirigaku hyōron 2, no.1 (Jan 1926), pp. 47-60.  
11 Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatu (1),” pp.21-23. 
12 Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Iwayuru chiseigaku no gainen,” Chirigaku hyōron 4, no.1(Jan 1928), pp. 76-99. 
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geographical configuration of the world based on racial constitution. However, his 
understanding of race was not concerned with simply acknowledging physical and 
social differences among races. He instead argued that geopolitics based on Western 
racism had served to constitute and justify the geography of white supremacy.  
Devoting more than half of the articles to analyzing various forms of Western racist 
ideologies,13 Iimoto emphasized that Western powers had discriminated against both 
the Chinese and Japanese people. 14 In other words, while Western geographers, 
German intellectuals in particular, were developing geopolitical thinking to criticize the 
existing world order dominated by “liberal democratic” powers within Europe, Iimoto’s 
approach to geopolitics in fact took on the schematic form of a dichotomy between the 
West as a victimizer and the East as the victimized. However, it should not be 
overlooked that in this strategic division of the world from a racial perspective, Iimoto 
was simply ignoring Japan’s colonization of fellow Asian countries. In short, when it 
was first introduced to Japan, it was politically appropriated by Japanese intellectuals to 
justify their double stance of situating Japan as a victim which belong to the “have-not” 
countries in the international order, and at the same time reinforcing Japan’s hegemony 
over the rest of Asia.  
While geographical thinking was not widely accepted by Japanese geographers in 
the 1920s, the field of geography itself was developing both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The geography lecture at Kyoto University, which was first separated 
from the Department of History in 1907, gained status as an independent department in 
                                                 
13 It is highly conceivable that Iimoto’s understanding of geopolitics was nurtured by the general social 
and political trend of 1920s Japan, when the issue of racism emerged as in important topic both in real 
politics and in the academia. The year 1925, when Iimoto’s articles were published, was a year after the 
Immigration Act to restrict the Japanese immigration to the United States was passed by the United States 
government. 
14 Iimoto, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatu (1),” p.30-37. Iimoto actually contributed three 
articles in 1925 and 1926. He briefly analyzed Western geopolitics and political geography in the first 
article and focused on criticizing Western racism against Asian races in the second and third articles.  
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1917. Professor Ogawa Takuji Ä]Å (1870-1941), one of its founding members 
of the geography lecture, went on to establish the Geology and Mineralogy Lecture in 
the School of Natural Science in 1921.15  With the establishment of the department, 
geography studies at Kyoto Imperial University were led by Ishibashi Gorō ÆÇÈ

(1877-1946) and his human geographical approach. Ishibashi, together with graduates 
of the history department, organized a research group, Shigaku-chirigaku dōsōkai 
- /É(Association of History and Geography Studies), in 1915 and 
published the journal History and Geography (j /) and in 1932, the Kyoto 
geography department began publishing its major journal, Journal of Geography ( /
:Ê).16  
     At Tokyo Imperial University, geography was first launched as an independent 
discipline in 1919, two years after the department of geography at Kyoto University 
was formed, but the speed and scale of its expansion was comparable to that of the 
Kyoto geography department. In addition to the general trend that geography was 
gradually obtaining the status of an independent academic department, Tokyo had 
another reason to intensify its geography research. The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 
fueled the idea that thorough geography studies could contribute to the “physical” 
stability of the Japanese nation-state.17 On the other hand, while Kyoto’s geography 
department was focusing on establishing its own scholarship, independent of the 
influence of the geography studies at Tokyo, Tokyo’s geography studies focused on 
                                                 
15 Kyoto daigaku hyakunenshi henshū iinkai ed., Kyoto daigaku hyakunenshi bukyōkushi hen (Kyoto-
Shi:Kyoto daigaku kōenhai, 1997), p. 174. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ishida Ryūjirō, “Meiji-taishōkino nihon8no chirigakkainoshisōtekidōkō,” Chirigaku hyōron 44, no.8 
(Aug 1971), p. 545. The 1919 Tokyo Imperial University Act stated reasons for establishing an 
independent geography department: (1) Geography can vividly show the international order and its 
applied fields are not small (2) Geography in Western universities has already been producing its own 
students, therefore it is imperative that Japan also produces geography specialists. Tokyo daigaku 
hyakunenshi henshu iinkai ed., Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi 5 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1984), 
p. 604. 
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representing Japanese geography as a whole. Yamazaki Naokata £ËÌÍ (1870-
1929), Professor of Geography at Tokyo University and often called the father of 
modern Japanese geography, organized a research group, Chiri dōsōkai  /É
(Club of Geography) and in 1923, the year of the Kanto Earthquake, founded and 
became president of a nation-wide research association, Association of Japanese 
Geographers ( /, hereafter AJG).18 
     The development of geography studies in both Tokyo and Kyoto fostered the 
spread of the geopolitical thinking that would come later, but it is important to note that 
there existed regional as well as theoretical tension between the two leading institutions. 
A glimpse at the process of the establishment of the AJG shows the degree of tension 
between Kyoto and Tokyo. Although the Association of Japanese Geographers, as its 
name signifies, was aimed at representing geography studies in Japan, its cadre of 
researchers was from the beginning ‘geographically’ limited to the Kanto area. Of the 
49 founding members of the AJG, most members were geography researchers at 
universities or high school teachers whose regional base was the Tokyo area. As a 
matter of fact, the division of geography studies in the 1920s was already accepted as a 
fait accompli by Tokyo-based geographers. According to the 50th anniversary 
publication of the AJG in 1975, the establishment of the AJG and its own journal, The 
Geographical Review Î /Ã:), was a result of competition between the two 
institutions. Geographers in the Tokyo area had in common the sense that in order to 
compete with the geography studies at Kyoto, which was on the rise and already 
publishing its own journal in the mid 1920s, it was necessary to found a sizable 
research organization as well as an academic journal in Tokyo.19  Since the mid 1920s, 
the AJG gradually extended its membership and academic influence in Japanese 
                                                 
18 It seems to be correct to translate Nihon chiri gakkai into the Association of Japanese Geography, but I 
follow the official English title provided by the association.  
19 Nihon chiri gakkai ed., Nihon chiri gakkai gojū nenshi (Tokyo: Kōkon shoin, 1975), p. 6. 
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geography, but there was no intellectual exchange between Kyoto and Tokyo aside 
from a few articles contributed to The Geographical Review by Professor Ishibashi 
Goro, who was teaching at Kyoto but was a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University.20  
The tension increased as both institutions started directing their research toward 
the realm of geopolitics. The influx of geopolitical thinking on the one hand played a 
role in creating a social scientific approach for geography, which had long been 
conceived of as part of the humanities, but in the case of the Tokyo and Kyoto 
geography departments, geopolitics, intentionally or unintentionally, became a 
barometer that now revealed the differences in their research. The Kyoto geography 
department’s endeavors to establish its own scholarship marked a turning point as 
Komaki Saneshige ÄÏ3Ð(1898-1990), Kyoto’s own Professor of Geography, 
rapidly directed the department’s research from the field of geopolitics in the mid 
1930s.21  
Around the same time, geopolitical thinking was gradually gaining currency for 
social scientists in Tokyo, but Komaki made it clear from the beginning that Kyoto’s 
geopolitics was fundamentally different from either Tokyo’s or Western geopolitics. 
This difference was due in large part to the academic trend surrounding a social organist 
perspective. Geopolitical thinking itself was heavily influenced by the organist notion 
of viewing space, people and most importantly the state as a social construct, and this 
notion of geopolitics did not come as something new to social scientists in Tokyo. 
Iizuka Kōji ÁÑÒÓ (1906-1970), an economist and Tokyo University Professor of 
Geography, contended in his 1942 and 1943 articles in Keizaigaku ronshū lm:Ô 
that the distinction between geography and geopolitics lay in whether or not researchers 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p.19. 
21 Kyoto daigaku hyakunenshi henshū iinkai ed., Kyoto daigaku hyakunenshi bukyōkushi hen (Kyoto-
Shi:Kyoto daigaku koenhai, 1997), p. 174. 
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would accept organist theory.22  
As is well known, at Tokyo Imperial University this organist perspective, or 
“organ theory” as it is often called, not only became increasingly popular among 
geographers but had already been widely accepted by social scientists as a major social 
and political theory. Minobe Tasukichi ÕÖk× (1873-1948), a legal scholar and 
Professor of Law at Tokyo University, introduced organ theory as early as the 1910s 
and boldly attempted to redefine the emperor system as part of the state organ system. 
Not surprisingly, his organist perspective was criticized by other social socialists and 
ultra-nationalist activists, and he was forced to resign from the House of Peers in 1936, 
when this ultra-rightist movement reached its apex with the outbreak of the February 26 
Incident. 23 However, these fierce responses to Minobe’s organ theory paradoxically 
showed that an organist perspective was at least widely accepted in academia. In 
contrast, geographers at Kyoto University were more concerned with the philosophical 
tradition that had been established by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, which showed 
salient differences from the organist approach. In short, the regional and theoretical 
differences between the leading geography institutions failed to find a middle ground, 
and this lack of a compromise was important in the formation of multiple approaches to 
the mapping and constructing of East Asian space during the wartime period.  
In spite of the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two leading 
geography institutions in their developing geopolitical thought, Japan’s rapidly 
changing position in the international order called for the birth of a new spatial thinking. 
                                                 
22 Iizuka Kōji, “Geopolitikuno kihontekiseigaku (1),” Keizaigaku Ronshū 12, no. 8 (Aug 1942), pp.56-84. 
Iizuka’s articles were published in three times. The second and third part of his articles appeared in 
Keizaigaku Ronshū 13, no.3 (March 1943) and Keizaigaku Ronshū 13, no.5 (May 1943) respectively. 
23 Minobe finally resigned from the House of Peers in 1936, when his organist perspective was severely 
attacked by ultra-rightists who attempted to restore the Emperor as the central political authority. As 
Andrew Gordon correctly points out, the purge of Minobe and his “conservative” political theory 
symbolized Japan’s rapid move toward a fascist society. See Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of 
Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
pp.198-199. 
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Japan’s contradictory position in the League of Nations as the third largest country in 
naval power, which, at the same time, constantly represented itself as belonging to the 
‘have-not’ nations was reaching a dead end.24 With the outbreak of the 1931 
Manchurian Incident, Japan made it clear that it would continue territorial expansion in 
mainland China. Under severe criticism by major European powers in the League of 
Nations for this premeditated violence, Japan finally withdrew its membership from the 
League of Nations in 1933. Japan’s withdrawal from the most powerful international 
organization was passionately welcomed by both the masses and the media in Japan 
proper. At the same time, it provided a whole new intellectual sphere for Japanese 
intellectuals, who were now placed in the position of having to create their own theory 
of the international order that could replace the existing League of Nations system, 
which they themselves had long criticized.  
Under these circumstances, the issues of internationalism and nationalism 
temporarily gained currency among Japanese intellectuals who in the 1910s and 1920s 
were focusing their attention on domestic issues represented by the minponshugi debate. 
25 Sociologist Takata Yasuma, for example, argued that although nationalism is not 
necessarily antagonistic to internationalism, in Japan’s current position in the Euro-
                                                 
24 Japan’s position as the third largest country in naval power was the result of the Washington Naval 
Conference held from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. The main purpose of the conference was 
to restrict the leading countries’ naval power, which emerged as the main threat to international peace 
during World War I. As a result, it was determined that the US, Britain and Japan were allowed to 
maintain battleships in a ratio of 5:5:3 tons respectively. The Washington conference was followed by a 
series of naval conferences in the 1920s, at which Japanese military leaders asked for equal status with the 
US, arguing Japan’s ‘have-not’ position in the international order. See Sadao Asada, “From Washington to 
London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921-1930,” in Erik Goldstein 
and John Maurer eds., The Washington Conference 1921-1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and 
the Road to Pearl Harbor (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 147-191. 
25 For the debate over internationalism and nationalism in early 1930s Japan, see Dick Stegewerns ed., 
Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian brotherhood or World citizenship?  
(London, NewYork: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Miwa Kimitada, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan: 
Nationalism, Regionalism and Universalism,” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann eds., Pan-
Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (New York: Routledge, 
2007), pp. 21-33; Jessamyn Reich Abel, “Warring Internationalism: Multilateral Thinking in Japan, 1933-
1964,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2004.  
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centric international order, internationalism should be understood as reinforcing self-
protecting power.26 However, the debate over internationalism and nationalism in most 
cases took place on an abstract level without producing sophisticated arguments. In this 
sense, finding a middle ground between internationalism and Japan’s hegemony in East 
Asia may have been too difficult a task for Japanese social scientists who had borrowed 
most of their intellectual frameworks from the West but had not developed their own 
perspective for interpreting international politics.   
 
Karl Haushofer and the Rise of Japanese Geopolitics 
Geopolitical thinking, once introduced to Japan by several geographers in the 1920s but 
ironically utilized with a view toward criticizing Western racism toward Asian races, 
started gaining attention now from different perspectives by Japanese scholars. This 
time the widespread influx of geopolitics in Japan took place rapidly. Not only 
intellectuals but also the government came to the forefront in introducing geopolitical 
thinking. Many works on geography and geopolitics translated into Japanese were 
financially and institutionally supported by the Japanese government,27 and among a 
number of Western specialists in geopolitics, the presence of the German geographer 
and politician Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) became especially important in Japanese 
academia beginning in the late 1930s.  
It was quite understandable that Japanese intellectuals were willing to accept social 
scientific studies produced in Germany, given that Germany was the single most 
                                                 
26 Takata Yasuma, “Sekaishugi to minzokushugi,” Keizai ōrai (November 1934), in Takata Yasuma, 
Minzoku no mondai (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1935), pp. 3-14. 
27 The publication of twelve-volume work entitled Shin doitsu kokka taikei best exemplifies the massive 
influx of German state theories into Japan. Importantly, one chapter in Volume 3 was dedicated to 
introducing Karl Haushofer’s geopolitics. Satō Hiroshi, Professor of Economics at Tokyo University of 
Commerce, and Ezawa Jōji, Lecturer at Tokyo University of Commerce, participated in this project. See, 
Satō Hiroshi and Ezawa Jōji, “Chiseigakuteki kite,” in Futara Yoshinori ed., Shin Doitsu kokka taikei; dai 
3 seiji (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1940), pp.335-417. 
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influential country for Japanese intellectuals, and that they had imported modern 
knowledge and technologies from Germany beginning in the mid 19th century. 
Moreover, since both Germany and Japan, in spite of their different concepts of the 
world, were searching for an alternative international order, especially in the mid and 
late 1930s, Japanese intellectuals were eager to accept this new spatial theory. 
 However, the somewhat overheated interest in Japan in Haushofer’s geopolitics 
leaves much room for further discussion. A glimpse at the successive translations of 
Haushofer’s major works gives us a picture of how rapidly he emerged as an influential 
scholar in Japanese academia.28 In particular, his Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans 
(Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) was translated and introduced in three different 
versions in 1940, 1942 and 1944 respectively.29 Most works on geopolitics produced 
by Japanese intellectuals commonly placed Haushofer as a symbolic figure who 
upgraded geopolitics from a subfield of geography or political science to an 
independent academic discipline. However, it is not my intention to say that Karl 
Haushofer was the only Western intellectual who had a major impact on Japanese 
intellectuals producing East Asian discourses. Yet I also argue that limiting Haushofer’s 
                                                 
28 The Japanese translation of Haushofer’s works was concentrated between 1940 and 1944. The 
following are Japanese titles of Haushofer’s works on geopolitics and Japan: Taiheiy no Chiseigaku 9
:;<= (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) (1940, 1942); Gendai Eikokuron >?@A8(A 
Study on Modern Britain) (1940); Chisejigaku no kiso riron <=-.B8(Basic Theories of 
Geopolitics) (1941); Chiseijigaku nyūmon <=CD8(1941); Semeiken to Sekaikan EFGHI8
(Life and Living Sphere) (1942); Nihon J8(Japan) (1942); Tairiku seiji to kaiyō seiji 2KL3M
;L8(Land Politics and Sea Politics) (1943); Dainihon 2J8(Greater Japan)(1943); Nihon no 
kokka kensetu JANOP8(Japan’s Nation Building)(1943). 
29 Haushofer’s Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans was first published in Germany in 1924 and 
republished in 1938. Its first Japanese translation appeared in 1940 by Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai entitled 
Taiheiyō Chiseijigaku (2 Vols), and was followed by the translation of Taiheiyō Kyōkai with a slightly 
different title, Taiheiyō Chiseigaku, in 1942. The third version, in 1944, was not a direct translation but an 
introductory book to Haushofer’s Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozean. See Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai, 
Taiheiyō Chiseijigaku: Chiri rekishi sōgō kankei no kenkyū (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: A Study on 
the General Relations between Geography and History) (Tokyo, Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai, 1940) 2 Vols; 
Taiheiyō Kyōkai trans., Taiheiyō Chiseigaku (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
1942); Sato Sōichirō, Haushofarno taiheiyō chiseigaku kaisetu (An Introduction to Karl Haushofer’s 
Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) (Tokyo: Taiheiyō gakkai rokkoshuppanbu, 1944). 
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influence to the narrow scope of geography would hide more important issues in the 
intellectual legacy of Japanese imperialism. Notably, Japanese intellectuals’ first 
encounter with geopolitics, as I have discussed, took place when they recognized 
geopolitics as part of the social sciences. Haushofer was not simply content to reiterate 
the statement that geopolitics also belongs to the social sciences. For him, geopolitics 
was an intellectual weapon by which he could redefine the basic concepts of the social 
sciences so that social scientists were able to produce imperial knowledge in a more 
scientific and systematic way.  
     How did Haushofer obtain the title of the father of geopolitics, challenging the 
previous generation of geographers and political scientists such as Rudolf Kjellen and 
Friedrich Ratzel? More broadly, given that his geopolitical thinking was expanding its 
influence beyond the border of geography, what made his social scientific approach so 
distinct as to penetrate the mindset of Japanese intellectuals? The following statement, 
if not complete, would supply us with an important clue in understanding the structure 
of his social scientific thinking: 
 
Politics can be, as it were, broadly defined as conflict about the exchange, 
acquisition and maintenance of power surrounding the surface of the world.  
Politics has the meaning that it has been created in a humanistic sense…At 
the same time it is tacitly accompanied by techne, that is to say, technology in 
politics. To be sure, as the example of geo ( : land) succinctly shows, things 
accumulated (either scientifically or practically) by knowledge on land and 
soil must be prepared for the preconditions for political techne.30 (Emphasis 
added) 
 
Haushofer here makes a provocative statement regarding how the social sciences 
should cope with the crisis in the modern international system. He attempted to 
differentiate political science from political technology, and argued that the latter 
                                                 
30 Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach, and Otto Maull, Bausteine zur Geopolitik, 1. Ueber 
die historische Entwicklung des Begriffs Geopolitik (Berlin-Grunewald, Kurt Vowinckel, 1928), trans., 
Tamaki Hajime, Chiseijigaku no kiso riron (Tokyo: Kagakushugikōgyōsha, 1941), pp.61-62. 
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responded to the demands for a new political thinking. However, what was more 
striking in his new approach to the social sciences was that the notion of techne, or 
technology in a broader sense, was not accompanied by the notion of objectivity as it 
had been for most social scientists. The importance and necessity of political 
technology, Haushofer contended, lay in its highly subjective nature. He asserted that 
“[T]hings necessary for people who are eager to develop geopolitics are not just 
knowledge related to it but superiority in human nature.”(emphasis added) 31  
Accordingly, his geopolitics was now newly defined as a discipline not just to deal with 
spatial knowledge in a political sense but also to challenge the essential question of 
objectivity in the social sciences. His overthrow of the existing thinking in the social 
sciences through geopolitics reached its apex when he remarked on the temporality of 
geopolitics: 
 
The scientific policies of the Allies, history, international law and eventually 
law, all these things should not be limited to merely elucidating the past. (a 
number of political geographers were limited to this) These things must strive 
to construct a spiritual structure (=geopolitics) in order to contribute to the 
courage of going forward and venturing toward the future.32 (Emphasis 
added) 
 
Futurity, as Haushofer emphasized, emerges as the locus for consolidating space and 
temporality in social scientific thinking. It is of course true that the existing social 
scientific disciplines did not neglect the notion of temporality. However, Haushofer 
contended that temporality in what he called scientific knowledge is no more than the 
representation of the past, and it therefore lacks insight into both where we exist 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p.54. Notably, the notion of technology in thinking about the dialectics between material and 
human beings’ labor and between subjectivity and objectivity was gaining attention from Japanese 
intellectuals. For example, Aikawa Haruki, a leading Koza -faction Marxist, and Tosaka Jun were 
developing debates on technology. For an extensive study of discourses on technology in wartime Japan, 
see Aaron Moore, “The Technological Imaginary of Imperial Japan, 1931-1945,” Ph.D. diss., Cornell 
University, 2006. 
32 Karl Haushofer, trans., Tamaki Hajime, Chiseijigaku no kiso riron, p.63. 
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spatially now and how we can predict the future. For this reason, geopolitics could and 
should be, according to Haushofer, a spiritual structure to restore the integrity of space 
and temporality in social scientific thinking. Yet it is important to keep in mind that 
futurity in geopolitics is not determined only by scientific knowledge, but rests on 
human beings’ subjective resolution through political techne. 
It is not surprising that Haushofer’s bifurcation between subjectivity and 
objectivity in the social sciences was criticized and rejected by Japanese social 
scientists. They had firmly believed in the objectivity of social scientific thinking, but 
Haushofer’s perception also paved the way for Japanese intellectuals who had been 
overwhelmed by the perception that “Western” social sciences were characterized by 
scientific objectivity. In particular, it had a tremendous impact on intellectuals who 
were grappling with the question of how to theorize and rationalize East Asian Space, 
keeping a distance from Euro-centric scholarship. As I shall discuss later, in this respect 
the coming of rationalist geopolitics to Japan was not just a strategic acceptance of a 
strain of anti-Euro-centric thinking within Europe, but was also an example of how and 
in what context Japanese social scientists were dominated by an oversimplification of 
objectivity and were directly facing the long-standing question of the West as universal 
and Japan or the East as particularistic.33  
Haushofer’s radical theorization of geopolitics as an alternative to the geopolitical 
constitution of the existing international order provided Japanese intellectuals with a 
favorable basis for their search for a political and geographical theory to replace what 
they called the Euro-centric international order. However, insofar as this geopolitical 
theory and social scientific approach originated in the West, the impending question of 
                                                 
33 For a discussion of wartime Japanese intellectuals’ concept of subjectivity and objectivity, see J. Victor 
Koschmann, “Constructing destiny: Royama Masamichi and Asian Regionalism in Wartime Japan,” in 
Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, 
Regionalism and Borders (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.185-189. 
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how to rationalize or theorize East Asian space could not be fully resolved by the 
theories of Haushofer. Various Asian discourses during the wartime period, despite 
having had somewhat different visions of empire, took on the form of a regional 
community. In the context of spatial thinking, the question remained unanswered is to 
whether or not Western geopolitics could pave the way for constructing an East Asian 
space where Asian subjects are encapsulated under the banner of a multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural empire  
In addition to his application of scientific knowledge to the world, Haushofer had 
one more distinction that made him stand out among other Western specialists in 
geopolitics. Together with his geopolitical research, what captured the attention of 
Japanese intellectuals was his extensive understanding of Japanese history and culture. 
The degree of Haushofer’s understanding of Japan simply surpassed that of other 
Western scholars and this was largely due to his 18-month stay in East Asia between 
1909 and 1910.34 Interestingly, his first book-length publication, Dainihon ¼, as 
well as his doctoral dissertation in 1914 were not works about geopolitics but works on 
Japan.35 This meant that his later interest in Japan and the Pacific Ocean was not just a 
mechanical application of Euro-centric theories to a case study of Asia, as was much of 
the Western scholarship at this time.36 This was the main reason for the popularity and 
                                                 
34 Haushofer travelled to Japan, Korea and Manchuria as a military observer of the Bavarian Army. 
Christian Spang, “Karl Haushofer Reexamined: Geopolitics as a Factor of Japanese-German 
Rapprochement in the Inter-war Years,” in Christian Spang and Rolf Harald Wippich eds., Japanese-
German Relations, 1895-1945 War and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 139-140. 
35 Karl Haushofer, Dai Nihon; Betrachtungen über Gross-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft 
(Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1913). This work was translated into Japanese in 1942. Wakai Rinichi, Dai 
Nihon (Tokyo: Rakuyō shōin, 1942). 
36 Alfred Mahan’s writings on East Asia are one example of how Western geographers viewed and 
situated Asia in their geopolitical thinking. Mahan predicted that Japan, together with Russia, would 
threaten American hegemony. Mahan’s analysis was based on his famous geopolitical theory of sea power 
and land power. According to him, countries that acquired sea power first would take the initiative in the 
world order, and Japan was one of the nations which had geographical access to sea power. But Mahan’s 
writings on East Asia were highly strategic and observational, not based on actual and empirical 
knowledge. See Alfred Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect on International Polices (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1900). 
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extensive translation of Haushofer’s books in Japan.37 
Haushofer’s observations of Japan and his later writings basically viewed Japan 
as a country with great potential for development in a geopolitical sense. What made 
Haushofer’s encounter with Japan distinct was his peculiar emphasis on Japan’s 
spiritual side. He explained Japan’s successful modernization in terms of its balance 
between technology and spirit. He also argued that precisely because of the presence of 
the Imperial Spirit, Japan could maintain distance from what he called the flooding of 
individualism and liberalism that he believed was destroying European society. 38 To 
be sure, many Western intellectuals showed interest in Japan’s “success” in 
modernization. However, their interpretation of Japan’s emergence in the international 
order was mainly concerned with how faithfully Japan had accepted Western 
knowledge and technologies. In contrast, Haushofer paid attention to the spiritual 
aspect of Japanese culture and importantly, this notion corresponded to his later work 
on geopolitics, which emphasized a spiritual structure. For this reason, it is not hard to 
understand why Haushofer’s presence was essential in wartime Japanese geopolitics as 
well as in cementing diplomatic relations between Japan and Germany during the 
wartime period.39  
Presumably Haushofer’s peculiar interest in Japan paved the way for Japanese 
intellectuals’ willingness to accept his geopolitical thinking. Nonetheless, it does not 
fully answer the question of how his geopolitics could be transformed into an ‘Asian’ 
geopolitics, or ‘Japanese’ geopolitics. This inquiry becomes even more complex 
considering that most of his writings on Japan were first published in German in the 
                                                 
37 A complete list of Haushofer’s writings on Japan can be found in Christian Spang, Ishi Shokai trans., 
“Karuhaushofarto nihon no chiseigaku: daiichijisekai daisengo no nichitokukankei no nakade,” Kūkan, 
shakai, chirishisō 6 (2001), pp.2-21. 
38 Karl Haushofer, trans., Wakai Rinichi, Dai Nihon, pp.167-228. 
39 Christian Spang, trans., Ishi Shokai, “Karuhaushofarto nihonno chiseigaku: daiichijisekaidaisengono 
nichitokukankeino nakade,” Kūkan, shakai, chirishisō 6 (2001), pp.2-21. 
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1910s and 1920s, and strategically translated into Japanese in the wartime period. This 
difference of some 20 years could be understood as the typical gap between the 
production of knowledge in the West and its introduction to Japan.40 However, in the 
case of Haushofer, that would be an oversimplification, since geopolitical thinking 
started to gain currency in Japan in the 1930s, when Japan invaded northern China and 
withdrew from the League of Nations. However, in spite of his in-depth understanding 
of Japanese history and culture, Haushofer’s geopolitics had some theoretical 
characteristics that were not compatible with Japan’s geopolitical position. Most of all, 
since Haushofer’s geopolitics developed in Germany, where the nation state simply 
consisted of a single German minzoku, it was hardly possible to find in his geopolitics 
any theoretical speculations on the relationship between the state and nation (minzoku). 
To put it another way, he was more concerned with how the state should mobilize 
people from an organist perspective than with whether or not the association between 
the state and nation could be possible through geopolitical thinking. 
What was at stake for Japanese geographers and social scientists was the question 
of whether it was possible to create a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural imperial space 
through geopolitical thinking. In summary, I argue that Haushofer’s importance in the 
Japan of the late 1930s and early 1940s can be characterized by two salient points. First, 
his peculiar understanding of geopolitics and social sciences expanded the scope of 
geography in Japan and heavily influenced Japanese social scientists who had a firm 
faith in the objectivity of the social sciences. On the other hand, his organist approach 
to geopolitics based on the nation-state and ethnicity provided Japanese social scientists 
with another challenge to the construction of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural East 
                                                 
40 For a quantitative study of Japanese students’ study in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, see Kato 
Tetsurō, “Personal contacts in Japanese-German cultural relations during the 1920s and early 1930s,” in 
Christian Spang and Rolf Harald Wippich eds., Japanese-German Relations, 1895-1945 War and 
Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 119-138. 
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Asian empire. In other words, the question was whether or not Japanese social scientists 
could establish a subjective Pan-Asian geopolitics, overcoming Western geopolitics as 
well as the universalism of Western social sciences. 
 
The Kyoto School of Geography 
As I have discussed, social scientists and geographers in the Tokyo area took the 
initiative in introducing Western geopolitical thinking. However, it was geographers in 
Kyoto who first addressed “Japanese” or “East Asian” geopolitics. As a matter of fact, it 
was not just the Department of Geography at Kyoto that was grappling with the notion 
of an “Asianized” spatial discourse. Some philosophers at Kyoto, later called the Kyoto 
School of Philosophy, were also focusing their attention on this issue. In particular, 
Watsuji Tetsurō 	
(1889-1960), one of the founding members of the Kyoto 
School of Philosophy, and his 1935 book Fūdo ØÙ (Climate) directly touched upon 
the question of how space and human beings living in space should be defined. 41 
Watsuji’s philosophical approach to the notion of spatiality was based on his 
observation that the ontological question of what it means to be a human being is not 
only a matter of social and historical concern but, more importantly, is a matter of 
geographical and environmental import. In other words, Watsuji’s search for 
subjectivity as a philosopher marked a turning point in his encounter with the notion of 
spatiality and his discovery of East Asia as an ontological space vis-à-vis the West.42 
Kyoto geographers’ bold move in the process of developing Japanese geopolitics 
                                                 
41 Watsuji Tetsurō, Fūdo : nigenteki kosatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1935). 
42 For Watsuji’s turn to spatiality and East Asian space, Naoki Sakai argues as follows: “Imitating the 
restorationist move in the West toward Eurocentricity, which was to a great extent motivated by an anxiety 
concerning the putative loss of the West’s superiority over the non-West in the 1930s and which found its 
cumulative expression in the obsessive emphasis on the idea of the distinctiveness of the West and on the 
separationist distinction of “we the West” from the rest of the world, Watsuji seemed to produce an 
equally ethnocentric move toward the East,” see Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity : On “Japan” 
and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p.91. 
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is traceable to the mid 1930s. Komaki Saneshige, one of the first of Kyoto’s own PhDs 
in geography, took the position of assistant professor in the Department of Geography 
in 1931.43 With the appointment of Komaki, geography studies at Kyoto established an 
academic basis for creating original scholarship, yet his emergence also foreshadowed 
the ever-present tension between the Tokyo and Kyoto geography departments. 
Originally trained in both human geography and geology under the instruction of 
Ishibashi Goro, who obtained a PhD at Tokyo University and resigned from his 
professorship at Kyoto shortly after Komaki was appointed as a professor, Komaki 
accelerated his move toward the world of geopolitics. Clearly aware of the tension 
between his position at Kyoto and its rival Tokyo University, Komaki’s engagement 
with geopolitics began with a criticism of Western geopolitics and an association of his 
geopolitical theory with the Imperial Way:  
 
German geopolitics started by defining the state as an acting power. Insofar as 
it was created in the West, it is not strange for us to witness from this the 
manifestation of Western imperialism. For this reason, it is natural that such 
scholarship cannot permanently satisfy us. Our eventual purpose is to declare 
the Imperial Way in the world and to realize the spirit of the Hakkō Ichiū 
ÚÛ¥Ü (eight corners of the world under one roof) in Japan’s world. 44 
 
Komaki’s somewhat provocative remark toward what he called a kind of rationalist 
geopolitics that unequivocally indicated Tokyo-centered geopolitical research foresaw 
his next steps toward the so-called Kyoto geopolitics. However, simply charging 
geopolitics in Tokyo with being a replica of Western geopolitics does not elucidate the 
real academic theoretical between the two geography institutions in serious rivalry. 
Furthermore, as I have discussed, it is a mistake to characterize the encounter of 
                                                 
43 Kyoto daigaku chirigaku kyōshitsu, Chirigaku kyoto no hyakunen (Kyoto : Nakanishiya shuppan, 
2008), pp. 80-83. 
44 Komaki Saneshige, Nihonchiseigaku sengen (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1940). The actual citation is from its 
second publication in 1942 by Hakuyōsha. Komaki Saneshige, Nihonchiseigaku sengen, (Tokyo: 
Hakuyōsha, 1942), p. 69. 
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Japanese social scientists with Western geography as parasitic on Western scholarship. 
What, then, distinguished Kyoto’s geopolitical perspective from that of Tokyo or 
Western geopolitics? If Kyoto’s geopolitics attempted to distinguish itself from an 
organist perspective at the outset, what constituted the methodological and 
epistemological backbone of Kyoto geography? 
In Tōa chiseigaku josetsu ( fg, Introduction to East Asian 
Geopolitics), Yonekura Jirō, Komaki’s own student and one of the main members of the 
Kyoto School of Geography, provided an interesting framework for geography. He 
conceptualized geography as a science to examine the world where the society of 
species spatially coexists.45 In addition to being the statement of a geographer who 
unquestionably regarded geography as a “science,” what was more striking in this 
comment was Yonekura’s peculiar introduction of the notion of species in geography. If 
geographical studies had already been redefined as a “social science” by Kyoto 
geographers, how, then, did the concept of species play an important role in shaping 
their politicized spatial discourses? 
For Yonekura, the ultimate issue of geography must be the question of how 
geography could and should respond to the question of the unity between space and 
human beings.46 In order to respond to this question, however, Yonekura did not turn to 
the determinist perspective in viewing space as a given and the human being as a 
passive actor in relation to space. He instead paid special attention to the notion of 
dialectics. By focusing on the interplay between space and human beings, Yonekura 
attempted to redefine space in terms of objectivity and subjectivity.47 Needless to say, 
his dialectics and the configuration of subjectivity and objectivity did not operate based 
on a simple schema that equated space with objectivity and individuals with subjectivity. 
                                                 
45 Yonekura Jirō, Tōa chiseigaku josetsu (Tokyo: Seikatsusha,, 1941), p.23. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p.21. 
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Yonekura contended that as Hegel’s dialectics vividly showed, dialectic thinking in the 
Western philosophical tradition had often resulted in neglecting the importance of space 
in its excessive dependence on the state both as the reason and as a medium between 
subjectivity and objectivity. 48 In contrast to Western dialectics, Yonekura’s concepts of 
space and spatial dialectics were centered on redefining space as a sphere where the 
interplay and interrelation between space and human beings can take place. Space was 
on the one hand characterized by its objective nature against each individual, but 
insofar as space was a representation of each human being’s life, Yonekura argued, it 
should also be understood as an amalgam of multiple subjectivities.49 Therefore, the 
notion of the unity between space and human beings was naturally redefined, for 
Yonekura and other Kyoto geographers, as the question of how to resolve the 
conundrum of subjectivity and objectivity in human society. Here, Yonekura 
encountered the notion of species. He argued: 
 
Species as a superior concept of nation [minzoku] is a broader concept of race 
including various nations. For example, in the case of what we call Asian 
races or European races, species as groups of nations preconditions Asian or 
European races that have Asia or Europe as their spatial ground. In addition, 
species have in common relatively similar characteristics through the 
proximity and similarity of residence and environment; therefore, they share 
a common destiny to cooperate and co-prosper.50 
 
As the statement above clearly shows, Yonekura’s search for spatial dialectics between 
human beings and nature bestowed the status of a medium between subjectivity and 
objectivity on the concept of species. Yonekura’s account of species is reminiscent of 
the theory of species developed by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, Tanabe Hajime
ÝÞ (1885-1962) in particular. Not surprisingly, Yonekura acknowledged that his 
notion of dialectic space was formulated from his close readings of Tanabe and other 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p.22. 
49 Ibid., p.20. 
50 Ibid., p.25. 
                                                       
 178 
Kyoto philosophers.51 It also implied that for Kyoto-based geographers, the schema of 
space was essential to their search for absolute dialectics, as Tanabe and the Kyoto 
School of Philosophy were grappling with the same question.52 This logic leads to a 
second question:  How could space itself be dialectically conceptualized and how 
could the dialectics of space be possible in their search for Greater East Asian 
geopolitics? 
          
Anti-Modern and Imperial-Way Geopolitics 
As Komaki’s engagement with geopolitics intensified, the Department of Geography at 
Kyoto itself also emerged as a new center for geopolitical studies. After becoming a full 
professor in 1938, Komaki started to organize a research group focusing on geopolitics 
and another Kyoto School, the Kyoto School of Geography, was brought into being. 
With the confidence that came from being the leader of a school that included some 15 
researchers and graduate students,53 Komaki boldly declared that the Kyoto School’s 
geopolitics were the only pure geopolitics that could realize the Imperial Spirit.54 
Given that Kyoto’s geopolitics had been heavily influenced by the Kyoto School of 
Philosophy and had accordingly established a clear-cut binary formation of the East and 
the West, it was highly understandable that Komaki would turn to the notion of the 
Imperial Way. 
However, it was not a simple distinction between the East and the West that 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 For Tanabe Hajime’s theory of species, see Naoki Sakai, “Ethnicity and Species : On the Philosophy of 
the Multi-ethnic State in Japanese Imperialism,” Radical Philosophy 95 (May/June 1999), pp. 33-45; 
Naoki Sakai, “Subject and Substratum: On Japanese Imperial Nationalism,” Cultural Studies 14, no. 3 
(2000), pp. 463-530.  
53 Although the exact number of researchers in the Kyoto School of Geography was not revealed, it can 
be estimated at approximately 15 researchers including Komaki himself. This number is based on the 
number of geographers who participated in a government-supported secret research group, the Yoshida 
Group, founded by Komaki Saneshige. See, Mizuuchi Toshio, “Tsusho “Yoshidano kai” ni yoru 
chiseigaku kanren shiryō,” Kūkan, shakai, chirishisō 6 (Osaka: Osaka siritu daigakko, 2001), pp. 59-112. 
54 Komaki Saneshige, Nihon chiseigaku sengen (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1940), pp. 75-80. 
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constituted the backbone of Kyoto’s geopolitics. Komaki was convinced that by 
situating his Kyoto geopolitics within the spiritual arena of the Imperial Way, he could 
avoid the problem of social science becoming the slave of policy studies, or in 
Haushofer’s term, political techne.55 Importantly, while both Komaki and Haushofer 
emphasized spiritualism in their geopolitics, their understandings of spirit or the 
Imperial Spirit were quite different from one another. While spiritualism in Haushofer’s 
geopolitics was logically associated with the search for a subjective social science that 
would overcome the myth of objectivity in scientific thinking, Komaki’s turn to the 
Imperial Way was connected to a kind of essentialism, that is, to rescue the purity of 
Japan from the influx of tainted Western knowledge.  
Just as he saw the Imperial Way the locus of East Asian geographies with which 
species in East Asia could be spiritually united, Komaki also paid attention to 
scientifically demonstrating that East Asian geographies in a physical sense were 
superior to the West and had the potential to integrate the East Asian people. Here it is 
important to note that Komaki did not simply attempt to search for an East Asian space 
by leaning on the conventional geo-environmental determinist notion that had attributed 
the creation of race to its geographical factors.56 Being conscious that human beings 
are creative creatures, Komaki redirected his question of spatial unity in East Asia as 
follows: How could people living in East Asia where there exist so many geographical 
dynamics eventually be united under the leadership of the Imperial Way?   
Interestingly, according to this epistemological underpinning, the fact that East 
Asia was full of geographical dynamics that could be scientifically discovered did not 
became an obstacle to Komaki’s search for a dialectic unity in East Asia. Rather, he 
                                                 
55 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
56 Komaki clearly differentiated race (jinshu, QRS from nation (minzoku,  ,). While race is more 
subject to environmental and geographical factors, he contended that race just represents the geographical 
and inherent part in the creation of minzoku. Thus he emphasized the necessity of minzoku geography 
rather than racial geography. Komaki Saneshige, Minzoku chiri (Tokyo: Chijinshōkan, 1937), pp.1-13. 
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believed that the diversity of environmental and racial constitutions could explain why 
East Asian space was superior to the West in a geographical and ethnic sense. In that 
sense Komaki was not most concerned with declaring that East Asia had existed in a 
form of perfect unification, rather, in accordance with the spirit of the Imperial Way, he 
focused on scientifically discovering a medium that could integrate such geographical 
diversity. He argued that the presence of the Pacific Ocean and its currents played an 
important role in integrating geographical characteristics and people in East Asia.57  
Simply put, since the Pacific Ocean mediates the diverse characteristics of East Asian 
geographies, Komaki was concerned that East Asia as a spatial unit had the capability 
to embrace geographical differences and at the same time integrate them under the 
aegis of the Imperial Spirit. 
One of the major concerns for the Kyoto School of Geography was theorizing East 
Asian geographies with a view toward shaping the scientific framework in East Asia for 
the precondition of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity space. Therefore, its next task 
was necessarily to discover the conditions for integrating people residing in East Asian 
space. However, the response to this search for an absolute dialectics between East 
Asian space and East Asian people had to be sought outside such inherent 
characteristics as blood and skin. Komaki himself reiterated in many of his writings that 
minzoku could not be created by simply sharing the same blood.58 If species is a 
superior concept of minzoku as well as a medium of unifying space and individuals, 
how could the concept of ‘East Asian people’ be established in Komaki’s geopolitics?  
Concerning this issue, Komaki’s Greater East Asian geopolitics shows its 
fundamental difference from the so-called rationalist geopolitics or Haushofer’s 
geopolitics. As I have discussed, Haushofer called for an epistemological and 
                                                 
57 Komaki Saneshige, Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppansha, 1939), p. 20. 
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methodological transformation by bringing a new notion of temporality to the social 
sciences. In other words, instead of leaning on a formula-laden future that is explicable 
as well as predictable in terms of social scientific objectivity, Haushofer paid special 
attention to the unpredictability of the future and the role of subjectified political 
technologies in driving people toward a common destiny. Komaki’s geopolitics also 
gave attention to the notion of temporality, but in exactly the opposite manner. What 
captured Komaki’s attention was History. However, his notion of history was 
characteristic in that whereas history in a general sense signifies the accumulation of 
time, in Komaki’s theory of geopolitics, it was particularly concerned with how people 
had responded to challenges pertaining to space. Komaki believed that the issue of 
temporality and space could be the locus to differentiate East Asian space from Western 
space.  
Both Komaki and Yonekura were convinced that the crisis in civilization was 
primarily responsible for destroying the possibilities for the unification of space and 
humans. To put it another way, by exerting too much artificial power over nature, 
Yonekura argued, European civilization had lost its spirit.59 Komaki also remarked 
“Europe’s discovery and colonization since the 18th century is in no way different from 
this tendency (toward spiritual destruction), and the development of science in Europe 
in fact has served for this.” 60 Borrowing this time from the observations of Nishitani 
Keijißàá(1900-1990), a scholar of religion in the Kyoto School of Philosophy, 
Yonekura adamantly argued that the spiritual crisis caused by modernization could only 
be cured by restoring what he called three spirits – Nature, Reason and Religion.61  
Yonekura’s encounter with Nishitani’s historical analysis of European civilization 
came as no surprise, given that the philosophical base of the Kyoto geographers was 
                                                 
59 Yonekura, Tōa chiseigaku josetsu, p.12. 
60 Komaki, Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa, p. 38. 
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derived mostly from their fellow Kyoto philosophers. Yet looking at their criticism 
toward Western civilization from a geopolitical perspective, one could find that their 
Imperial-Way geopolitics was now attempting to juxtapose East Asian space with the 
West in the realm of modernization. The following remark by Komaki seems to give us 
the clearest sense of how Kyoto’s geopolitical strategies of contrast operated:  
 
[However] Asian minzoku has neither disobeyed nor resisted against nature. 
Rather, it has adored and been in accordance with nature. It has neither 
analyzed nor anatomized nature. Asian minzoku has never tried to overcome 
nature, but tried to make it alive. This is the spirit of Asia.62 (Emphasis 
added)  
 
Needless to say, the ‘spirit’ that Komaki is praising for Asia minzoku’s loyalty to nature 
could only be realized and maximized by being subordinated to the spirit of the 
Emperor, as demonstrated by Japan’s capability for restoring its national polity since 
the 19th century following Europe’s exploitative invasion into East Asian space. 
Therefore, China and the Southern Seas were geopolitically redefined as a strategic area 
where Europe’s exploitive spirit and Asia’s Imperial spirit would collide. 63 
Interestingly, Komaki’s analysis is reminiscent of the notion of Lebensraum (Living 
space), which is the core concept of Western geopolitics. However, while Lebensraum 
in Western geopolitics was a concept that justified a nation’s territorial expansion into 
the future, Komaki’s East Asian space was constantly conceptualized as a return to the 
past. His bold ‘declaration’ of Japanese geopolitics in 1940 was repeated in 1942, yet 
this time with a new manifesto, Dai azia no hukko ishin sengen ¼âãâ*äåe
æç (Greater Asia’s Declaration of Restoration).64 
Once Asian space as well as Asian minzoku gained an independent and nature-
friendly status in contrast to Western civilization and imperialism, how did the Kyoto 
                                                 
62 Komaki, Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa, p. 36. 
63 Ibid. 
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School of Geography envision the economy of East Asian space? Komaki’s restorative 
(or reactionary) geopolitics now attempted to offer a spatial community in the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere. He viewed agriculture as the basis for communal living 
in East Asian space.65 Here his Imperial-Way geopolitics was closely associated with 
the traditional family system in East Asia.  
 
In looking at the occupational constitution of the people of Greater East Asia, 
more than 50 percent of the Japanese, 60-70 percent of the Chinese, and over 
90 percent of people in the rest of Asia are working in agriculture. In addition, 
due to environmental factors, agriculture in Greater East Asia is mostly 
irrigation agriculture. Without cooperation from family or village, managing 
this [irrigation agriculture] would be difficult. Society in Asia is based on the 
family system and it is for this reason that Asian society has permanently 
maintained a self-sufficient economy benefiting each ethnic group.66 
(Emphasis added) 
 
East Asian space, minzoku, and the Imperial Spirit, Komaki believed, could be most 
gloriously realized when they were combined with the family system and agriculture as 
its economic base. As Komaki himself emphasized, his search for an absolute dialectics 
in Japanese geopolitics would never become possible unless East Asian space was 
accompanied by a self-sufficient economic system.   
 
Kyoto Geopolitics’ Involvement in Total War 
Komaki’s sharp criticisms of Western and Tokyo-based geopolitics, as I have discussed, 
were based upon his firm belief that geographical studies should not be subordinated to 
the realm of technology. However, this did not mean that Komaki and the Kyoto School 
of Geography confined the scope of their research to the narrow space of the ivory 
tower. To begin with, Komaki deeply involved himself in the processes of 
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propagandizing geopolitics through media and roundtable discussions.67 He was in a 
favorable position to come to the forefront in this ‘thought war.’ Koyama Iwao, a Kyoto 
School philosopher, focused on the necessity of ‘thought war’ in various writings68 and 
this peculiar intellectual trend was easily accepted by Komaki and the Kyoto 
geographers who were already familiar with the Kyoto School philosophers.69 
However, Komaki and Kyoto geopolitics were not content with this somewhat 
‘traditional way’ of encountering the world outside the university.  
Importantly, Komaki and his students established close ties with the army from an 
early stage in their geopolitics studies. According to the recently discovered documents 
on Kyoto geopolitics’ relationship with the army, their collaboration is traceable to late 
1937, when Komaki had just launched geopolitical studies at Kyoto Imperial 
University.70  In response to a request from the Imperial Army, Komaki established a 
secret geopolitics research group later called “Yoshida no kai (*, The Yoshida 
Group).” This research group, whose real name is Sōgōchirikenkyukai («V /
pGeneral Research Group of Geography), was actually established under the 
financial and political guidance of the Institute of National Defense (èé).71 
Renting a private house near Kyoto Imperial University, Komaki and the Imperial 
Army continued this secret meeting and shared strategic geographic information on 
                                                 
67 Komaki’s Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa was actually a compilation of his lectures to a Kyoto radio 
station between February 23, 1942 and February 28, 1942. Komaki Saneshige, Chiseigakujōyori mitaru 
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war. See Komaki Saneshige, “Dai tōa no rinen,” in Dainihon genron hōkoku kyōkai ed., Seikaikan no 
tatakai (Tokyo: Dōmei tushinsha, 1944), pp. 204-233. 
68 Koyama Iwao, “Sōryōkusen to shisōsen,” Chuōkōron 58, no.3 (Mar 1943), pp.2-28. 
69 For example, Koyama’s article “Shinchitujō no dogisei” was also included along with Komaki’s in 
Seikaikan no tatakai. 
70 Mizuuchi Toshio, “Tsushō “yoshidano kai” ni yoru chiseigaku kanren shiryō,” Kūkan, shakai, 
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company, Showa Trade Company (VWXYZ0/) was another.  
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battlefields and the colonies until the end of the war.72  
Komaki and Kyoto geopolitics’ collaboration with the Imperial Army effectively 
undermines the notion that Komaki’s criticism of Karl Haushofer’s theory of 
geopolitics as a branch of policy studies was no more than meaningless rhetoric. More 
importantly, Kyoto geopolitics’ wartime studies of Asia and Southeast Asia as area 
studies became increasingly systematical and organized through their collaboration 
with the Imperial Army. Since the primary purpose of the “Yoshida Group” was to 
provide information on a region of interest to the army on a weekly or biweekly basis, 
Komaki and his research group were accordingly reorganized so that each member 
would focus on one or two specific regions. Their first collective work of 1943, entitled 
A New Discourse on East Asian Geopolitics (¼ e:), clearly showed that 
Komaki’s geopolitics studies operated under a highly organized division of research.73 
Although there were changes in the composition of the researcher team, this basic 
division of research remained intact until 1945.74  
In addition, Komaki’s early connection to the Imperial Army might provide a 
clue as to why the Kyoto School of Geography developed close ties with the Imperial 
Army rather than the Navy. As I have discussed, Komaki emphasized the Pacific Ocean, 
which physically separates Asian space from that of Europe. Moreover, Komaki’s 
Imperial-Way geopolitics was unquestionably closer to the thinking of the Navy, which 
emphasized the Imperial Way more than the Army. Moreover, it has been widely 
accepted that the Kyoto School of Philosophy, by which Kyoto geopolitics was heavily 
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influenced, was closely connected to the Navy. I argue that Kyoto geopolitics’ 
collaboration with the Army that came in late 1938, when a full-scale war against China 
was in progress and, accordingly, and the Kwantung Army was exerting a much more 
powerful influence than the Navy. This could partly explain the conditions and reasons 
for Komaki’s relationship with the Army. Finally, their somewhat peculiar 
“honeymoon” terminated when the Army made its last request, which was to predict 
where the US Air Force would bombard in Tokyo in 1945.75   
 
Rationalist Geopolitics   
While geographers at Kyoto University were advocating a spirit-oriented geopolitics 
based on the Imperial Way, in what context was geopolitical thinking being developed 
by social scientists in the Tokyo area? More importantly, how did Japanese social 
scientists attempt to create a new geopolitical perspective of their own, overcoming the 
influence of Western geopolitics characterized by Karl Haushofer? 
From a quantitative standpoint, geopolitics in early 1940s Japan had already been 
widely accepted as a major social theory. As many as 20 articles on geopolitics by 
various social scientists appeared between 1937 and 1945 in Kaizō alone.76 Moreover, 
as the translation of Haushofer’s works exemplifies, the wartime Japanese government 
financially supported the spread of this spatial theory. However, the quantitative 
expansion of geopolitics in Japan did not necessarily mean that geography studies, once 
divided into two camps regarding geopolitics, eventually found a middle ground. 
Komaki contributed a few articles to Kaizō, but other Kyoto School geographers hardly 
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participated in this journal.77  
This spread of the new spatial discourse eventually resulted in the establishment of 
both an independent geopolitics research group as well as a research journal. In 
November 1941, the Japanese Association of Geopolitics (hereafter JAG) was founded, 
led by Iimoto Nobuyuki, who had first introduced geopolitics to Japanese academia in 
the 1920s for the first time. While the JAG did not have a direct impact on the 
Association of Japanese Geographers, the existing national geography association, the 
rise of the JAG implied that geopolitics had now become a powerful ideological and 
theoretical weapon, accepted not only by geographers but also by social scientists in 
general. It also started publishing its own journal, Geopolitics ( ), beginning in 
January 1942, one month after the Pearl Harbor attack. The membership numbers of the 
JAG varied from year to year but around 50 people remained active until 1945. What 
was more conspicuous was its composition. College professors, high school teachers, 
researchers at government-funded institutions such as Tōa kenkyūsho , and 
generals and officers from the Army and the Navy alike were all involved in this new 
academic association, but no one from Komaki’s Kyoto school joined.78  
However, the fact that geopolitics was becoming a widespread and commonly 
discussed theory in wartime Japan makes it much harder to accurately determine the 
characteristics of what might be called Tokyo geopolitics. Komaki denounced it as 
rationalist-centered and thus a mere imitation of Western geopolitics. However, it 
remains unclear how rationalism became so closely intertwined with geopolitics. More 
importantly, it should not be overlooked that irrespective of the different intellectual 
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camps in geopolitics, the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was 
universally espoused and eventually each and every work on geopolitics was aiming at 
realizing a co-prosperity space in Asia, which was most vividly depicted in Komaki’s 
Imperial-Way geopolitics. Based on these observations, I will examine the work of 
economic geographer Ezawa Jōjiêëìí (1907-1975) and political scientist 
Rōyama Masamichi î£(1895-1980), whose geopolitical thought can be seen 
as the locus of a rationalist extreme.  
Born in 1907, Ezawa Jōji received his college education at Tokyo University of 
Commerce (present-day Hitotsubashi University), where the famous neo-Kantian 
philosopher Sōda Kiichirō ïðñ¥
(1881-1927) was teaching economic 
philosophy. After spending nearly 10 years in Germany, Soda introduced the concept of 
culture [kultur] to Japanese academia. Among the many issues in connection with 
which the so-called neo-Kantian philosophers studied, Soda was particularly interested 
in how intellectuals should cope with the crisis of culture triggered by rapid 
industrialization. For this reason, culture was reconceptualized by Soda not as a value 
parallel to politics and economics, but as a fundamental spirit that one must nurture in 
order to maintain independence from the state. 79 Hence, “culturalism” was for Soda a 
series of activities to develop kyōyō (òó, bildung) for each individual.  
Heavily influenced by Soda’s thought, which had shaped a mainstream perspective 
in economic philosophy at Tokyo University of Commerce, Ezawa began writing about 
German philosophy and culture in the 1930s. Just as Soda pointed out the dominance of 
industrialized nation-states over individual freedom and values, Ezawa vehemently 
criticized the notion that reason and rationalism had served only in the formation of a 
despotic nation-state. He pointed out that reason in the European intellectual tradition 
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took precedence over an individual’s various experiences with things.80 In other words, 
he contended that in the European philosophical tradition, individuals’ judgment of 
things is determined not by the images of their direct experiences with things but by the 
pure sense that already exists before experiences.81 He went on to argue that the state 
and the aristocratic class had defined reason and forced ordinary people to acknowledge 
its primacy, this highly abstract and exclusive process which he called rationalization 
seemingly provided a common value that everyone could share in the name of freedom 
and equality. However, it actually resulted in subordinating people’s social experiences 
with things to the narrow and standardized space called the “nation-state.”82 Ezawa’s 
observation later played an important role in developing his geopolitical thinking in 
relation to individuals’ experiences of subjectivity in space.  
Ezawa’s highly “interdisciplinary” early writings on Western philosophy focused 
on the question of how he could make this theoretical framework more sophisticated in 
his later encounters with economic geography and eventually geopolitics. Rather than 
directly discussing geopolitics, Ezawa showed special interest in the field of economic 
geography, which had become popular among European intellectuals. His 1935 book 
Theory of Economic Location (lm /) was his first work in which he associated 
the economic philosophy that Soda introduced to Japan with geographical thinking. His 
primary concern centered on the question of how a new form of objectivity can be 
achieved if, as I have discussed, reason or rationality is merely a construct that the 
ruling class created to justify its political power. Hence, Ezawa argued that human 
beings’ efforts to obtain objectivity against nature as a priori could be realized by 
conceptualizing nature as an object of negation.83 
                                                 
80 Ezawa Jōji, “Doitsuteki ideorogitoshite kantō,” Shisō 150 (Nov 1934), p. 679. 
81 Ezawa Jōji, “Keimōteki sensei,” Shisō 138 (Nov 1933), pp. 606-607.  
82 Ibid., p. 608. 
83 Ezawa Jōji, Keizairichigaku (Tokyo:Kawade shobo, 1935), pp. 1-12.  
                                                       
 190 
Central to Ezawa’s early writings on the relationship between nature and human 
beings is the observation that conflict and collaboration form the basis of their 
interaction. In fact, Ezawa’s interest in economic geography was aimed at introducing 
the location theory of industry led by German economic geographer Alfred Weber, the 
younger brother of sociologist Max Weber. Translating Weber’s books into Japanese, 84 
Ezawa also developed a keen interest in how human beings could maximize economic 
profits by determining geographic locations that most efficiently maximize the 
economic effects of capital, raw materials, labor and transportation. For this reason, 
Ezawa was not content with the notion of living space (Lebensraum), the core concept 
of German geopolitics, which he believed to essentialize nature as a space where 
human beings are restricted to nature’s predominating power. Ezawa argued:  
 
The concept of living form (Lebensform) is a living that human beings 
experience in reality and it is preconditioned as an essential “meaning” before 
it is regarded as an object (ôõ). Insofar as it is understood as such, it cannot 
be said that it is an object of geopolitics. That it [living form] could be 
objectively represented as a living form is premised on the assumption that it 
conflicts with or resists against the other, or it is resisted by the other. In this 
case, conflict, challenge and resistance become elements of negation in order 
for a living form to be objectified. (Emphasis added)85 
 
This statement clearly shows that Ezawa basically conceptualized space as a place 
(ö: basho), where both experiences and the interaction of experiences take place. 
According to this observation, national territory was also conceptualized as the space 
where a group of people living in the state have shared their experiences. However, 
Ezawa argued that living within the same territorial boundary does not guarantee that 
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people in the state have the same “objective” experiences.86 For this reason, Ezawa 
redefined the object of geopolitics as transforming these experiences into a certain type; 
that is, objectifying experiences. In this respect, Ezawa’s spatial thought presents a 
striking contrast to that of Komaki Saneshige, who searched for a middle ground 
between space and human beings in the spiritual mediation of the Imperial Way.  
Furthermore, Ezawa’s observations of human beings as actors in space were 
substantially different from Komaki’s positioning of minzoku or species in space. 
Ezawa’s spatial theory is premised on the perception that objectifying or formalizing 
experiences is the process of transforming them into an objectified type. However, this 
process does not mean that minzoku or a special social group within the same spatial 
boundary is, too, objectified and positioned as a medium between nature and human 
beings. Ezawa instead insisted that minzoku cannot be objectified since it not only 
indicates sharing the same experiences in a certain space, but it is also a subject of 
voluntary activities. In other words, since minzoku is not necessarily restricted to a 
certain territorial border and the concept of minzoku pertains to the spatial as well as the 
temporal, the latter of which cannot be simply objectified, Ezawa held that in order to 
eventually comprehend the relationship between geography and history, which 
Haushofer himself termed a subfield of geopolitics, geopolitics should not simply be 
limited to the realm of objectification.87 In short, the main issue in Ezawa’s spatial 
theory was how to redirect the relationship between space and human beings in a 
futuristic sense rather than how to prove that a certain minzoku or species has an 
objectified spatial experience by returning to history as suggested by Komaki and 
Yonekura’s notion of species. Evidently, this question was not separable from the 
question of how to spatially conceptualize the ‘community of destiny’ among different 
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ethnic groups. 
Ezawa’s understanding of minzoku and temporality was a turning point where 
he attempted to redirect geopolitics from the realm of objectivity to subjectivity. How, 
then, could geopolitics intervene in the future as a subjective social science? It was at 
this point that Ezawa found validity in Haushofer’s geopolitics. Borrowing Haushofer’s 
statement that the aim of geopolitics is to predict the tendency of each group in the 
future and therefore it is not only an academic discipline but also a technology, Ezawa 
asserted that geopolitics enters the realm of “performative intuition” through a de-
objectification process, and that this is how geopolitics encounters the future as 
temporality, distinguishing itself from other objective social sciences.88 
It was not only Ezawa who penetrated this character of geopolitics as a subjective 
and intuitive science. The political scientist Rōyama Masamichi even argued that 
geopolitics was the first subjective social science: 
 
The historical movement that shapes historical phenomena such as nation (
) and minzoku has been the focus of a geopolitical approach […] Since 
historical examination is accompanied by value judgment, it has been said 
that there exists no objective reality in geopolitics. However, in contrast to the 
existing social sciences that have advocated objectivity and represented 
reality through formulation and fixation, it is interesting that geopolitics (in 
the social sciences) for the first time acknowledges subjectivity and also its 
characteristics as policy studies. 89 
 
Ezawa and Rōyama’s somewhat coincidental observations of geopolitics as a subjective 
social science entail several important questions. First, why is the notion of subjectivity 
such an important issue in examining the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? 
Second, what role did the notion of subjectivity play in the making of Greater East 
Asian space? One possible answer might be that by emphasizing subjectivity and 
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intuition in conceiving East Asian space, both Ezawa and Rōyama could re-
conceptualize it as fundamentally unknown. To put it another way, any attempt to 
overcome the geographical determinism associated with Western racism must start by 
dislocating this geographical constitution of the world in the name of the East and the 
West. For this reason, geopolitics’ stance of approaching the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere from a scientific perspective was paradoxical. As Rōyama himself 
indicated, “[T]he notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is still 
ambiguous in its grounds and content, and it is difficult to understand its origins.”90 
Geopolitics reconfirmed the ambiguity of this new East Asian discourse. However, the 
impossibility of demarcating the geographical border between the East and the rest of 
the world through objective social science ironically opened up new possibilities of 
subjectivity, thereby allowing geopolitics to emerge as an intellectual weapon for 
envisioning a new East Asian order.  
It now became clear that for both Rōyama and Ezawa, geopolitics could be the 
kind of discipline that could provide an answer to the longstanding question of which 
regions or countries should be included and which should not in Greater East Asia. In 
what context could geopolitics play a role in envisioning the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere? More importantly, how did Ryama and Ezawa theorize geopolitics 
in dealing with the issue of the economic gap between metropole and colony? In the 
pages that follow, I will explore the question of how the rationalist geopolitics 
developed by Ezawa and like-minded social scientists attempted to actually 
“rationalize” modernization and economic development in the colony as a driving force 
for constructing an East Asian empire. 
             
Space, Temporality and “Sphere” 
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Henri Lefebvre has theorized space in his concept of spatial practice. According to him, 
space, a social construct, “embraces production and reproduction.” He observes that 
through this process of production and reproduction, some degree of cohesion between 
space and each member in a society takes place.91 To put it another way, the 
relationship between space and human beings is by no means static, and the capitalistic 
mode of production constantly intervenes in the process of human beings’ becoming 
spatial subjects.   
    Returning to Japanese social scientists’ discussion of empire building, I have 
argued in the previous chapters that these social scientists had a strong tendency to 
criticize individualism and capitalism. On the other hand, they also contrived the slogan 
of “overcoming modernity,” in which the logic of subjectivity formation was theorized 
in a highly abstract notion of negation and self-negation. Apart from assessing the 
validity of the notion of “overcoming modernity,” I argue that solving the issue of the 
economic gap between metropole and colony emerged as a central theme to convince 
colonial subjects of the historical necessity of creating a Japan-centered East Asian 
empire. The problem of economic imbalance was closely connected to the question of 
how spaces in the colony should be restructured and thus become a social space, where 
“some degree of cohesion” between metropole and colony takes place.   
To solve this conundrum, Ezawa paid special attention to conceptualizing the 
term “sphere” in relation with temporality. As I have discussed, Ezawa basically 
theorized space as the location for individuals’ experiences and the proximity of 
experiences. Therefore, for Ezawa national land was a space where the objectification 
of experiences by people in a nation-state eventually takes place. However, this 
formulation of national territory as the objectification of experiences is always 
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accompanied by the process of the fixation of meanings.92 In other words, the threefold 
relationship of the state, national territory and people (minzoku) is predicated on the 
principle that people have the same and therefore objective experiences in the same 
space. However, when people share the same experiences, Ezawa contended, there is 
no guarantee that people in a nation-state will have the same destiny. Sharing the same 
past through the medium of space, national territory for instance, must be mediated 
again by a new space. In that respect, Ezawa conceptualized national territory as a place 
(basho, ö).93 
Instead of focusing on the concept of basho, Ezawa was particularly concerned 
with the concept of “sphere” and its implications for the future. He was clearly aware 
that the creation of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity “Sphere” was not simply a 
matter of consolidating different national territories. Ezawa’s concern was how these 
geographical changes in national borders should be transformed into a new spatial 
consciousness that would allow people in a Greater East Asia to have the same spatial 
community of destiny. Hence, he insisted that a “sphere” be where the constant 
relationships between subjects and living forms (Lebensform) take place.94 However, 
he was also convinced that creating a co-prosperity “sphere” would be simply 
impossible unless people living in the “sphere” had a “stream of experiences” that 
pointed to the future. Precisely for this reason, he emphasized that the stream of 
experiences in the co-prosperity sphere should be directed toward sharing the same 
future instead of sharing the same past in the objectified and fixed border of national 
territories. In order for this concept of a “sphere” to operate constantly in the process of 
creating the stream of experiences, Ezawa maintained that the notion of living space 
(Lebensraum) should be substituted for the notion of reconstructing space 
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(Raumordnung) and national territory plans.95 
Just as Rōyama emphasized that the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere should be a historical movement that transcends the border of 
nationalism,96 for Ezawa a ‘co-prosperity sphere’ would be impossible to create simply 
by scientifically analyzing natural conditions in East Asian space and consolidating 
them by the Imperial-Way as in Komaki’s Greater East Asian geopolitics. More 
importantly, his concept of Raumordnung, despite the concept’s origin in Europe, was 
not an East Asian version of Europe’s economic imperialism, which had geographically 
divided the world into several parts to maximize the exploitation of natural resources. 
In this respect, Ezawa’s attempts to connect the concept of Raumordnung to the notion 
of a co-prosperity sphere were fundamentally different from the theory of what might 
be called a bloc-economy, which aimed at consolidating East Asian space in the clear 
schematic division of Japan (Heavy Industry), Korea & Manchukuo (Agriculture & 
Heavy Industry) and Southeast Asia & the Southern Seas (Raw Materials). Criticizing 
this kind of geographical division of Asia as a lopsided production, he argued: 
 
In terms of the co-prosperity sphere in the Southern Seas, the one-sided 
viewpoint by the leading powers based on the theory of location, that is, the 
notion of lopsided production, on the one hand destroys the self-sufficient 
power of indigenous people and on the other hand causes the maldistribution 
of population. Needless to say, the national land plan is the only thing that 
could resolve these problems.97 
 
Arguing that the bloc economy system would eventually destroy the ethnicity of people 
living in the colonies,98 Ezawa also maintained that the East Asian economic sphere 
should not be constructed based on hierarchal relations between ethnic groups. In this 
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way he tried to redefine it as an economic sphere upheld by the common ethnic 
sentiment and will of Asian people.99 
 
Modern Development and National Land Planning 
What, then, was the final destination of Ezawa’s geopolitics and his notion of an East 
Asian co-prosperity sphere? How were Ezawa’s concepts of Raumordnung and national 
land planning rationally connected to a spatial community of destiny? Borrowing from 
Rōyama’s concept of geopolitics as a subjective social science, how did Ezawa portray 
a common goal in an East Asian sphere through which subjects in East Asian space 
could share the same stream of experiences pointing toward the future? 
Ezawa paid particular attention to the concept of autarky. If we loosely interpret 
this term to mean an economically self-sufficient nation or sphere, we can see that it 
was not just Ezawa who explicitly advocated an autarky. As I have discussed, Komaki 
Saneshige’s Imperial-Way geopolitics ultimately targeted a self-sufficient East Asian 
co-prosperity sphere, and the ultimate goal of the “bloc economy” system in Komaki 
geopolitics was no doubt to establish a self-sufficient anti-Western economic order. 
However, Ezawa’s notion of autarky seemed to be concerned with restructuring ethnic 
and economic borders of Greater East Asian space, rather than with assuring territorial 
expansion to the West. Ezawa contended that the previous and existing theories of 
European geopolitics simply emphasized territorial expansion based on the perception 
that solving the problem of limited resources in living space was only possible by 
politically occupying another space. For him, Britain’s colonization of India was a clear 
example of this resource-centered geopolitical concept of space.100  
Instead of advocating constant territorial expansion by the leading powers, 
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Ezawa’s spatial theory, associated with the theory of marginal utility, focused on a 
“retrospective” approach to natural resources.101  Ezawa believed that the division of 
space through the distribution of raw materials could be an easy way for a leading 
power to temporarily obtain economic self-sufficiency, but he also maintained that this 
mechanical division of space would inevitably create political hierarchies within a 
certain spatial community and would not reach the level of sharing a common destiny. 
Precisely for this reason, for Ezawa the concept of autarky did not mean continuing to 
conquer unexplored space, but rather to economically develop ‘marginal’ spaces so that 
people in these spaces could have a new set of experiences. In short, autarky as the final 
destination of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was also the ultimate end of 
Ezawa’s geopolitical thinking, which emphasized the processes by which human beings 
negate natural space as given and construct a new space, constructing their own identity 
through this schema of negation and construction.  
In terms of envisioning industrialization in the underdeveloped region of Greater 
East Asia, Ezawa’s idea might be seen as one of the most radical economic approaches. 
Even Yanaihara Tadao, Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University and a 
leader among progressive intellectuals during the wartime period,102 relentlessly 
argued that oppressive and violent measures should be taken in ruling uncivilized 
people in Southeast Asia.103 Ezawa’s geopolitics became closely associated with 
modernization, and geopolitics’ encounter with modernization was also found in 
Rōyama’s notion of regional development. Criticizing both commercial investment and 
the notion of a bloc economy, Rōyama asserted that the final aim of an East Asian Co-
operative Community should take the form of regional development.104  
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    To turn his theory of space into a realistic force for economic development, Ezawa 
showed keen interest in the notion of national land planning (Ù÷ø). This idea 
rapidly gained currency among bureaucrats and intellectuals as Japan conducting its 
war against China, and it was highly likely that Japan would declare a total war against 
the United States. As the notion of total war clearly suggests, these intellectuals 
observed that both human and material resources must be mobilized for Japan’s war 
efforts. Central to this logic lay the question of how marginal utility should be 
maximized under the condition of limited resources. Therefore, advocates of national 
land planning naturally focused their concern on restructuring spaces in the Japanese 
empire for the sake of wartime mobilization.  
    After the Committee for National Land Planning (Ù÷øùú) was 
established in Japan in 1939, national land planning became an important issue in the 
colony as well. In 1940, the Committee for National Land Planning was established in 
colonial Korea and it was filled with top-ranking officials in the Governor General’s 
Office and leading intellectuals at universities in colonial Korea. Between 1940 and 
1942, a number of articles on national land planning appeared in major journals in 
Korea. Importantly, their discussion of national land planning varied substantially based 
on these authors’ political positions. For example, the converted Korean Marxist 
intellectual In Jeong-Sik interpreted it as part of a state-centered controlled economy 
that would replace the laissez-faire system based on individualism.105 Inherent in In’s 
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observation was the thinking of a colonial intellectual that the economic gap between 
Japan and colonial Korea might be lessened by Korea’s voluntary participation in 
national land planning, which would result in the development of the Korean economy. 
But most Japanese intellectuals viewed it as merely part of the wartime total 
mobilization policies to exploit resources in the colonies. To this end, they emphasized 
the necessity of scientifically measuring the location of raw materials and effectively 
utilizing them in colonial Korea. For this reason, their discussion of and writings on 
national land planning took the form of geography-centered area studies to accumulate 
knowledge and information about raw materials in the colony. However, completely 
missing in their observation was how people in the colony should become the subject of 
a politically reconstructed and economically “developed” East Asian empire.   
    Ezawa was clearly aware of such limitations of national land planning when it was 
applied to the colony as a means to exploit resources. He was also equally critical of the 
economics-centered interpretation of such planning, which was that national land 
planning was primarily concerned with increasing productivity and marginal utility, or 
in other words, maximizing exploitation. Interestingly, he critically revisited Alfred 
Weber’s theory of industrial location (ûüý :), which Ezawa himself introduced 
to Japan in the mid 1930s, arguing that it is premised on the perception that economic 
conditions are naturally given. To put it another way, establishing plants or factories as 
part of national land planning where the total cost of labor, production and 
transportation is lower might contribute to increasing productivity and effectiveness. 
However, he contended that it would not change the political constitution of people’s 
life.106 In Basic Theories of National Land Planning (Ù÷ø*­®/:), Ezawa 
theorized the notion of economic development in national land planning as a logic of 
                                                                                                                                            
the notion of national land planning.  
106 Ezawa Jōji, Kokudo keikaku no kisoriron (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1941), pp.13-28. 
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subject formation.  
 
In order to completely realize national land planning, it must encompass all 
aspects of human life. For this reason, it should not only restructure 
population, the economy and transportation, but should also reach the 
political, administrative, legal and customary order of minzoku. It is 
insufficient to manage labor in industries and construct cities and villages, 
and build new railroads, national roadways and waterways that are necessary 
for development…. To put it another way, true national land planning is to 
take into consideration various representations, customs, blood-centered 
sentiments and religions in people’s life in rural villages. We should be able to 
anticipate that through the reorganization of (national land), what kind of 
effects the interplay of minzoku would bring out to a new order.107 (Emphasis 
added) 
 
Ezawa’s understanding of national land planning and economic development clearly 
showed how he appropriated modernization as a driving force for constructing a new 
order. To be sure, he was also aware that capitalism had constantly caused economic 
inequality, and that this gap became the major reason for imperialism and colonialism. 
Therefore, modernization in a Japan-centered new order needed to be associated with 
restructuring the discriminatory political hierarchy between metropole and colony. 
Accordingly, his geopolitical approach to Southeast Asia concentrated on the question 
of how rapidly national land planning could restructure Southeast Asia into a modern 
space, and this was no doubt the same question that the general economic plan of 
Imperial Japan had to confront. Criticizing Europe’s exploitative imperialist economy 
in Southeast Asia, Ezawa argued: 
 
In order for Japan to construct a mutually unified relationship in Southeast 
Asia, it is imperative that Japan change the allocation and distribution of raw 
materials and at the same time change the transportation relations of these 
raw materials…. To discuss industrialization in Southeast Asia presumably 
means to correct the existing relationships [in Southeast Asia], and at the 
same time, the reconstruction of the existing relationships is essential in 
restructuring Japan’s economic structure itself from a new perspective. 108 
                                                 
107 Ibid., p.45. 
108 Ezawa Jōji, Nanpō seijiron (Tokyo: Chikura shobo, 1943), p. 192. 
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(Emphasis added) 
 
Consequently, the so-called rationalist geopolitics developed by both Ezawa and 
Rōyama ironically was associated with the concept of modernization, which had long 
been believed to be the fruit of the Western social scientific tradition. However, their 
notion of modernization leaves much room for further discussion. How could subjects 
in East Asia share the sense of the “community of destiny” while experiencing different 
stages of economic development? How could the notion of geopolitics and national 
land development constitute the realistic content of the East Asia Cooperative 
Community, without simply “objectifying” colonial subjects as means of exploitation 
for Japan’s war efforts? 
  
Conclusion 
Geopolitical thinking gained currency in interwar Japan as “Asia” emerged as a spatial 
concept challenging and replacing the West as universal in the international order. Yet it 
should not be overlooked that this rapid spread of spatial discourse unequivocally 
reflected the double mindset of Japanese intellectuals who on the one hand were 
advocating “overcoming the modern,” and “overcoming the West,” but who were also 
searching for scientific and rational ways to justify Japan’s spatial hegemony over the 
rest of Asia. 
Nowhere were the seeds of geopolitics stronger than in the social sciences in 
wartime Japan. Various Pan-Asian discourses produced by Japanese social scientists 
during the wartime period aimed at distinguishing themselves from the previous Pan-
Asianism, which had been characterized by its particularistic and culturalist orientations. 
Rationalizing the East in a social scientific manner and theorizing East Asian space 
were unquestionably one of the most imperative problems that Japanese social 
scientists were confronted with. In that respect geopolitics played an important role in 
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providing intellectual grounds for this very fundamental and important question.  
I argue that the notion of geopolitics in wartime Japan went beyond a temporary 
intellectual fashion. Geopolitics provided a new space for other disciplines that had not 
been conceived of as social sciences. In this process, the fixed border of “objectivity” in 
the social sciences was gradually deconstructed. This did not mean that a certain 
departmental unit, geography for example, was newly included in the realm of social 
sciences. Instead, as the geopolitical thinking of Ezawa and Rōyama shows, these two 
social scientists tried to redefine the objectivity-centered framework of social scientific 
thinking by engaging with new concepts such as spatiality, futurity, and most 
importantly “subjective (#(=)” social science.  
As both Ezawa and Rōyama showed in their writings, the question of modern 
development never disappeared from imperial social scientists’ discourses on an East 
Asian new order. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will further explore this question by analyzing 
the Asian discourse of Japanese Marxist intellectuals who most seriously dealt with the 
issue of historical development and universalism in 1930s Japanese social sciences. 
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Chapter 5 
Japan and Asia: 
The Asiatic Mode of Production Debate in 1930s Japan 
 
Prewar Japanese Marxism and Asia 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I will explore Japanese Marxists’ perception of Asia and their 
commitment to the East Asia Community during the wartime period. Marxist 
intellectuals were the most radical intellectual group in 1910s and 1920s Japan. The 
growing influence of Marxism was closely related to the limits inherent in liberalism 
led by Yoshino Sakuzō and like-minded social scientists during the Taisho period. As 
Kato Shūichi has correctly pointed out, these liberal thinkers called for a better politics 
based on democracy, or minponshugi to borrow Yoshino’s term, but this did not mean 
that they intended to fundamentally change the structure of the government.1 Therefore, 
the urgent need for radical reforms such the abolition of the Emperor system, land 
reform, universal suffrage, all of which were necessary for bourgeois democracy, was 
primarily addressed by Marxist intellectuals. In this sense, being a true liberal was 
inseparable from being a Marxist, and this connection explained why Marxism became 
the emblem of Japanese social scientists in 1920s Japan.2 
    Marxism rapidly penetrated the mindset of Japanese social scientists in their 
search for universal values such as democracy and economic equality in Japan. 
However, there existed internal tension in the way this universalism was theorized and 
applied to Japanese society. After the foundation of the Japanese Communist Party in 
                                                 
1 Kato Shūichi, “Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese Militarism,” in Bernard Silberman and 
H.D. Harootunian eds., Japan In Crisis : Essays on Taishō Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1974), p.223. For an exellecnt study of postwar Japanese Marxism and its modern legacy, see J. 
Victor Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
2 Kato, “Taisho Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese Militarism,” pp.222-224. 
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1922, Japanese Marxism, in spite of its enormous influence throughout the academic 
circles and political worlds, gradually branched off two main theoretical factions. One 
group of Marxist social scientists focused on the feudal remnants in Japanese society. 
They contended that the presence of the emperor system and the oppressive 
bureaucratic organizations explained the immaturity of bourgeois democracy and their 
economic impacts could be seen most clearly in the backwardness of Japanese 
agriculture. Accordingly, they proposed a two-stage revolution theory; that is, bourgeois 
democratic revolution must precede socialist revolution in Japan. On the other hand, 
another group of Marxist intellectuals viewed the Meiji Restoration as an important 
turning point in realizing bourgeois democracy and capitalism in Japan, and argued for 
the urgency of direct socialist revolution.  
     In this chapter I will explore the first group of Japanese Marxist social scientists, 
often called Koza-ha (hþ¯, Lecturer’s faction).3 Their perception of the uniqueness 
and backwardness of the Japanese economy, agriculture in particular, was heavily 
influenced by Western Marxist thinkers’ analysis of Asian society. Ever since Marx’s 
writings on the backwardness of “Asiatic society” appeared in the mid 19th century, 
there had been a strong tendency to portray the historical development of Asian society 
as particular and thus backward in comparison to Western society. On the level of real 
politics, The Communist International (hereafter the Comintern) reiterated its manifesto 
in a series of theses on Asia between the late 1920s and the early 1930s that a two-stage 
revolution must be carried out in Japan and Asia, given that capitalism and democracy 
had not matured enough in these areas. The notion of Asiatic society was also discussed 
in theory in the famous Asiatic mode of production debate in the mid 1930s. Both 
Western Marxist theoreticians and Japanese Marxist social scientists fervently debated 
                                                 
3 The term Koza-ha was widely used by students of Japanese Marxism as Marxist social scientists in this 
group published a monumental 8-volume work, entitled Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi kōza (J[
\]^_`, Lectures on the Developmental History of Japanese Capitalism) between 1933 and 1934.  
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over how the notion of Asiatic society was defined and where it was positioned within 
Marx’s 5-stage theory of historical development.  
    All of these political and intellectual circumstances first demonstrate how deeply 
the perception of “Asian backwardness” came to permeate in the mindset of Marxist 
intellectuals in Asia, Koza-ha Japanese Marxist social scientists in particular. However, 
my study argues that the concept of Asiatic society should not be simply characterized 
by a few words such as stagnation, underdevelopment and backwardness. The notion of 
Asiatic society and its interpretation in mid 1930s Japan by Japanese Marxist social 
scientists instead reflect the highly intertwined nature of prewar Japanese Marxism. 
Although Koza-ha Marxist social scientists invariably acknowledged the backwardness 
of Japanese society vis-à-vis the West, their encounter with the rest of Asia through the 
logic of Asiatic society reveals some important points that must be discussed in 
answering the question of why they eventually converted (B, tenkō) and committed 
themselves to the Japanese empire. Instead of revisiting the issue of conversion, which 
has been touched upon by a number of scholars, I will focus on theoretical limitations 
inherent in Koza-ha Marxist intellectuals’ understanding of Asia.4 In so doing, this 
chapter aims to draw a discursive map on which the continuity between prewar and 
converted Marxists during the wartime period can be logically explicated. 
    In the pages that follow, I will deal with three main questions. First, I will briefly 
                                                 
4 A number of works on the issue of Tenkō deserve attention, including Shisō no kagaku kenkyūkai eds., 
Tenkō (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1975), 3 Vols; Fujita Shōzō, Tenkō no shisōteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1975) ; Tachibana Takashi, Nihon kyōsantō kenkyū (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1978), 2 Vols: Nagajima 
Makoto, Tenkōron josetsu : senchū to sengo o tsunagu mono (Kyoto : Mineruva shobo, 1980); Germain 
Hoston, “Marxism and the National Question in Prewar Japan,” Polity 16, no.1(Fall 1983), pp. 96-118; 
Honda Shūgo, Tenkō bungakuron (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985); Kobayashi Morito, "Tenkōki" no hitobito : 
Chian ijihō ka no katsudōka gunzō (Tokyo: Shinjidaisha, 1987); Patricia Steinhoff, “Tenkō and Thought 
Control,” in Gail Lee Bernstein and Fukui Haruhiro eds., Japan and the world : essays on Japanese 
history and politics in honour of Ishida Takeshi (New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp.78-94; Germain 
Hoston, “Ikkoku shakai shugi: Sano Manabu and the Limits of Marxism as Cultural Criticism,” in 
Thomas J. Rimer ed., Culture and Identity : Japanese Intellectuals during the Interwar Years (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), pp.168-190; Patricia Steinhoff, Tenkō ideology and societal integration 
in prewar Japan (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990); Ito Akira, Tenkō to tennōsei : nihon kyōsan shugi 
undō no 1930nendai (Tokyo: Keisō shobo, 1995). 
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summarize how the notion of Asiatic society first emerged in Western Marxism in the 
mid 1920s and how it was introduced and interpreted by Japanese and Korean Koza-ha 
Marxists in the mid 1930s. Here, I will emphasize that Japanese Marxists’ 
understanding of Asian backwardness over the course of the Asiatic mode of production 
debate took on very different perspectives when it was applied to the rest of Asia, China 
in particular. Second, I will show that in an attempt to differentiate the stage of the 
Japanese economy, feudalism, to be precise, from that of other Asian countries, these 
Japanese Marxist social scientists began highlighting stagnation in Asia village 
communities, which they believed no longer existed in Japan. In this process, they 
gradually internalized the perception that revolutionary potential could be no longer 
found in these Asian village communities. Finally, I will argue that the impossibility of 
theorizing political forces from the Asian village community and overcoming the logic 
of Asiatic society rapidly led them to endorse a Japan-centered East Asian community 
during the wartime period.    
 
The Asiatic Mode of Production Debate in 1930s Japan 
Before examining in what context the Asiatic mode of production debate emerged in 
Japan in the mid 1930s, let me briefly discuss its intellectual background. In July 1927, 
the Comintern announced a thesis on the prospect of a socialist revolution in Japan. In it, 
the Comintern articulated the necessity of a two-stage revolution in Japan, pointing out 
the remnants of the feudalistic system and the immaturity of capitalism. 
 
In Japan, there exist the objective prerequisites both for a bourgeois 
democratic revolution (the survivals of feudalism in the political structure and 
the acuteness of the agrarian question) and for its transformation into a 
socialist revolution (the high level of capital concentration and trustification, 
the close interconnections of State and industry, the comparatively close 
approximation to a State capitalist system, the alliance between bourgeoisie 
and feudal landowners). 
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But if Japan’s economic situation offers a direct prospect of revolution, a 
tremendous obstacle and barrier is provided by its ideological 
backwardness… Neither the Japanese proletariat nor the peasantry have 
revolutionary traditions or experience of struggle; the broad masses are only 
now awakening to political life, and only a very small proportion of them are 
involved in it; workers’ and peasants’ organizations are numerically small and 
have shown very little activity. Class instincts and recognition of the necessity 
for class struggle are still smothered by a stupefying patriotism or pacifist 
illusions…5 (Emphasis added) 
 
As the statement above clearly shows, the Comintern diagnosed the developmental 
stage of Japanese society as remaining in feudalism. To overcome this backward status, 
the Comintern urged the Japanese Communist Party Oû (hereafter the JCP) 
to carry out thirteen radical movements, including the abolition of the monarchy (the 
emperor system) and granting complete independence for the colonies.6 These slogans 
first tell us that the Comintern maintained an internationalist perspective in discussing 
communist movements in Asia, that is, the JCP must pay attention to the Chinese 
revolution and anti-colonial movements in Korea. On the other hand, underlying the 
Comintern’s series of theses on Asia was the deep-rooted perception that the Asian 
region was portrayed as a backward area in general in its map of the international 
communist movement. In fact, the two-stage revolution theory was reiterated when the 
Comintern analyzed the socialist movement in colonial Korea, and this indicates that 
both Japan and colonial Korea, in spite of the empire-colony relationship between the 
two, were seen by the Comintern as feudal or semi-feudal societies.7 In a 1932 thesis, 
                                                 
5 Jane Degras ed., The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents : Volume II 1923-1928 (London, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p.397. 
6 The thirteen slogans are as follows: 1. Fight against the imperialist war danger. 2. Hands off the Chinese 
revolution. 3. Defense of the Soviet Union. 4. Complete independence for the colonies. 5. Dissolution of 
parliament. 6. Abolition of the monarchy. 7. Universal franchise from the age of eighteen. 8. Freedom of 
assembly of association, of speech, and of the press, etc. 9. Eight-hour work a day. 10. Unemployment 
insurance. 11. Repeal of all anti-labor laws. 12. Confiscation of the land of the Mikado, the landowners, 
the State and the Church. 13. A progressive income tax. Ibid., pp.400-401. 
7 See, “Resolution of the E.C.C.I. on the Korean Question.” This document was adopted by the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern on December 10, 1928 and was issued to the Koreans in December 1928. It 
is commonly known as the “December Theses” in Korea. Suh Dae Sook ed., Documents of Korean 
Communism 1918-1948 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp.243-256.  
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this viewpoint was confirmed once again, as the Comintern defined the Emperor 
system as the “chief pillar of political reaction and of all the survivals of feudalism in 
Japan.”8 
     In discussing the logic of Asiatic society, it is important to understand how 
communist movements in Asia were perceived on a political level. The JCP and Koza-
ha Marxists basically accepted the Comintern’s analysis and focused on abolishing the 
emperor system while at the same time resisting against colonialism and imperialism. 
Apart from the question of how dominant the presence was the Comintern in the 
prewar Japanese Marxist movement, it is evident that these Japanese Marxists followed 
the Comintern’s directions and shared the same conviction; that is, a socialist revolution 
would and should be realized in spite of backward elements in Asia. However, several 
questions still remained to be answered: How should revolutionary potential be 
theorized and turned into an actual social force? More importantly, did the 
developmental stage of Asian society represent the same backward elements? If this 
was the case, how should the empire-colony structure between Japan and its colonies be 
explained? 
    To be sure, radical socialist movements in real politics were focused on the 
necessity of realizing socialist revolution in Asia. But the subtle but essential questions 
that constantly challenged Marxist intellectuals in Asia could no longer be avoided on a 
theoretical level. In a sense, ambiguities and negative images on Asian society were 
first found in Marx’s writings on Asia themselves. Except for an about 10-page long 
writing, in which Marx categorized modes of production before capitalism,9 Marx 
                                                 
8 Jane Degras ed., The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents : Volume III 1929-1943 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), p.196. 
9 See “Forms Which Precede Capitalist Production (Concerning the process which precedes the 
formation of the capital relation or of original accumulation,” in Karl Marx, trans., Martin Nicolaus, 
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critiques of Political Economy (London, New York : Penguin Books in 
association with New Left Review, 1993), pp. 471-479.  
                                                       
 210 
mentioned neither Asiatic mode of production nor Asiatic society in other writings in 
detail.10 In Foundations of the Critiques of Political Economy, Marx presented three 
forms of production and possession that existed before capitalism – the Hebrew, 
Germanic and Asiatic forms. In contrast to the Germanic form, in which individuals 
possess property independent of community, Marx argued, “[T]he individual’s property 
can in fact be realized solely through communal labor.” Therefore, the commune in the 
Orient was conceptualized by Marx as the “presupposition of property in land and 
soil.”11    
    Marx’s early writings on Asiatic society were based on his observation that private 
ownership did not emerge in the Orient. However, Marx did not articulate further on 
how this mode of production in the Orient should be positioned in his general theory of 
historical materialism. These ambiguities in Marx’s own writings caused a number of 
postmortem interpretations of Asiatic society by Western Marxist theoreticians. Of 
many issues in Marx’s writings on the Orient, it was his ambiguous judgment on the 
role of the British Empire in India that provoked fierce debates. Marx put it: 
 
England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated 
only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. 
But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny 
without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever 
may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history 
in bringing about the revolution. (Emphasis added)12  
 
Marx’s statement above left fundamental questions for European Marxists; that is, if the 
backwardness and underdevelopment in Asiatic society was geographically determined, 
how could immanent forces for a revolution be theorized within Asia? Arguably, one 
                                                 
10 Marx’s letter to Engels dated June 14 1953, “Die britische Herrschaft in Indien.” It was published in 
New York Daily Tribune on June 25 1853.  
11 Karl Marx, trans., Martin Nicolaus, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critiques of Political Economy, p. 
475. 
12 Karl Marx, “Die britische Herrschaft in Indien,” in Iqbal Husain trans., Karl Marx on India (New 
Delhi : Tulika Books, 2006), pp.16-17. 
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might not simply criticize Marx for endorsing the role of imperialism in Asia. But 
Marx’s writings on Asia clearly reveal that he himself was heavily influenced by 
Western thinkers such as Adam Smith, James Mill and Friedrich Hegel, all of whom 
developed particularistic and negative views on Asia. This also indicates that although 
Marx’s concept of Asiatic society was primarily concerned with modes of production in 
ancient times, it was inseparable from his backward and stagnant images of 
contemporary Asian society in general.13 
    Since Marx’s writings mainly dealt with ancient modes of production, the first 
phase of the Asiatic mode of production debate among Western theoreticians also 
focused on the period between primitive community and slavery. Liudvig Mad’iar, for 
example, presented an in-depth analysis of Marx’s discussion of Oriental society. 
According to him, the dismantlement of the blood-centered primitive community in 
ancient society must be followed by a slavery system, but this universal path did not 
take place in China.14 Chinese society, Mad’iar maintained, instead sustained a unique 
state-centered land ownership system, which resulted in the absence of private land 
ownership necessary for the advent of the feudalistic mode of production.15 In this way, 
he concluded that Chinese society represented four unique elements distinct from 
feudalism in Europe – (1) absence of private landownership (2) artificial irrigation and 
state-centered huge irrigation projects (3) village communities (4) despotic politics.16 
Echoing Marx’s writings on China and India, Mad’iar observed that these “Asiatic” 
characteristics are essentially related to unique geographical conditions in Asia.   
                                                 
13 Many previous studies on the Asiatic mode of production debate in Japan and China deserve attention 
and some of them include Joshua A Fogel, “The Debates over the Asiatic Mode of Production in Soviet 
Russia, China, and Japan,” American Historical Review 93, no.1 (Feb 1988), pp. 56-79; Timorthy Brook 
ed., The Asiatic Mode of Production in China (New York : M.E. Sharpe, 1989). 
14 Liudvig Madiar, trans., Puroretaria kagaku kenkyūkai chūgoku mondai kenkyūkai, Chūgoku noson 
keizai kenkyū (1), (Tokyo: Kibokaku, 1931). 
15 Ibid., p.10. 
16 Germain Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), pp. 140-145. 
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 Based on these observations, Mad’iar concluded that these structural problems in 
Chinese society inevitably called for external powers to destroy the primitive and state-
centered mode of production and implant private land ownership in China.17 On the 
other hand, Mad’iar acknowledged that Japan experienced the stage of feudalism, if not 
exactly the same as that of Western Europe.18 The Hungarian-born Soviet theoretician 
Eugen Varga presented a similar analysis of the Asiatic mode of production, 
reconfirming that bureaucrats in China did not allow for the formation of private 
ownership, but maintained the state’s monopoly over all arable lands. In this respect, 
both Mad’iar and Varga basically accepted Marx’s highly negative evaluation of the 
development of feudalism in China and India.  
     It is important to emphasize that Soviet Marxists’ early writings on the Asiatic 
mode of production did not equate Japan with either China or India. Perhaps this gave 
Japanese Marxists a certain kind of mental relief that the developmental stage of 
Japanese society was different from that of China or India, even if powerful feudal 
remnants still remained in the Japanese economy. Therefore, this thinking thus led 
Japanese Marxist intellectuals, Koza-ha Marxists in particular, to think that semi-
feudality in contemporary Japan was different from the Chinese version of Asiatic 
society, or that Asiatic society in Japan merely represented a time lag between Europe 
and Japan as a late-comer country. However, this “optimism” did not last long. As I 
discussed, the Comintern reconfirmed that the emperor system was still the major 
obstacle for bourgeois revolution in Japan and called for establishing a socialist front 
against imperialism and the emperor system.  
     Returning to the notion of Asiatic society, I argue that the reconfirmation of the 
two-stage revolution theory in the 1932 Thesis itself come as no surprise to Koza-ha 
                                                 
17 Madiar, Chūgoku noson keizai kenkyū (1), p.10. 
18 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Marxists in Japan. Instead, what captured their attention was the fact that Soviet 
Marxist theoreticians began presenting quite different views on the Asiatic mode of 
production. This trend culminated in 1931, when Soviet Marxist theoreticians gathered 
in Leningrad and modified their earlier notion of the Asiatic mode of production. 
Mikhail Godes, who later had an enormous impact on Japanese Marxist social scientists, 
asserted in his concluding speech at the Leningrad conference that the Asiatic mode of 
production was nothing but a form of feudalism.19 In other words, Godes theorized it 
as a variety of the feudal modes of production rather than placing it outside the realm of 
Marx’s historical materialism. 
     The fact that the Asiatic mode of production was conceptualized as a form of 
feudalism had an impact on Japanese Marxists. Insofar as it belonged to the feudal 
mode of production, it was inseparable from the contemporary problems of the 
Japanese economy, agricultural problems in particular. To put it another way, the notion 
of Asiatic society and the presence of feudal remnants were logically interconnected 
and thus represented contemporaneity both in theory and practice.  
On the other hand, Godes and other Soviet Marxist intellectuals redefined the 
Asiatic mode of production in an attempt to resolve ambiguities inherent in Marx’s 
writings on Asian society.20 Marx’s short essay on India, as I discussed, did not 
sufficiently articulate certain points for Western Marxist theoreticians to scientifically 
evaluate the structure of the Asian economy based on historical materialism. Just like 
Mad’iar and Varga, these Western Marxists recognized unique elements in Asian 
society. However, these findings did not lead them to portray the Asiatic mode of 
production as a particular mode of production that only existed in Asia. Aside from 
                                                 
19 Mikhail Godes, “Ajiateki seisanyoshiki ni kansure tōron no sogetusan,” in trans. and ed., Hayakawa 
Jirō,Ajiatekiseisanyoshikini tsuite (Tokyo: Hakuyōsha, 1933), pp.1-57. 
20 Hoston argues that Soviet Marxists began presenting new interpretations of the Asiatic mode of 
production after Stalin criticized Marx’s misunderstanding of the role of imperialism in Asia. Hoston, 
Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan, pp.144-145. 
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assessing the intellectual depth of Godes’ argument, his new theory indicated that the 
spatial and temporal dimension of the Asiatic mode of production was transformed 
from the Asian village community in China and India to feudalism in Asian society in 
general. However, it is important to note that Godes’ theory never completely removed 
Western Marxists’ negative images of Asia such as stagnation and underdevelopment 
associated with the Asiatic mode of production.  
     While the perception of Asian backwardness persisted in the mindset of Western 
Marxist intellectuals, how did Japanese Koza-ha Marxists theorize Asiatic society? 
Here it is important to note that acknowledging backwardness in Japanese society does 
not necessarily indicate that they thought socialist revolution would be impossible in 
Japan. Irrespective of various slogans for a revolution in Japan put forth by the 
Comintern, these Japanese Marxists were preoccupied with proving that immanent 
revolutionary forces could and should be found in theory. Accomplishing this 
intellectual mission meant that they could proclaim that in spite of feudal remnants in 
Japanese society, backwardness in Japanese society merely represented a time lag 
between Europe and Japan. To this end, these Koza-ha Marxist social scientists had to 
present a far more scientific analysis of Asiatic society and thus theorize revolutionary 
forces in Japan. However, it was their preoccupation with these intellectual challenges 
which widened the conceptual gap between Japan and the rest of Asia. 
In a 1933 article, Aikawa Haruki ]ñ (1909-1953) first problematized the 
particularistic interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production. Vehemently criticizing 
the stagnation-oriented analysis of Mad’iar and Vargas, he defined the Asiatic mode of 
production as “the first hostile form in the process of social production (-=û
**	ô=I
),” which existed between primitive community and ancient 
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slavery.21 According to him, a hostile form in social production was indicative of the 
advent of class society. Therefore, for Aikawa, the ancient slavery system demonstrated 
that class relations first came into play in human relations, and slave-ownership took on 
the form of private property in Marx’s periodization of historical development. 
However, Aikawa paid special attention to Marx’s 1859 article “Foundations of the 
Critiques of Political Economy,” in which Marx himself divided the modes of 
production before capitalism into three categories. Carrying this notion a step further, 
Aikawa attempted to theorize the Asiatic mode of production as an offshoot of slavery. 
At this stage, primitive communities were drastically deconstructed but the conflict 
between slaves and slave owners still took on a communitarian form. To put it another 
way, Aikawa contended that slaves were a “commonly shared private property” in 
ancient Asiatic society, but the system could still be regarded as a form of ancient 
slavery.22 
     Aikawa held that this mode of production existed not only in Asia but in other 
parts of the world. This observation led him to fundamentally reject so-called the 
geographic determinism that was once mentioned by Marx and constantly reemerged in 
the writings of Mad’iar and Varga. He was discontented with Godes’ theory as well. 
Although Godes rejected geographic determinism, Godes’ theory was distinctive from 
that of Aikawa in that Godes understood the Asiatic mode of production as a “unique 
feudal system” that existed only in Asia. Since Aikawa viewed it as a “transitional” 
system between primitive community and ancient slavery, it was neither a unique nor a 
particularistic form of feudalism, nor a mode of production that existed only in Asia.  
     It is not difficult to see Aikawa’s intentionality in his harsh critiques of Godes’ 
analysis of the Asiatic mode of production. By preventing it from being discussed in 
                                                 
21 Aikawa Haruki, “Ajiateki kannenkeitai heno keikō – “ajiateki seisanyoshiki to godesteki kenkai”,” 
Shisō 139 (Dec 1933), p.79. 
22 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
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relation to feudalism, Aikawa aimed to minimize the impacts of the notion of Asiatic 
society on contemporary Japanese society. He was clearly aware that any logical 
connections between the Asiatic mode of production and feudalism in Japan would 
eventually result in extending to Japanese society the images of stagnation and 
underdevelopment that had been applied to China and India. Therefore, it is highly 
understandable that Aikawa strongly emphasized the fact that Marx himself 
acknowledged the presence of feudalism in Japan.23 
To be sure, Aikawa’s viewpoint represented one stream regarding Koza-ha Marxist 
social scientists’ discussion of the Asiatic mode of production. In contrast to him, 
Hayakawa Jirō ]Ó
 (1906-1937), who introduced Godes and the Leningrad 
Conference on the Asia problem to Japanese academic circles, attempted to get through 
this challenge by defining the Asiatic mode of production as a unique “tribute system 
()).”24 He acknowledged that, as Lenin articulated, there must be slavery 
between the primitive and feudal modes of production.25 Central to this observation of 
Japanese history was the problem that the transitory periods between these two modes 
of production were very complex. According to him, primitive communities began to 
collapse as external powers conquered them and this very process of conquering and 
being conquered represented the development of productivity and the emergence of 
class relations. However, this transition, he argued, did not necessarily result in the 
coming of a new mode of production. The development of production power had to 
create class relations and gradually dismantle primitive communities in theory. 
Hayakawa argued, however, that the leaders of the conquered primitive communities 
formed communal relations with the conqueror to sustain their power. This unique 
                                                 
23 Aikawa Haruki, “Ajiateki seisanyoshiki no nihon rekishi e no tekiyōron ni kanrenshite,” 
Rekishikagaku 2, no. 3 (May 1933), p.48.  
24 Hayakawa Jirō, “Iwayuru tōyōshi ni okerudoreishōyushateki kōsei no ketsujōwo ikani setumei 
subekika?” Yuibutsuron kenkyū 30 (Apr 1935), pp. 114-125. 
25 Ibid., p.117. 
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relationship between a new ruler and the conquered community was therefore referred 
to the tribute system.26 Based on these observations, Hayakawa concluded that Asian 
societies entered the stage of feudalism without experiencing slavery. 
     Hayakawa acknowledged that the tribute system would represent stagnation in 
history but he was also adamant that it was “by no means an independent social 
relation.”27 Therefore, for him the lack of a slavery system did not imply that Asian 
society had not taken the universal path of economic development. Three months later, 
he reconfirmed this view in a new article by contending that Asian society experienced 
what he called a “slavery economic system ()=lm)),” not the social 
constitution by slave-owners that appeared in the West.Î¶=y28 
Consequently, Hayakawa argued that Asia had simply “passed by” the slave-ownership 
stage and had taken normal development stages afterwards.  
     Although Aikawa and Hayakawa differed slightly in understanding of the Asiatic 
mode of production, their notion of Asia and the orient are telling in many ways. To 
begin with, both attempted to historicize the Asiatic mode of production. By staging it 
between the primitive community and the feudal system, they aimed to minimize its 
contemporaneity and claimed that it existed for a “short and transitory period of time” 
in ancient history. To be sure, this argument did not completely refute the fact that 
feudal remnants still functioned as a decisive factor in the mode of production in Japan. 
However, one can clearly recognize their intentionality; that is, by historicizing the 
Asiatic mode of production, they aimed to preclude it from being extended to a sort of 
deterministic that no social forces for a revolution could be found in Japan.  
Second and more importantly, the historicization of the Asiatic mode of production 
                                                 
26 Ibid., pp.115-116. 
27 Ibid., p.116. 
28 Hayakawa Jirō, “Doreishoyūshateki kōsei to tōyōteki keitai no mondai,” Yuibutsuron kenkyū 33 (July 
1935), p.75. 
                                                       
 218 
entailed more profound theoretical problems inherent in Koza-ha Marxist social 
scientists’ perception of Asia. As Aikawa boldly argued, “[T]he term “Asia” itself is 
inappropriate in discussing the Asiatic mode of production since this phenomenon 
existed in other parts of the world as well.”29 However, his separation of Asia from the 
perception of particularism paradoxically produced a highly abstract concept of Asia. 
First and foremost, Aikawa and Hayakawa’s strategy of overcoming the limits of the 
Asiatic mode of production focused on demonstrating that Japanese society had 
already passed by the stage of the Asiatic and thus stagnant primitive society. Both 
argued that class struggle took place as primitive communities were dismantled. Such 
an approach was not unexpected since Marx’s concept of Asiatic society, if not 
precisely articulated, was primarily concerned with the commune, that is, primitive 
community in Asia.  
In order to completely surpass conceptual limits inherent in the logic of Asiatic 
society, they had to prove that the Asian village community had disappeared not only in 
Japan but in the rest of Asia, China in particular. However, completely missing in their 
discussion was the issue of how to cope with the problem of the Chinese village 
community. To be sure, they steadfastly extended an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
gaze to the revolutionary movement in China. But supporting the Chinese revolution on 
a political level did not mean that these Japanese Marxists were able to fundamentally 
overcome the specter of the Asian village community, which Marx and Western 
intellectuals pointed out as the essence of stagnation. In this way, the spatial dimension 
of the Asiatic mode of production was reduced to Japanese society, leaving the question 
of village communities unanswered. 
If not taking exactly the same direction, Moritani Katsumi à (1904-
1964) also interpreted the Asiatic mode of production in a similar way to Hayakawa. 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
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While teaching at Kyungsung Imperial University in colonial Korea, Moritani 
intermittently participated in the Asiatic mode of production debate. Differentiating 
blood-centered community from the primitive Asian community, Moritani theorized 
Asiatic society as a mode of production that emerged during the transitory period 
between blood-centered community and agricultural community.30 According to him, 
the latter is characterized by the communal possession of land and he argued that 
peasants in agricultural communities gradually came to possess their own land. 
However, Moritani also tended not to historicize Asiatic society by positioning it in a 
certain stage of historical development. As I will discuss in detail in the following 
chapter, he instead tried to present an alternative view that the origins of the so-called 
oriental culture can be discovered by understanding Asiatic society.31 To be sure, 
Moritani’s somewhat unique standpoint was not unrelated to his position as an assistant 
professor at Kyungsung Imperial University in colonial Korea. 
     Consequently, Japanese Marxist social scientists’ discussion of the Asiatic mode 
of production, in spite of several differences among them, showed a strong tendency to 
reduce it to the context of Japanese history. To put it another way, they made every 
effort to discover objective evidence to reduce Asiatic society to the realm of the Asian 
village community, which, they claimed, had already disappeared in Japan. In this way, 
they attempted to prevent the feudalistic constitution of Japanese society from being 
conceived of as a continuous form of village community where spontaneous forces for 
revolution could hardly be found. This indicates that Japanese Marxists’ supporting 
anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements in Korea and China was not necessarily 
based on their observation that revolutionary potential could be theorized in these 
                                                 
30 Moritani Katsumi, “Iwayuruajiateki seisanyoshikizairon,” Rekishi kagaku 4, no. 10 (1935); also in 
Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron (Tokyo: Rikuseisha, 1937), pp. 69-108. 
31 Moritani Katsumi, “Shakai keizaishi ni okeru tōyō no tokushusei - tōyōteki na monoha naika,” 
Rekishi 7 (1937) ; also in Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron, pp. 127-136. 
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countries, as they believed it could be in Japan.  
How, then, did Marxist social scientists in colonial Korea confront this challenge? 
In the pages that follow, I will examine how Korean Marxist social scientists 
encountered the notion of Asiatic society in the mid 1930s. Here, I pay special attention 
to the problem of colonial consciousness. The absence of colonial Korea in Japanese 
social scientists’ discussion of Asiatic society necessarily created a vacuum space. 
Undoubtedly, it first represents Japanese intellectuals’ colonial consciousness as they 
took it for granted that Korea now naturally belonged to Japan. On the other hand, the 
way Korean Marxists filled this gap revealed their desire to overcome the emperor-
colony structure by theorizing the possibility of universal socialist revolution in colonial 
Korea.   
 
Between Particularity and Universality 
The Asiatic mode of production debate in Japan showed an evident schematic structure 
that placed ancient Japan and contemporary China in two symmetric units. While 
Koza-ha Marxists admitted the presence of feudal remnants in Japanese society, these 
were portrayed as essentially different from the characteristics of the village community 
in the rest of Asia.  
In a 1934 article published in the Korean language journal Shin Dong-A, Roh 
Tong Kyu  (1904 - ?) touched upon this issue for the first time.32 In the article, 
Roh conceptualized the Asiatic mode of production as having nine major 
characteristics.33 However, these characteristics, as Roh himself pointed out, are too 
                                                 
32 Roh Tong Kyu, “Aseajok sangsanyangsik ui daehaya,” Shin Dong-A 4, no. 7 (July 1934), pp.100-107. 
33 The nine categories Roh indicated are as follows: (1) importance of artificial irrigation (2) Asiatic 
despotism (3) absence of private land ownership (4) taxes commensurate with the rent from land (5) 
development of agricultural community (6) inseparable association of agriculture and handicraft industry 
(7) underdevelopment in urban areas (8) fixation of the class system such as Caste in India (9) irreversible 
repetition of stagnation. Ibid., pp.102-103. 
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desultory to determine the constitution of a certain society. Therefore, he maintained 
that the Asiatic mode of production must be discussed from the perspective of two 
questions: (1) Is the Asiatic mode of production an independent mode of production 
opposed to or different from slavery, feudalism and capitalism? (2) Can the so-called 
“Oriental society” that Western capitalism discovered be categorized either feudal or 
Asiatic society?34 
    Roh’s questions hinted that the direction of his theorization would be significantly 
different from that of Japanese Marxist social scientists. To begin with, the temporal 
scope of the Asiatic mode of production in his discussion was not limited to ancient 
time or the slavery system, nor did he avoid discussing it in relation to capitalism in 
contemporary Asian society. To answer these questions, Roh appropriated the strategy 
of “double translation.” He first introduced a series of opinions on Asiatic society 
promulgated by Western scholars, focusing on Hegel, Marx, Mad’iar and Godes. He 
then moved on to Japanese Marxists’ interpretation and critiques of these Western 
thinkers. Repeating Godes’ definition of the mode of production, Roh reconfirmed that 
feudalism occurs when producers create surplus products. However, the whole process 
of creating surplus value in Asian society, Roh argued, was controlled by oppressive 
relationships between landowners and producers. Based on this analysis, he concluded 
that the Asiatic mode of production was not an independent mode of production. 
Although surplus value took the form of taxes, not commodities from land, and 
peasants paid taxes to the government, these relations themselves could not constitute 
an ostensibly different mode of production. For this reason, Roh emphasized that the 
issue of an Asiatic society must be now confined to two remaining characteristics – 
artificial irrigation and centralized despotism.35   
                                                 
34 Ibid., p.103. 
35 Ibid., p. 107. 
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     Central to Roh’s analysis of Asiatic society was his intention to differentiate the 
mode of production from the political structure. By emphasizing that surplus value was 
created in the agricultural sector, he tried to demonstrate that Asian society had 
experienced economic development. Therefore, the uniqueness of Asiatic society, for 
him, was not related to the mode of production itself, but understood as the question of 
why and how the state emerged as a dominant political unit. However, it was the 
relationship between village community and the state that Western Marxist 
theoreticians portrayed as Asiatic, since neither private ownership nor autonomous 
political subjects could be found in this structure. As he himself acknowledged, Roh 
was actually heavily influenced by Hayakawa Jirō, who positioned the Asiatic mode of 
production between primitive community and slavery.36 Hayakawa contended that 
class struggle and private ownership occurred as primitive communities were 
dismantled. However, what is important is the fact that Hayakawa’s argument focused 
on Japan, while it was widely accepted that the structure of Korean agriculture was 
much closer to that of China.37 To put it another way, Roh’s views were on shaky 
ground, since he simply repeated Japanese Koza-ha Marxists’ discussion of Asiatic 
society without explaining why the village community continued to exist in Korean 
agriculture.  
Therefore, the only way for Korean intellectuals to overcome the question of the 
village community was to demonstrate that Korean society had experienced the typical 
feudalistic mode of production. It was the 1933 work of Paik Nam Un  (1984-
1979), Chōsen shakai keizaishi -lm (The Social and Economic History 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 For example, Moritani Katsumi published several articles in 1933 and 1934 and argued that certain 
characteristics such as irrigation and state land ownership were also found in Korean agriculture. Moritani 
Katsumi, “Chōsen shakai to shizen kankyō (1),” Tōa 7, no. 12 (Dec, 1934); Moritani Katsumi, “Kyūrai no 
chōsen nogyoshakai ni tssuite no kenkyū no tameni,” in Keijōteikokudaigaku hōbungakkai ed., Chōsen 
shakai keizai shi kenkyū (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1933), pp. 397-482. 
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of Chosun), that directly touched upon this issue.38 Trained at Tokyo University of 
Commerce (present-day Hitotsubashi University), where he learned economics from 
two leading Japanese social scientists, Fukuda Tokuzō  (1974-1930) and 
Takata Yasuma   (1883-1972), Paik from the beginning centered his 
academic concern on the question of scientifically explaining Korean history through 
historical materialism.39 Fukuda had established himself as a leader in social policy 
studies in the early 1920s and Takata, as I discussed in the previous chapter, was boldly 
criticizing Marxism in the 1920s. Therefore, Paik absorbed Marxism through his 
acquaintance with other Marxist intellectuals, and his exposure to Marxist social 
sciences deepened his academic interest in establishing Korean studies based on 
Marxism.40 
     Paik was well aware that Japanese Marxist social scientists paid little attention to 
colonial Korea in their discussion of the Asiatic mode of production. In fact, bourgeois 
and even Marxist social scientists had already published a series of writings on Korea 
that described Korean society as a typical underdeveloped colonial country. These early 
works had shaped basic but highly problematic perceptions of Korea. Surprisingly, a 
1925 article of Fukuda Tokuz, Paik’s mentor at Kyoto Imperial University, was among 
them. Based on his twenty-day stay in Korea in 1902, Fukuda boldly concluded that 
Korea was a stagnant society that had not even undergone the stage of feudalism.41 
Although Fukuda was not an orthodox Marxist economist, his gaze at Korea was 
strikingly compatible with the conventional Asian stagnation theory, as best described 
                                                 
38 Paik Nam Un, Chōsen shakai keizaishi (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1933). 
39 For a detailed analysis of Paik’s study in Japan, see Pang Ki-Jung, Hanguk kun-hyondae sasangsa 
yongu : 1930, 40-yondae Paik Nam-un ui hangmun kwa chongchi kyongje sasang (Seoul: Yoksa 
Pipyongsa, 1993), pp.29-64. As I have already discussed in Chapter 3, Takata studied German Neo-
Kantianism and also taught economics at Tokyo University of Commerce before he moved to Kyoto 
Imperial University. 
40 Paik, Chōsen shakai keizaishi, pp.55-56. 
41 Fukuda Tokuzō’s article, entitled “Kankoku no keizai soshiki to keizai tani,” was published in 
Keizaigaku kenkyū in 1925. 
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by Soviet Marxists such as Mad’iar. Together with natural scientific studies of Korean 
races such as Torii Ryūzō’s !6" ethnographic studies, Fukuda’s social scientific 
study played an important role in establishing particularism-oriented Korean studies. 
     At the heart of Paik’s project of rewriting Korean history, therefore, was his harsh 
critiques of the “particularism” that was rampant in Korean studies in 1930s Japan. In 
The Social and Economic History of Chosen, he clearly took a new direction in the 
study of the economic history of Korea: 
 
Studies of Korean history () must set up as their mission empirically 
and practically exploring the processes of its historical and social 
development in the past, and theorizing its movements in practice. This is 
possible only by analyzing class relations in the life of Korean people and 
historical changes in social systems, and universally abstracting its formality 
based on historical dialectics (=#$spwhich is the universal rule of 
movements in human society. In so doing, studies of Korean history as part of 
the whole history of human beings can examine the processes of the influx 
and development of modern capitalism on a world-historical 
scale.42ÎEmphasis added) 
 
To be sure, Paik was conscious that the universal rule of economic development in 
historical materialism had been applied differently to each society. Differences in 
economic development between advanced capitalist countries such as Japan and Korea 
were the most important challenge Paik was facing. He vehemently rejected to the 
notion that the particular temporality of a certain society would represent its historical 
particularism in relation to universal societies. Paik thus paid special attention to 
theoretically differentiating particularity in the stages of historical development from 
particularism in general: 
 
The only particularity in historical science is the particularity in the stage of 
the historical development of a society… The whole process of historical 
development in Chosun, given that there are slight differences in 
geographical conditions, […] is not something to be distinguished from the 
                                                 
42 Paik Nam Un, Chōsen shakai keizaishi, p.5. 
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rule of historical development in other cultural nations, but something that 
Chosun has experienced in a very similar way to other nations through the 
one-dimensional rule of world history. The slow tempo in Chosun’s 
developmental process and the light and shade in its culture are by no means 
essential particular.43 (Emphasis added)  
 
As he reiterated, “Blacks are blacks, but they become slaves only under certain 
conditions.”44 For him, particularity at a certain point of historical time was defined as 
a mere reflection of certain socio-economic conditions, and he was opposed to the idea 
that the amalgam of particularities represents particularism as a whole. Paik attempted 
to conceptualize the Asiatic mode of production as particular elements that occurred in 
the general process of development in Asian society.  
    To be sure, the first and foremost task in his rewriting of Korean history was to 
theorize the presence of the slavery mode of production, given that many Soviet 
Marxist theoreticians pointed out the absence of slavery as intrinsic to the Asiatic mode 
of production. As production power developed, he contended, primitive communities 
based on blood relations were dismantled and experienced class divisions, which 
generated slavery in all three kingdoms in ancient Korea.45 This explanation, however, 
faced logical inconsistencies. Most of all, Paik could not explain why the advent of 
slavery did not come with the dismantlement of the village community, and why the 
predominant state land ownership was established in ancient Korea.46 If surplus value 
in the slavery and feudalistic modes of production in Korea was monopolized by the 
state in the form of land taxes, these modes of production could not be regarded as a 
typical feudal system and therefore would not be transformed into a capitalist economy 
based on private ownership. 
    For this reason, central to Paik’s writings on Korean history was the question of 
                                                 
43 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., pp.196-207, 262-267& 344-350. 
46 Ibid., p.207. 
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how to theorize the village community as a driving force for historical development. 
This problem constantly appeared in his other writings. In a 1937 work, Chōsen hōken 
shakai keizai shi %½-lm (The Feudal Socio-Economic History of 
Chosun), which he entitled as the second volume of The Social and Economic History 
of Chosun, Paik admitted that the basic unit of agricultural production in the feudal 
system of the Koryo Dynasty & (918-1392) was the village community (¿'O
() and it was directly controlled by the state.47  
     Ironically, the village community was described by him as a space where 
peasants cultivated land and distributed products on a communal basis, which reminds 
us of Marx’s categorization of Asiatic society. Since these peasants were still 
powerfully bound to the power of the state and the state actually monopolized land, the 
feudalistic mode of production based on land ownership did not occur in the village 
community. Paik strove to answer this seemingly impossible question by 
conceptualizing the land taxes peasants paid to the state as similar to taxes that peasants 
paid to landlords in the typical feudal relations of production.48 However, this 
mechanical analogy between the Asian village community and the European model of 
feudalism could not answer the question of why the village community continued to 
exist, even if Korean society, as Paik contended, underwent the universal path of 
economic development. 
 
The Village Community in Tatters  
Korean Marxist intellectuals’ writings in the mid 1930s clearly show that the focal issue 
in the Asiatic mode of production was the village community. As I have discussed, 
Japanese Marxist intellectuals tried to avoid this question by contending that the village 
                                                 
47 Paik Nam Un, Chōsen hōken shakai keizaishi (1) (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1937), pp.139-142. 
48 Ibid. 
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community disappeared as the feudal mode of production was established in Japan. But 
this seemingly convenient explanation further widened the gap between Japan and the 
rest of Asia. Insofar as the village community powerfully remained as a significant 
mode of production in Asian society, it would constantly reproduce the notion of Asiatic 
society as stagnant and underdeveloped. However, Koza-ha Marxist social scientists’ 
encounter with the Asiatic mode of production showed their strong Japan-centeredness 
in their efforts to liberate Japan from the specters of the stagnant village community 
lacking revolutionary potential. Many Koza-ha Marxists simply avoided analyzing the 
nature of the Asian village community, and some intellectuals inherited and reproduced 
the negative images of the Asian community once promulgated by Western intellectuals. 
In this way, the Japanese interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production never played 
a significant role in removing particularism imposed on the Asian village community. 
     It was only Hani Goro ()È
 (1901-1983), a Koza-ha Marxist historian, 
who strove to extract revolutionary potential from the peasant masses in the Asian 
village community Contributing four articles to the Journal of History (*+) 
entitled “The Formation of Capitalism in the Orient (,-./N0#$*I
),” Hani directly confronted the question of the Asian village community and 
capitalism.49 Spatially speaking, Hani’s discussion included China, India and Japan 
from the beginning. He first delineated his observation that the Orient, intentionally or 
unintentionally, participated in the stream of the world economy, which was 
characterized by colonialism and capitalism. For him, India’s status as a colony, China’s 
status as a semi-colony, and finally the Meiji Restoration in Japan all demonstrated that 
the Orient is also part of the world economy.50 However, he also pointed out that Asia’s 
entrance into the world economy was actually forced by external powers. Summarizing 
                                                 
49 The four articles appeared in Shigaku zasshi no. 2, no. 3, no. 6 and no. 8 (all in 1932); Hani Goro, Meiji 
ishinshi kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), pp.13-150. 
50 Hani, Meiji ishinshi kenkyū, p.21. 
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the formation of the world economy as a transition from an agricultural and handicraft- 
centered economy to a highly commercialized one, Hani viewed the incapability of 
Asia’s responding to this grand transformation as the core problem inherent in the 
Asiatic mode of production. 
The village community in Asia, that is, an “Oriental-historical representation of the 
world-historical rule (WX=s*,=10)” to borrow Hani’s own words,51 
had not been extinguished and in fact still determined the mode of production in the 
Orient. However, Hani did not approach the issue of underdevelopment or 
backwardness in Asia in the simple context of production power. Nor did he 
oversimplify the issue by arguing that China, India and Japan experienced the same 
paths of economic development. Instead, he contended that in spite of structural 
problems in the village community, Asian countries had improved production power to 
a considerable degree.52 
Therefore, a close reading of Hani’s works tells us that his main concern was not 
stagnation or backwardness associated with productivity itself, but the question of why 
development in productivity did not result in the coming of new modes of production. 
He observed that under the state’s monopoly over land ownership, surplus value was 
not transformed into commercial capital but was absorbed predominantly by 
bureaucrats as land taxes. This system essentially precluded the capitalistic mode of 
production from taking place in urban areas. Surplus labor in the village community 
was not absorbed by industrial and commercial sectors in the city either, which 
worsened the problem of overpopulation in agriculture and impoverished peasants.53 
Hani believed that this situation could also explain the underdevelopment of 
commercial capital and urban areas in China. Thus, the Asiatic mode of production in 
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China was redefined by him as the question of how this “vicious circle” should be 
destroyed. However, he was opposed to the idea that the arrival of external powers 
might solve this problem:  
 
Under the despotic ruling system in China, where the feudal relationships of 
production and possession are centered on the state level, the deconstruction 
of feudal relationships trapped in this circulation in Chinese society must lead 
to a complete emergence of the new relationship of production. Therefore, it 
is to destroy feudal forms in the class relations of production by realizing the 
capitalistic relations of production… However, the fact that China actually 
has been colonized and is forced to become a supplier of commodities and 
cheap labor power for foreign capital undoubtedly makes much more 
complex the problem of searching for liberation through collapsing the old 
relations of production and possession.54  
  
Hani did not believe that the influx of imperialism to underdeveloped countries would 
stimulate the collapse of feudal relations, as Marx had once argued regarding the impact 
of British imperialism on India. He instead emphasized that colonial powers had 
exploited Chinese peasants and as a result, the vicious circle deeply distressed them. 
Paradoxical as it may sound, this acute and critical analysis of Western imperialism and 
foreign capital in Asian society marked a point of departure where Hani saw the peasant 
masses as his last resort for bourgeois democratic revolution in Asia. Irrespective of the 
presence of the village community saturated with stagnation and underdevelopment, 
Hani asserted, the capitalist economy in the Orient is a historical necessity (=2
3).55 He continued to argue that on behalf of the immature bourgeois class, the 
Chinese peasant masses started organizing a revolutionary force against both 
colonialism and imperialism.56  
However, Hani’s projection of bourgeois revolution into the hands of the Chinese 
peasants did nothing but reveal the inconsistencies of his argument. Since these 
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peasants were never exposed to the new modes of production, only to be marginalized 
within overpopulated village communities, it was simply impossible to expect these 
peasant masses to become revolutionary subjects with political and class awareness. 
Roughly speaking, Hani imposed his abstract belief in the progress of oriental society 
on the Asian peasants, who could not realize bourgeois revolution according to Marx’s 
historical and dialectic materialism. Therefore, Hani’ writings foreshadowed Koza-ha 
Marxists social scientists’ fractured understanding of the village community in Asia.  
In addition to pessimistic prospects for the village community in the rest of Asia, 
Japanese Marxist social scientists gradually modified their earlier analysis of Japanese 
capitalism and began rewriting it based on Marx’s 5-stage development theory. For 
example, in a 1928 article entitled “The History of the Meiji Restoration (4åe
),” Koza-ha Marxist Hattori Shisō 5kÂ« (1901-1956) argued that the Meiji 
Restoration was neither a social nor a bourgeois revolution but merely a transfer of 
political power from feudal lords to elite groups located in Satsuma and Choshu.57 
According to him, the Japanese economy at the end of the Tokugawa period was still 
handicraft-industry-centered. Therefore, he concluded that the entrance of the Japanese 
economy into world capitalism since the arrival of Perry was not a bourgeois revolution 
in a real sense, but the result of top-down power reconstruction triggered by external 
powers.58 
     However, Hattori’s emphasis on external powers was heavily criticized by both 
Rono-ha and other Koza-ha Marxists for overlooking immanent economic development 
that came to fruition during the Tokugawa period. As the Asiatic mode of production 
debate drew attention from Japanese Marxists, Hattori began modifying his earlier 
analysis of the Meiji Restoration. In an article entitled “Revolution and Anti-Revolution 
                                                 
57 Hattori Shisō, “Meiji ishinshi,” Hattori shisō zenshū 3 (Tokyo: Fukumura shuppan, 1973), pp.11-174.   
58 Ibid.  
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of the Meiji Restoration,” contributed to Lectures on the Development History of 
Japanese Capitalism,59 he argued that the manufacturing industry was already on the 
rise in late Tokugawa Japan, and accordingly conceptualized this as “proto-capitalism” 
(60#$).60  
More important than emphasizing immanent forces in the Japanese economy was 
the way Koza-ha Marxists approached the village community in Japan. Hirano 
Yoshitarō’s H7$
(1897-1980) seminal book, The Constitution of Japanese 
Capitalist Society (0#$-*xy), clearly demonstrated this tendency. In 
this work, Hirano, a leading Koza-ha Marxist, emphasized that the Japanese peasants 
were still under the condition of what he called “half-slavery.” According to him, the 
oppressive Meiji government and landlords emerged as exploitative powers and as a 
result, most peasants in Japan cultivated land on a small scale and became “fractured 
and isolated.”61 However, as Nagaoka Shinkichi has correctly argued, Hirano’s 
description of the Japanese peasants as fractured and isolated shaped conspicuously 
different images of Japanese agriculture in relation to other Asian countries, China in 
particular. To put it another way, the dispersion and isolation of the Japanese peasants 
was portrayed by Hirano as the absence of the communal labor that was an essential 
element in the Chinese village community. Precisely for this reason, the main problem 
of Japanese agriculture was now summarized by him not as that of the static village 
community but as the immaturity of the capitalistic mode of production.62 Therefore, 
Hirano’s critiques of Japanese agriculture reconfirmed the general views of Koza-ha 
                                                 
59 Hattori Shisō, “Meiji ishin no kakumei to han kakumei,” in Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi koza vol.1 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1933), also in Hattori shisō zenshū 3 (Tokyo: Fukumura shuppan, 1973), pp. 
177-256. 
60 However, Hattori conceptualized the term “proto-capitalism” as provisional, without providing an in-
depth analysis of it. Hattori shisō zenshū 3, p.211. 
61 Hirano Yoshitarō, Nihon shihonshugi shakai no kikō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1934), p. 293.  
62 Nagaoka Shinkichi, “Kōzaha riron no denkai to ajia ninshiki – hirano yoshitarō no baai,” Keizaigaku 
kenkyū 34, no.4 (Mar 1985), p.460. 
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Marxists toward the village community; that is, Japan already passed through the stage 
of the village community, and the capitalistic mode of production would soon occur as 
these “isolated” but liberated-from-village-community peasants absorbed modern 
technologies and nurtured political awareness.  
    Sooner or later, the absence of the logic of community in their socialism faced 
another fundamental challenge. Beginning in 1935, a number of Japanese Marxists 
dismissed Marxism and surrendered to Japanese imperialism. This political 
phenomenon, which occurred in the mid and late 1930s, is telling in many ways in 
understanding these converted Marxists’ involvement in imperial discourses. Their 
conversion meant that anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism on a political level, 
perhaps the only forward-looking gaze they extended toward China and Korea, were 
removed from their political point of view. Not surprisingly, their space of radical 
politics was rapidly replaced by the notion of a Japan-centered East Asian order in the 
name of civilizing mission and modernization. However, they did not change their 
earlier observation that the village community in the rest of Asia did not have any 
immanent forces for capitalistic development.  
     Beginning in the late 1930s, a number of discourses on the East Asian 
community emerged and rapidly gained currency among Japanese social scientists. As I 
discussed in previous chapters, it was non-Marxist bourgeois social scientists such as 
Rōyama Masamichi and Kada Tetsuji who came to the forefront in developing the logic 
of cooperative community in Asia. To be sure, their theories of community were 
completely different from the notion of the village community. They attempted to create 
a new form of subjectivity that could serve the good of an East Asian community and at 
the same time maintain an individual’s own identity in his or her local community. 
Central to their intellectual project was the question of how this new form of 
subjectivity should be theorized. This was also inseparable from the realistic issue of 
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the economic gap between metropole and colony and between rural and urban areas. 
How, then, did these converted Marxists respond to this new stream of East Asian 
discourses? If they did not challenge the observation that neither subjectivity nor 
political awareness can be extracted from the village community, how could they 
theorize a new form of subjectivity that must go beyond the border of these static 
village communities? In Chapter 6, I will deal with these issues by exploring two 
converted Koza-ha Marxists’ discourses on the East Asian community. 
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Chapter 6 
Colonial Social Science: 
East Asian Community in Hirano Yoshitarō and Moritani Katsumi 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Marxist social scientists in early and mid 
1930s Japan and Korea encountered the intellectual challenge of the Asiatic Mode of 
Production. Their responses to it varied substantially and provided important issues not 
to be overlooked in understanding their wartime Asian discourses. Koza-ha Marxist 
social scientists attempted to demonstrate that the nature of the Japanese economy, in 
spite of the semi-feudal remnants within it, was essentially different from that of other 
Asian societies, which were based on the village community. In this process, they could 
not overcome the initial question Marx and Western Marxist theoreticians posed: Why 
did the village community continue to exist as the most dominant social system, even if 
improvements in productivity were achieved? This question was inseparable from the 
prospect of socialist revolution in Asia. Insofar as peasants are bound to a village 
community and the state dominates the entire agricultural sectors, how could peasants 
acquire subjective political awareness?  
However, their discussion of the Asiatic mode of production did not become more 
sophisticated after the mid 1930s. As the domestic political atmosphere became 
increasingly aggravated beginning at that time, a number of Japanese Marxists were 
arrested and forced to disavow Marxism.1 This ideological turnaround, often called 
tenkō, brought profound changes to the intellectual topography of wartime Asian 
discourses. Bourgeois social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei 
                                                 
1 For an excellent summary of tenkō, see Nagaoka Shinkichi, Nihon shihonshugi ronsō no gunzō (Tokyo: 
Mineruba shobo, 1984). 
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Masamichi had grappled with the question of the East Asian community before the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In contrast to them, Marxist intellectuals 
encountered the spread of Asian discourses, while their mainstream approach to Asia 
was still a clearly divisionist perspective; that is, Japan had developed a substantially 
different mode of production in comparison to the village community in China and 
Korea..  
     In this chapter, I examine the Asian discourses of two former wartime Koza-ha 
Marxists, Hirano Yoshitarō H7$
(1897-1980) and Moritami Katsumi à
 (1904-1964). Invariably, wartime Asian discourses, in spite of their different 
ideological orientations, all emphasized the notion of community as a driving force to 
bind Asian people together. This gave rise to an interesting question: How did Japanese 
Marxists, who did not overcome the specters of stagnation and backwardness in the 
Asian village community, create a new logic of an East Asian community? The notion 
of cooperative community necessitated the intellectual task of theorizing a type of 
subjectivity which would encompass both regional identity such as East Asian 
nationalism and local identities shaped through indigenous cultures, languages and 
religions. Could converted Japanese Marxist social scientists envision this new kind of 
subjectivity by reinterpreting the village community, where they could not find any 
political dynamics over the course of the Asiatic mode of debate? 
In dealing with these questions, Hirano and Moritani provide two different 
directions that are inseparable from their previous writings on Asia. By analyzing these 
two former Marxist intellectuals, I will first investigate how they portrayed Asian 
society and theorized it in the project of restructuring the empire-colony structure. In 
this process, I will show the limits of their wartime Asian discourse, focusing on the 
colonial consciousness inherent in their logic of subjectivity formation in the empire. 
By looking at how pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals responded to their voices, I will 
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also highlight the tension between colonial and imperial intellectuals in envisioning a 
new form of subjectivity in an East Asian empire.    
 
Specters of Scientific China Studies : Hirano Yoshitarō and Karl Wittfogel 
Hirano Yoshitarō officially committed “tenkō” B (conversion) after he was arrested 
in 1936, and his tenkō has been often considered a turning point in his scholarship on 
Asia. Although the political environment surrounding him played an important role in 
his later commitment to Japanese imperialism, it is also important not to overlook 
theoretical issues inherent in his writings on Asia. As I discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Chinese village community was first portrayed by Hirano as a unique characteristic 
of Asiatic society. But he did not simply endorse the colonial prescription by some 
Western Marxist theoreticians that external impacts on Asia, China and India in 
particular, would transform the Asiatic mode of production into a modern one. In this 
respect, an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist standpoint was predominant in Hirano’s 
early scholarship on Japan and Asia.  
    However, what is more important was how Hirano evaluated the political 
dynamics inherent in the Chinese village community. As many have argued, the Koza-
ha Marxists’ encounter with the so-called China studies was traceable to their interest in 
the 1911 Nationalist Revolution in China.2 Witnessing the collapse of the Qing dynasty, 
they anticipated that civil society would come into being in China before long. But this 
change in the political superstructure was not followed by changes in the mode of 
production from a Marxist perspective.  
     Between the anti-imperialist political ideal in Marxism and the impossibility of 
                                                 
2 For example, Narita Ryōji argues in his recent article that Japanese Marxists’ study of China in the 
1920s and early 1930s was closely connected to their interest in the Nationalist revolution in China. See 
Narita Ryōji, “Hirano yoshitarō to murukusu shakaikagaku no ajia shakai ron,” Ishii Tomoaki, Kobayashi 
Hideo and Yonetani Masafumi eds., 1930 nendai no ajia shakairon – tōa kyodotairon wo chūshin to suru 
gensetsukukan no shosho (Tokyo: Shakaihyōronsha, 2010), pp. 215-222.   
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drawing political forces from Asian village communities to realize an anti-imperialist 
revolution, the village community gradually lost the attention of Japanese Marxist 
social scientists, including Hirano. To be sure, intellectuals like Hani Goro strove to 
find political potentials from Asian peasant masses. However, his manifesto did not 
include a scientific analysis of how peasants could be reborn as subjects with political 
awareness. In this way, the Asiatic mode of production debate terminated without 
making theoretical progress toward radical revolution in the rest of Asia. On the other 
hand, Koza-ha Japanese Marxists gradually emphasized the transition of the Japanese 
economy from semi-feudalism to what might be called proto-capitalism, although 
feudal remnants were still a major obstacle to pure bourgeois revolution. Consequently, 
the Asiatic mode of production debate in mid 1930s Japan could not remove the 
pessimistic images of the Asian village community first promulgated by Marx and 
reproduced by Western intellectuals. Rather, through the efforts of Japanese Marxist 
intellectuals, it created an epistemology to separate Japan from the rest of Asia. 
    In an article published in 1934, two years before his conversion, Hirano developed 
a socio-economic analysis of Chinese society, referring to Adam Smith’s discussion of 
China. Here, Hirano made it clear that the Asiatic mode of production had bound 
Chinese peasants in an oppressive landlord-peasant relationship and as a result 
prevented civil society from emerging in China.3 Hirano’s gaze toward the Chinese 
village community was not optimistic as he put forth civil society as the sole path for 
bourgeois democratic revolution. But this did not simply mean that he endorsed the 
necessity of external intervention in China by Western powers.  
Hirano aimed to approach China from a different perspective, and accordingly 
called for methodological transformations in China studies. In a 1934 article entitled 
                                                 
3 Hirano Yoshitarō, “Kaitai wo maeni seru kyūshina no keizai, shakai – adamu smisu no shinaron,” 
Chūōkōron 49, no.1 (Jan 1934), pp.15-36. 
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“Two Ways in China Studies,” he opened fire against the so-called mainstream China 
studies in the West. Until the 1920s, Hirano asserted, Western intellectuals had been 
trapped in the perception that feudalism in China would be dismantled by external 
impacts, that is, western imperialism.4 Instead of such an ideology-laden approach, 
what he suggested was a scientific and objective interpretation of Chinese history and 
culture. It was under these circumstances that Hirano encountered the German 
economic historian Karl Wittfogel. In fact, much of Hirano’s thesis of methodological 
transformation in this article was based on Wittfogel’s “scientific” and “empirical” 
research on China. Beginning with the co-translation of Wittfogel’s seminal two-
volume work with Moritani Katsumi, Kaitai katei ni aru Shina no keizai to shakai 8
(Ó9N:;*lmj- (Chinese Economy and Society in the Process of 
Dismantlement, hereafter Shina no keizai to shakai), in 1934,5 Hirano played a central 
role in introducing Karl Wittfogel to Japanese intellectual circles, and as a result Karl 
Wittfogel’s scholarship formed a powerful thread of China studies in the late 1930s.6 
     To critically discuss Hirano’s notion of objective and scientific China studies, it is 
necessary to trace Wittfogel’s scholarship on China. Instead of repeating Marx’s 
                                                 
4 Hirano Yoshitarō, “Shina kenkyū ni taisuru hutatsu no michi,” Yuibuturon kenkyū 20 (June 1934), pp. 5-
27. 
5 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō, Kaitai katei ni aru shina no keizai to shakai (Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft Chinas; Versuch der wissenschaftlichen Analyse einer grossen asiatischen Agrargesellschaft, 
1931) (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1934), 2 Vols.  
6 Wittfogel’s works started to appear in Japanese language in 1929. Major publications of his works in the 
1930s as follows: Karl Wittfogel, trans., Eiichi Tsutsui, Son issen to shina kakumei (Tokyo: Nagata shoten, 
1929); Karl Wittfogel, trans., Sakada Yoshiochō, “Marukusushigi ni okeru futotekikeikino igi,” Shisō 103 
(Dec. 1930), pp.110-123; Hermann Duncker, Alfons Goldschmidt,  Karl August Wittfogel eds., trans., 
Buhei Kitajima, Marukusu shugi rōdōsha kyōtei: Kokusai rōdōsha undōshi (Marxistische Arbeiter 
Schulung. Geschichte der Internationalen Arbeiterbewegung) (Tokyo: Chugai shobo, 1931), 2 Vols; Karl 
Wittfogel, trans., Kawanishi Seikan, Chirigaku hihan (Kyoto: Yukosha, 1933); Karl Wittfogel, trans., 
Mizuno Chikara, Nijima Shigeru, Kume Makoto, Jinrui shakai hattatsushi gaiyō (Vom Urkommunismus 
bis zur proletarischen Revolution) (Tokyo: Ōhata shoten, 1934); Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō, 
Kaitai katei ni aru Shina no keizai to shakai (Tokyo: Chuō kōronsha, 1934); Karl Wittfogel, trans., Nijima 
Shigeru, Hirano Yoshitarō, Shimin shakaishi (Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ) (Tokyo: 
Sōbunkaku, 1935), 2 Vols; Karl Wittfogel, trans., Tōa keizai chōsakyōku, Shina keizai hatten no kiso to 
dankai (Tokyo: Tōkeizaichōsakyōku, 1935); Karl Wittfogel, trans., Yorokawa Jirō, Shina keizaishi 
kenkyū(Tokyo: Sōbunkaku, 1935); Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō and Usami Seijirō, Shina 
shakai no kagakuteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1939). 
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concept of Asiatic society, Wittfogel’s early writings were more concerned with 
showing his peculiar understanding of dialectic materialism in relation to space and 
geography. Wittfogel maintained that dialectic materialism was predicated on its notion 
of geography being completely separated from the human being’s power of social 
production.7 He went on to contend that neither nature nor geography nor human 
beings’ acquired production power normatively explained the stages of certain 
economies.8 It appears that Wittfogel’s perspective was not that much different from 
Marx’s concept of nature, but Wittfogel’s view was that Marx’s notion of nature 
focused more on how nature determined human social behavior than on how it provides 
different possibilities for revolution.9 For this reason, Wittfogel never denied the 
validity of nature’s impacts on human activity, but he also tried to avoid a somewhat 
hasty conclusion that natural restrictions would eventually give reasons for the different 
stages of economies, as Marx conceptualized in his theory of the Asiatic Mode of 
Production. 
     In a 1933 book, A Critique of Geography ( /<=), Wittfogel further 
elaborated on his spatial theory.10 Here, Wittfogel’s critiques of the existing spatial 
theories targeted Marx’s concept of nature as well as political geography, the latter of 
which rapidly gained currency in post-World War I Europe. Wittfogel’s concept of 
nature was premised on the perception that the world is not divided into universal 
spaces and particular spaces, as Marx’s concept of geography put forth. Criticizing Karl 
Haushofer’s geopolitical analysis of Asian society, Wittfogel argued that geopolitics 
does not provide a scientific analysis for why peasants in China, India and Japan 
                                                 
7 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Sakada Yoshiocho, “Marukusushugini okeru futotekikeikino igi (fudoseijigaku, 
chiritekiyuibuturonn narabini marukusushugi),” Shisō 103 (Dec 1930), pp. 110-123. 
8 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
9 Ibid., p. 118. 
10 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Kawanishi Seikan, Chirigaku hihan (The original German title is Geopolitik, 
Geographischer Materialismus und Marxismus) (Kyoto : Yūkōsha, 1933). 
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developed particular socio-economic activities.11 In other words, for Wittfogel the 
issue of particularity in Asia was not a problem that should be explained according to 
geographical characteristics, but more in terms of how people in Asian had shown 
certain social, economic and political activities under these geographical characteristics. 
     Through these theoretical speculations, Wittfogel formulated his notion of China 
studies. As his critiques of the existing epistemology of China well suggest, it seems 
evident that he strove not to repeat the conventional interpretations of Asiatic society 
that had emphasized stagnation in Asia as geographically determined. This also 
explains why Wittfogel painstakingly put forth the necessity of scientific and objective 
studies of China. Based on these observations, Wittfogel defined a scientific attitude 
toward China as follows: 
 
A Scientific attitude was, in terms of its fundamental configuration, based on 
the conviction that although Chinese civilization exists along with a variety of 
Western civilizations, the former is the same as the latter to some extent. For 
this reason, many social scientists think that categories that apply to the 
development of Western civilization can also be applicable to Chinese studies. 
The validity of this notion is obvious; that is, it enabled the introduction of 
scientific methods [to Chinese studies]. Since various characteristics of 
agricultural society are similar, a certain kind of mechanical identification is 
applied and this produces objective truth to some degree. But this 
accomplishment does not transcend this level. A number of theoretical and 
practical misunderstandings and failures take place, and presumably these 
problems are, most of all, due to the lack of consciousness on what kind of 
society China is in its basic sense.12 (emphasis added) 
 
As the statement above indicates, Wittfogel’s concept of both nature and China as a 
scientific object was not premised on the assumption that the West represents the 
universal in social scientific research and the East the particular. Rather, for Wittfogel, 
                                                 
11 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
12 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō, Shina shakai no kagakuteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
1939), p. 57. This book was a compilation of Wittfogel’s writings on China in the late 1930s. The first 
chapter of this book, which contains the core part of Wittfogel’s methodology on China studies, was the 
translation of Wittfogel’s 1938 report, “New Light on Chinese Society, An investigation of China’s Socio-
economic Structure,” published by the International Secretarist, Institute of Pacific Relations. 
                                                       
 241 
particulars of each society, Asian society in particular, were scientific variables that 
enabled social scientists to consider in retrospect the limits of the universality of the 
social scientific method. How, then, did Wittfogel interpret Chinese society? In Shina 
no keizai to shakai, Wittfogel concretized his famous theory of hydraulic society. 
Agriculture in China, Wittfogel argued, had been greatly influenced by water resources. 
Since floods and drought frequently take place in China, this geographical condition 
necessitated massive state-sponsored irrigation projects.13 Thus explained Wittfogel, 
the state directly intervened in the process of agricultural production, which was 
characterized by the state’s dominant ownership of arable lands.  
     This observation by Wittfogel led him to conclude that these geographical and 
structural conditions were not conducive to the Western form of a landlord-peasant 
relationship. Instead, the peasants were directly bound to the state and this unique 
production relationship lasted until external powers arrived in China.14 This thesis later 
became the theoretical grounds for Wittfogel’s seminal book, Oriental Despotism, 
published in 1957. However, unlike other Western Marxist theoreticians, Wittfogel 
never carried his argument a step further to claim that it was inevitable for external 
powers to change the economic structure in China. Ostensibly, Wittfogel seemed to 
maintain his objective and empirically oriented research on China, although he was also 
involved in highly political institutes such as the Institute of Pacific Relations.  
     All in all, Wittfogel’s China studies, based on meticulous interpretations of 
primary sources, rapidly received attention from many, if not all, Japanese intellectuals. 
However, his theory was not necessarily endorsed by Japanese Marxists at face value. 
Aikawa Haruki, for example, cast a dubious eye on Wittfogel’s methodology, 
denouncing Wittfogel’s theory as a form of “dual” materialism. Aikawa’s discontent 
                                                 
13 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō, Kaitai katei ni aru shina no keizai to shakai. pp.238-471. 
14 Ibid. 
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was centered on Wittfogel’s notion of nature and geography as discussed in his 1932 
and 1933 writings. He conceptualized Wittfogel’s material dialectics as “double 
dialectics.” In other words, Wittfogel’s notion of nature, Aikawa contended, was based 
on the perception that natural geographical conditions only provide possibilities for 
surplus value, but do not explain the reality of surplus value. For this reason, Wittfogel 
created a dual structure of production power, in which the production power 
conditioned and determined by nature and the production power determined by the 
social process of labor operated separately.15 Aikawa went on to argue that Wittfogel’s 
understanding of labor and production power as overdetermined between nature and 
society rendered his dialectics ambiguous.16 
In what context were Wittfogel’s ostensibly objective studies of China 
appropriated by former Japanese Marxist social scientists? To begin with, it is important 
to take a close look where Wittfogel’s interpretation of China was located in relation to 
his analysis of Japan. Interestingly, Wittfogel visited Japan in 1935 as a part of 
commemoration of the translation of Shina no keizai to shakai into Japanese.17 At a 
meeting with Japanese Marxist intellectuals, Wittfogel was asked four questions, two of 
which were about the differences between Chinese Confucianism and Japanese 
Confucianism, and the difference between the Chinese family system and the Japanese 
family system.18 Not surprisingly, Wittfogel wrote in a clear tone in the foreword of 
Shina no keizai to shakai that Japan had undergone a quite different process of 
economic development from China.19 This short remark provided Japanese Marxist 
                                                 
15 Aikawa Haruki, “Wittofogeru “shina keizai to shakai” no nihonha kankō ni yosete,” Rekishikagaku 3, 
no.5 (1935), p. 170. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For Wittfogel’s visit to Japan in 1935, see Fukuritu Shōji, “Wittofoguru hakase no nihon hōmon,” 
Shinagaku 8, no.1 (1935), pp. 133-141.  
18 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō Shina shakai no kagakuteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
1935), pp. 189-191. 
19 Ibid. 
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social scientists with a powerful basis for their claim that Japan had already passed the 
stage of Asian village community, characterized by stagnation and the despotic political 
structure.  
     Heavily influenced by Wittfogel’s so-called scientific and objective study of 
China, Hirano’s writings on China took on a much clearer divisionist perspective 
between China and Japan. A year after Wittfogel’s books were published, Hirano 
contributed an article to Shisō  comparing Japan’s agriculture with Asiatic 
agriculture. In this article, Hirano did not deny that the premodern constitution of 
Japan’s agriculture bore a resemblance to Asiatic society.20 But he did not 
pessimistically conclude that the potential for civil society could not be found in 
Japanese society. In his seminal book, The Constitution of Japanese Capitalistic Society 
(0#$-*xy), Japanese peasants were described as “fractured and 
isolated.”21 However, the alienation of Japanese peasants in Hirano’s understanding of 
Japanese agriculture, as Nagaoka Shinkichi has argued, was in large part based on 
Hirano’s observation that they could not become independent peasants possessing 
arable land under the semi-feudal landlord-peasant system.22To put it another way, 
Hirano argued that the impoverishment and marginalization of Japanese peasants took 
place as they were exposed to the capitalistic mode of production, although feudal 
remnants were still dominant in agriculture. Therefore, Japanese agriculture, although it 
still had semi-feudal remnants within it, was portrayed as fundamentally different from 
village communities in China. Such a statement could be easily associated with the 
observation that these Asiatic characteristics had already disappeared as Japan gradually 
entered the stage of the capitalist economy.  
                                                 
20 Hirano Yoshitarō, “Ajiateki nōgyō seisan to nihon no nōgyō,” Shisō 169 (June 1936), pp.214-252. 
21 Hirano Yoshitarō, Nihon shihonshugishakai no kikō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1934), pp. 286-293. 
22 Nagaoka Shinkichi, “Kōzaha riron no denkai to ajia ninshiki – hirano yoshitarō no baai,” 
Keizaigakukenkyū 34, no.4 (Mar 1985), p.6. 
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     In this way, Hirano as a Koza-ha intellectual maintained his Marxist thinking in 
analyzing both Japanese and Chinese agriculture. Paradoxically, the very concept of 
civil society as a necessary step for bourgeois revolution became a major turning point 
in Hirano’s search for revolutionary potential in the Chinese village community. 
Importantly, rather than denouncing Chinese society as such, Hirano constantly strove 
to locate his research in the realm of scientific and objective analysis. To this end, Karl 
Wittfogel’s China studies were purposely appropriated by Hirano. 
 
Moritani Katsumi - Colonial Korea and the Concept of the Oriental  
Hirano Yoshitarō appropriated Wittfogel’s China studies to rationalize his highly biased 
gaze at China, namely armed with “scientific objectivity.” In contrast, Moritani 
Katsumi, a Koza-ha Marxist theoretician who was teaching social policy at Kyungsung 
Imperial University >»¼ in colonial Korea, wrote extensively on China and 
colonial Korea from a different perspective. Notably both Hirano and Moritani 
encountered each other on several occasions. Together with Hirano, Moritani was a co-
translator of Wittfogel’s Shina no keizai to shakai, published in 1935, and four years 
later, they co-translated another of Wittfogel’s books, Tōyōteki shakai no riron ,=
-*/:.23 In this way, Moritani actively involved himself in China studies from 
the perspective of Marxist social science.  
    Moritani was appointed as a lecturer at Kyungsung Imperial University in June 
1927, two months after he graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. In 1929, he 
became an assistant professor and took charge of social policy courses, which he taught 
until 1945. At Kyungsung Imperial University, he was known as a liberal intellectual 
among Japanese and Korean students. His Marxist scholarship did not deprive him of 
                                                 
23 Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō & Moritani Katsumi, Tōyōteki shakai no riron (Tokyo: 
Nihonhyōronsha, 1939).  
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his professorship in colonial Korea, but it became a major reason for his remaining an 
assistant professor for 16 years, between 1929 and 1945.24 On the other hand, 
Moritani’s stay in colonial Korea between 1927 and 1945 partly explains his somewhat 
marginalized position within Japanese Marxist intellectual circles. However, it was this 
intellectual background that made him a very influential imperial intellectual in colonial 
Korea during the wartime period. Undoubtedly, Moritani was virtually the only 
converted Marxist intellectual who wrote extensively on colonial Korea and, precisely 
for this reason, tracing his scholarship must become an integral part of any effort to 
depict Japanese Marxists wartime discourses.  
    Before looking at Moritani’s wartime writings on colonial Korea and the East 
Asian community, it is useful to explore his observation of the Asiatic mode of 
production debate and his understanding of Asian society. Here, locating Moritani as an 
observer, as I have discussed, is related to the spatial marginality that he experienced as 
a Japanese professor in colonial Korea. Importantly, Moritani’s writings over the course 
of the debate were focused on problematizing the very concept of Asiatic society. In an 
article on Asiatic society in Hegel and Marx, Moritani began setting forth his critical 
approaches to the so-called Asiatic society conceptualized by Western thinkers.25 
According to him, Asia was positioned by Hegel as one of the civilizations in world 
history. Moritani observed, however, that Hegel described China as a state in a political 
sense but portrayed Chinese society as lacking immanent forces for development. The 
absence of private ownership prevented class relations from being formed in China, and 
Hegel asserted, therefore, that everyone in China eventually degenerated to become a 
“slave before the Emperor.”26  
     Although Moritani acknowledged that Hegel’s highly idealist approach to China 
                                                 
24 Lee Chung Woo, Kyungsung jeguk daehak (Seoul: Darakwon, 1980), p.210. 
25 Moritani Katsumi, “Tōyōshakai ni kansuru hegeru to marukusu,” Shakai 2, no.1 (Jan 1933), pp.2-15. 
26 Ibid., pp.3-7 
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was a product of 18th century European philosophy, what he problematized seriously 
was the strong geographical determinism inherent in Hegel.27 Moritani contended that 
Hegel’s determinism actually became a prelude to European intellectuals’ particularistic 
gaze at Asian society through its geographical characteristics in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. To be sure, not only Moritani but many Japanese Marxist social scientists did 
not simply endorse geographical determinism at face value, and even Marx’s concept of 
Asian geography became a target of criticism. However, it is important to note that 
Moritani’s viewpoint was heavily influenced by his research on colonial Korea.  
    Soon after the publication of an article on Hegel and Marx, Moritani produced 
numerous articles on colonial Korea between 1933 and 1935. Given that he was 
teaching at Kyungsung Imperial University, his extensive writings on colonial Korea 
were not unexpected. He was affiliated with the Institute for Chosun Economy (l
m, Chōsen keizai kenkyūsho) at the College of Law and Literature at 
Kyungsung Imperial University. However, other Japanese scholars in this group 
represented quite conservative studies on Korea. Shigata Hiroshi, for example, actually 
led this group and sought to prove that the underdevelopment of Chosun society was 
attributable to the lack of immanent forces for modernization within Korea.28 On the 
other hand, Korean intellectuals were adamantly opposed to such a particularist view on 
Korea. For example, Paik Nam Un  (1984-1979), who was teaching at Yŏnhee 
College !?@AB (present-day Yonsei University), promulgated a universalist 
approach to Korean history, insisting that like other societies, Korea had undergone the 
5-stage economic development based on historical materialism. In this way, Moritani’s 
early writings on colonial Korea were situated within the rivalry between these different 
                                                 
27 Ibid 
28 See, Shigata Hiroshi, “Chōsen ni okeru kindai shihon shugi no seiritsu katei,” Chōsen shakai keizaishi 
kenkyū [Keijō Teikoku Daigaku Hōbun Gakkai Daiichibu ronshū vol.6] (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1933), pp. 1-
226. 
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perspectives.  
     In a 1934 article entitled “Natural Environment and Chosun Society (1),” 
Moritani further elaborated on his anti-geographical determinism and applied it to 
colonial Korea. In this article, he paid special attention to the relationship between 
natural environment and ethnicity (&@, minzokusei). He particularly problematized 
the tendency to explain world history based on climate and natural environment and 
argued that this explanation is often reduced to geographical materialism: 
 
Generally, an attempt to draw upon ethnicity, that is the physical and spiritual 
nature of a certain ethnic group, and to explain the history of a nation-state 
through natural environment is not free from the same problem (geographical 
materialism). On one hand, a certain ethnic group under similar natural 
environment, climate in a general sense, shows differences in the processes of 
cultural development. Other ethnic groups at the same stage of cultural 
development are under conspicuously different natural environment.29  
 
Moritani did not hastily conclude that the natural environment must be ignored in 
writing the history of a certain ethnic group or a nation-state. Instead, he emphasized 
that the basic mechanism of production and reproduction is greatly contingent upon 
natural conditions.30 He contended, therefore, that conducting research on the natural 
conditions of Korean society would provide a scientific basis for understanding the 
development of the Korean economy.31 Such observation by Moritani was associated 
with his somewhat radical interpretation of Marx’s historical materialism. In other 
words, Moritani intended to distinguish particularity (EF@) from characteristics. 
According to him, differences in natural conditions invariably have different impacts on 
the mode of production and reproduction, creating some particular moments in the 
history of each human group. But the amalgam of these pieces of particularities, he 
contended, does not constitute the particularity of a certain people or nation in 
                                                 
29 Moritani Katsumi, “Chōsen shakai to shizen kankyō (1),” Tōa 7, no.12 (Dec 1934), p. 43. 
30 Ibid., p.46. 
31 Ibid., p.48 
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comparison to the so-called universal path of history.32  
     Based on these observations, Moritani was equally critical of what he believed to 
be an extremely universalistic approach to Korean history. For example, he asserted 
Paik Nam Un, a Marxist economic historian, put forth the logic of universality in an 
excessive way, intentionally ignoring particularistic characteristics that Chosun society 
had shown in its history.33 Moritani maintained that Paik showed an excessive 
intentionality to locate Korean history in Marx’s universal 5-stage theory of economic 
development, overlooking its important social and natural factors that would be 
imperative to a scientific understanding of Korean society. In this way, Moritani sought 
to locate his studies of colonial Korea in the realm of scientific objectivity and this 
indicated that his Korean studies should not be simply reduced to the hasty 
generalization of a certain culture, nationalism in particular. Not surprisingly, this 
standpoint bore a resemblance to that of Karl Wittfogel’s research on China, and 
Moritani actively engaged himself in expanding Wittfogel’s work to the understanding 
of Korean society. He observed that both China and Korea represented similar natural 
conditions, in that irrigation and great lakes were the main variables of agricultural 
production, and as a result, the central government emerged as a dominant political 
force to control this social pattern. Moritani described this as the river culture in the 
Orient in contrast to the ocean culture in the West.34  
     Just as Wittfogel viewed the village community as the basic unit in Chinese 
society, Moritani thought that this was also the case for Korean society. He maintained 
that in spite of various socio-political changes, the so-called autonomous community in 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p.49. 
33 Ibid. Paik Nam Un’s work that Moritani criticized was Paik’s seminal book, The Social and Economic 
History of Chosun (Chōsen shakai keizai shi), published in 1933. 
34 Moritani Katsumi, “Chōsen shakai to shizen kankyō (1),” Tōa 8, no.2 (Feb 1935), pp. 22-40; Moritani 
Katsumi, “Kyurai no chōsen nōgyō shakai ni tuite no kenkyū no tameni,” in Keijōteikokudaigaku 
hōbungakkai ed., Chōsen shakai keizaishi kenkyū (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1933), pp. 397-482. 
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premodern Korea had survived. However, this autonomy was not necessarily 
interpreted in a positive way. Moritani went on to argue that village communities 
remained autonomous on a superficial level, since they were predominantly controlled 
by state power, leaving them intact from external powers. Consequently, he argued, 
such factors as class relations and a new mode of production did not arise in the village 
community in premodern Korea.  
 Moritani never carried his views a step further to make the value-laden judgment 
that Korean society lacked immanent forces, or that the autonomous village community 
had to be a driving force for the socialist revolution. Instead, he maintained that the 
village community in both China and Korea was a reflection of their geographical and 
environmental conditions, characterized by irrigation. Based on these observations, 
Moritani intended to make an “objective” statement that agricultural policies in the 
1910s and 1920s followed by Japan’s annexation of Korea brought about significant 
changes in Korea.  
     To be sure, Moritani was not an anti-colonial Marxist social scientist, as he 
developed Korean studies from his own perspective. But he intended to maintain a 
physical distances from Koza-ha Marxists in Japan proper, who had been striving to 
reach a conclusion that (1) the Asiatic mode of production is an ancient form of 
production that existed not only in Asia but also in other parts of the world, and (2) 
contemporary Japanese society had already surpassed the stage of Asiatic society as it 
underwent rapid capitalistic development. In response to these highly Japan-centered 
analyses of the Asiatic mode of production debate, Moritani, who had not been 
outspoken during the course of the debate, published several articles between 1935 and 
1937, that criticized his colleagues. In a 1935 article, Moritani revisited the question of 
the village community in Asia and rejected the tendency to place the Asiatic mode of 
production as a particular mode of production within the five stages of development in 
                                                       
 250 
Marx’s historical materialism. Instead, he emphasized that the village community in 
Asia existed in both ancient times and the feudal era.35  
     Moritani’s somewhat later involvement in the notion of Asiatic society might not 
have received much attention from his colleagues, simply because the debate itself 
rapidly withered away beginning in 1935. Many of the participants were either arrested 
or forced to disavow Marxism beginning in the mid 1930s. However, it is important to 
note that Moritani continued to elaborate on these fundamental issues inherent in the 
logic of Asiatic society. Among them, what captured his attention was the notion of 
universality and particularity in Oriental culture. As I have discussed, his critical 
interpretation of so-called Asiatic society was based on the perception that the village 
community in Asia should be conceived of as a form of common culture rather than as 
a class system or a mode of production in a socio-political sense. Accordingly, Moritani 
carried his question a step further to the level of an epistemological analysis.  
    In a close reading of literary critic Tsuda Sōkichi’s Cïð (1873-1961) 
notion of Oriental culture (,=, tōyōteki bunka), Moritani observed that 
Japanese intellectuals tended to think that such a thing as oriental culture did not exist 
in relation to so-called Western culture.36 Tsuda, a conservative intellectual, 
vehemently argued that the particularistic cultures developed by China, India and Japan 
could not be conceived of as an “oriental culture,” since fundamental differences 
existed among them. Although Moritani expressed some sympathy with Tsuda’s 
argument, his disagreement with such a divisionist view of Oriental culture focused on 
the way Tsuda preconditioned ethnic culture as trans-historically given.37 Moritani 
                                                 
35 Moritani Katsumi, “Iwayuru ajiateki seisanyoshikizairon,” Rekishi kagaku 4, no.10 (1935), in 
Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron (Tokyo: Rikuseisha, 1937), pp. 69-108. 
36 Moritani Katsumi, “Shakai keizaishi ni okeru tōyōno tokushusei - tōyōteki na monoha naika,” 
Rekishi 7 (1937), in Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron, pp. 127-136. 
37 Ibid. Although Moritani mentioned in passing Tsuda’s highly Japan-centered and almost hyperbolic 
interpretation of Chinese culture, Tsuda’s notion of cultural differences between China and Japan was 
premised on his conviction of the civilizational superiority of Japanese culture to Chinese culture. Based 
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pointed out that Tsuda’s notion of particularity in each culture was based on the 
fundamental perception that climate (ØÙ) and geographic conditions produce 
different ethnic cultures.38 
    It is understandable that Moritani, who held a steadfast belief in historical 
materialism, could not simply endorse Tsuda’s particularist approach to the notion of 
ethnicity. Moritani’s understanding of ethnicity as fluid was formulated as he 
encountered discourses on the nation by Western theoreticians. Analyzing the theories 
of nation and ethnicity by two prominent social democrats, Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) 
and Otto Bauer (1881-1938), Moritani revisited materialist and cultural conditions that 
give rise to ethnicity. Moritani was critical of Kautsky’s emphasis on a national 
language as a decisive condition for nation (&) and character (@D): Would the 
language or character of a nation as a form of idea (<u) exist without a material base 
on which members of a nation live?39 In addition, Moritani was clearly aware that the 
so-called a modern nation is a historical product of social relations that constantly 
changes themselves.  
    Therefore, Moritani acutely pointed out the limits of the circulative argument that 
the particular culture of a nation is prescribed by the historical particularity of the 
nation: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
on these observations, Tsuda boldly argued, “Chinese thinkers usually hate retrospection and introspection, 
and they also hardly make any efforts to objectively see things as they are. Furthermore, their ways of 
speculation for the most part are ways of combining various ideas through association, and this 
association is in many cases inconsistent since it is merely rhetorical and based on ancient words and 
expressions. …. The fundamental reason the Japanese could not understand and speculate on Chinese 
thought as thought although they have read huge numbers of Chinese books is not only that, as I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Chinese thought in itself was not created based on profound reflection, 
and the Japanese language is not suitable for understanding Chinese language and sentences. Chinese 
thought expressed by Chinese language and sentences from the outset does not have any character that 
stimulates people to speculate or that enhances people’s ability of speculation.” (Emphasis added) Tsuda 
Sōkichi, Chūgoku shisō to nihon (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970, c1938), p.24. 
38 Moritani, Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron, p.132. 
39 Moritani Katsumi, “Shakai minshushugi no minzoku riron danhen,” in Chōsen keizai no kenkyū 
(Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1929), p.61. 
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If someone argues that the culture of Japan is an independent thing of Japan 
and it is represented in the Japanese people’s independent life prescribed by 
the climate and historical particularity of Japan, that person would not prove 
this argument unless he could explain clearly how independent the life of the 
Japanese is.40   
 
This observation led him to insist that China, Japan and India had commonly 
maintained the Oriental in terms of the life of productive labor (û=EF) in 
relation to the West. Irrigation projects and so-called garden cultivation based on the 
state’s direct control were presented by him as examples of common characteristics in 
the Orient.41 In this way, Moritani’s interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production 
became increasingly detached from the formalist view; that is, how a certain mode of 
production should be positioned within the process of historical development. Based on 
these observations, Moritani reiterated in several articles published between 1935 and 
1937 that the notion of the Asiatic mode of production should not be reduced to a 
certain period of time or a form of production. Consequently, by replacing the notion of 
modes of production with what he called “things on living (G=HI*),” Moritani 
sought to find a middle ground between one-dimensional universalism and Asian 
particularism.  
     To be sure, such an apolitical approach to colonial Korea and China provided him 
with much room to engage in wartime Asian discourses based on the logic of 
similarities within Oriental culture. However, it also left behind one important question: 
Once he set aside the issue of the mode of production in analyzing Asian society, how 
did he elaborate on the question of modernization and ethnic nationalism in envisioning 
an East Asian community? Of course, this question must be asked of Hirano’s wartime 
Asian discourses as well. In the following pages, I move on to Hirano Yoshitarō’s 
encounter with the Asian community and his Greater Asianism (¼âãâ#$) 
                                                 
40 Moritani Katsumi, Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron, p.133. 
41 Ibid. 
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Hirano Yoshitarō’s Encounter with the East Asian Community 
In 1936, a year after the publication of Wittfogel’s Kaitai katei ni aru Shina no keizai to 
shakai, Hirano Yoshitarō was arrested for organizing a Marxist research group with 
Yamada Moritarō and other Koza-ha Marxists. This incident, later called “the Comm 
Academy Case,” became a major turning point in Hirano’s Marxist scholarship and 
political engagement. In the following year, he submitted a letter of conversion to the 
government and was released soon after that. Between 1936 and 1940, Hirano did not 
publish Marxism-related academic, except for biographical works on his former 
mentors. 
     In 1939, Hirano began publishing works on political issues, focusing on China 
and the problem of ethnicity and nationalism in Asia. Together with Moritani Katsumi, 
he translated Wittfogel’s Tōyōteki shakai no riron ,=-*/: (A Theory of 
Oriental Society). In the same year, he joined the Institute of East Asia (), 
one of the major government-funded think tanks where his former teacher Suehira 
Kentarō was the director of the institution. Hirano participated in the 6th committee, a 
special committee organized to conduct extensive field research on rural Chinese 
villages.  
     On May 1, 1940, shortly after joining the institute, Hirano’s writing appeared in 
the famous journal Chūōkōron bcd:. In this roundtable discussion entitled “Social 
Constitution in the Orient and the Future of Japan and China,” Hirano delineated his 
notion of the East Asian community for the first time after tenkō.42 Notably, the 
participants in this discussion represented both disciplinary diversity and different 
political positions regarding China studies within Japanese Marxist circles. Among the 
discussants, Ozaki Hotsumi JË (1901-1944) was one of the most renowned 
                                                 
42 A round-table discussion, “Tōyō no shakai kōsei to nichishi no shōrai,” Chūōkōron 55, no.7 (July 
1940), pp. 44-68. 
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journalists and had already contributed several articles on the so-called “China 
Problem” to major journals based on his experience as a China correspondent for the 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper. Together with Ozaki, Hosakawa Karoku K]LM(1888-
1962) represented the journalist side of the discussion.43 Tachibana Shiraki NO
(1881-1945) was an established China scholar who published two major books on 
China, Shina shakai kenkyū (:;-, A Study of Chinese Society) and Shina 
shisō kenkyū (:;, A Study of Chinese Thought), both in 1936. Similar to 
Karl Wittfogel, Tachibana’s China scholarship was characterized by his particularist 
approach to Chinese society based on Marx’s historical materialism.44 
     Given that this round-table discussion was held three years after the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese War, a major issue to which the discussants paid special attention 
was the question of how to rethink the nature of the Chinese village community, and 
based on this, how to examine the potential for constructing an East Asian community. 
Tachibana began the discussion by describing Chinese society as a community (O
() as opposed to an assembly (ÔV(). According to him, the former is characterized 
by its blood-centeredness and the state’s control over individuals, whereas the 
constitution of the latter is based on individuals’ goal-oriented activities.45 An assembly 
in Tachibana’s discussion actually signified civil society in the West. This observation 
was followed by his observation that except for the case of Japan, no Asian countries 
had reached the level of civil society. In this way, Tachibana’s notion of social 
constitution took on a developmentalist perspective, in that he pointed out capitalistic 
                                                 
43 Ozaki and Hosokawa became acquainted with each other as they organized a research group for the 
Chinese revolution (aAbFcde) at the Ohara Institute for Social Research 2f/0ghcdi 
in 1927. They organized another research group for China studies in 1939, but both were arrested in 
October 1941 for the Jorge Incident.  
44 In Shina shakai kenkyū, Tachibana dedicated three chapters to analyzing capitalists, workers and 
bureaucrats in China and the titles of these chapters all end with the term “particularity” (jkl). 
Tachibana Shiraki, Shina shakai kenkyū (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1936). 
45 A round-table discussion, “Tōyō no shakai kōsei to nichishi no shōrai,” pp.50-52. 
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development as a key to the formation of civil society.  
Endorsing Tachibana’s argument, Hirano attributed the nature of the Chinese 
community to its natural and environmental conditions, characterized by great lakes 
and irrigation. Based on this observation, which he actually borrowed from Karl 
Wittfogel’s research, he elaborated further on the differences between China and Japan. 
In contrast to geographical conditions in China, where the government always had to be 
prepared for attacks by nomadic tribes and as a result, the central government became 
increasingly dominant over all other social sectors, the archipelagic topography of 
Japan enabled local governments and landlords to develop a typical feudal system in 
which hierarchal relations arose between the samurai and peasants arose.46  
In response to this distinction made by two intellectuals, Hosakawa, the 
journalist, revisited the issue of community in the contemporary world. Although a 
(village) community had been conceived of as something to be transformed into civil 
society, Hosokawa argued, a community in a new and sustainable form became 
increasingly necessary at the time of the universal crisis in capitalism.47 As for 
Hosokawa’s question, Tachibana defended himself by maintaining that Japan reentered 
the stage of a community-based society. Tachibana contended that a primitive form of 
community had been preserved in Japanese society, and described it as a “pyramid state 
organization,” in which the emperor is located atop the political structure and mediates 
social struggles and sustains what he called Gemeinschaft.48 His theory of community, 
however, was in fact delineated in a highly abstract way.  
    Needless to say, Tachibana’s notion of the pyramid community was inconsistent 
with his own developmentalist perspective, according to which community should be 
replaced by civil society when the capitalistic mode of production is attained. Although 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p.55 
47 Ibid., p.61 
48 Ibid. 
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his remark was purposely made in an attempt to prove similarities between Japan and 
China in their communitarian social configurations, differences in natural and social 
conditions between the two, which participants of the roundtable discussion 
emphasized, would not simply disappear. Aware of these problems, Tachibana himself 
raised the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community (t(), which was 
rapidly gaining currency among Japanese and Korean intellectuals beginning in the late 
1930s. Hirano delineated his understanding of this new theory: 
 
Super-national-great-regionalism (~&=¼ P#$) deserves attention 
in the East Asian Co-operative Community. This ideology is different from 
imperialism. While there is conflict between empire and colony in 
imperialism, super-national-great-regionalism is the new theory that each 
ethnic group obtains independence at its highest degree in domestic politics, 
economy, culture and tradition, reorganizing defense, finance and diplomacy 
in a unit of a great region. At any rate, when it comes to discussing cultural 
cooperation between Japan and China in the East Asian Cooperative 
Community, I believe that it would be possible only when the differences 
between the two in ethnicity, social development, and cultural tradition are 
recognized. Henceforth, I have intentionally talked about the comparison 
between Japan and China in traditional social constitution before capitalism.49 
 
This statement shows that Hirano, too, was sympathetic to this new theory to some 
extent. However, as he himself emphasized many times, the marked differences 
between Japan and China must be recognized. Hirano went on to discuss the conceptual 
differences between two Chinese letters, t and O, in a legal sense. In ancient 
Roman law, he argued, the term O in community (O() indicated that an 
individual surrenders himself to totality. In this sense, the term O connotes a similar 
meaning to sharing. On the other hand, the term t might be used if it has the meaning 
of gathering individuals’ forces, and this corresponds to the system of German law.50 
    Hirano’s legal analysis of community and cooperative community is traceable to 
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his 1924 book Roman Thought and German Thought in Civil Law (s-./NQ
RjSTRU), in which he observed that German law emerged in an 
attempt to postulate a cooperative society in Europe, replacing Roman law as 
representing individualism.51 Hirano held that the locus of German law lay the concept 
of Genossenshaft, which connotes a similar meaning to cooperativism, while the prefix 
“co” in terms of individuals’ belonging to a community is analogous to communis in 
Roman law.52 Hirano’s analogy with German and Roman law systems in discussing the 
East Asia Cooperative Community sounds inconsistent in many ways, simply because, 
as he himself emphasized, the latter pertained to “super-national-great-regionalism,” 
while the former operated in a single-nation-state framework. However, it tells us in 
which direction Hirano would develop his discourses on the East Asian Community. As 
I have discussed, Hirano’s writings in the early and mid 1930s over the course of the 
Asiatic mode of production debate clearly show his disillusion with community itself, 
the Chinese village community in particular. Beginning in the late 1930s, anti-
individualist communitarian discourses were widely accepted by both conservative and 
“progressive” intellectuals, and under these circumstances, Hirano had to revisit his 
writings in the 1920s in which he deliberated the notion of community. However, his 
adherence to the fundamental differences between Japan and China, which he borrowed 
from Wittfogel’s theory, continued to dominate his epistemology. This explains why 
Hirano, together with Tachibana Shiraki, concentrated on the institutional and legal 
aspects of the East Asian Community, focusing on the term political power (i) in 
an attempt to draw a picture of community between the two saliently different societies.  
    Tachibana defined a new political power as deriving from the state’s capability to 
                                                 
51 For an excellent analysis of the continuity between Hirano’s law studies in the 1920s and his East 
Asian discourses in the 1940s, see Mori Hideki, “Hirano Yoshitarō ni okeru hōgaku to shakaikagaku,” in 
Amano Kazuo (et al.) eds., Marukusu hōgaku kōza 1: Marukusu shugi hōgaku no seritu to hatten, Nihon 
(Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1976), pp. 88-91. 
52 A round-table discussion, “Tōyō no shakai kōsei to nichishi no shōrai,” p.63. 
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organize the Japanese people. Therefore, his idea is no doubt different from the so-
called notion of reorganizing the nation (ª) that was presented by many 
intellectuals as the logic of total mobilization.53 Responding to Tachibana’s discussion 
of domestic politics, Hirano sought to outline a new political power in a regional 
context. As he put it, “In short, the Japanese people guide and are respected by ethnic 
groups in East Asia, which fulfills the capabilities of the Japanese people. Only under 
this objective condition, can the alliance and cooperation between Japan and China be 
made.”54   
 
National Politics () and Subjectivity 
In this way, Hirano did not hide his desire to construct an East Asian empire under the 
leadership of Japan and resolve the issue of ethnic nationalism in China. However, he 
was clearly aware that the abstract notion of political power must be elaborated further 
to convince the Chinese people. Central to this question was how to draw a logic of 
politics from the Chinese village community and could link it to a Japan-centered 
regional order. Following the 1940 roundtable discussion, Hirano became actively 
involved in several government-funded China study projects. After conducting research 
on rural areas in China and Southeast Asia, Hirano published several books on ethnicity 
and nationalism in these areas. Beginning with the 1942 publication of Minzoku 
seijigaku no riron (&*/:pThe Theory of National Political Science), he 
published two more books, Minzoku seiji no kihon mondai (&*­+,pThe 
Basic Problems of National Politics) and Taiheiyō no minzoku=seijigaku (H,*
&VpNations in the Pacific Ocean = Political Science, co-authored with 
Kiyono Kenji) between 1942 and 1944.55 As the titles of these books suggest, Hirano’s 
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main concern was the relationship between politics and nation. Needless to say, it was 
not only Hirano but virtually all Japanese intellectuals during the wartime period who 
grappled with this issue.  
Before analyzing Hirano’s notion of national politics during the wartime period, 
it might be useful to discuss his concept of ethnicity in the mid 1930s. I argue that 
Hirano’s keen interest in the concept of ethnicity did not emerged unexpectedly in the 
early 1940s, although it is evident that the notion of ethnic politics served him as a 
vehicle for rationalizing his wartime discourses. While focusing on translating Karl 
Wittfogel’s works, Hirano also introduced one interesting book to Japanese academia, 
German psychologist Willhelm Wundt’s Social Psychology (Völkerpsychologie). From 
this 10-volume work, Hirano translated the 8th volume, which deals directly with the 
relationship between ethnicity and community.56 In contrast to Hirano’s own 
translation of Karl Wittfogel’s Shimin shakaishi W- (A History of Civil 
Society), which focused on the origin of European civil society from a Marxist 
perspective, Wundt’s concern was centered on how the primitive village community 
was transformed into Gesellschaft or a nation-state. In the Japanese preface, Hirano 
emphasized that Wundt’s approach to ethnology was a key in determining a general 
rule that each ethnic group shares in forming civil society.57 What really attracted 
Hirano’s attention was Wundt’s understanding of ethnicity as cultural and social, not 
what might be called “natural minzoku.”58 Wundt’s approach to ethnic psychology was 
naturally connected to Hirano’s interest in a nation state with multiple ethnic groups 
that later formed his notion of national politics. 
                                                                                                                                            
Kiyono Kenji, Taiheiyō no minzoku= seijigaku (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1942); Minzoku seiji no kihon 
mondai (Tokyo: Koyama shoten, 1944). 
56 The title of the 8th volume is Die politische Gesellschaft (Political Society). Hirano Yoshitarō trans., 
Minzoku shinri yori mitaru seijiteki shakai (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1938). 
57 Ibid., p.4. 
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Another aspect of Hirano’s concern with nation and nationalism is traceable to his 
1934 essay “The Rise of Chauvinism in the Mid Meiji Era and Its Social Implications 
(4b6-./NX#$*YZ[\*-=]$),” published in Shisō.59 
Here, Hirano provided two directions for modern nationalism:  
 
Nation (&) is the social association of human beings by the communality 
of ideologies represented by economic life, territory, language and culture. 
Nation is accompanied by amalgamation, absorption and assimilation in the 
process of the capitalist mode of production. Under a system controlled by 
the feudal mode of production, the formation of a minzoku and nationalism 
do not occur.60 (Emphasis added) 
 
Given that this article was published in 1934, three years before Hirano’s tenkō, and 
when the Asiatic mode of production debate was still in progress, Hirano’s obvious 
definition of nation in Marxist language is not surprising. What is more important, 
however, is that Hirano acknowledged the positive aspects of nationalism in the rise of 
the capitalist economy. Basically viewing the nation-state in the capitalist economy as 
state-centered, he also believed that its foundation was grounded in the abolishment of 
the slavery system, and thus it could be conceived of as “liberating.”61 
      More important in Hirano’s understanding of modern nationalism was not just 
its ontological affinity to the capitalist economy. He was clearly aware that the 
development of production power in one nation-state would not be limited to within it. 
Once the integration of different social groups in a single nation-state was 
accomplished, Hirano argued, the nation-state would inevitably widen its political and 
economic interests outside its territory. The two distinct directions he conceptualized 
were as follows: 
 
                                                 
59 Hirano Yoshitarō, “Meiji chūkini okeru kokusuishugi no taitō, sono shakaiteki igi,” Shisō 144 (May 
1934), pp. 53-89. 
60 Ibid., p. 54. 
61 Ibid., p. 55. 
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A nation-state with a higher level of production power not only destroys the 
feudal system, but absorbs and assimilates other ethnic groups in a 
democratic way and creates a nation-state. (2) In the name of nationalism, a 
nation-state does not destroy the feudal system of other ethnic groups, rather 
reinforces its feudal system in collaboration with aristocracy, and forcibly 
assimilates and integrates them.62     
 
Hirano, of course, acknowledged that Japan’s annexation of neighboring countries 
exemplified the second of these two directions. However, he also maintained that 
Japan’s particular path to imperialism was in large part due to the fact that chauvinistic 
Japanism (#$), not nationalism, emerged as a central ideology during the Meiji 
era. He went on to argue that the preponderance of Japanism or chauvinism in Meiji 
Japan caused conceptual complexities between nationalityD@
and ethnicity (
&@), and this distortion was in large part due to the presence of Western powers in 
Japan.63  
    Therefore, Hirano’s prewar writings suggest that modern nationalism in a pure 
sense did not emerge even in Japanese society, not to mention in China, which was 
under the feudal system. In addition, his endorsement of modern nationalism was 
confined to Marx’s five-stage theory; that is, modern subjects come into being in the 
mode of capitalist production, but a new type of subjectivity should replace the 
capitalist mode of production in a socialist order. How, then, did he convert his notion 
of modern nationalism into a new theory of national politics in the early 1940s? In a 
1943 book, Basic Problems of National Politics (&*­+,), Hirano 
delineated the direction of national politics in Greater East Asia: 
 
Ethnic groups in Asia are now intimately associated with each other like a 
family and unified under a solid cooperative spirit through which they have 
shared life and death. Sharing coexistence and co-prosperity, joys and 
sorrows in the past and having the same destiny of life and death is only 
possible through the order and morality of cooperation and solidarity in 
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family. It is through this that a new order in East Asia becomes not only a 
“new” order but a “true” order that should sincerely contribute to the 
establishment of peace in the world, differentiating itself from the old order of 
Britain and the United States, or a new order that they are now claiming. The 
order of family, indeed, becomes the principle for guiding ethnic groups in 
Greater East Asia and constructing an East Asian indigenous society (^Ù-
) is the principle of national politics.64 (Emphasis added)     
 
The marked emphasis on family in Hirano’s vision of a new East Asian order deserves 
attention. In addition, his notion of indigenous society was strikingly different from his 
earlier discussion of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism. Therefore in Hirano’s theory of 
the East Asian Community, the notion of integrating indigenous societies in East Asia 
as an entity was focused on highlighting the differences between the East and the West. 
Referring to the work of J. H. Boeke, Professor of Economics at the University of 
Leiden, the Netherlands, Hirano further elaborated on his theory of the village 
community in a completely different manner. As Boeke argued, “[I]t is completely 
misleading to identify villages in Asia with those in the West, because the former are a 
spiritual and familial community that prioritize the happiness of family.”65 
     Apart from employing the abstract concept of a spiritual familial community, 
Boeke’s statement itself is not strikingly different from the conventional perception of 
Asiatic society in both Western bourgeois and Marxist social science. Boeke’s 
observation of a family-based society was also based on the static nature of Asian 
village society. As he argued, “When members of a grand family accumulate wealth, 
this family is divided into several small families, which explains the patriarchal family 
constitution in contemporary Asian villages.”66 In other words, a certain ethnic group is 
still decisively determined as the expansion of familial relations, irrespective of its 
economic development. If this is the case, it indicates that several questions still 
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remained to be answered by Hirano, and among them, special attention was paid to 
how an East Asian society could be sustained that was both super-national and family-
based society at the same time.  
     Hirano acknowledged that as capitalism prevailed, even peasants in Asian village 
communities underwent a drastic transformation in their modes of life. As he asserted, 
“[O]ne cannot judge whether the village community has stagnated as it did in the past. 
As development continues and the distribution of products grows, they necessarily 
bring a monetary economy to the community and as a result, one facet of community-
based society collapses.”67 This observation by Hirano meshes with his earlier 
definition of nation as emerging in the capitalistic mode of production. Instead of 
presenting a sophisticated analysis of identify formation in the capitalist village 
community, Hirano centered his argument on highly value-laden and abstracted aspects. 
He purposely emphasized that the advent of the modern economy spread individualism, 
competition and conflicts, eventually dismantling the moral consciousness of the 
community. These changes necessitated the implantation of what might be called civic 
responsibility, replacing the ancient concept of bonds.68 
     Hirano observed that although a number policies were enacted to revitalize the 
value of community in the Western capitalist economy, all these measures eventually 
resulted in democratic politics (_). However, such a seemingly rational order of 
politics based on individuals’ civic responsibility and political rights, he asserted, was 
completely fragmented as it was applied to national politics in the colony. French, 
British and the Dutch colonialism commonly aimed to maintain the discriminatory 
hierarchy between metropole and the colony, suppressing the development of 
indigenous cultures, colonized Asian ethnic groups in particular.69 His articulation of 
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national politics, therefore, was to reconfirm that a Japan-centered new Asian order 
would not repeat the path of European imperialism. To this end, Hirano proposed 
Japan’s superior leadership based on morality in incorporating ethnic groups into an 
empire.70 
In this way, Hirano’s discussion of national politics became increasingly detached 
from the politics of identify formation, that is, how a new form of subjectivity ought to 
be constructed in order to overcome the discrepancies between the capitalist economy 
and the multi-ethnic and cultural social constitution in East Asia. The dimension of 
Hirano’s national politics was reduced to the relations between the ruling majority and 
the ruled minority. In other words, what captured his attention most was not the nature 
and dynamics of ethnicity, but the question of what kind of political measures should be 
taken to effectively manage ethnic minorities. Therefore, Hirano’s discussion of 
national politics took institutional and legal directions. At the heart of it lay one 
important challenge: how to theorize moral and spiritual values in the Chinese village 
community as a guiding principle, replacing the legal rationality of the Western law 
system. 
In this sense, spiritual values such as morality were suggested as a mediator 
through with which Japan’s guidance could be accomplished in East Asia. This 
suggests that Hirano’s national politics lacked any sort of speculations on how minority 
ethnic groups could become essential subjects of an East Asian empire, as best 
illuminated in the notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community presented by 
bourgeois social scientists like Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi. However, 
Hirano’s theorization of the equal relationship between Japan and the colony still did 
not resolve certain fundamental questions: how could he present community-oriented 
common values that had existed in Asia as moral and spiritual vehicles to replace profit-
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oriented individualism? More importantly, how should the socio-economic gap 
between metropole and colony be rationalized in the empire-building project? 
In order to respond to these questions, Hirano sought to rehabilitate the moral 
values of the Chinese village community, which he once viewed as lacking any political 
dynamics. To this end, Hirano was actively involved in empirical China studies. Right 
after Hirano’s participation in the Institute of East Asia () in 1939, the 
institute, together with the Northern China Research Bureau of the Manchurian 
Railway Company, launched an extensive fieldwork project entitled “Studies of Rural 
Customs and Practices in China (b`¿abc)” on village community, law, the 
family system in China. As Suehira Akira’s meticulous study shows, this was the most 
extensive fieldwork research ever conducted during the wartime period.71 Given that 
Hirano wrote the general introduction for the six-volume work, “Rural Customs and 
Practices of China,” published between 1941 and 1944, there is no question that he 
played a crucial role in this fieldwork project.72 In the introduction, Hirano boldly 
announced that the purpose of this research project was to overcome the limits of 
previous China studies. By doing so, he intended to position this project as highly 
objective research on China, and thus irrelevant to any political purposes.73 Needless to 
say, Hirano’s statement on the apolitical nature of China studies was inconsistent, given 
that almost all major government-funded institutions participated in this highly political 
fieldwork project.  
                                                 
71 According to Suehira’s meticulous research, it was four different groups that actively participated in 
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Suehira Akira, “Ajia chōsa no keihō- mantetsu chōsabu kara ajiakeizai kenkyūshō ē,” in Yamamuro 
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On the other hand, a close look at this research project reveals some interesting 
aspects of Japan’s wartime China studies. For Hirano, overcoming previous studies on 
China in Japan actually meant that he had to challenge the concept of Oriental History 
(tōyōshi,,), presented and shared by historians and social scientists in Japan.74 
The core logic of tōyōshi was to portray China as a particularistic and thus static 
historical space in relation to Japan which was seen part of the universal world.75 In 
spite of the appropriation of tōyōshi in different contexts by Japanese intellectuals, 
Marxist social scientists, including Hirano himself, did not separate themselves from it, 
as shown in the Asiatic mode of production debate. Therefore, to denouncing the logic 
of tōyōshi was overcoming the specter of particularism in China studies. For Hirano 
himself, it was to discover moral and spiritual values that could bridge the gap between 
Japan’s ethnic politics and indigenous Asian communities.  
However, Hirano’s political positioning of this research project was not 
necessarily endorsed by other China specialists at the institution; on the contrary it 
uncovered severe tensions among the research teams. Both the institution and the 
research teams included scholars of China from various disciplines.76 According to 
Suehira, the tension occurred primarily between the researchers focusing on empirical 
research, the Kyoto University research group in particular, and the Tokyo group, 
represented by Hirano and the Tōa kenkyūsho.77 On the surface, this tension, according 
to Suehira’s explanation, was between a fieldwork-centered approach and a concept-
oriented approach. I argue, however, that it clearly demonstrates that there existed 
fundamental disparities in visions of an East Asian community, even within 
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government-funded think tanks. Hirano was at least aware that the epistemology of 
China as particular should not be put forth any longer, as the front of the so-called 
thought war ({) was formed between the East and the West, not between Japan 
and the rest of Asia. However, conservative China specialists such as Tsuda Sōkichi 
were also participating in this project. Consequently, those dealing with the “China 
problem” were seriously at odds with each other in the early stage of state-centered 
China studies as part of colonial area studies, and under these circumstances Hirano’s 
ethnic politics also emerged.78 
Beginning in the early 1940s, Hirano began reinterpreting village communities 
in China and Southeast Asia based on his fieldwork research. Among the characteristics 
of everyday life in the village community, special attention was paid by him to how the 
space of autonomous governance should be created. Hirano aimed to link this question 
to critiques of the modern legal system in the West, and to theorize moral codes in the 
Chinese village community as non-institutional but rather a highly effective self-
sufficient lay system. He first vehemently argued that the modern legal system in the 
West was characterized by its non-involvement in an individual’s economic life in the 
name of liberalism, utilitarianism, individualism and self-responsibility. He pointed out, 
however, that unless equality before the law was guaranteed, or if there was anything 
undefined by the law in one’s life, the principle of nonintervention in an individual’s 
private life was not respected.79 According to Hirano, the colony was where this 
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vacuum space of the Western legal system emerged. The majority of the population in 
the Dutch East Indies was still under the control of its own indigenous law system. 
Precisely for this reason, even if a brutal assimilation policy were not enforced and 
indigenous cultures were recognized to some degree, as in the Dutch East Indies, for 
example, Hirano asserted that the fundamental discrepancy between Western law and 
what he called the “primitive law system” in Asian village communities would preclude 
the relationship of metropole and colony from being transformed into a co-prosperity 
community.80 He wrote: 
 
National policy is based on the ideology of co-prosperity - autonomism and 
cooperativism and recognizes and acknowledges the life and tradition of 
indigenous society. Since it [cooperativism] aims to develop indigenous 
society toward its own direction, it is opposed to the lopsidedness of 
assimilation policy and takes the form of the individual and the particular. 
The national policy (&) of Japan, a member of the co-prosperity 
sphere, that has led and protected national groups in East Asia is a 
cooperativism that has gone beyond Europe’s cooperativism originating from 
the aspect of economic profit.81 (Emphasis added) 
 
What, then, did Hirano suggest as the principle of a cooperative community to replace 
profit-oriented European imperialism? While developing national politics toward what 
he called underdeveloped ethnic groups in Southeast Asia, he wrote several articles on 
the theory of constructing indigenous village communities in China. Among other 
aspects of the Chinese village community, what captured his attention most is the 
concept of national morality (&) inherent in Chinese villages.  He observed 
that national morality had controlled and enabled the cooperative life of Chinese village 
communities.82 In contrast to Europe’s legal system in which magistrates or 
administrators regulated the community, national morality, Hirano argued, constituted a 
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system of law that permitted townspeople to mediate, regulate, and integrate socio-
economic activities with the everyday life of the community. Hirano showed especially 
keen interest in the Chinese tradition of keeping moral ledgers (dD: Gong guo Ge). 
Gong guo Ge was a kind of everyday life manual that recorded the bad and good deeds 
and also provided townspeople with a way to compensate for misbehaviors by doing 
good deeds. In doing so, Hirano believed that the indigenous legal system of Gong guo 
Ge created a political space where individuals in the community were given the 
autonomy to evaluate and criticize themselves, but their individual activities contributed 
to the general good of the community.83 Hirano further argued that the Chinese village 
(ef) functioned as a space for negotiation and mediation in which elderly people 
minimized internal conflict and sustained the autonomy of the community.84 Hirano 
held that this decision-making process, in spite of the fact that it had paradoxically 
isolated townspeople into a limited spatial boundary of the village community and 
prevented them from protesting against the despotic state, enabled them to live with 
minimal class conflict.85 
     In this way, Hirano believed that national morality in the Chinese village 
community would serve as a kind of a buffer-zone where the influx of the capitalistic 
mode of life could not penetrate. Therefore, various cooperative organizations that had 
existed in premodern China were portrayed as a positive means to incorporate the 
impoverished Chinese peasants under the capitalist economy.86 Such an immanent 
cohesiveness of the Chinese village community was proposed as the nature of Chinese 
ethnicity. Referring to Liang Shuming ghi (1893-1988), a Chinese philosopher 
and social activist who advocated rural reconstruction movements based on Confucian 
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ethics in the 1930s, Hirano maintained that village communities in China preceded 
modern capitalism and these village communities would continue to exist even after the 
arrival of capitalism.87 In this way, Hirano bestowed trans-historicity on both ethnicity 
and national morality and argued that they would serve as a superstructure that would 
transcend any sort of modes of production. To be sure, Hirano reiterated in most of his 
works that his Greater Asianism recognized indigenous cultures in China. The realistic 
question of the economic gap between Japan and China was effectively dismissed in an 
excessive emphasis on the dynamics of the village community. In this way, Chinese 
society was redefined not as static and underdeveloped but as sustainable and 
autonomous.   
     Completely missing in Hirano’s national politics was the question of how a new 
and co-operative subjectivity would be constructed in a new East Asian empire. If the 
logic of ethnicity and community had remained intact in China, how should the Chinese 
people become subjects of a Greater East Asia? To answer this question, he sought to 
create spiritual links between the Chinese Confucian order and the Emperor system. 
The family order, he believed, should be expanded to the logic of Japan’s leadership 
based on the emperor system. Ironic as it may sound, however, Hirano’s explanation of 
why Japan must lead China and other Asian ethnic groups, however, was thoroughly 
capitalistic. He revisited the Meiji Restoration, which he once conceptualized as merely 
a transfer of oppressive power, and redefined it as a “world-historical moment” for 
Asian people, in that Japan proved that Asia could accomplish modernization as well.88 
Awakened by this world-historical moment in Japan, Hirano contended, Japanese 
intellectuals renewed their gaze at Asianism, and as a result, various Asian discourses 
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flooded for some 40 years between 1868 and 1911, followed by the Chinese 
revolution.89 
     In this way, Hirano strove to present a vision of gemeinschaft in China and 
incorporate it into a broader project of Greater Asianism. In an effort to rationalize the 
Chinese rural community as a visible force, he retracted his earlier discussion of 
nationalism as a social product in the capitalistic mode of production. Instead, he 
retreated towards the history of China to find an identity in a highly essentialist and 
nativistic form. To be sure, it was not so much his new discovery that would overcome 
the limits of the previous China studies, which were saturated with pessimistic views, 
but a highly politicized response to Chinese nationalism that was targeting Japanese 
imperialism. His gaze at other ethnic minorities in Asia thoroughly maintained the 
standpoint of the colonizer. Apart from the absence of Korea and Taiwan in his Greater 
Asianism, for him the indigenous people in Southeast Asia and the Southern Seas were 
no more than objects of colonial area studies that would eventually fall under the 
benevolence of Japan’s colonial governance.  
 
Colonial Korea and the East Asia Community 
In contrast to that of Hirano, Moritani’s wartime commitment was already 
preconditioned by several specific factors. As Japan waged a full-scale war against 
China in 1937 and Prime Minister Konoe Fumimarō announced a new order in East 
Asia, colonial Korea became deeply involved in Japan’s wartime efforts. Under these 
circumstances, various politico-economic discourses on how to position colonial Korea 
in imperial Japan emerged. As many have pointed out, the basic direction was to make 
Korea a base to support munitions and human resources.90 In particular, colonial Korea 
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recaptured attention from Japanese bureaucrats as a means to solve the problem of the 
rice shortage in Japan proper. From the perspective of political assimilation, 
conservative Japanese and pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals were spreading the notion 
of naisenittai (¥(, Japan and Korea as one body) as a way to incorporate 
Koreans into the Japanese empire. 
     As I discussed in other chapters, the notion of the East Asian Cooperative 
Community aimed to incorporate ethnic minorities into the broad concept of an East 
Asian nation. To this end, social scientists like Rōyama Masamichi and Kada Tetsuji 
maintained as a prerequisite that the discriminatory hierarchy between empire and 
colony must be abolished. In this sense, naisenittairon ¥(: was a Koreanized 
response; that is, pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals subjectively responded to the East 
Asian Cooperative Community, which was highly philosophical and abstract in nature.  
     As the meaning of the term itself connotes, naisenittairon was first conceived of 
as the degree of assimilation of the Korean people into Japan. However, it was also 
closely related to Korean intellectuals’ endeavors to create a socio-political space where 
Koreans could participate in the empire as political subjects. As part of this project, 
several directions of naisenittai came into being in academic circles. A group of 
intellectuals such as Hyun Yong Sop, for example, advocated the “complete 
Japanization of Koreans (jk#$),” arguing that in order for Koreans to embody 
Japaneseness, Koreaness must be discarded, including the Korean language. This 
“radical” interpretation of naisenittairon, however, provoked criticism from another 
group of pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals. They maintained that discarding 
Koreanness would not necessarily result in an individual’s embodiment of Japaneseness. 
More important than creating a homogeneous culture, they argued, was to dismantle the 
structural inequity between Koreans and Japanese. This observation was based on the 
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practical perception that even if Koreans became Japanese by learning the Japanese 
language and absorbing Japanese culture, this would not guarantee that the majority of 
the Japanese people recognize these “Japanized Koreans” as equal citizens. Therefore, 
for these intellectuals, the notion of naisenittai was appropriated as a political weapon 
to press for structural changes in Japan proper. In Jeong Sik lmn (1907 - ?), a 
converted Korean Koza-ha Marxist, put it:  
 
The fact that the Japanese nation takes the initiative does not mean that it 
outwardly forces on other nations its ethnic authenticity as such. If there is 
any element to the detriment of the whole unification of Asia, it must be 
sublimated although it is part of the authenticity of Japanese nationalism. (for 
example, the islander-like character of the Japanese people) For that reason, 
the problem of naisenittai and the discourse on the reconstruction of East 
Asia based on naisenittairon are the problem of nationalism not only for the 
Korean people but also for the Japanese people.91 
 
As an established scholar of colonial Korea, Moritani also showed keen interest in how 
the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community could be applied to the 
relationship between Japan and Korea. In 1939, he was involved in Ryokki Renmei o
pqr, a political organization established by Japanese residents in colonial Korea in 
1930. With direct as well as indirect support from the colonial government, this 
organization soon became the most influential political agency that provided a bridge 
between pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals and Japanese intellectuals. Invariably, their 
guiding principle was naisenittarion. How, then, did Moritani portray the future of 
colonial Korea in an East Asian community in the making. 
     In a 1939 article contributed to Ryokki op, the journal published by Ryokki 
Renmei, Moritani attempted to link naisenittairon to the East Asian Cooperative 
Community. His writing started with the observation that each ethnic group’s 
nationalism must be recognized, but he also argued that not every form of nationalism 
                                                 
91 In Jeong Sik, “Minjok munjeui bangbeopron,” Samcholl’i 11, no.4 (Apr 1939), p. 63. 
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would always result in its true completion.92 Ironic as it may sound, he criticized 
Chinese nationalism for being associated with “imperialism” and asserted that it was 
only Japan that achieved nationalism in a true form.93  
     Moritani’s perception of the East Asian Cooperative Community first suggests 
that he, like other imperial intellectuals, took it for granted that Japan must lead other 
ethnic groups in Asia. However, he was also aware that the socio-economic gap 
between metropole and colony would eventually hinder the incorporation of colonial 
subjects into the East Asian community. Therefore, he believed that naiseittairon, a 
Koreanized version of the East Asian Cooperative Community, must be associated with 
the “epoch-making development of the status of underdeveloped Chosun.”94 This also 
indicates that economic development would take a central position in Moritani’s 
discussion of colonial Korea. In contrast to Hirano, who sought the logic of community 
through the primitive village community detached from capitalistic development, 
Moritani did not return to the past, nor did he romanticize the Asian village community. 
At the center of his theorization of the East Asian Cooperative Community was the 
question of how and to what degree colonial Korea had to be developed and how 
Moritani himself rationalized the logic of Asiatic society, which he had been trying to 
formulate in the mid 1930s. 
 
Agricultural Problems and the Ethos of Productivism  
It is important to note that the great drought of 1939 became a turning point in Japan’s 
wartime agricultural policy. Although colonial Korea had been a major site for rice 
exploitation in the 1930s, the dramatic shortage of rice in 1939 ironically led Japanese 
intellectuals and bureaucrats to rethink the importance of Korean agriculture. Not 
                                                 
92 Moritani Katsumi, “Tōa kyōdōtai no rinen to naisenittai,” Ryokki 4, no. 8 (1939), pp.18-19. 
93 Ibid., p.20. 
94 Ibid., p.21 
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surprisingly, their discussion was focused on increasing production power in Korean 
agriculture, while normalizing the devastated Japanese agricultural sector. As a result, 
various discourses on “reconstructing agriculture (`üªs)” proliferated in both 
Korea and Japan between 1939 and the early 1940s. The main issue in these discourses 
was the question of where the main problems of Korean agriculture should be located.  
     In a 1941 roundtable discussion hosted by Ryokki Renmei, Moritani pointed to 
irrigation and the landlord-peasant relationship as the two main problems in Korean 
agriculture.95 These issues had been already discussed in full in Moritani’s prewar 
writings on Asian agriculture. In order to manage hydraulic issues, the state also 
emerged as a great landlord and most peasants were tenant farmers. This unique 
landlord-peasant relationship did not change in 20th century Korea. Most peasants were 
still tenant farmers cultivating extremely small plots of land. Moritani described this 
characteristic of the Asiatic mode of production as intensive agriculture; that is, 
cultivation greatly depended upon laborers who possess small plots of land96  
     Once peasant revolution was no longer the prescription for the feudal system, 
how did imperial intellectuals like Moritani attempt to solve this issue and envision a 
new type of community in colonial Korea? Here, it is vitally important to note that 
Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats had a strong tendency to reduce the political 
nature of the tenant-landlord relationship to the issue of an excessive supply of labor. In 
other words, intensive agriculture in colonial Korea, they argued, resulted in 
overpopulation in rural areas and inefficacy in production. They observed, therefore, 
that Korean agriculture would not meet the demand for rice in Japan proper, if these 
problems persisted. Moreover, as Japan waged a total war against the United States, 
underpopulation emerged as a major issue in securing human resources on the 
                                                 
95 A roundtable discussion, “Hanto no nōsonmondai wo kataru,” Ryokki 6, no. 2 (Feb 1941), p.149. 
96 Ibid. See also Iwata Ryou, “Chōsen nōgyō saihenseini oite no kakusho,” Chōsen gyōsei 21, no. 8 
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battlefield as well as for war industry.  
     For this reason, discourses on restructuring agriculture in colonial Korea 
increasingly turned from the direction of creating land-owning independent farmers, 
although even many Japanese intellectuals were acutely aware of its importance. Given 
that reshaping the landlord-peasant relationship was closely intertwined with the mode 
of production itself, many of these landlords were Japanese residents and pro-Japanese 
Koreans. Depriving them of their socio-economic privileges might result in destroying 
the backbone of the colonial structure. Instead, the term “productivity” or “production 
power” within the existing agricultural structure took the central position in their 
discussion. In this way, ironic as it may sound, these imperial intellectuals were 
envisioning a community filled with a highly capitalistic productivist spirit, but a 
community in equilibrium, that is, with neither class struggle nor independent subjects 
such as private landowners. However, instilling productivism into the mindset of 
Korean peasants was another challenge. To this end, they strove to refute the 
conservative perception of Korea; that is, underdevelopment in Korean agriculture, like 
that in China, was in large part due to geographical determinism. 
Moritani attempted to overcome this determinist perspective by reconfirming that 
Asian countries, including Japan, all contain so-called Asiatic characteristics in 
agriculture, in spite of several differences. This statement was logically connected to 
holding up Japan’s agriculture as a successful example of development in productivity 
accomplished by the mechanization of agriculture.97 To be sure, what Moritani 
intended to address here was not the capitalistic mode of production in a pure sense. He 
was clearly aware that the capitalistic mode of production would give rise to all sorts of 
social conflicts that would eventually make it impossible to create an East Asian 
                                                 
97 Moritani Katsumi, “Nihon nōgyō no saihensei to tōa nōgyō no saiken,” Shakai seisaku jihō (1939), in 
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community. Moritani did not turn to abstract spiritualism such as the Imperial Way 
either, though he was not completely free from the rhetoric of the so-called hakkō ichiū 
(ÚÛ¥Ü, eight corners of the world under one roof), nor did he try to revitalize the 
so-called primitive form of community, as best illuminated in Hirano Yoshitarō’s 
imperial discourse. Instead, Moritani asserted that in order to develop productivity in 
Korean agriculture, what he called “organized intervention” must be emphasized.98  
     Needless to say, the final purpose of reorganizing agriculture in colonial Korea 
was to maximize productivity in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. Moritani 
believed that if mechanization and efficiency reached a certain degree, it would push 
superfluous rural laborers to the city, where they could fill jobs in the war industries. In 
this way, he drew upon the picture of an East Asian economic co-prosperity sphere, and 
accordingly defined the relationship between metropole and colony: 
 
The intensification of gaichi (t , colonial Korea) as a military base or a 
stronghold in Japan’s conducting of radical policies in East Asia must be 
accomplished by facilitating industrialization, once agriculture has been 
improved to a certain degree…. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Crisis, 
industrial policy in Chosun has changed from rice-cultivation-oriented 
agriculture to the uniform advancement of agriculture and industry (`u
vw).99  

How, then, did “organized intervention” produce such an advancement of agriculture 
and industry? On the surface, Moritani’s discussion of economic policy bore a 
resemblance to the notion of the controlled economy promulgated by Japanese 
economists and bureaucrats in the name of the Japan-Manchuria-China economic bloc. 
In an attempt to overcome the capitalist system and control individuals’ profit-oriented 
desires, these intellectuals insisted that major industries should be nationalized. 
                                                 
98 Ibid., p.140. 
99 Moritani, “Chōsen ni okeru shokuryōseisaku to kōshin no kihon mondai,” in Tōyōteki seikatuken, 
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However, these highly organized forces turned to spiritualism in incorporating 
individuals into the state. Putting forth the Imperial Way, these intellectuals intended to 
create homogeneous subjects who functioned organically under the leadership of the 
state.100 
     Central to Moritani’s concern was the question of whether a controlled economy 
based on the nationalization of industry would result in the degree of productivity 
necessary for the Korean economy. Given that full-fledged industrialization had not 
even started in colonial Korea, the notion of nationalizing major industries could not be 
applied there. Precisely for this reason, Moritani was attentive to other theoretical 
streams relating to economic development, although he himself accepted the idea of the 
bloc-economy and self-sufficient economic sphere to a certain degree. Notably, 
beginning in the late 1930s, a group of social scientists in Japan were attempting to link 
the idea of restructuring the economy to spatial thinking. The state not only controlled 
the economy but also focused on reorganizing the spatial configuration of the economy 
between agriculture and industry, and between light industry and heavy industry, 
thereby maximizing marginal utility and the efficiency of labor. This geopolitical 
thinking was in fact concretized as a government policy in the name of national land 
planning (Ù÷ø) in Japan in September 1940. Two months later, the Governor 
General’s Office in colonial Korea established the Committee for National Land 
Planning in Chosun, in which most high-ranking bureaucrats in the Governor General’s 
Office participated. 
     Moritani showed keen interest in this new spatial thinking and was appointed to 
the Committee for National Land Planning in colonial Korea. Not surprisingly, 
geopolitics rapidly gained momentum among Japanese intellectuals. Among various 
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spatial discourses, what Moritani problematized was the theory of industrial location, 
formulated by the German economist Alfred Weber, younger brother of sociologist Max 
Weber. According to Weber, an industry had to be located where the transaction cost of 
raw materials, labor and transportation was minimized. Moritani found this theory 
suitable for the case of colonial Korea, where the Governor General’s Office was 
supposed to construct basic infrastructure for industrialization such as roads, factories 
and ports.101 Expanding this idea to East Asia, he intended to draw upon the picture of 
an self-sufficient East Asian economic sphere (ýlmx). This economic 
sphere, he believed, would then need to be extended to a Lebensraum (living space, 
Gx) in East Asia, given that there are historical and cultural affinities among Asian 
people.102  
     Moritani’s understanding of Weber’s theory suggests that he intended to link the 
theory of industrial location to a government-centered economic plan, although the 
theory itself was created from a highly capitalistic perspective. Therefore, national land 
planning in colonial Korea was also based on an anti-capitalistic approach to 
development and this anti-capitalistic approach to national land planning was also 
shared by colonial intellectuals. In Jeong Sik, a former Koza-ha Marxist who, together 
with Moritani, was appointed to the Committee for National Land Planning in Chosun, 
reconfirmed this:  
 
National land planning itself seems natural and rational but it is something 
that cannot be imagined in economic relations in which liberal or private 
interests are prioritized. Under the laissez faire system, private interests are 
prioritized in utilizing national land.103 
 
                                                 
101 Moritani Katsumi, “Kōgyo richi gairon” in Chōsen shōko kaigisho, Senjisangyōkeieikōwa 
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102 Moritani Katsumi, “Tōa kyōei keizairon,” Chūōkōron 56, no.10 (Oct 1941), p.29. 
103 In Jeong Sik, “Chosun nongop kwa sikryang kwa kuk’tokyehoek,” Samcholl’i 13, no.6 (June 1941), 
p.113. 
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Based on this observation, In went to argue that the use of land in colonial Korea was 
disorganized; that is, land suitable for industry was used for agriculture, or vice versa.104 
In this respect, both Moritani and In recognized national land planning as a way of 
maximizing productivity and at the same time overcoming the anti-communitarian 
capitalist economy. I argue that the notion of land planning provided a middle ground 
for the two former Marxist social scientists who could not solve the conundrum that the 
absence of private ownership and a market economy in the Asiatic agricultural 
community would result in underdevelopment. When the state took the initiative in 
creating a community-centered economic sphere, they believed, efficiency could be 
maximized. 
 
Empire and Colony: Identity Politics 
However, this highly rationalized discussion of economic development in colonial 
Korea was not fully endorsed by Korean intellectuals. For Moritani, the completion of 
naisenittairon in colonial Korea would be achieved when colonial Korea became an 
important organ in the East Asian Cooperative Community. Needless to say, the only 
way for colonial Korea to prove its crucial position was to provide rice and munitions 
for imperial Japan. Moritani’s wartime discourses on colonial Korea, therefore, were 
centered on taking institutional measures to expand productive capacities. However, 
missing in Moritani’s discussion of naisenittairon was any consideration of identity 
politics; that is, how peasants and workers in colonial Korea could become subjective 
members of the East Asian community. In contrast to other imperial intellectuals who 
were casting a highly colonial gaze on Korea as merely a site for human and material 
exploitation, Moritani was at least aware that this approach was one-dimensional. Thus 
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Moritani contended that social policies had to be implemented in Chosun as well.105  
     However, from the start such a social engineering-oriented approach to the 
colony was not concerned with transforming the already-impoverished peasant masses 
into independent subjects. As Ōkochi Kazuo’s ¼¥y (1905-1984) discussion of 
social policy in wartime Japan well suggests, its main objective was to preclude labor 
from being marginalized in wartime production. Ōkochi argued, therefore, that social 
policy should be redefined as a policy to maximize production and labor resources, not 
as a policy of distributing to the economically marginalized.106 Reiterating Ōkochi’s 
theory, Moritani, who had been teaching social policy in colonial Korea, asserted that 
the locus of social policy lay in the project of “incorporating the lower class into the 
state organization by education and enlightenment.”107 
In this respect, Moritani viewed as necessary steps for the naisenittai project the 
3rd Educational Act and the new conscription law allowing Koreans to voluntarily join 
the Imperial Army, both enacted in colonial Korea in April 1938.108 The 1938 
Education Law stipulated the Japanese language as the “national language” and focused 
on extending technical training for potential workers in the war industry. Of course, it 
was also closely associated with the practical need to indoctrinate Koreans who would 
fight for the Japanese empire. As Leo Ching has argued, this so-called kōminka (
) project required colonial subjects to objectify “Japanization” and to “act, live and 
die for the emperor in defending the Japanese empire.”109  
     However, such a direct projection of Koreans into subjects of imperial Japan 
created ruptures between Japanese and pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals. Pointing out 
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that the kōminka project was primarily focused on abolishing Koreanness, In Jeong Sik 
cast a skeptical eye on these institutional measures. Two years after the implementation 
of the 3rd Educational Act, In described the status of Korean peasants as follows: 
 
Why hasn’t the mandatory education system been put into practice to date 
and why do millions of Korean people remain illiterate and uncivilized? The 
locus of this problem lies in the living standard of peasants. A survey of 
peasant families tells us that they have little room for education and culture. 
This is because they are thoroughly impoverished. As fieldwork surveys 
suggest, the cause of such impoverishment lies in social conditions such as 
landlord-tenant relations rather than natural conditions.110 
 
In drew attention to the importance of politics for restructuring social conditions, 
criticizing Japanese intellectuals’ one-dimensional gaze at colonial Korea as a site for 
economic exploitation. Therefore, In appropriated the notion of naisenittai as a political 
weapon to call for transforming Korean peasants, who had been oppressed by 
feudalism, into modern national subjects. For him, the politics of Japan and Korea as 
one body was portrayed from the beginning as creating heterogeneous subjects. 
Becoming Japanese did not necessarily mean discarding Korean language and culture. 
Instead, Koreanness was presented as an effective cultural and spiritual condition to 
produce modern subjectivity, together with the modernization of colonial Korea.   
 
Conclusion   
For Japanese Marxist social scientists, the notion of the Asiatic mode production came 
as the biggest intellectual challenge in the early 1930s. In an effort to locate Japanese 
history in the universal developmental process of historical materialism, they either 
attempted to redefine the Asiatic mode of production itself or, in most cases, focused on 
confining it to the history of other Asian societies, China and Korea in particular. In this 
process, Asian village communities were portrayed as the cause of stagnation and 
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underdevelopment. Therefore, Japanese Marxist social scientists became increasingly 
detached from any political zeal for finding political potential in this Asiatic social 
formation.  
    However, such an antagonistic attitude toward the Asiatic formation of community 
in Marxist scholarship on Asia faced another challenge as Japan waged a war against 
China and announced a new East Asian order. At the heart of this was the logic of the 
East Asian Cooperative Community, and many Japanese social scientists began casting 
a new eye toward the community-oriented Asian tradition and culture. Hirano Yoshitarō 
also invoked the notion of national politics to rationalize a multi-ethnic empire and 
became deeply engaged in the production of imperial knowledge on China during the 
wartime period. Criticizing both civil society and nationalism based on the capitalistic 
mode of production, he revisited the Chinese village community as a self-sufficient 
socio-political organization superior to the profit-oriented Western orientation toward 
individualism. By linking it to the logic of the family state in which the Emperor rests 
atop, he intended to create a theory of national politics that would embrace Asian 
people. However, his ethnic politics and Greater Asianism did not contain any 
speculations on how Chinese and other Asian people would become subjects in a new 
Asia. Ironically, Hirano argued that the Meiji Restoration proved that Japan was the 
only country to reach the universal standard of economic development. Based on these 
observations, he rationalized that Japan’s invasion of China was a necessary step to 
modernize this underdeveloped society. In his national politics he portrayed Southeast 
Asia as simply the site for economic exploitation. In this respect, Hirano never revised 
his view of the Chinese village community as stagnant and lacking developmental 
forces and simply appropriated its communitarian nature in his Greater Asianism, 
which was based on the philosophy of the family state. 
      In contrast to Hirano, Moritani developed a different vision of the East Asian 
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community, in large part due to his position in colonial Korea as a professor of social 
policy at Kyungsung Imperial University. Like Hirano, Moritani was also heavily 
influenced by Karl Wittfogel’s interpretation of Chinese society, but he rejected the idea 
of attributing underdevelopment and stagnation in Asia to geographical determinism. 
After the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Moritani aimed to concretize both the East 
Asian Cooperative Community and naisenittairon by advocating the notion of the 
uniform development of agriculture and industry in colonial Korea. To be sure, his 
notion of Korea and Japan as one body took on a developmentalist form. He was 
convinced that naisenittai as a Koreanized version of the East Asian Cooperative 
Community would be realized as colonial Korea became an indispensable organ in the 
Japanese empire.   
    To this end, Moritani grappled with the question of maximizing productivity and 
labor efficiency. In an effort to overcome the limits of the capitalist economy as well as 
lack of efficiency in the Asian village community, he encountered geopolitical thinking 
in the form of national land planning. Rather than drawing upon the state as an agency 
of monopolizing land and oppressing peasants, Moritani envisioned the imperial state 
as a highly rationalized organ to serve the maximization of productivity. However, as 
even pro-Japanese intellectuals such as In-Jeong Sik argued, such a rosy picture of 
colonial Korea would not be possible without fundamentally transforming the mode of 
production itself, that is, the feudal landlord-peasant relationship that subjugated 
Korean peasants. In this sense, Moritani saw the developmental side of modernization, 
completely ignoring the emergence of modern subjects in the process. Therefore, he 
could not respond to pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals’ identity politics, which held 
that Koreans must become modern subjects in order to become members of imperial 
Japan. In Jeong Sik was clearly aware of this logic and put forth the modernization of 
the Korean economy as a prerequisite for naisenittairon
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Conclusion 
 
I have discussed Japanese social scientists’ wartime discourses on empire building. 
Throughout this dissertation, I showed that their commitment to the Japanese empire 
was not forced on them by the government, and thus was not a one-time “deviation,” 
but was instead a highly subjective involvement. For this reason, this study has also 
focused on exploring the thought and behavior of prewar Japanese social sciences that 
foreshadowed imperial social sciences during the wartime period. In that respect, the 
“crisis” in the social sciences in the early 1930s fundamentally changed the topography 
of Japanese social sciences. Until the late 1920s, Japanese intellectuals, social scientists 
in particular, had rationalized imperialism and colonization in the name of civilizing 
mission and modernization. At the same time, they strove to develop a “democratic” 
space based on the observation that the state had dominated society and individuals. 
While their zeal for reforming the domestic socio-political structure bore fruit in the 
1920s to some extent in their “discovery” of society, this did not mean that they 
fundamentally questioned the paradoxical coexistence of democracy at home and 
imperialism abroad. 
After Japan invaded Manchuria and China, Japan had to respond to the Chinese 
anti-imperialist nationalism, while confronting Western powers that were hostile to 
Japan’s imperialist moves. Under these circumstances, Japanese intellectuals presented 
a series of imperial discourses. Irrespective of differences in theory and practice, both 
right-wing and so-called “reformist” social scientists were clearly aware that the 
existing social scientific logic would no longer sustain the stability of the Japanese 
empire. Most of the right-wing intellectuals’ discourses eventually focused on 
transforming the Imperial Way into an imperial regional theory and appropriated the 
binary logic of Western imperialism and Asianism, in which Japan was defined as an 
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agency that would protect Asian people.  
However, the social scientists I have discussed were acutely aware that repeating 
such a one-dimensional perception of the West and the East would not convince the 
Chinese and the colonized Asian people of the necessity of constructing an East Asian 
empire. Nor did they think that reproducing the rhetoric of civilizing mission would 
rationalize their commitment to the empire. While facing the challenge of overcoming 
the limits inherent in the liberal social scientific tradition during the Taisho period and 
looking at the rapid emergence of reactionary political discourses, these social scientists 
were placed in one position of having to contrive a new logic of social science.  
In order to encounter Asia as a social scientific object, they first had to explain 
intrinsic, irrational and non-objective concepts such as blood, religion, customs and 
community, which had not been the object of social scientific study. In doing so, these 
social scientists voluntarily dismantled the fortress of scientific objectivity and 
rationality, which had been deep-rooted in social scientific thinking. This new project of 
imperial social science had to confront the binary formation of the West as universal 
and the East as particular as well. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, these 
imperial social scientists did not intend to create an East Asian empire and claim that 
the East was superior to the West and thus, it was the East that was universal. Rather 
than appropriate the schematic configuration of the East and the West, they strove to 
find the logic of a universal community from these seemingly unscientific and intrinsic 
elements of human society. They aimed to expand the exteriority of rationality and 
create what might be called a “subjective (#(=)” social science. In this way, 
individuals’ subjective and ubiquitous modes of life became part of social scientific 
study. These imperial social scientists believed that they could create a theory, which 
posited that the amalgam of individuals’ subjective and at times unpredictable behavior 
could become the basis for subject formation. They believed that through this theory, 
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Asian subjects in a new East Asian Community could share the sense of the community 
of destiny.  
While producing imperial social scientific knowledge, these Japanese 
intellectuals faced two major challenges. One was to dismantle the empire-colony 
power structure. Second, and more importantly, they had to provide an alternative logic 
of subjectivity formation beyond capitalism. They were convinced that the question of 
ethnic and racial hierarchy between metropole and colony would not be fundamentally 
solved by simply adopting political measures such as giving the colonized a national 
identity. Individuals’ becoming members of a regional community entailed much more 
profound discussions of subjectivity formation than the binary configuration of empire 
and colony. For this reason, these imperial social scientists realized that a new form of 
subjectivity could not be created simply by suppressing individuals’ profit-oriented 
activities and eradicating all social conflicts and economic inequality by the state. To 
sustain the empire, or the destiny of community, to put it in a more symbolic way, an 
individual had to embody a productivist ethos, but the very logic of productivism was 
inseparable from the principle of the capitalist economy. 
    Depending on their academic disciplines and political positions, these imperial 
social scientists responded to this question quite differently. It seemed that they were all 
discussing the same theory, that is, the East Asian Cooperative Community, but the way 
each intellectual interpreted and rationalized it clearly the revealed theoretical limits 
inherent in his scientific thinking process. For example, Hirano Yoshitarō, a converted 
Koza-ha Marxist, never overcame the specter of the so-called Asian village community, 
which had been labeled the locus of stagnation and underdevelopment in Asian society. 
He tried to break through this reality by returning to history. By constantly reproducing 
images of harmony and social equilibrium from premodern Asian communities, Hirano 
linked these images to the Imperial Way and envisioned a family state. On the other 
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hand, Moritani Katsumi grappled with the question of how productivity could be 
maximized in Asian village communities, which lacked political and economic 
dynamics. It was at this point that he encountered geopolitics and the logic of the state-
controlled planned economy.  
     However, none of these social scientists ever presented a sophisticated answer to 
the question of why Japan should lead the rest of Asia in the empire-building project. 
Ironically, they returned to the logic of capitalism and modernization; that is, most of 
these imperial social scientists claimed that Japan’s successful entrance into modern 
society demonstrated Japan’s leading role in Asia. Moreover, these social scientists at 
the metropole paid little attention to colonial reality. Apart from their naïve perception 
that Taiwan and Korea had already become part of imperial Japan, their rosy theory of 
an East Asian Community seemed far removed from what was happening in the colony 
in practice. In that respect, one might criticize their wartime discourses for “empty” 
rhetoric.  
     Nonetheless, I argue that it is important to carefully analyze why their writings 
captured attention from colonial intellectuals and had an impact on the formation of 
postcolonial Asia. Colonial intellectuals’ discourses resonated with these Japanese 
social scientists’ voices, although Japanese intellectuals never discussed colonial 
problems in detail. In this sense, the absence of particularism – the fact that they did not 
extend a “particularized” gaze to the colony and maintained a universalist standpoint -- 
created an ironic political space. Colonial intellectuals developed their own version of 
an East Asian Community in which hierarchies between metropole and colony and 
between underdevelopment and modernization could be overcome at the same time.  
     As many have pointed out, postwar Japanese social scientists in the 1950s and 
1960s removed these wartime social scientists from the orthodox history of Japanese 
social sciences. To be sure, their intentionality first stemmed from a strong belief that 
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scientific objectivity and rationality must not be associated with bad science such as 
that which justified colonialism and imperialism. Throughout this dissertation, I have 
highlighted the fact that the origins of Japanese social science are untraceable without 
looking at its colonial engagement. The “newness” of wartime Japanese social sciences, 
however, was the perception that “rationalizing” the empire could be done only by 
dismantling the notion of Japan as universal and the rest of Asia as particular. Therefore, 
the social scientists I have dealt with in this study invariably advocated the notion of a 
universal empire rather than particularize Asia or the Orient. In that respect, these 
imperial social scientists never dismissed the epistemology that viewed social scientific 
knowledge as creating a universal world. However, the very logic of universalism and 
cosmopolitanism produced a most violent theory which rationalized total war and 
mobilization. 
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